Chattisgarh High Court
Tapan Kumar Rai vs Ashok Kumar Rai on 31 March, 2008
Author: Dilip Raosaheb Deshmukh
Bench: Dilip Raosaheb Deshmukh
HIGH COURT OF CHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Civil Revision No.700 of 1997
Tapan Kumar Rai
...Petitioners
versus
Ashok Kumar Rai
...Respondents
! Smt. Renu Kochar,Shri Sunil Sahu
Shri H.B.Agrawal with Shri Pankaj Agrawal,
^ Shri G.D.Vaswani, Shri Ratan Pushty
Hon'ble Shri Dilip Raosaheb Deshmukh, J.
Dated:31/03/2008
: Judgment
ORDER
(Passed on this 31st day of March, 2008) Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 28.02.1997 passed in Civil Suit No. 90A/1995 by the 12th Civil Judge, Class-2, Raipur granting relief of possession of the suit shop to the non-
applicant/plaintiff herein in a suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act, 1963'), the applicant/defendant has preferred this Civil Revision as no appeal lies under Section 6 (3) of the Act, 1963.
2. Brief facts are that the non-applicant/plaintiff filed a Civil Suit before the 12th Civil Judge Class- II, Raipur, on 20.08.1992 under Section 6 of the Act, 1963 against the applicant/defendant for recovering possession of the suit shop situated at Kalibadi Chowk, Raipur and shown by red ink in the plaint map, on the ground of forcible and unlawful dispossession by the applicant/defendant on 10.03.1992. For purposes of pecuniary jurisdiction, the suit was valued at Rs.10,100/-.
3. The applicant/defendant resisted the suit on the ground that his wife Smt. Mamta Rai was the owner of the suit shop and the allegation of forcible dispossession of the non-applicant/plaintiff on 10.03.1992 was false. An objection to the valuation of the suit was also taken to the effect that the non- applicant/plaintiff ought to have valued the suit at the market value of the suit shop which ranged from Rs.75,000/- to Rs.1,00,000/-, in which case the suit would have been beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court.
4. Parties adduced oral as well as documentary evidence. The trial Court, on appreciation of evidence, held the factum of forcible dispossession of the non-applicant/plaintiff by the applicant/defendant proved. It also held that since the applicant/defendant had not led any evidence whatsoever relating to the market value of the suit shop, the valuation put by the non-applicant/plaintiff for pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court was proper and since the Court of Civil Judge Class-2, had jurisdiction to hear suits upto the value of Rs.25,000/- , it had pecuniary jurisdiction.
5. Smt. Renu Kochar, learned counsel for the applicant/defendant argued that under Section 6 of the M.P.Civil Courts Act, 1958 (henceforth `the Act, 1958'), on the date of institution of suit i.e. 20.08.1992, the Court of Civil Judge Class-II had jurisdiction to hear and determine any suit or original proceeding of a value not exceeding Rs.10,000/-. The suit was valued at Rs.10,100/- by the non- applicant/plaintiff for pecuniary jurisdiction. This was amended by M.P.Act 5 of 1994 w.e.f. 16.3.1994 whereby the jurisdiction of the Civil Judge Class-II to hear and determine any suit or original proceeding was enhanced to Rs.25,000/-. It was urged that the amendment not being retrospective, the Court of Civil Judge Class-II had no pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the suit on the date of presentation of the plaint i.e. 20.08.1992. It was also urged that the entire proceedings conducted by the Civil Judge Class- II being without jurisdiction, was a nullity. It was further urged that the learned Civil Judge Class-II erred in relying upon the testimony of a highly interested witness B.K.Dutta P.W.2 while decreeing the suit in favour of the non-applicant/plaintiff.
6. On the other hand, Shri Sunil Sahu, learned counsel for the non-applicant/plaintiff urged that on the date of filing of written statement i.e. 31.01.1995 by virtue of amendment incorporated on 16.03.1964 the Court of Civil Judge Class-II had the pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the suit upto the value of Rs.25,000/-. The impugned judgment and decree, therefore, ought not to be set aside on the ground that the trial Court had no pecuniary jurisdiction because valuation of the suit had not prejudicially affected the disposal of the suit on merits. On merits, learned counsel argued in support of the impugned judgment.
7. Shri H.B.Agrawal, learned Senior Advocate, Shri Ratan Pushty, learned counsel and Shri G.D.Vaswani, learned Government Advocate assisted the Court as Amicus Curiae. Shri Ratan Pushty, learned counsel drew attention of this Court to Hasham Abbas Sayyad v. Usman Abbas Sayyad & Ors., AIR 2007 SC 1077 for the proposition that if objection to the pecuniary jurisdiction was not taken at the earliest possible opportunity, it could not be allowed to be taken at the stage of revision. It was further urged that jurisdiction as to subject matter is totally distinct and stands on a different footing than territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court. In the present case, since by amendment incorporated w.e.f. 16.03.1994 i.e. before the written statement was filed on 31.01.1995, the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court was enhanced from Rs.10,000/- to Rs.25,000/- by the amending Act 5 of 1994, the impugned judgment and decree ought not to be unsettled merely on the ground that on the date of institution of the suit the Court had no pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit valued at Rs.10,100/-. The case of Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v. D.L.F., Universal Ltd. and another, AIR 2005 SC 4446 was also referred to buttress the arguments. Shri H.B.Agrawal, learned Senior Advocate submitted that even if on the date of inception of the suit i.e. 20.08.1992 the Court of Civil Judge had no pecuniary jurisdiction to try suits of value which exceeded Rs.10,000/-, before filing of the written statement by the applicant/defendant on 31.01.1995, the amendment to Section 6 of the M.P.Civil Courts Act had taken place and the Court had acquired pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit, therefore, the suit could not be transferred to any other Court but had to be determined by the same Court.
8. Shri G.D.Vaswani, learned Government Advocate drew the attention of this Court to Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887 and submitted that a specific objection as to pecuniary jurisdiction not having been taken before the trial Court and the disposal of the suit by the Civil Judge Class-II on merits not having been prejudicially affected on account of valuation of the suit the Revisional Court ought not to entertain an objection relating to pecuniary jurisdiction of the trial Court to entertain the suit.
9. Having considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and the submissions made by the Amicus Curiae, I am of the considered opinion that this revision has no merit. In Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v. D.L.F., Universal Ltd. and another (supra), the Apex Court while classifying the jurisdiction of the Court into several categories has observed as under:
"We are unable to uphold the contention. The jurisdiction of a court may be classified into several categories. The important categories are
(i) Territorial or local jurisdiction;
(ii) Pecuniary jurisdiction; and (iii) Jurisdiction over the subject matter. So far as territorial and pecuniary jurisdictions are concerned, objection to such jurisdiction has to be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and in any case at or before settlement of issues.
The law is well settled on the point that if such objection is not taken at the earliest, it cannot be allowed to be taken at a subsequent stage.
Jurisdiction as to subject matter, however, is totally distinct and stands on a different footing. Where a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit by reason of any limitation imposed by statute, charter or commission, it cannot take up the cause or matter. An order passed by a court having no jurisdiction is nullity."
10. It, therefore, needs to be examined whether the applicant/defendant had raised the objection as to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court before the trial Judge. Under Section 6 of the M.P.Civil Courts Act, on the date of institution of the suit i.e. 20.08.1992, the Court of Civil Judge Class-II had jurisdiction to determine any suit or original proceeding of value not exceeding Rs.10,000/-. For purpose of pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court, the suit was valued at Rs.10,100/-. A perusal of paragraph 5 (a) and (b) of the written statement shows that the applicant/defendant did not raise any objection before the trial Judge that it had no jurisdiction to try the suit of value exceeding Rs.10,000/-. The objection raised by the applicant/defendant was to the effect that if the market value of the suit shop was taken into consideration, the Court had no pecuniary jurisdiction. This objection was rightly turned down by the learned trial Judge on the ground that no material was placed before the Court to show that the valuation put by the non-applicant/plaintiff on the basis of market value of the suit shop was not proper.
In this manner, it transpires that the applicant/defendant did not raise specific objection before the trial judge that the suit at its very inception was not within the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court since the Court had jurisdiction only to hear suits of the value not exceeding Rs.10,000/- on the date of the presentation of the plaint.
11. Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887 ordains that an objection as to valuation of the suit shall not be entertained by an Appellate Court unless the objection was taken in the Court of first instance at or before the hearing at which issues are first framed and recorded or the Appellate Court is satisfied that over valuation or under valuation of the suit has prejudicially affected the disposal of the suit or appeal on its merits. Sub-clause (4) of Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887 makes the provision applicable while exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure also. In this view of the matter, I am of the considered opinion that a specific objection as to pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court not having been taken by the applicant/defendant before the learned Civil Judge Class-II, cannot be entertained at this stage. It is also to be noticed that by the amending Act 5 of 1994 which was incorporated in Section 6 of the M.P.Civil Courts Act, 1958 w.e.f. 16.03.1994, the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court of Civil Judge Class-II was enhanced from Rs.10,000/- to Rs.25,000/-. The written statement was filed by the applicant/defendant on 31.01.1995. In this manner, learned Civil Judge Class- II had, before the filing of written statement, the pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit which was valued for the said purpose at Rs.10,100/-. Thus, the valuation of the suit has in no manner prejudicially affected the disposal of the suit on merits. Therefore, on both counts the objection raised by the learned counsel for the applicant/defendant is liable to and is accordingly rejected.
12. As regards the merit is concerned, on a perusal of the record, it is clear that the learned Civil Judge Class-II has on proper appreciation of evidence held that the non-applicant/plaintiff was forcibly dispossessed from the suit shop on 10.03.1992. This finding is based on the testimony of B.K.Dutta P.W.2 as also the admissions made by the applicant/defendant D.W.1 and Smt. Mamta Rai D.W.2. The applicant/defendant had admitted in paragraph 4 that all the formalities for obtaining the loan in the name of A.K.Cycle Stores had been completed by the non- applicant/plaintiff who used to sit in A.K.Cycle Stores. Smt. Mamta Rai also admitted in paragraph 5 that non-applicant/plaintiff used to look after the suit shop i.e. A.K.Cycle Stores and was responsible for all the dealings of the shop. In view of the admissions by the applicant/defendant and his mother Smt. Mamta Rai, the testimony of B.K.Dutta P.W.2 that he saw the applicant/defendant forcibly ousting the non- applicant/plaintiff from the suit shop could not be discarded merely on the ground that he was an interested witness. Thus, no perversity, illegality or manifest error of law is seen in the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned Civil Judge Class-II.
13. In the result, the revision is dismissed.
14. Before parting with this order, the valuable assistance rendered by Shri H.B.Agrawal, learned Senior Advocate, Shri G.D.Vaswani, learned Government Advocate and Shri Ratan Pushty, learned counsel is acknowledged.
Judge 31.03.2008