Central Administrative Tribunal - Jaipur
R.P. Nag vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 25 May, 2004
Equivalent citations: 2005(1)SLJ317(CAT)
ORDER J.K. Kaushik, Member (J)
1. This is perhaps the bulkiest case in this Bench of the Tribunal as well as one of the oldest cases pending adjudication, The applicant Shri R.P. Nag, has filed this O.A., assailing the penalty order dated 01.08.97 (A/2), appellate order dated 24.08.98 (A/1), U.P.S.C. letter dated 09.07.97 (A/3), DOPT's orders dated 13.01.98 (A/87) (Sic A/77) i.e. show cause notice for regularisation of suspension period and order dated 09.06.98 (A/88) (Sic A/78) i.e. order of regularisation of suspension period and has inter alia sought for their quashment with a further direction to the respondents to give him all consequential benefits of promotion to the higher post and grade which were withheld due to the disciplinary case etc.
2. Filtering out the superfluities, the material facts relevant for resolving the controversy involved in this case as depicted from the pleadings are that the applicant was posted on the post of Superintendent of Police, Alwar, where he joined on 30.09.93 and continued to work up to 28.01.94. He was sent to Alwar due to the emergent law and order problem arisen there due to the breaking of Dr. Ambedkar's, statue. He was posted there keeping in view his best record and being an efficient police officer. He handled the peculiar situation in Alwar very tactfully. The general election was also conducted in the year 1993 during his tenure at Alwar. The further facts are that the applicant in the capacity of Superintendent of Police of a district was competent to transfer officials' in the police department from the rank of constable to the level of Sub-inspector within the district under his jurisdiction. Subsequently, he was authorised to transfer officials up to the rank of Inspector within his jurisdiction as per the communication dated 17.07.95. After the general election was over, the applicant found that certain police officers requiring replacement at different places from their present place of postings and such placement was necessary due to the request of the officials themselves in certain cases and due to administrative exigencies in other eases.
3. As per the instructions issued by the Government of Rajasthan on 03.09.93, restriction was imposed on transfers of Government employees. The said instructions came to be issued in pursuance with a circular dated 28.06.90. These instructions were issued only after the Assembly Election was declared and during the general election there has been restriction on transfer of Government employees for the obvious reason for conducting free and fair election. General Election was over in December, 1993. As per the transfer policy dated 28.06.90, no employee can be transferred before completion of two years at a particular place of posting. However, employees can be transferred before completion of normal prescribed period to tenure of two years at one station, by the Competent Authority, in cases where there were complaints against the particular Government employee and that too after conducting preliminary inquiry and it was also advisable to recommend for departmental inquiry in such cases. Employees could also be transferred on promotion or to fill up any vacant post. Certain amendments were done to the said transfer policy by the subsequent orders.
4. It is also averred that in some cases, the transfer is not resorted to but in the policy department, officials are sent on attachment to work on different places for the lime being. On such attachments one neither gets transfer allowance nor joining lime and T.A. advance etc. Such attachments are quite frequent due to administrative exigencies in the police department, Pseudonymous complaint through a telegram dated 24.01.94 was received by the then Chief Minister of Rajasthan, who took personal interest in the complaint and directed the Director General of Police for conducting an inquiry. The then D.G.P. forwarded the preliminary inquiry report to the Secretary to the Chief Minister with twin recommendations. (i) the applicant he placed under suspension (ii) be made APO. He was placed under suspension vide memo dated 27.01.94. There was a second preliminary inquiry report in continuance of the earlier report to the D.G.P.
5. The applicant preferred an appeal to the Secretary. Ministry of Home Affair, New Delhi, on 18.02.94, against the order of suspension. But there was no response despite numerous reminders. On the other hand, he was issued with a charge sheet vide memorandum dated 11.03.94, alleging the following articles of charges as per Para 4.17 of the O.A.:
"(a) The allegation No. 1 against the applicant is that while posted as S.P. Alwar, he contravened Government Circular dated 03.09.93 (A/5) and order of DGP dated 21.08.93 by making large scale transfers/attachments.
(b) Allegation No. 2 against the applicant is that while posted as S.P. Alwar. he wrote Demi-Official letter to DIGP, Bharatpur seeking permission for transfer of 14 Sis on administrative grounds and on the basis of complaint, however, without waiting for permission, he transferred/ attached 20 Sis. 2ASIs, 5HCs and 11 constables.
(c) Allegation No. 3 against the applicant is that he ordered transfers (if police officials between 20.01.94 to 25.01.94 but deliberately used the word "attachment" in place of transfer and thus misled the Government.
(d) The 4th allegation against the applicant is that after his transfer from the post of S.P. Alwar, he ordered transfers of Police Officials.
The applicant submitted an application dated 15.03.94 for supplying copies of relevant documents, but the same was not accepted. Thereafter the applicant submitted a provisional reply to the charge sheet vide letters dated 25.03.94, 13.04.94, 02.06.94, 29.07.94, 15.09.94, and 6.10.94. The same was followed by further letters dated 28,04.94, 30.07.94. 09.08.94. 30.08.94 and 01.11.94 to the Secretary, Department of Personnel and Training, containing the factual position. The Disciplinary Authority had decided to hold an oral inquiry and the Commissioner of Departmental Inquiry, Rajasthan was appointed as Inquiry Officer. During the inquiry, the applicant demanded certain documents but the entire record was not supplied to him. The relevant documents mentioned in sub-para 1 to 3 of Para 4.8 were not supplied to the applicant. The prosecution produced 20 witnesses; the applicant produced 30 witnesses during the inquiry. The Inquiry Officer completed inquiry proceedings and held charge No. 1 & 3 as partly proved and charges 2 & 4 as fully proved. The UPSC had also concurred with the findings of the Inquiry Officer and ultimately imposed the penalty of stoppage of annual increments for three years with cumulative effect {sic-stoppage of three increments with cumulative effect) vide order dated 01.08.94. The applicant preferred an appeal to the Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi, which was rejected vide order dated 24.08.94 (Annex. A/2). The impugned orders have been assailed on diverse grounds, which are intermixed with the factual portion of the pleadings as well as under the captain 'Grounds for relief with legal provisions. The same are very much scattered and it is difficult to put them in seriatim. However, we propose to deal with the grounds, which have been stressed during the arguments by the learned Counsel for the applicant in the later part of this order.
6. The respondents have contested the case and separate replies on behalf of respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 4 have been filed. In the reply filed on behalf of respondent No. 2 it has been averred that the applicant issued transfer/attachment orders without obtaining prior permission from his seniors and also after his transfer from the post of S.P. Alwar. The punishment was imposed after conducting inquiry as per Rule 8 of the All India Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, after consultation with UPSC. The complete matter otherwise pertains to Government of Rajasthan. Further it had been averred that instructions were issued by the State Government from time to time, which could not have been ignored on any pretext. Instructions issued in regard to transfer policy are self-explanatory. The applicant had transferred officials under his jurisdiction in the garb of attachment. There were violations of instructions issued by the State Government banning of transfers. The State Government also received an interim report and after its due consideration, the applicant was placed under suspension. There was no delay in finalising the disciplinary proceedings and it has been dealt with expeditiously. After the applicant's transfer from Alwar, administrative propriety demanded that he should not transact any important official business like transfers/attachments etc. It is also stated that the defiance of the Government orders cannot be termed as petty and trivial matter. The application for supply of documents, which is alleged as turned down, was properly considered and as per the provisions of disciplinary rules. The Hon'ble Tribunal would not like tore-appreciate the evidences produced during the course of inquiry with a view to form an opinion.
7. The UPSC considered the entire matter in an objective manner and gave its findings and recommendations in a proper and justifiable manner and no fault can be fastened to the same in any manner. The allegations made against respondents 1 &3 have been denied. The applicant could not be promoted to the rank of D.I.G. due to the pendency of disciplinary proceedings. Regarding the orders by which the applicant has been denied the selection grade and persons junior to him have been promoted to the post of D.I.G., separate O.A. ought to have been filed as per the provisions of Rule 10 of CAT (Procedure) Rules, 1987. Even though a specific reply has been filed on behalf of respondent No. 4, we do not want to deal with the same since the same was got deleted by the learned Counsel for the applicant at time of hearing of the case.
8. An exhaustive rejoinder to the replies has been filed almost reiterating the facts mentioned in the O.A. and the averments made in the replies have been controverted. The main averments related to the factual aspect of the matter that numbers of attachments orders were issued under similar circumstances by the other Police Officers, but no action whatsoever has been taken against them.
9. We have heard the elaborate arguments advanced by Mr. Virendra Lodha learned Counsel for the applicant. Mr. Manish Rastogi, learned Counsel for respondents 1 & 3 and Mr. U.D. Sharma, learned Counsel for respondent No. 2 in piece meal on a number of days and have anxiously considered the pleadings and the records of this case. Mr. Lodha has reiterated the facts and grounds mentioned in the O.A. He has primarily laid stress and emphasis on the following grounds.
(i) The applicant has not committed any misconduct in as much as there was no ban for making transfer but it was only a restriction imposed on the transfers.
(ii) The applicant did not order any transfer and only ordered attachments and attachment is not transfer.
(iii) There was denial of opportunity to the applicant since he was not supplied the relevant document to submit the statement of defence in reply to the charge sheet.
(iv) The action of respondents tantamount to hostile and wilful discrimination.
(v) Suspension of the applicant was not sustainable in the eye of law.
(vi) There was unexplained delay in deciding the appeal and the appeal has been decided without assigning any reason.
10. The learned Counsel for the applicant has made us to travel through the various documents forming part of the paper book. He has canvassed that the applicant did not commit any misconduct whatsoever and has not violated any conduct rules. The very articles of charges did not make any mentioned as to which of the conduct rule has been violated. He drew our attention to order dated 03.09.93, at Annex.A/5 and submitted that the order relates to putting up restriction and not for any ban on the transfers. It has also been provided in Annex. A/6 transfer could be made even one has not completed two years in certain conditions i.e. when there are serious complaints, on promotion, for filling up vacant posts or on abolition of post or reversion of a person. In this way there was no ban in strict sense on the transfer. Thus the applicant has not committed any misconduct. On the next point the learned Counsel for the applicant has tried to persuade us that the applicant only ordered attachment and did not issue any transfer order. Transfer is different from the attachment. He has explained the distinction between the transfer and the attachment. In regard to transfer it has been said that transfer may be of a permanent transfer or it may be temporary and one gets some allowances in both these cases but in the case of attachment one is not paid any such allowances and one is attached to a particular station or unit for certain specified purpose and for a stipulated period. On attachment one is not paid any allowance as are admissible in transfer. The other difference is that in the case of attachment it is only for work purpose he remains under the control of the unit to which he is attached and for all other purposes he is under the control of parent unit. The practice of resorting to such attachment is not common in other establishments but it is usual in the police organisation. When it was enquired from the learned Counsel Mr. Lodha as to whether there was any rule or policy in record with regard to attachments in police department, the answer forthcoming was in negative. He has contended that the term attachment is used in military organisation and the same is in vogue in police department since long time and the said term is not a foreign concept to the police organisation.
11. As regards the another ground that despite specific written request by the applicant for supply of relevant documents, the applicant was not supplied the relevant documents and due to the non-supply of documents, he could not submit the effective statement of defence in pursuance to the charge sheet. It resulted in the non-application of mind by the Disciplinary Authority, which appointed the Inquiry Officer on the basis of incomplete things. Thus there has been denial of reasonable opportunity to defend his case.
12. As regards the hostile discrimination, the learned Counsel for the applicant has strenuously submitted that thousands of attachments orders have been issued in the past in similar circumstances. But none of the authorities that resorted to such attachments was ever questioned and the question of taking any disciplinary action against them did not arise. It is perhaps for the first time that the applicant has been picked up and made as a scapegoat due to some extraneous reasons whereby the usual act being done and practised without any fellers has been brought within the four corners of misconduct. The same seems to have been made only to damage the service career of the applicant which resulted in depriving him his selection grade and other promotions including consequential benefits in addition to keep him under suspension for a long time. It is also contended that there is no law, which prohibits the use of powers. If the applicant has issued any attachment order during the said period, the same cannot be construed as misconduct by any stretch of imagination. Thus, there has been clear infraction of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
13. As regards the next contention regarding the appeal preferred against the suspension order was not finalised for about two years and no reason had been adduced, it is contended that in the first preliminary inquiry report it has been clearly Stated that most of the attachment orders have been issued to fill up the vacancies. In the second preliminary report it has been stated that the allegation of corruption against the applicant was not substantiated. Thus the very order of suspension was misconceived, erroneous and illegal in the eye of law. Further the Appellate Authority has taken 11 months in deciding the appeal and no reason for the delay have been given. The appeal has been rejected summarily without disclosing any reason. The learned Counsel has cited about 23 decisions/authorities in support of his contentions. He has also made available a copy of each judgment in a booklet form. We have waded through the judgments.
14. Per contra, Mr. U.D. Sharma, the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2 has submitted his arguments very succinctly that the law is well settled by now that the scope of judicial review in disciplinary proceedings is very limited. He has reiterated the defence as set out in the reply and has submitted that there was restriction on the transfers and the transfers could be made only in such circumstances as per the policy in vogue. He has submitted that the respondents banned transfers. He has further submitted that transfer and attachment though look distinct but the purpose of both is the same. Firstly, there is no term like attachment in the rules relating to police personnel. The attachment, at the most can be said to be temporary transfer. But as per the restriction/ban, there is no distinction like temporary transfer or permanent transfer, meaning thereby, that such ban or restriction were on all type of transfers. Thus the applicant has disobeyed the lawful order and disobedience of lawful orders is a very serious mailer especially in the police force, which is meant for maintaining law and order situations and such an act would definitely fall within the four corners of misconduct. Thus it is not a case of 'no evidence or of perverse' findings. He has also submitted that the non-supply of the so-called relevant documents was in no way prejudiced the case of the applicant. The appellate order at Annex. A/2 clearly makes a mention that the applicant had agreed that there was a ban on the transfer of personnel and this position has not been refuted. He has next contended that in such cases, Article 14 is not attracted and the applicant cannot take shelter under the pretext that other officials in similar circumstances have also issued number of attachment orders and the plea of discrimination cannot be taken in such cases. He also submitted the various orders regarding the attachments were not the part of disciplinary inquiry proceedings. As regards the delay in finalising the appeal of the applicant, it has taken some time since the appeal was to be decided by the Central Government and other proceedings were conducted by the State Government.
15. We have considered the rival submission made on behalf of both the parties. Before proceeding further in the matter we would like to ascertain the scope of judicial review by this Tribunal. It is the settled legal position that strict rules of evidences are not applicable to the departmental inquiries and every violation of procedure does not vitiate the inquiry. See R.S. Saini v. State of Punjab, 1999 SCC (L&S) 1424, K.L. Shinde v. State of Mysore, AIR 1976 SC 1080, Rae Bareli Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Bhola Nath Singh and Ors., AIR 1997 SC 1908; Bank of India and Anr. v. Degala Suryanarayana, 1999 SCC (L&S) 1036; Inspector General of Police v. Thavasiappan, JT 1996(6) SC 450. The Apex Court in case of AIR 1999 SC 677, Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police has lucidly illustrated the scope of judicial review. The following paras are relevant:
"It is no doubt true that the High Court under Article 226 or this Court under Article 32 would not interfere with the findings recorded at the departmental enquiry by the Disciplinary Authority or the Enquiry Officer as a mailer of course. The Court cannot sit in appeal over those findings and assume the role of the Appellate Authority. But this does not mean that in no circumstance can the Court interfere. The power of judicial review available to the High Court as also to this Court under the Constitution lakes in its stride the domestic enquiry as well and it can interfere with the conclusions reached therein if there was no evidence to support the findings or the findings recorded were such as could not have been reached by an ordinary prudent man or the findings were perverse or made at he dictate of the superior authority.
Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" were based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny.
A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions, which are perverse, and those, which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with."
16. Now adverting the facts of this case, as far as the material facts are concerned, there is hardly any quarrel. It is a fact that there were restrictions/ban on the transfer order at the relevant time. Most of the orders ordering such attachment do not indicate any specific period of attachment. The applicant did issue certain attachment orders and numbers of persons were sent on attachments to various establishments. Some of the attachments were made against the vacant posts. Some of the officials sent on attachment did not complete their normal tenure of minimum stay of two years at the previous station as per the transfer policy in vogue. The applicant himself before the Appellate Authority has also agreed upon this position. It is also not in dispute that such practice has been prevalent in Police Department; particularly in Rajasthan. Certain transfer orders as such were also issued whereby numbers of police personnel were transferred during the ban period e.g. orders dated 10.09.93, at Annex. A/38 to A/39.
17. Before proceeding further, we may answer the first and second issues as to whether the applicant has at all committed any misconduct and the distinction between transfer and attachment. The answer to this question depends on the reply to another issue i.e. as to whether the attachments tantamount transfer or not. If the answer were in affirmative, the act of the applicant would be a disobedience of order, which is misconduct, admitting of no doubt. However, as observed above, the applicant has issued even the transfer orders and there is hardly any necessity to embark upon the term attachment. In any case much anxiety has been shown on this and we would consider the same. Firstly, we find from the records and the submissions put forward by the learned Counsel for all the parties that there is no term like attachment in the rules relating to the Police Department. This term is only used in DSSR wherein the same is defined as under:
"93 Attachment to the staff:
Officers may be temporarily attached to or employed on the Staff of Army HQ Inter Services, Organisation, Command, Corps div/area or other formation headquarters for periods not exceeding six months at a time. They will not be replaced in their units, nor will they be entitled to any extra pay.
18. From the aforesaid, it would be safe to conclude that the so-called attachment shall fall within the term temporary transfer since the attachment involves shifting of personnel from one place to another. The payment of any allowance does not make any difference since some transfers may be even on request where no allowance is admissible. Otherwise also , we are of firm opinion the attachment is a species of transfer only. We are refraining from examining the propriety of attachments in Police Organisation as not provided under the rules. Even such practices for a long time are sometimes given recognition by the Courts of law. The second issue is , accordingly, answered in positive. Admittedly, there was restrictions/ban on transfers; may not be full ban but the transfers could be made in accordance with the policy in vogue and not in the normal course. However, in the instant case, the same have been resorted considering them as no the transfer and question of following the norms/restrictions have not been followed. It may be noticed that once a thing cannot be done directly, the same cannot be done indirectly. In other words once a particular mode of doing a thing is provided, other modes of doing are necessarily forbidden. But in the instant case despite conditional prohibition on transfers, an indirect via media of attachment was used to achieve the same objective, which clearly entails an act in contravention of the specific instructions issued by the Government of Rajasthan, thus we are bound to answer the question that the acts of the applicant fell within the four corners of misconduct.
19. As regards the meaning of the misconduct, the same came for consideration before the Apex Court in State of Punjab and Ors. v. Ram Singh, AIR 1992 SC 2188. Their Lordships have observed that the word 'misconduct' though not capable of precise definition, its reflection receives its connotation from the context, the delinquency in its performance and its effect on the discipline and the nature of the duty. It may involve moral turpitude, it must be improper or wrong behaviour, unlawful behaviour, wilful in character; forbidden act, a transgression of established and definite rule of action or code of conduct but not mere error of judgment, carelessness or negligence in performance of the duty; the act complained of bears forbidden quality or character. Its, ambit has to be construed with reference to the subject matter and the context wherein the term occurs, regard being had to the scope of the statute and the public purpose it seeks to serve. In the instant case, the basic allegations levelled against the applicant is that he contravened Government circulars, vide which transfers were banned. Therefore the applicant had resorted to doing acts, which were forbidden by law, and therefore, the same would otherwise also fall within the definition of 'misconduct'.
20. Now we come to the third ground, regarding denial of reasonable opportunity due to no supply of relevant documents before submission of reply to charge sheet. We find that the complete inquiry has been conducted as per the rules and the applicant was given reasonable opportunity to defend his case. Mr. Lodha has not amplified as to what prejudice to the defence of applicant was caused due to non-supply of said documents. We have already indicated above while narrating the scope of judicial review by the Courts that the strict rules of evidences are not applicable to the departmental inquiries and every violation of procedure does not vitiate the inquiry. Thus this ground is groundless and no interference on the same is called for.
21. As regards the ground of hostile discrimination , much emphasis has been laid by Mr. Lodha, on this ground. While it is true that orders of attachment and transfers have also been issued by number of police authorities in the past as well as after the incident in question. We did not find any specific pleadings to the effect that whether the same were issued under the similar circumstances i.e. during the period of restriction/ban by the authorities. However, we move on the premises that such orders were issued in the similar set of facts. Having held in unequivocal terms that the attachments were covered under the term transfer, which could not have been done in normal course and contravened the Government orders, cannot be justified. Whether, the applicant can claim immunity from such an action the ground of discrimination resulting due to offending equality clause. The answer is emphatically "no". By now the law is well settled that a wrong order cannot be the foundation for claiming equality for enforcement of the similar benefits. As stated earlier, his right must be founded upon enforceable right to entitle him to the equality treatment for enforcement thereof. A wrong decision by the Government does not give a right to enforce the wrong order and claim parity or equality. Two wrongs can never made a right. We are fortified with our view by a recent decision of Supreme Court in case of State of Bihar and Ors. v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh and Anr., 2000 SCC (L&S) 845. Para 30 is relevant and contents of it are extracted as under:
"30. The concept of equality as envisaged under Article 14 of the Constitution is a positive concept which cannot be enforced in a negative manner. When any authority is shown to have committed any illegality or irregularity in favour of any individual or group of individuals, others cannot claim the same illegality or irregularity on the ground of denial thereof to them. Similarly wrong judgment passed in favour of one individual does not entitle others to claim similar benefits. In this regard this Court in Gursharan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee held that citizens have assumed wrong notions regarding the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution which guarantees equality before law to all citizens. Benefits extended to some persons in an irregular or illegal manner cannot he claimed by a citizen on the plea of equality as enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution by way of writ petition filed in the High Court. The Court observed: (SCC P. 465 Para 9) "Neither Article 14 of the Constitution conceives within the quality clause this concept nor Article 226 empowers the High Court to enforce such claim of equality before law. If such claims are enforced, it shall amount to directing to continue and perpetuate an illegal procedure or an illegal order for extending similar benefits to others, Before a claim based on equality clause is upheld, it must be established by the petitioner that his claim being just and legal, has been denied to him, while it has been extended to others and in this process there has been discrimination."
22. As regards the grounds relating to the suspension are concerned, suspension can he effected when the charges are grave in nature to impose any of the major penalties on a delinquent official. In the instant case, a major penalty has been imposed on the applicant and therefore, the suspension cannot be said to be unjustified. Suspension is required to he regulated by the Competent Authority and we have not been shown any ground, which could justify our interference with the order of suspension.
23. Equally true is regarding the delay in finalising the appeal. It is stated that there is a delay of 11 months in finalising the appeal. Though it likes bit abnormal that the Appellate Authority has taken a long time, but keeping in view the nature of proceedings and the number of documents involved, as well as the involvement of different authorities, we are not persuaded to hold that there has been any abnormal delay and no judicial review on this ground is justified.
24. In the last, we would like to mention that enormous judgments have been cited on behalf of the applicant on the various points involved in the instant case. We have waded the same but refrain form dealing them individually so as to avoid plethora. In the disciplinary case, each case has its own facts and circumstances and it is only the ratio of a particular decision, which lays down the principle of law, which could he applied and required to examine the case on the touchstone of the principle of law summarised in Kuldeep Singh's case supra. The present case is not a case of no evidence. There is no dispute regarding the act of the applicant, thus it is not a case of perverse finding also. In the instant case, we have carried out incisive study and also made specific queries and it was specifically ascertained as to what the applicant had to say with regard to the ban on transfers as indicated in the Appellate Authority's order, it was answered in positive and there is absolutely no dispute that there was ban which may he called restrictions on transfer and the applicant had issued transfer orders as well as attachment orders. In view of this admitted position , by no stretch of imagination it could be said that prejudice had been caused to the applicant. Certain judgments have been cited with regard to proportionality of punishment and not to pass special orders. In the instant case, the main charge against the applicant has been contravention of orders issued by the Government and the penalty imposed is withholding of increments for three years with cumulative effect. The same cannot he said to disproportionate penalty, which could shock the consciousness of the Court. Thus we are not impressed with the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the applicant and with any of the grounds as indicated in the aforesaid paragraphs. Thus no judicial review of the disciplinary proceedings in question is called for.
25. In the result the O.A. sans merit and the same fails and stands dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to hear their own costs.