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[Cites 13, Cited by 0]

Central Information Commission

M Indira vs National Highways Authority Of India ... on 28 September, 2022

Author: Saroj Punhani

Bench: Saroj Punhani

                               के   ीय सूचना आयोग
                        Central Information Commission
                            बाबागंगनाथमाग , मुिनरका
                         Baba Gangnath Marg, Munirka
                          नई द ली, New Delhi - 110067


File No : CIC/NHAIN/A/2020/117827

M. Indira                                               ......अपीलकता /Appellant


                                      VERSUS
                                       बनाम
CPIO,
National Highways Authority of India,
PIU, RTI Cell, No. 314E, K.P. Road,
Near Ayyappan Kovil,
Parvathipuram, Nagercoil,
Kanyakumari-629003,
Tamilnadu                                          .... ितवादीगण /Respondent

Date of Hearing                   :   26/09/2022
Date of Decision                  :   26/09/2022

INFORMATION COMMISSIONER :              Saroj Punhani

Relevant facts emerging from appeal:

RTI application filed on          :   26/06/2019
CPIO replied on                   :   03/07/2019
First appeal filed on             :   25/07/2019
First Appellate Authority order   :   Not on record
2nd Appeal/Complaint dated        :   09/06/2020

Information sought

:

The Appellant filed an RTI application dated 26.06.2019 seeking the following information:
"xxx 1
(a) Whether the statutory benefit of interest for the excess amount as provided under section 72 of the RFCTLARR Act is applicable to the affected landowners whose lands were acquired under NH Act 1956.
(b) If applicable the word "date of taking possession" means the date of notification published in the Gazette under section 3D(1) of the NH Act or the date on which the lands were taken over physical possession from CALA/Spl. DRO Nagercoil.
(c) If not applicable the reason for the non-payment of interest for the excess amount under section 72 of RFCTLARR Act 2013."

The CPIO furnished a point wise reply to the appellant on 03.07.2019.

Being dissatisfied, the appellant filed a First Appeal dated 25.07.2019. FAA's order, if any, is not available on record.

Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied, the appellant approached the Commission with the instant Second Appeal on the ground of non-receipt of specific desired clarifications from the CPIO against point no. 2 of RTI Application which deals with the compensation awarded to him in lieu of revision of the award in compliance with the Hon'ble High Court's order.

Relevant Facts emerging during Hearing:

The following were present:-
Appellant: Not present.
Respondent: T. Velaraj, PD/PIU & CPIO present through video-conference.
The CPIO reiterated the contents of his written submission dated 21.09.2022, relevant portion of which are reproduced below in verbatim -
" xxxxx ..... Requisite information was provided to the applicant on 03.07.2019 i.e. within a week of time, which is within the stipulated time frame as specified in the provision of the RTI Act, 2005. It has been contended before the Hon'ble Central Information Commission by the Appellant that the CPIO has furnished misleading, incomplete and false information against her query No 2 raised in the RTI Application and that the Appellant has filed First Appeal petition to the First Appellate Authority on 25.07.2019. In as much as the 2 Appellant has not sent any information regarding her First Appeal, this Public Authority has no remarks on the First Appeal to offer........
xxxxxxxxx It is submitted that in this context, it is pertinent to refer the provisions contained in section 3(E) of the National Highways Act, 1956. Section 3 (E) deals with the procedure for taking possession of land under acquisition and Section 3 (H) relates to deposit and payment of compensation before taking possession of the land. The above sections are reproduced below for kind ready reference. "3 E. Power to take possession :- Where any land has vested in the Central Government under sub-section (2) of section 3 D, and the amount determined by the Competent Authority under section 3 G, with respect to such land has been deposited under sub-

section (1) of Section 3 H, with the Competent Authority by the Central Government, the Competent Authority may by notice in writing direct the owner as well as any other person who may be in possession of such land to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the Competent Authority or any person duly authorised by it in this behalf within sixty days of the service of the notice".

"3 H. Deposit and payment of amount (1) The amount determined under section 3 G shall be deposited by the Central Government in such manner as may be laid down by rules made in this behalf by that Government with the Competent Authority before taking possession of the land".

A harmonious reading of the above provisions of the NH Act, 1956, would go to show that taking possession of the land under acquisition is a subsequent process after vesting of lands with the Central Government under section 3 D of the Act. However, the Appellant has filed this Second Appeal referring to the issuance of order dated 03.12.2013 in W.P. No. 30548 of 2013 by the Hon'ble High Court, Madras. In the above judgement, the Madras High Court held as under.

"Vesting of lands with the Central Government under section 3 D of the Act is from the date of issuance of the notification in Gazette of India and the entitlement of owner or the person or persons interested to receive compensation is from the date of taking possession".

It may kindly be noted that vesting of lands with the Government under section 3 D of the Act and taking possession is not one and the same. Further, the Hon'ble High Court in their order has not specified about the entitlement of compensation from the date of issuance of the Notification under section 3 D of the Act. It is submitted that by and large, if there is any resistance from the land owners/interested persons, the procedure contemplated under section 3 E(2) of the NH Act has to be invoked. When the necessity to recourse to such a procedure does not arise, the land owners continued to be in possession of the acquired property.

It is respectively submitted that under the grounds for the prayer the Appellant has asserted that the CPIO has willfully disobeyed the order of Hon'ble High Court, Madras (Judgement dated 03.12.2013). In this context it is submitted that the Hon'ble 3 High Court has not issued any order or directions to this CPIO, to be adhered to. Hence, the averment of the Appellant is denied.

It is further submitted that it may be appropriate to refer to the expression of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority's case cited in the matter of 1) Lanka Prabhakar Rao and 2) Yarlagadda Harish Chandra Prasad and the Union of India, Ministry of Shipping, Roads, Transport and Highways (Writ Appeal No. 344 and 369 of 2021) in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, as it was held as under.

"247. The question which arises whether there is any difference between taking possession under the Act, 1894 and the expression 'Physical Possession' used in Section 24(2). As a matter of fact, what was contemplated under the Act 1894, by taking the possession meant only Physical Possession of the land. Taking over the possession under the Act of 2013 always amounted to taking over physical possession of the land".

In the light of above expression of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the information provided to the Appellant for query No.2 is within the ambit of the Act and it is in order.

xxxxxx .....by virtue of issuance "The RFCTLARR (Removal of Difficulties), order 2015, and issue of Lr No. 11011/302015-LA, dated 29.04.2015 from the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways", select provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act 2013 were made applicable to a limited extent the National Highways Act 1956 w.e.f 01.01.2015 i.e. determination of compensation in accordance with the First Schedule and rehabilitation and resettlement specified in the Second and Third Schedules alone are made applicable to the cases of land acquisition under the NH Act, 1956. As such, other sections of the RFCTLARR Act 2013 is not applicable to the NH Act.

.......as per the provisions contained in sub-section 3 of Section 19, a Second appeal against the decision under sub-section (1) shall lie within ninety days from the date on which the decision should have been made or was actually received, with the Central Information Commission. Whereas in this case, as per the version of the Appellant, First appeal has been filed on 25.07.2019 and the Appellant in bound to prefer the Second appeal within 90 days But the Second Appeal has been received by the Central Information Commission only on 24.04.2020.

xxxxx"

Decision:
The Commission observes from a perusal of records that the core premise of the instant Appeal was non receipt of the desired clarification against point no. 2 of RTI Application. In response to it, the CPIO has provided a very comprehensive detailed point wise reply along with relevant inputs has already been provided to the Appellant.
4
In this regard, the Commission does not find any scope of action in the matter with respect to the information sought for as well as the reply of the CPIO's provided thereon; as the queries raised by the Appellant are more in the nature of seeking clarifications to be drawn by the CPIO which concededly do not conform to Section 2(f) of RTI Act. Despite this, the CPIO response very adequately addresses all the issues flagged in the RTI application.
Adverting to Appellant's insistence seeking clarifications against points no. 2, it shall be noted that outstretching the interpretation of Section 2(f) of the RTI Act to include deductions and inferences to be drawn by the CPIO is unwarranted as it casts immense pressure on the CPIOs to ensure that they provide the correct deduction/inference to avoid being subject to penal provisions under the RTI Act. The Appellant's attention is also drawn towards a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the scope and ambit of Section 2(f) of RTI Act in the matter of CBSE vs. Aditya Bandopadhyay & Ors.[CIVIL APPEAL NO.6454 of 2011]wherein it was held as under:
"35. At this juncture, it is necessary to clear some misconceptions about the RTI Act. The RTI Act provides access to all information that is available and existing.........A public authority is also not required to furnish information which require drawing of inferences and/or making of assumptions. It is also not required to provide `advice' or `opinion' to an applicant, nor required to obtain and furnish any `opinion' or `advice' to an applicant. The reference to `opinion' or `advice' in the definition of `information' in section 2(f) of the Act, only refers to such material available in the records of the public authority. Many public authorities have, as a public relation exercise, provide advice, guidance and opinion to the citizens. But that is purely voluntary and should not be confused with any obligation under the RTI Act." (Emphasis Supplied) Similarly, in the matter of Khanapuram Gandaiah vs Administrative Officer &Ors.

[SLP (CIVIL) NO.34868 OF 2009], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:

"7....Public Information Officer is not supposed to have any material which is not before him; or any information he could have obtained under law. Under Section 6 of the RTI Act, an applicant is entitled to get only such information which can be accessed by the "public authority" under any other law for the time being in force. The answers sought by the petitioner in the application could not have been with the public authority nor could he have had access to this information and Respondent No. 4 was not obliged to give any reasons as to 5 why he had taken such a decision in the matter which was before him...."

(Emphasis Supplied) And, in the matter of Dr. Celsa Pinto, Ex-Officio Joint Secretary,(School Education) vs. The Goa State Information Commission [2008 (110) Bom L R 1238], the Hon'ble Bombay High Court held as under:

"..... In the first place, the Commission ought to have noticed that the Act confers on the citizen the right to information. Information has been defined by Section 2(f) as follows.
Section 2(f) -Information means any material in any form, including records, documents, memos e-mails, opinions, advices, press releases, circulars, orders, logbooks, contracts, reports, papers, samples, models, data material held in any electronic form and information relating to any private body which can be accessed by a public authority under any other law for the time being in force;
The definition cannot include within its fold answers to the question why which would be the same thing as asking the reason for a justification for a particular thing. The Public Information Authorities cannot expect to communicate to the citizen the reason why a certain thing was done or not done in the sense of a justification because the citizen makes a requisition about information. Justifications are matter within the domain of adjudicating authorities and cannot properly be classified as information." (Emphasis Supplied) Nonetheless, the reply and as a sequel to it further clarifications tendered by the CPIO during hearing is in the spirit of RTI Act, merits of which cannot be called into question.
Having observed as above and considering the absence of the Appellant during hearing, no further action is warranted in the matter.
The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
Saroj Punhani (सरोजपुनहािन) हािन) Information Commissioner (सूचनाआयु ) 6 Authenticated true copy (अिभ मािणत स#यािपत ित) (C.A. Joseph) Dy. Registrar 011-26179548/ [email protected] सी. ए. जोसेफ, उप-पंजीयक दनांक / 7