Madhya Pradesh High Court
Smt.Kujmati vs Union Of India on 6 November, 2015
Equivalent citations: AIR 2016 MADHYA PRADESH 37, (2016) 1 ACC 870, (2016) 3 ACJ 2046, (2016) 1 TAC 185, (2016) 2 MPLJ 679, ILR 2016 MP 55
MA-3108-2009
(SMT.KUJMATI Vs UNION OF INDIA)
06-11-2015
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
PRINCIPAL SEAT AT JABALPUR
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M.A.No.3108/2009
Smt. Kujmati
VS.
The Union Of India
Shri Vivek Agrawal, counsel for the appellant.
Sushri Amrit Ruprah, counsel for the respondent.
________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
{06.11.2015}
1. Heard on I.A.No.8460/2009 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay of 319 days in filing this miscellaneous appeal.
2. It has been submitted on behalf of the appellant that appellant Kunjmoti is widow of deceased Raghuwar who had died in a train accident while traveling from Allahabad to Chapa in Sarnath Express on 15.01.2004. The Railway Claims Tribunal Bhopal Bench, had allowed the claim under Section 16 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to in the order as âthe Actâ); and had awarded a sum of Rs.4,00,000/-. Being aggrieved by the quantum of the award, this miscellaneous appeal under Section 23 of the Act, has been preferred.
3. It has been stated that as the appellant was not satisfied by the award passed by the Railway Claims Tribunal dated 29.08.2008, shall handed over the copy of the award for necessary action to her counsel Shri Manishanker Sahu of Raigarh; however, since the formalities regarding vakalatnama and affidavit could not be completed by the appellant, the appeal could not be preferred within the stipulated period. Subsequently, the copy of the award got misplaced in the office of the advocate. Later, on 25.07.2009, she learnt that for want of formalities regarding vakalatnama and affidavit, the appeal could not be filed. So, she along with her counsel visited the counsel at Jabalpur and ultimately the appeal was filed on 31.07.2009. The miscellaneous appeal was accompanied by an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, supported by affidavit of the appellant. Thus, the delay of 319 days was bona fide and deserves to be condoned.
4. The respondent has opposed the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, by filing a written reply mainly on two counts. Firstly, it has been submitted that as per sub-section 3 of Section 23 of the Act, every appeal under section 23 has to be preferred within a period of 90 days from the date of the order appealed against. Placing reliance upon the judgments rendered by the Apex Court in the cases of Singh Enterprises Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur And Others, (2008) 3 SCC 70, Commissioner of Customs And Central Excise Vs. Hongo India Private Limited And Another, (2009) 5 SCC 791, Chaudharana Steels Private Limited Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Allahabad, (2009) 15 SCC 183, Prakash H. Jain Vs. Marie Fernandes, (2003) 8 SCC 431, Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board Vs. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission And Others (2010) 5 SCC 23 and Vinod Gurudas Raikar Vs. National Insurance Company Limited And Others (1991) 4 SCC 333, it has been argued that the Act being a special law, provisions of sub-section (2) of section 29 of the Limitation Act, are not applicable and High Court has no jurisdiction to extend the period of Limitation prescribed by section 23 (3) of the Act. Secondly, taking recourse to Part I of the âScheduleâ appended to the Railway Accidents and Untoward Incidents (Compensation) Rules, 1990, it has been contended on behalf of the respondent that the maximum amount which may be awarded for death of a person in a Railway accident is Rs.4,00,000/-, which has already been awarded by the Tribunal; as such, the Court has no jurisdiction to enhance the amount any further. Thus, the appellant has no case on merits either; therefore, it has been prayed that the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act as also the miscellaneous appeal, be dismissed.
5. This Court shall first consider as to whether or not Section 5 of the Limitation Act can be pressed into service for the purpose of condonation of delay in filing an appeal under section under Section 23 (1) of the Act?
6. In this regard learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the cases relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant relate to Central Excise Act, 1994, Electricity Act, 2003 Representation of People Act, 1951 and Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The principles enunciated in aforesaid cases would not be applicable to an appeal under section 23 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act. It has also been submitted that as per sub-section 2 of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, where any special or local law prescribed for any suit, appeal or application, a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law. The provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. Relying upon the aforesaid language used to sub-section 2 of section 29 of the Limitation Act, learned counsel for the appellant has contended that there is nothing in Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987, which expressly excludes the application of provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act; therefore, Section 5 thereof would be applicable to the appeals filed under Section 23 (1) of the Act, and the high Court has jurisdiction to condone the delay taking recourse to Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
7. This Court bestowed its anxious consideration on the rival contentions. It may be seen that there are two provisions in the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987, which relates to limitation, Section 17 of the Act reads as hereunder:
17. Limitation.â(1) The Claims Tribunal shall not admit an application for any claimâ
(a) under sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 unless the application is made within three years from the date on which the goods in question were entrusted to the railway administration for carriage by railway;
(b) under sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section (1) [or, as the 1 case may be, sub-section (1-A)] of Section 13 unless the application is made within one year of occurrence of the accident;
(c) under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 unless the application is made within three years from the date on which the fare or freight is paid to the railway administration:
Provided that no application for any claim referred to in sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 shall be preferred to the Claims Tribunal until the expiration of three months next after the date on which the intimation of the claim has been preferred under Section 78-B of the Railways Act.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), an application may be entertained after the period specified in sub-section (1) if the applicant satisfies the Claims Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period.
Section 23 is reproduced hereinbelow:
23. Appeals.â(1) Save as provided in sub-section (2) and notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), or in any other law, an appeal shall lie from every order, not being an interlocutory order, of the Claims Tribunal, to the High Court having jurisdiction over the place where the Bench is located.
(2) No appeal shall lie from an order passed by the Claims Tribunal with the consent of the parties.
(3) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of ninety days from the date of order appealed against.
8. It may be noted at the outset that though sub-section (2) of section 17 expressly empowers the Railway Claims Tribunal to entertain an application made under sub- section (1) thereof even beyond the period of limitation prescribed by that sub-section, in case the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within the prescribed period, no corresponding power has been conferred upon the High Court under Section 23.
9. It is true that the provisions relating to limitation in sub-section (3) of section 23 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 are not in pari materia with those in the Central Excise Act, 1944, Electricity Act, 2003, Representation of the People Act, 1951 or the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; however, what are the principles to be considered while deciding as to whether or not application of sections 4 to 25 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act to any special or local law, have been clearly enunciated by the apex Court in the case of Hukumdev Narain Yadav Vs. Lalit Narain Mishra (1974) 2 Supreme Court Cases 133, which was a matter under the Representation of the People Act 1951. In paragraph no. 17, the Supreme Court has observed that:
âIt is contended before us that the words âexpressly excludedâ would mean that there must be an express reference made in the special or local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded. As usual the meaning given in the Dictionary has been relied upon, but what we have to see is whether the scheme of the special law, that is in this case the Act, and the nature of the remedy provided therein are such that the Legislature intended it to be a complete code by itself which alone should govern the several matters provided by it. If on an examination of the relevant provisions it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. In our view, even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the Court to examine whether and to what extent the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject- matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation.â Likewise a three judge bench of Supreme Court in the case of CCE & Customs v. Hongo India (P) Ltd., (2009) 5 SCC 791, at page 802 has held that:
35. It was contended before us that the words âexpressly excludedâ would mean that there must be an express reference made in the special or local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded. In this regard, we have to see the scheme of the special law which here in this case is the Central Excise Act. The nature of the remedy provided therein is such that the legislature intended it to be a complete code by itself which alone should govern the several matters provided by it. If, on an examination of the relevant provisions, it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. In our considered view, that even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the court to examine whether and to what extent, the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation. In other words, the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, therefore, is to be judged not from the terms of the Limitation Act but by the provisions of the Central Excise Act relating to filing of reference application to the High Court.
10. If in the backdrop of aforesaid authoritative pronouncement, the scheme of the special law in question namely the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987, is examined, it may be seen that the preamble reads as hereunder:
Preamble:
An Act to provide for the establishment of a Railway Claims Tribunal for inquiring into and determining claims against a railway administration for loss, destruction, damage, deterioration on non-delivery of animals or goods entrusted to it to be carried by railway or for the refund of fares or freight or for compensation for death or injury to passengers occurring as a result of railway accidents or untoward incidents and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.
11. Section 2 contains definitions. Chapter II provides for establishment of Railway Claims Tribunals and benches thereof. Chapter III relates to jurisdiction, power and authority of the Claims Tribunals. Section 15 engrafts a bar to the exercise of jurisdiction by any Court or authority in any matter covered by the Act. Chapter IV lays down the procedure to be adopted by the Claims Tribunals established under the Act, including provision with regard to limitation. Section 22 relates to execution of the orders of the Claims Tribunal.
12. Thus, there can be no manner of doubt that the Railway Claims Tribunals Act, 1987 is a complete code in itself. It was enacted in view of the fact that the litigation in Courts of law and before Claims Commissioners was very protracted; and with the avowed object to set up a specialized Tribunal for speedy adjudication of railway claims.
13. As such, regardless of the fact that no express reference has been made in The Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987, excluding the application of specific provisions of the Limitation Act, such application shall be deemed to have been impliedly excluded in view of the fact that the Railway Claims Tribunal Act is a complete code in itself and makes specific provisions to cover every aspect of the accident claims against railways.
14. In aforesaid view of the matter, Section 5 of the Limitation Act would have no application to an appeal under sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 and the High Court would have no jurisdiction to entertain such appeal beyond the stipulated period of limitation of 90 days regardless of the fact that the appellant had sufficient cause for such delay.
15. The Court is also in agreement with the arguments of learned counsel for the respondent that even on merits appellant has no case because Railway Claims Tribunal has also passed an award in the sum of Rs. 4 Lacs for the death of son of the appellant in a railway accident. Section 3 (1) of the Railway Accidents and Untoward Incidents (Compensation) Rules, 1990, ordains in clear terms that the amount of compensation payable in respect of death or injuries, shall be as specified in the Schedule. Part-I of the Schedule appended to aforesaid Rules, prescribes the amount of compensation as Rs.4 Lacs, which has already been awarded by the Railway Claims Tribunal. Thus, even on merits the appellant has no case.
16. In the result, I.A.No.8460/20009 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay is dismissed.
17. Consequently, this miscellaneous appeal under Section 23 (1) of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1923 also stands dismissed.
C.C. as per rules.
(C V SIRPURKAR) JUDGE