Kerala High Court
Sony George vs State Of Kerala
Author: Alexander Thomas
Bench: Alexander Thomas
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT:
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ALEXANDER THOMAS
SATURDAY, THE 16TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2017/25TH BHADRA, 1939
Crl.Rev.Pet.No. 49 of 2017 ()
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AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 22/12/2015 IN CRL.MP. NO. 1062/2015 IN
UN-NUMBERED CRIMINAL APPEAL OF SESSIONS COURT, ERNAKULAM.
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT IN CC. NO.162/2010 OF JUDICIAL FIRST CLASS
MAGISTRATE COURT- II, PERUMBAVOOR DATED 23/11/2011.
.....
REVISION PETITIONER/PETITIONER & APPELLANT/ACCUSED:
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SONY GEORGE,
(CONVICT NO. 9242 OF CENTRAL PRISON, VIYYUR),
S/O. GEORGE PAUL, MANAKUNNAM KULASSERIL HOUSE,
MOTHIRAPPILLY, KOTHAMANGALAM P.O.,
ERNAKULAM DISTRICT.
BY ADVS.SRI.E.C.POULOSE,
SMT.BOBBY RAPHEAL.C.
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS/STATE & COMPLAINANT:
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1. STATE OF KERALA,
REPRESENTED BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM-682 031.
2. MOHAN PAUL,
S/O. POULOSE, KOZHIKKADAN HOUSE,
CHENGAL P.O., PIN - 683 574.
R1 BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR SRI.SAIGI JACOB PALATTY.
THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD
ON 16-09-2017, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY PASSED THE
FOLLOWING:
rs.
Crl.Rev.Pet.No. 49 of 2017
APPENDIX
PETITIONER'S ANNEXURES:-
ANNEXURE A1 COPY OF THE AWARD DATED 20/12/2013 IN PLP NO.189/2013
OF LOK ADALAT.
ANNEXURE A2 COPY OF THE JAIL MEMO DATED 20/12/2013 ISSUED BY THE
JUDICIAL FIRST CLASS MAGISTRATE COURT II, PERUMBAVOOR
TO THE SUPERINTENDENT, CENTRAL PRISON, VIYYUR.
ANNEXURE A3 TRUE OF THE APPLICATION DATED 08/02/2017 SENT FOR
AND ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER UNDER RIGHT TO
INFORMATION ACT AND ITS REPLY SENT BY THE
SUPERINTENDENT, CENTRAL PRISON, VIYYUR.
RESPONDENT'S ANNEXURES:- NIL.
//TRUE COPY//
P.S.TO JUDGE
rs.
C.R.
ALEXANDER THOMAS, J.
----------------------------------------
Crl.R.P.No.49 of 2017
-----------------------------------------
Dated this the 16th day of September, 2017
O R D E R
The revision petitioner has been indicted for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in C.C.No.162 of 2010 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate's Court-II, Perumbavoor, instituted on the basis of a complaint preferred by the second respondent herein.
2. Exhibit-P1 dishonoured cheque dated 5.4.2007 is for Rs.1,50,000/-. The trial court as per the impugned judgment rendered on 23.11.2011 had convicted the petitioner for the abovesaid offence and had sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for two months and further ordered to pay Rs.1,50,000/- (cheque amount) to the complainant in terms of Section 357 (3) of the Cr.P.C. and in default thereof, he was ordered to suffer simple imprisonment for a further period of two months.
3. It is brought to the notice of this Court that the petitioner was running an agency for recruitment of personnel for employment abroad. In connection with such financial transactions, the petitioner happened to be indicted in many criminal cases for the offences as in Crl.R.P.No.49/17 ::2::
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, Section 420 of the I.P.C., etc. It appears that at the time of pronouncement of the present impugned judgment dated 23.11.2011, the petitioner was suffering prison sentence in some other cases. Presumably, on this account or due to his lack of financial resources or due to various criminal proceedings faced by him, he could not prefer Criminal Appeal as against the present trial court judgment within the prescribed time. It appears that later, the present impugned criminal proceedings happened to be referred to the Lok Adalat on 20.12.2013 in accordance with the provisions contained in the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. The matter was taken up for consideration in the Lok Adalat organized by the Taluk Legal Service Committee, Kunnathunadu (trial court concerned). In the said Lok Adalat, both parties were present and represented and the respondent therein (petitioner/accused herein) had admitted the claim of the petitioner and award was passed and accordingly, the Lok Adalat passed Annexure-A1 award dated 20.12.2013 holding that the complainant is entitled to realise Rs.1,50,000/- from the respondent therein (petitioner/accused herein) with 12% interest per annum from 25.4.2005 till its realisation and there shall be a charge for that amount on 66 cents of land belonging to the accused lying in Survey No.1321/IX A of Kothamangalam Village.
Annexure-A1 award reads as follows:
Crl.R.P.No.49/17 ::3::
"LOK ADALAT
Held on 20.12.2013 at Munsiff Court, Perumbavoor (Organized by the Taluk Legal Service Committee, Kunnathunadu) Petitioner: Mohan Paul aged 40 years, S/o.Poulose, Kozhikkadan House, Chengal P.O.PIN 683 574.
Respondent: Sony George aged 38 years, S/o.George, Mankkunnel (H), Kulassery Mathirappalli, Kothamangalam Village, Present Address:- C.9424, Superintendent Viyyur Central Prison, Thrissur - 680 110.
No. of proceedings of the PLP 189/13 Court/T.L.S.C. at Kunnathunadu Present Presiding Officer: Sri.M.I.Johnson, Munsiff, Perumbavoor.
Members : Adv.Jaya Thomas, Perumbavoor.
AWARD
The dispute between the parties having come up for determination at the Lok Adalat and the parties having settled the matter and filed a compounding application/compromise, the following award is passed in terms of the compromise:
Both parties present. Matter settled. Respondent admitted the claim of petitioner in the PLP. Hence award passed. Petitioner is entitled to realize Rs. 1,50,000/- from the respondent with 12% interest per annum from 25.04.2005 till its realization and there shall be a charge for that amount on the 66 cents cents of land belonged to the respondent lying in Sy.No.1321/IX A of Kothamangalam Village.
Mahan Paul Sd/- Sony George Sd/-
It is further ordered that court fee paid on the plaint/Appeal memo be refunded to the Plaintiffs/Appellants counsel. On memo being filed before the court of institution concerned as per rules.
Sd/- Sd/- Member
Presiding Officer Member
Sri.M.I.Johnson, Munsiff Adv.Jaya Thomas."
4. It appears that prior to the rendering of Annexure-A1 award, the impugned sentence in this case was already executed and the petitioner had suffered the substantive sentence of simple imprisonment for two months imposed in this case for the period from 8.8.2012 to Crl.R.P.No.49/17 ::4::
8.10.2012. Pursuant to Annexure-A1 Lok Adalat award, the petitioner had paid the full compensation amount due under the award to the second respondent/complainant, which is clear from the communication sent by the trial court to the Jail Superintendent, where the petitioner had suffered the sentence. The said jail memo dated 20.12.2013 sent the Judicial First Class Magistrate's Court-II, Perumbavoor, addressed to the Superintendent, Central Prison, Viyyur, has been produced as Annexure-A2, which reads as follows:
"No.1972/13. OFFICE OF THE JUDICIAL I CLASS MAGISTRATE-II Dated: 20/12/2013 JAIL MEMO The Superintendent/Central prison Viyyoor is hereby informed that undermentioned accused involved in C.C.162/2010 on the file of this Court has paid entire compensation to the complainant. Hence the Superintendent is hereby directed to release him after execution of substantive sentence, if his further detention is not necessary in any other case.
Sd/-
Judicial I Class Magistrate-II Address of the accused:
Sony George, S/o.George Paul, Manakunnam Kulasseril House, Mathirappilly, Kothamangalam P.O. To The Superintendent, Central Prison, Viyyoor."
Thus it is evident from Annexure-A2 that the petitioner had also paid the full compensation amount in terms of Annexure-A1 Adalat award.
5. It is thereafter that the petitioner had filed the Criminal Appeal before the Sessions Court, Ernakulam, for impugning the Crl.R.P.No.49/17 ::5::
judgment dated 23.11.2011. An application as per Crl.M.P.No.1602 of 2015 for condoning the delay in the filing the said appeal was also filed along with the Criminal Appeal. The appellate Sessions Court concerned as per the impugned order rendered on 22.12.2015 has held that since the petitioner has already suffered the sentence and as he has already paid the compensation amount through the Lok Adalat process, there is no point in considering the appeal and that the matter has become infructuous and that accordingly, the Sessions Court has dismissed the application for condoning the delay in filing the Criminal Appeal and consequentially the Criminal Appeal also stood in limine dismissed. The judgment of the trial court as well as the abovesaid impugned orders of the appellate Sessions Court are under challenge in this revision.
6. Though notice has been duly served on R-2/complainant, there is no appearance for that party.
7. Apart from various contentions on the merits of the matter, Smt.C.Bobby Raphael, learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner/accused would also submit that in view of Annexure-A1 Lok Adalat award, the impugned sentence and conviction imposed on the petitioner by the trial court and as confirmed by the appellate court, are per se illegal and ultra vires. In this regard, it is pointedly argued by Smt.C.Bobby Raphael, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner/accused, that it has been now categorically well settled by the Crl.R.P.No.49/17 ::6::
Apex Court in the celebrated judgment in K.N.Govindan Kutty Menon v. C.D.Shaji, reported in (2012) 2 SCC 51 (rendered by Justice P.Sathasivam, as His Lordship then), that if a criminal complaint involving offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is referred to the Lok Adalat in terms of the provisions contained in the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, and parties voluntarily reached a compromise, then such an award passed by the Lok Adalat on the basis of the consensus between the parties shall be mandated to be treated as a deemed civil decree in terms of Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, and that such an award becomes an executable decree and further that in this process, the criminal court becomes functus officio and the dispute between the parties, which originally emanated as a criminal proceeding will become converted as an executable civil decree. Therefore, in view of the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in K.N.Govindan Kutty Menon's case (supra), the impugned conviction and sentence imposed on the petitioner in this case as per the impugned judgments are per se illegal and ultra vires on this ground alone. Further it is argued by Smt.C.Bobby Raphael, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner/accused, that since the petitioner has already suffered the substantive sentence in this case and since the said conviction and sentence are per se illegal and ultra vires, this Court Crl.R.P.No.49/17 ::7::
may ensure that justice is effectively rendered to the petitioner by ordering that the period of two months' simple imprisonment suffered by the petitioner in this case should be treated to have run concurrently with the sentences, which are currently being suffered by the petitioner in other cases and that this Court has the power to grant such benefit in the light of the provisions contained in Section 427 and/or Section 428 of the Cr.P.C. 1973. The details of various cases in which the petitioner has suffered conviction, etc. have been now submitted by the learned Public Prosecutor on the basis of the specific instructions in that regard furnished by the Superintendent of Central Prison & Correctional Home, Viyyur, Thrissur, and it will be relevant to extract tabular details in that regard furnished along with the memo dated 7.6.2017 filed by the Public Prosecutor on the basis of the instructions of the jail authorities concerned, which reads as follows:
T A B L E - I "THE CASES IN WHICH SENTENCE YET TO UNDERGO BY C.NO.9242 SONY GEORGE S/O GEORGE Sl.
No. Case No. Court Sentence Remarks
JFCM II Default
1 CC-9/10 Muvattupuzha Till rising of court and pay fine sentence
wt.dt.10.06.2011 Rs.1894333/- i/d SI 6 Months pending
JFCM-II Default
2 CC-2/11 Muvattupzuha Till rising of court and pay fine sentence
wt.dt:13.09.2011 Rs.494000/- i/d SI 6 Months pending
JFCM-II Default
3 CC-1/11 Muvattupzuha Till rising of court and pay fine sentence
wt.dt:13.09.2011 Rs.100000- i/d SI 3 Months pending
Crl.R.P.No.49/17 ::8::
JFCM-I, Default
4 CC.1035/0 SI-6 months and compensation
7 Perumbavoor, sentence
wt.Dt.23.11.2011 Rs.30,000/- i/d SI 3 Months. pending JFCM I Default 5 CC- SI-6 months and compensation 1279/07 Perumbavor sentence wt.dt:23.11.2011 Rs.20,000/- i/d SI 3 Months. pending Expiry of JFCM sentence, 6 CC- RI-3 years and compensation 771/07 Kothamangalam Default wt.dt:07.03.2012 Rs.114000/- i/d RI 1 year sentence pending Expiry of JFCM sentence, 7 CC- RI-3 years and compensation 769/07 Kothamangalam Default wt.dt:07.03.2012 Rs.115000/- i/d RI 1 year sentence pending JFCM 8 CC- RI-3 years and compensation Sentence 770/2007 Kothamangalam wt.dt:07.03.2012 Rs.140000/- i/d SI 1 year pending JFCM 9 CC- RI-3 years and compensation Sentence 649/07 Kothamangalam wt.dt:07.03.2012 Rs.40000/- i/d SI 1 year pending JFCM 10 CC- RI-3 years and compensation Sentence 569/07 Kothamangalam wt.dt:07.03.2012 Rs.115000/- i/d SI 1 year pending JFCM 11 CC- RI-3 years and compensation Sentence 571/07 Kothamangalam wt.dt:07.03.2012 Rs.40000/- i/d RI 1 year pending JFCM 12 CC.579/07 Kothamangalam RI-3 years and compensation Sentence wt.dt:07.03.2012 Rs.65000/- i/d SI 1 year pending JFCM 13 CC- RI-3 years and compensation Sentence 768/07 Kothamangalam wt.dt:07.03.2012 Rs.140000/- i/d SI 1 year pending JFCM 14 CC- RI-3 years and compensation Sentence 707/07 Kothamangalam wt.dt:07.03.2012 Rs.115000/- i/d SI 1 year pending JFCM 15 CC- RI-3 years and compensation Sentence 652/07 Kothamangalam wt.dt:07.03.2012 Rs.140000/- i/d RI 1 year pending JFCM 16 CC- RI-3 years and compensation Sentence 568/07 Kothamangalam wt.dt:30.04.2012 Rs.40000/- i/d RI 1 year pending Crl.R.P.No.49/17 ::9::
JFCM 17 CC-85/09 Kothamangalam RI-3 years and compensation Sentence wt.dt:30.04.2012 Rs.40000/- i/d RI 1 year pending JFCM 18 CC- RI-3 years and compensation Sentence 631/07 Kothamangalam wt.dt:30.04.2012 Rs.30000/- i/d RI 1 year pending JFCM 19 CC- RI-3 years and compensation Sentence 638/07 Kothamangalam wt.dt:30.04.2012 Rs.30000/- i/d RI 1 year pending JFCM 20 CC- RI-3 years and compensation Sentence 650/07 Kothamangalam wt.dt:30.04.2012 Rs.75000/- i/d RI 1 year pending JFCM 21 CC- RI-3 years and compensation Sentence 653/07 Kothamangalam wt.dt:30.04.2012 Rs.115000/- i/d RI 1 year pending JFCM 22 CC- RI-3 years and compensation Sentence 662/07 Kothamangalam wt.dt:30.04.2012 Rs.40000/- i/d RI 1 year pending JFCM 23 CC- RI-3 years and compensation Sentence 672/07 Kothamangalam wt.dt:30.04.2012 Rs.140000/- i/d RI 1 year pending JFCM 24 CC- RI-3 years and compensation Sentence 773/07 Kothamangalam wt.dt:30.04.2012 Rs.140000/- i/d RI 1 year pending JFCM 25 CC- RI-3 years and compensation Sentence 778/07 Kothamangalam wt.dt:30.04.2012 Rs.95000/- i/d RI 1 year pending JFCM 26 CC- RI-3 years and compensation Sentence 800/08 Kothamangalam wt.dt:30.04.2012 Rs.140000/- i/d RI 1 year pending JFCM 27 CC- RI-3 years and compensation Sentence 801/07 Kothamangalam wt.dt:30.04.2012 Rs.140000/- i/d RI 1 year pending JFCM 28 CC- RI-3 years and compensation Sentence 651/07 Kothamangalam wt.dt:30.04.2012 Rs.30000/- i/d RI 1 year pending JFCM 29 CC-68/09 Kothamangalam RI-3 years and compensation Sentence wt.dt:30.04.2012 Rs.400000/- i/d RI 1 year pending 30 ST:203/12 JFCM-III, Aluva SI for 3 Months, set off Sentence wt.dt:11.06.2013 20.11.2012 to 10.06.2013. pending Crl.R.P.No.49/17 ::10::
SI for 3 Months, set off 31 ST:225/11 JFCM-III, Aluva Sentence wt.dt:11.06.2013 16.08.2012 to 10.06.2013. (299 days, set off exceeded) pending 32 ST:226/11 JFCM-III, Aluva SI for 3 Months, set off Sentence wt.dt:11.06.2013 01.11.2012 to 11.06.2013. pending 33 ST:227/11 JFCM-III, Aluva SI for 3 Months, set off Sentence wt.dt:11.06.2013 20.11.2012 to 10.06.2013. pending RI-3 years and compensation JFCM Rs.25000/-, 32000/- and 35000/-
34 CC- to the 4th, 5th, 7th prosecution Sentence 533/09 Kothamangalam wt.dt:09.10.2014 witness, i/d of compensation RI pending for Six months each. Set off 27.10.2011 to 07.03.2012.
JFCM 35 CC- RI - 3 years and compensation Sentence 772/07 Kothamangalam wt.dt:13.11.2014 Rs.150000/- i/d RI 12 months pending JFCM 36 CC-618/11 Kothamangalam RI - 1 years and compensation Sentence wt.dt:14.01.2015 Rs.50000/- i/d RI six months pending RI - 3 years and compensation Rs.50000/- each to the PW1 to PW 3 & PW 5 i/d of payment of compensation as directed above, the accused shall further undergo JFCM RI for a period of one year each 37 CC- Sentence 765/07 Kothamangalam for default of payment of wt.dt:28.01.2015 compensation to each witness. pending Set off 02.06.2007 to 20.08.2007 and 27.06.2008 to 04.09.2008 and
8.06.2011 to 11.05.2012. The default sentence shall run consecutively.
RI-2 years and to pay fine of
JFCM Rs.230000/- i/d SI six months, Set
38 CC-619/11 Kothamangalam off 20.05.2007 to 12.09.2007 and Sentence
wt.dt:13.12.2016 07.02.2010 to 28.04.2010 and pending
27.10.2011 to 07.03.2012
JFCM
39 CC-627/11 Kothamangalam RI- 2 years and to pay fine of Sentence
wr.dt.13.12.2016 Rs.220000/- i/d SI six months pending
Crl.R.P.No.49/17 ::11::
T A B L E - II
THE CASES IN WHICH SENTENCE ALREADY UNDERGONE BY C.NO.9242 SONY GEORGE S/O GEORGE JFCM, Kalpatta, Expiry of 1 CC.9/07 Wayanad, Compensation Rs.60000/- (No sentence on Wr.Dt.08.7.2011 default sentence) 07.10.2011 JFCM-1 SI-6 months and compensation Expiry of 2 CC.1161/07 Perumbavoor, Rs.100000/- i/d SI for 3 sentence and wt.dt:31.01.2012 months paid compensation JFCM-1 SI for two months and Expiry of 3 CC.162/10 Perumbavoor, compensation Rs.15000/- i/d sentence and wt.dt:23.11.2011 SI for 2 months paid compensation JFCM-1 4 CC-422/07 Thamarassery RI - 3 years and Pay fine Acquitted on wt.dt:06.07.2012 Rs.10000/- i/d SI for 6 months 21.03.2014 JFCM-1 5 CC-55/09 Thamarassery, RI-3 years and pay a fine of Acquitted on wt.dt:19.07.2012 Rs.115000/- i/d RI one year 13.01.2017 Sd/-
Superintendent, Central Prison & Correctional Home, Viyyur."
8. It is pointed out by the petitioner's counsel that as evident from Sl.No.(3) of Table No.II, the petitioner has already suffered the substantive sentence of two months' simple imprisonment for the period from 8.8.2012 to 8.10.2012 in respect of the present matter in C.C.No. 162 of 2010 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate's Court-I, Perumbavoor, and that the petitioner is now currently suffering sentence in respect of serial No.8 of Table No.I given above, viz., C.C.No.770 of 2007 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate's Court, Kothamangalam, and it is submitted by the petitioner's counsel that this Crl.R.P.No.49/17 ::12::
Court may order in exercise of the powers under Section 427 of the Cr.P.C. that the substantive sentence of two months' imprisonment imposed in the present case should be treated to have run concurrently, with the sentence currently being suffered by him in the other cases concerned. Alternatively, it is submitted by the petitioner that in case invocation of power under Section 427 of the Cr.P.C. is not feasible, then this Court may invoke its powers conferred under Section 428 of the Cr.P.C. and grant set off for the period of two months' simple imprisonment as against the sentence being currently suffered by the petitioner in the other cases concerned. In this regard he places reliance on the judgments of the Apex Court in the case in State of Maharashtra & another. v. Najakat Alia Mubarak Ali reported in (2001) 6 SCC 311 and State of Punjab v. Madan Lal reported in (2009) 5 SCC 238.
9. Heard Smt.C.Bobby Raphael, learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner/accused and Sri.Saigi Jacob Palatty, learned Prosecutor appearing for R-1. As noted herein above, there is no appearance for R-2 complainant, in spite of due service of notice on that party.
10. The main point to be decided is as to the legality and correctness of the impugned conviction and sentence rendered by the trial court in the present case as affirmed by the appellate court. The Crl.R.P.No.49/17 ::13::
trial court had rendered the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence on 23.11.2011. It appears that the petitioner was implicated as accused in various cases for the offences as in Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, etc. On account of his suffering sentence in other cases or on account of his financial disabilities, the petitioner could not prefer a Criminal Appeal before the Sessions Court, so as to impugn the present trial court judgment. It is also not in dispute that the impugned sentence in this case was executed and the petitioner had suffered substantive sentence of simple imprisonment for two months in this case for the period from 8.8.2012 to 8.10.2012. The impugned criminal proceedings happened to be referred to the Lok Adalat in terms of the provisions contained in the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. In the said Lok Adalat, Annexure-A1 has been passed as mentioned hereinabove wherein it was unconditionally ordered in the said award that the complainant is entitled to receive Rs.1,50,000/- alongwith 12% interest from 25.4.2005 (date of cheque) and that there should be a charge for that amount on 66 cents of land belonging to the petitioner herein. As evident from Annexure-A2 communication dated 20.12.2013 issued by the trial court, the petitioner had also paid full compensation amount covered by Annexure-A1 Lok Adalat award to the complainant. In the judgment in K.N.Govindan Kutty Menon's case (supra), the Apex Court has Crl.R.P.No.49/17 ::14::
conclusively and categorically held that a Lok Adalat award can also be lawfully passed on the basis of consensus between the parties in a criminal complaint involving offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and that in such a case where the award is passed on the basis of consensus between the parties, then it will be covered by the mandatory provisions contained in Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act and that such an award shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court which is to be executed by the party concerned. In M/s.Valarmathi Oil Industries and another v. Saradhi Ginning Factory reported in AIR 2009 Madras 180, it has been categorically held by the Madras High Court that once such a Lok Adalat award is passed in respect of a criminal complaint for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, it is for the complainant to file Execution Petition before the appropriate court, seeking enforcement of the award as a deemed executable decree for realisation of the amount covered by the award alongwith interest and cost, etc. and in such a case, the criminal court becomes functus officio to deal with the matter after the award passed by the Lok Adalat. In this view of the matter, the Madras High Court in the said judgment had set aside the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court as well as the impugned appellate judgment rendered by the Sessions Court in that case on the ground that the criminal courts have become functus officio to deal with Crl.R.P.No.49/17 ::15::
the matter any further. Thus though the proceedings had started as a criminal proceeding, once the parties have voluntarily on the basis of a consensus have arrived at a settlement and it has fructified as an award in terms of Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, then it becomes a deemed executable decree in terms of the provisions contained in Section 21(1) of the said Act and in such a case, conviction and sentence imposed on the accused in that case by the criminal courts concerned is illegal and ultra vires, etc. The said judgment of the Madras High Court in M/s.Valarmathi Oil Industries's case (supra) has been fully relied on and approved by the Apex Court in paragraph 23 of K.N.Govindan Kutty Menon's case (supra). In the judgment in Subhash Narasappa Mangrule v. Sidramappa Jagdevappa Unnad reported in (2009) 3 Maharashtra Law Journal 857, the Bombay High Court has also held that once an award is passed by the Lok Adalat on a matter arising out of a complaint for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, then it becomes a deemed executable decree in terms of the Legal service Authorities Act, 1987. The said decision of the Bombay High Court has also been duly approved and relied on by the Apex Court in paragraph 23 of K.N.Govindan Kutty Menon's case (supra). A subsidiary issue in this regard is also to be duly taken care of. The appellate court has held that it is not proper for Crl.R.P.No.49/17 ::16::
that court to consider the appeal on merits at such a belated stage inasmuch as the petitioner had already suffered the substantive sentence of two months covered by the impugned trial court judgment and he had also paid the compensation based on the Lok Adalat award and that it is not proper and right for the appellate court to consider on merits of the issues relating to the conviction and sentence in a Criminal Appeal which has been filed quite belatedly. The said stand taken by the appellate Sessions Court is clearly legally wrong. The Apex Court has held in the judgment in Retti Deenabandhu and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in (1977) 1 SCC 742 that a convicted person in challenging his conviction in a Criminal Appeal not only seeks to avoid undergoing punishment imposed upon him as a result of the conviction, but that he also wants that other adverse civil consequences flowing from the conviction should not visit him and that the stigma which attaches to him because of the conviction should be wiped out and that the fact that he is set at liberty and would not have to undergo further sentence of imprisonment would not debar him from questioning the validity of his conviction and object of such a challenge to the conviction is to avoid the other consequences flowing from the conviction and also to erase the stigma resulting from the conviction. In the said matter dealt with by the Apex Court in Retti Deenabandhu's Crl.R.P.No.49/17 ::17::
case (supra), the appellant therein was convicted by the Sessions Court, Visakhapattanam, for the offences under Sections 147, 148 and 352 of the IPC and the sentence of imprisonment awarded to some of the appellants therein was two years, while in the case of other appellants was one year. The appellants had gone up in appeal before the High Court against judgment of the trial court and the High Court in that case referred to the fact that the appellants therein had been in custody during the course of the investigation, inquiry and trial for about two years and that the appellants were entitled under Section 428 of the Cr.P.C. to set off the period of detention against the sentence of imprisonment imposed upon them and the High Court thereby dismissed the appeal after observing that it was unnecessary to go into the matter, as it would only be of academic interest. The said dismissal of the Criminal Appeal by the High Court was challenged before the Apex Court by the appellants therein. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court conclusively held that even if the accused had already undergone imprisonment period, they still have the right to challenge the conviction, so as to wipe out the stigma that arises out of the conviction. Paragraph 3 of the said judgment of the Apex Court in Retti Deenabandhu's case (supra) reads as follows:
"3. We have heard Mr Agarwala on behalf of the appellants and Mr Rao on behalf of the State, and are of the opinion that the judgment of the High Court insofar as it has refrained from going into the merits of the conviction of the appellants, cannot be sustained. The fact that a Crl.R.P.No.49/17 ::18::
convicted person has already undergone the sentence or is otherwise entitled to be set at liberty because of the length of the period during which he has been under detention during the course of investigation, inquiry and trial cannot prevent the said person from challenging his conviction in appeal. Conviction for an offence entails certain consequences. Conviction also carries with it a stigma for the convicted person. A convicted person challenging his conviction in appeal not only seeks to avoid undergoing the punishment imposed upon him as a result of the conviction, he also wants that other evil consequences flowing from the conviction should not visit him and that the stigma which attaches to him because of the conviction should be wiped out. In case the convicted person undergoes the sentence of imprisonment imposed upon him or he is otherwise entitled to be set at liberty by the time his appeal against conviction comes up for hearing in view of the length of the period he was in detention during the course of investigation, inquiry or trial, such a person would still be entitled to challenge his conviction. The fact that he is set at liberty and would not have to undergo any further sentence of imprisonment would not debar him from questioning the validity of his conviction. The object of such a challenge to conviction is to avoid the other consequences flowing from conviction and also to erase the stigma resulting from the conviction. The High Court, in our view, was in error insofar as it declined to go into the validity of the conviction of the appellants." This Court has also held in the common order dated 8.3.2017 rendered in Crl.R.P.No.1692 of 2016 and Crl.M.C.No.1527 of 2017 that though the petitioner therein had earlier undergone the substantive sentence of imprisonment till the rising of the court and had paid the compensation amount of Rs.50,000/-, that by itself will not take away the accused's precious right to file an appeal to challenge the very basis of the conviction. For these reasons, the stand taken by the appellate court is clearly untenable and legally wrong. Merely because the petitioner had suffered the substantive sentence of two months and he had also volunteered to pay off the compensation amount due to the complainant, will not in any manner estop or disentitle the petitioner from pursuing his statutory right to pursue the Criminal Appeal on merits. One crucial Crl.R.P.No.49/17 ::19::
aspect of the matter requires due cognizance by this Court. After suffering the substantive sentence of two months for the period from 8.8.2012 to 8.10.2012, the petitioner could have easily avoided the suffering of default sentence of two months by paying only the compensation amount of Rs.1,50,000/- as ordered by the trial court.
Since the petitioner was suffering sentences in many cases, he could not have been immediately made to suffer the default sentence of two months simple imprisonment imposed in this case by virtue of the mandatory provisions contained in Section 429(2) of the Cr.P.C. Instead of merely paying Rs.1,50,000/- as compensation to the complainant, the petitioner had volunteered to take part in the Lok Adalat proceedings which was conducted by the subordinate court concerned and he had voluntarily agreed to pay not only the compensation amount of Rs.1,50,000/- as ordered by the trial court, but also interest thereon @12% per annum from the date of the borrowal (24.5.2005). In that regard it is also worthwhile to note that Exhibit P1 dishonoured cheque for Rs.1,50,000/- is bearing the date 5.4.2007. The petitioner is said to have borrowed the amount of Rs.1,50,000/- from the complainant on 25.4.2005. In many cases, the Apex Court and various High Courts have held that in offence involving Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the trial court could award interest up to 9% per annum from the date of cheque up to the date of realisation. In the instant case, the Crl.R.P.No.49/17 ::20::
petitioner has volunteered to pay not only the principal amount, but also interest thereon at the higher interest rate of 12% from the date of borrowal of money (25.4.2005) and not merely from the date of the dishonoured cheque (5.4.2007). Therefore, conduct of the petitioner is to be duly appreciated for having paid not only the full compensation amount, but also interest thereon at the higher rate of 12% per annum from the date of the alleged borrowal. It is also too well established by various rulings of the Apex Court as in Damodar.S.Prabhu v. Sayed Babalal reported in AIR 2010 SC 1907 that in criminal complaints involving offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the compensatory aspect of the remedy should be given utmost priority over the punitive aspects. Further the Apex Court has also held in the decisions as in Kaushalya Devi Massand v. Roopkishore reported in AIR 2011 SC 2566 that the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is essentially a civil wrong which has been given criminal overtones by legislative amendment of the provisions contained in the N.I. Act and that gravity of such a complaint cannot be equated with offence under the Indian Penal Code and instead of jail sentence, imposition of fine payable as compensation would be sufficient to meet the ends of justice. In view of these aspects, this Court has no hesitation to hold that at least the substantive sentence of simple Crl.R.P.No.49/17 ::21::
imprisonment for two months imposed in this case by the trial court as confirmed by the appellate court is excessive and disproportionate and the courts below could have easily confined the punishment to imposition of fine with adequate compensation under Section 357(3) of the Cr.P.C. and an appropriate default sentence clause. So, even it is assumed that the conviction rendered in this case is correct, still the substantive sentence imposed in this case can only be held to be legally wrong and improper in the facts and circumstances of this case. That apart in view of the legal principles laid down by the Apex Court in K.N.Govindan Kutty Menon's case (supra), it is only to be held that in view of Annexure-A1 Lok Adalat award, the criminal court had become functus officio as far as the impugned criminal proceedings are concerned and therefore, the conviction and sentence imposed on the petitioner by the trial court as confirmed by the appellate court is only to be held as illegal and ultra vires.
11. In this view of the matter, the impugned conviction and sentence imposed on the petitioner by the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court will stand rescinded and set aside and the petitioner is acquitted of the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, as the criminal courts have become functus officio. It is ordered that the matter in relation to the present impugned criminal proceedings would be governed by Annexure-A1 Lok Adalat award and Crl.R.P.No.49/17 ::22::
since the terms and conditions of the award has already been complied by the petitioner by paying the full amount covered by that award, no further action is required in that regard as far as enforcement of the said award is concerned.
12. Now the issue to be decided is as to what are the reliefs that should be granted to the petitioner inasmuch as this Court has found that the impugned conviction and sentence imposed on him is not legal and proper. The dilemma faced by this Court is that the petitioner has already undergone the said substantive sentence of two months for the period from 8.8.2012 to 8.10.2012 in this case. Therefore, the matter to be examined is as to whether the provisions contained in Section 427 of the Cr.P.C. or that in Section 428 of the Cr.P.C. could be invoked in the facts and circumstances of this case. Section 427 of the Cr.P.C. reads as follows :
"427. Sentence on offender already sentenced for another offence:- (1) When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life, such imprisonment or imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previously sentenced, unless the Court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence :
Provided that where a person who has been sentenced to imprisonment by an order under Section 122 in default of furnishing security is, whilst undergoing such sentence, sentenced to imprisonment for an offence committed prior to the making of such order, the latter sentence shall commence immediately.
(2) When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for life is sentenced on a Crl.R.P.No.49/17 ::23::
subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life, the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence."
Section 427(1) of the Cr.P.C. deals with the situation when a person already undergoing sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on subsequent conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life in another case, such imprisonment or imprisonment for life shall then commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previously sentenced, unless the court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently to such previous sentence. In sub- section (2) of Section 427 further stipulates that when a person already undergoing sentence of imprisonment for life is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term of imprisonment for life, the subsequent sentence would run concurrently with such previous sentence. So, in all cases other than that covered by Section 427(2) of the Cr.P.C., the sentence imposed on a convicted prisoner in a subsequent case will normally run consecutively and not concurrently unless otherwise ordered by the convicting court or appellate court or revisional court in the subsequent case.
13. The Apex Court in the judgment in M.R.Kudva v. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in (2007) 2 SCC 772 has dealt with a case where the appellant/accused therein was convicted and sentenced in two separate cases and appeals there against the High Court were Crl.R.P.No.49/17 ::24::
dismissed and S.L.P.s filed before the Supreme Court were also dismissed. Later, application was moved before the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking the benefit of Section 427 of the Cr.P.C. interalia that sentences imposed in both the cases be treated to run concurrently and the said plea was rejected. This was taken up in challenge before the Apex Court, which led to the judgment in M.R.Kudva's case (supra). It was held by the Apex Court that the provision contained in Section 427 of the Cr.P.C. was not invoked in the original cases or in the appeals. A separate application filed before the High Court, after dismissal of the S.L.Ps. was not maintainable and the High Court could not have exercised its inherent jurisdiction in a case of that nature as it had previously not exercised while deciding the appeals and that the provision contained in Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is not an appropriate remedy in that case as neither the trial court judge nor the High Court while convicting and sentencing the appellant had indicated that the sentences passed against him in both the cases shall run concurrently or that Section 427 of the Cr.P.C.
would be attracted. So, ordinarily it will not be right and proper to consider the plea for the benefit of Section 427 of the Cr.P.C. by a subsequent application moved under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., without raising such a plea at the appropriate time before the trial court, appellate court, revisional court, etc. It has been held by this Court in Crl.R.P.No.49/17 ::25::
Bhaskaran v. State of Kerala reported in 1978 KLT 6 that such plea for the benefit of Section 31(1) or Section 427(1) of the Cr.P.C. could be considered by the trial court or by the appellate court or revisional court, etc. The parameters for considering the pleas under Section 427 of the Cr.P.C. have been dealt with by the Apex Court in the decisions as in V.K.Bansal v. State of Haryana and another reported in (2013) 7 SCC 211, Shyam Pal v. Dayawati Besoya and another reported in (2016) 10 SCC 761, Benson v. State of Kerala reported in (2016) 10 SCC 307 as well as by this Court in Benson v. State of Kerala and another reported in 2014 (4) KLJ 82, etc.
14. In the instant case, this Court has already held that the substantive sentence imposed on the petitioner is not legally correct and proper and the impugned judgments have also been set aside in that regard, but more crucially it is relevant to note that the petitioner has already suffered the said substantive sentence for the period from 8.8.2012 to 8.10.2012. Sub-section (1) of Section 427 of the Cr.P.C. can be invoked only in a case when a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life, then such subsequent imprisonment or imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previously sentenced, unless Crl.R.P.No.49/17 ::26::
the court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence. In the instant case, the sentence has already been set aside and therefore, there is no question of ordering that the said subsequent sentence should run concurrently with the previous sentence. More importantly, even if the substantive sentence in this case has not been set aside, as the said sentence has already been suffered by the petitioner, it will not be right and proper to order that a sentence which has already been suffered should be treated to have run concurrently with the previous sentence. A High Court while exercising its powers as a revisional criminal court is confined by all the limitations which are imposed on the exercise of its powers as a criminal court in terms of the provisions contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, in order to consider the grant of the relief as envisaged in Section 427(1) Cr.P.C., it has to be ensured that the jurisdictional facts required for the implication of that provision are completely satisfied before the court takes a decision in that regard. Therefore, in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, it is only to be held that the provision contained in Section 427(1) of the Cr.P.C. cannot be invoked in this case.
15. The next issue is as to whether the provision contained in Section 428 of the Cr.P.C. would come into play. Section 428 of the Cr.P.C. reads as follows :
Crl.R.P.No.49/17 ::27::
""428. Period of detention undergone by the accused to be set off against the sentence of imprisonment:- Where an accused person has, on conviction, been sentenced to imprisonment for a term not being imprisonment in default of payment of fine, the period of detention, if any, undergone by him during the investigation, inquiry or trial of the same case and before the date of such conviction, shall be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed on him on such conviction, and the liability of such person to undergo imprisonment on such conviction shall be restricted to the remainder, if any, of the term of imprisonment imposed on him :
Provided that in cases referred to in Section 433A, such period of detention shall be set off against the period of fourteen years referred to in that Section."
Under the operative portion of Section 428 of the Cr.P.C., it is stipulated that where an accused has, on conviction, been sentenced to imprisonment for a term not being imprisoned in default of payment of fine, the period of detention, if any, undergone by him during the investigation, inquiry or trial of the same case and before the date of such conviction, shall be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed on such conviction, and the liability of such person to undergo imprisonment on such conviction shall be restricted to the remainder, if any, for the term of imprisonment imposed on him, etc. The majority judgment in the case in State of Maharashtra and another v. Najakat Alia Mubarak Ali reported in (2001) 6 SCC 311 has held that the period of imprisonment undergone by an accused as an undertrial during investigation, inquiry or trial of a particular case, irrespective of whether it was in connection with that very case or any other case could be set off against the sentence of imprisonment imposed on conviction in that Crl.R.P.No.49/17 ::28::
particular case and that the words "same case" does not suggest a set off would be available only if the period undergone as an undertrial prison is in connection with the same case in which he was later convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment, etc. The abovesaid judgment of the Apex Court in State of Maharashtra and another v. Najakat Alia Mubarak Ali reported in (2001) 6 SCC 311 has subsequently followed by the Apex Court in the case in State of Punjab v. Madan Lal reported in (2009) 5 SCC 238. However, later, the Apex Court in the judgment in Atul Manubhai Parekh v. Central Bureau of Investigation reported in (2010) 1 SCC 603 has held that the benefit of set off as envisaged in Section 428 is available in relation to the period of detention already undergone in respect of the same case and hence, a convict in a given case cannot be granted set off against periods of detention/imprisonment undergone by him in connection with other cases, etc. In view of the judgment of the Apex Court in Atul Manubhai Parekh's case (supra), it will not be right and proper for this Court to grant the benefit of set off to the petitioner in terms of the provisions contained Section 428 of the Cr.P.C. Moreover, the period of imprisonment undergone by the petitioner is not pre-trial detention, but the substantive sentence involved in this case. Moreover, very crucially it is to be noted that the period of detention/imprisonment suffered by Crl.R.P.No.49/17 ::29::
the petitioner in this case is not the pre-trial detention as envisaged in Section 428 of the Cr.P.C., but the substantive sentence suffered consequent to the conviction imposed by the trial court. On this reason alone, the petitioner is not technically entitled for the benefit of Section 428 of the Cr.P.C.
16. It is true that the petitioner would not fulfill the technical requirements of the provisions contained in Section 427(1) as well as Section 428 of the Cr.P.C. But the fact of the matter that stares at this Court is that he has suffered real injustice. More crucially, it is to be noted that the petitioner who has been implicated in various cases, obviously due to his financial mismanagement, has proved his bonafides at least in this case by volunteering to pay not only the principal amount of Rs.1,50,000/- to the complainant, but also interest thereon at the higher rate of 12% and that too not merely from the date of the cheque, but from the date of the alleged borrowal. The petitioner could have easily avoided the default sentence in this case by paying only the principal amount of Rs.1,50,000/- as the compensation awarded by the trial court in the impugned judgment is confined only to that amount and without any other interest. The above conduct of the petitioner is highly commendable. This Court in exercising its powers at criminal revisional court is confined by all the limitations that are imposed in exercise of the powers in terms of the provisions contained in the Code of Criminal Crl.R.P.No.49/17 ::30::
Procedure. It will not be right and proper for this Court to exercise its constitutional powers in a revisional proceedings under the Cr.P.C. The legislature has made specific provisions as in Section 427 and Section 428 of the Cr.P.C.and there could be many other cases which may have unjust and unfair consequences, which cannot be given the benefits of the statutory provisions as in Sections 427 or 428 of the Cr.P.C., etc. and those are matters which should gain the attention of the Parliament and the Law Commission. However, it will be highly unjust if this Court leaves the matter at that and that would amount to clear miscarriage of justice. On a consideration of the entire aspects of the matter, this Court is of the considered opinion that for a grievance of the present nature that is being suffered by the petitioner, the best remedy would be for the State Government to consider the grant of remission to the petitioner in the current sentences being suffered by him by virtue of the enabling powers conferred under Section 432 and Article 161 of the Constitution of India. Section 432 of the Cr.P.C. reads as follows :
"432. Power to suspend or remit sentences : - (1) When any person has been sentenced to punishment for an offence, the appropriate Government may, at any time, without conditions or upon any conditions which the person sentenced accepts, suspend the execution of his sentence or remit the whole or any part of the punishment to which he has seen sentenced.
(2) Whenever an application is made to the appropriate Government for the suspension or remission of a sentence, the appropriate Government may require the presiding Judge of the Court before or by which the conviction was had or confirmed, to state his opinion as to whether the application Crl.R.P.No.49/17 ::31::
should be granted or refused, together with his reasons for such opinion and also to forward with the statement of such opinion a certified copy of the record of the trial or of such record thereof as exists.
(3) If any condition on which a sentence has been suspended or remitted is, in the opinion of the appropriate Government, not fulfilled, the appropriate Government may cancel the suspension or remission, and thereupon the person in whose favour the sentence has been suspended or remitted may, if at large, be arrested by any police officer, without warrant and remanded to undergo the unexpired portion of the sentence.
(4) The condition on which a sentence is suspended or remitted under this Section may be one to be fulfilled by the person in whose favour the sentence is suspended or remitted, or one independent of his will.
(5) The appropriate Government may, by general rules or special orders, give directions as to the suspension of sentences and the conditions on which petitions should be presented and dealt with :
Provided that in the case of any sentence (other than a sentence of fine) passed on a male person above the age of eighteen years, no such petition by the person sentenced or by any other person on his behalf shall be entertained, unless the person sentenced is in jail, and, -
(a) where such petition is made by the person sentenced, it is presented through the officer in charge of the jail; or
(b) where such petition is made by any other person, it contains a declaration that the person sentenced is in jail.
(6) The provisions of the above sub-sections shall also apply to any order passed by a Criminal Court under any Section of this Code or of any other law which restricts the liberty of any person or imposes any liability upon him or his property.
(7) In this Section and in Section 433, the expression "appropriate Government" means,-
(a) in cases where the sentence is for an offence against, or the order referred to in sub-section (6) is passed under, any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the Union extends, the Central Government ;
(b) in other cases, the Government of the State within which the offender is sentenced or the said order is passed."
Article 161 of the Constitution of India reads as follows :
"161. Power of Governor to grant pardons, etc., and to suspend, remit or commute sentences in certain cases:- The Governor of a State shall have the power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites or remissions of punishment or to suspend, remit or commute the Crl.R.P.No.49/17 ::32::
sentence of any person convicted of any offence against any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the State extends."
As this Court has held that the substantive sentence imposed in this case is not legally correct and proper, and as the said sentence has already been set aside by this Court, the petitioner cannot be left in the lurch and the executive Government which is conferred with the necessary statutory powers and constitutional powers, will have to rise to the occasion and to ensure that a citizen like the petitioner should be given justice as enshrined in the statutory provisions as in Section 432 of the Cr.P.C. and in the constitutional provision as in Article 161 of the Constitution of India. This Court would venture to add that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, it will be highly right and proper if the State Government could consider the grant of remission of two months period from the current sentence being suffered by the petitioner in other cases. Accordingly, it is ordered that the Government of Kerala in the Home Department shall consider this question with all its seriousness and solemnity and decide on the issue of grant of remission to the petitioner in an appropriate manner without much delay, so that the period of two months (suffered by him in substantive sentence in this case for the period from 8.8.2010 to 8.10.2012) is given as remission from the sentence that is being currently suffered by him in other cases. It is brought to the notice of this Court that the petitioner is Crl.R.P.No.49/17 ::33::
now currently suffering sentence in Sl.No.8 of Table No.1 mentioned hereinabove, viz., C.C.No.770 of 2007 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Kothamangalam. In order to fully effectuate the consideration of this aspect, the petitioner will give a comprehensive representation in that regard to the Principal Secretary to Government of Kerala in the Home Department seeking the benefit of remission as stated hereinabove and such representation may be forwarded to the jail authorities concerned and it shall be ensured by the jail authorities concerned that such representation is forwarded to the Government in the Home Department without any further delay on its receipt. In case, consultation with the criminal court concerned is necessary for considering the prayer of remission, then formalities in that regard may also be adhered to by the competent authority of the State Government. The petitioner may be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard through his authorised representative/counsel, if any engaged.
17. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, it is ordered that the Government in the Home Department will ensure that the said representation of the petitioner for the grant of remission is considered with all its seriousness and solemnity and without much delay and it may be ensured that a final decision is rendered in that matter at least within a period of four months from the date of receipt of the said representation of the petitioner after following all requisite Crl.R.P.No.49/17 ::34::
formalities, if any. The Registry to forward a certified copy of this order to the Principal Secretary to Government in the Home Department. Learned Prosecutor will also forward copies of this order to the Principal Secretary to Government in the Home Department as well as to the Superintendent, Central Prison & Correctional Home, Viyyur, Thrissur, for further necessary action.
With these observations and directions, the Crl.Revision Petition will stand finally disposed of.
ALEXANDER THOMAS JUDGE csl