Delhi District Court
Kari Yadav vs Dinesh Singh on 24 March, 2026
DLND010058642025 Page 1 of 20
Cr Rev 392/2025
Kari Yadav
Vs.
Dinesh Singh
IN THE COURT OF ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE-05
NEW DELHI DISTRICT : PATIALA HOUSE COURTS : NEW DELHI
Criminal Revision No. 392/2025
In the matter of :-
Kari Yadav
S/o Sh. Anant Yadav,
R/o H. No. CN-161-A, Shankar Camp
Rangpuri Pahari, Malikpur Kohi @
Mahipalpur, Delhi-110037
.....Revisionist
(represented by Ld. Counsel Sh. Ashutosh Upadhyay,
Sh. Vivekanand Ray and Sh. Kundan Kumar Singh)
Versus
Dinesh Singh,
S/o Sh. Virendra Singh,
R/o Shed Room, Community Hall,
D-7 & 8, Vasant Kunj,
New Delhi-110070
....Respondent
(represented by Ld. Counsel Sh. Kanwar Udai Bhan Singh and
Sh. Shrinkar Chaturvedi)
Criminal Revision Under Section 438 BNSS
Date of institution : 31.07.2025
Date when judgment reserved : 23.03.2026
Date of Judgment : 24.03.2026
DLND010058642025 Page 2 of 20
Cr Rev 392/2025
Kari Yadav
Vs.
Dinesh Singh
JUDGMENT
1. INTRODUCTION:
a. It is a lamentable truth that the corridors of justice are frequently traversed by those who seek to escape the legitimate demands of law. The present revision petition stands as a monument to such an attempted flight--a last desperate gambit by the revisionist to evade the payment of compensation lawfully awarded by the courts, including the learned trial court and the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi. b. The revisionist, having undergone his substantive sentence and the sentence in default of payment of fine, now approaches this Court with the thesis that by merely enduring imprisonment, he has purchased immunity from his monetary obligations. This interpretation of law is as flawed as it is dangerous. It betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of the distinction between punitive imprisonment and the obligation to restore what was wrongfully taken or damaged. c. The revisionist's contention is not merely erroneous; it is an affront to the very concept of restitutive justice. When a court imposes a fine as compensation, it does so not as a punishment alone, but as an instrument of restoration--to make whole the victim who has suffered loss. To suggest that the passage of time spent in a prison cell can absolve one from restoring what DLND010058642025 Page 3 of 20 Cr Rev 392/2025 Kari Yadav Vs. Dinesh Singh was taken is to render the victim's right to compensation a hollow shell, devoid of substance and dignity.
2. THE IMPUGNED ORDER a. The learned trial court, vide judgment dated 30.01.2020 and order dated 07.02.2020, convicted the revisionist, Kari Yadav, under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and sentenced him to:
i. Substantive sentence: Simple imprisonment for one year; and ii. Fine: Rupees twelve lakhs (₹12,00,000/-) as compensation to the respondent-complainant; and iii. Default clause: In the event of non-payment of fine, further simple imprisonment for three months.
b. The revisionist's appeal against this judgment was dismissed by the Appellate Court. Thereafter, the revisionist filed a petition under Section 427(1) Cr.P.C. read with Section 482 Cr.P.C. praying that the substantive sentences awarded in Case Nos. 1682/2017 and 1683/2017 run concurrently. The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi, vide order dated 14.05.2024, allowed this petition and recorded that the revisionist had undergone his full substantive sentence as well as the sentence in default of payment of fine.DLND010058642025 Page 4 of 20 Cr Rev 392/2025
Kari Yadav Vs. Dinesh Singh c. It is material to note--and indeed, it is the crux of this matter
--that nowhere in the original judgment or order of sentence did the learned trial court grant any recovery rights to the complainant under Sections 421 or 431 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
d. Subsequently, the respondent-complainant filed an application under Sections 421/431 Cr.P.C. seeking the issuance of warrants for attachment of the revisionist's immovable property for recovery of the fine amount. The learned trial court, vide the impugned order dated 12.06.2025, allowed this application and directed attachment proceedings. e. It is against this order that the present revision petition has been filed. The said order is reproduced as under:
" Present: Mr. Kanwar Uday Bhan Singh Sehrawat, Ld. Counsel for Complainant.
The matter is taken up on an application filed by the complainant seeking direction to the concerned SDM, Saharsa, Bihar for attachment of the immovable property identified in the name of the convict namely Kari Yadav @ Kari Lal Yadav.
Ld. Counsel has referred to the report dated 24.10.2024 filed by the concerned SDM. The report is accompanied by a letter dated 07.10.2024, wherein it is stated that an entry bearing token No.3487/2016 and document No. 3440/2016 dated 28.03.2016 has been identified which indicates that an immoveable property has been registered in the name of Kari Lal Yadav S/o Anant Lal Yadav. Ld. Counsel has drawn attention to the registered document, wherein a mobile number is written in handwriting in Hindi numerals. It is submitted that the said mobile number belongs to the convict and therefore, it could be seen that the property identified by the concerned SDM is DLND010058642025 Page 5 of 20 Cr Rev 392/2025 Kari Yadav Vs. Dinesh Singh actually in the name of the convict, namely Kari Yadav @ Kari Lal Yadav.
The documents indicate that the convict is the owner of the said immoveable property.
In the light of the fact that the present application is in the nature of recovery under Section 421 Cr.P.C. qua the amount of fine/compensation payable by the convict to the complainant as per the order of sentence, I am of the considered opinion that it is a fit case to direct appropriate action for recovery of fine in accordance with Section 421(1)(b) of Cr.P.C. out of the immoveable property registered in the name of Kari Lal Yadav S/o Anant Lal Yadav, measuring 418.66 Sq. Yards, Book No.I, Volume No.46 at pages 564 to 571, bearing token No.3487/2016, situated in Mauza Dhabauli, P.S. Pathar Ghat, Tehsil Saur Bazar, District Saharsa, Bihar. Let a warrant of attachment of the said immoveable property be issued to the concerned Collector/Deputy Commissioner as well as to the concerned SDM of District Saharsa, Bihar.
Let process/warrants of attachment also be provided dasti to the applicant and the applicant shall be at liberty to approach the concerned Collector/Deputy Commissioner in addition to the process through official channel.
Application stands disposed of accordingly.
As prayed, a copy of this order be given dasti absolutely free of cost, to applicant/Ld. Counsel against proper acknowledgment/receipt, as per rules.
Let a compliance report of attachment be filed before this Court on the date already fixed i.e. 08.07.2025."
3. GROUNDS OF REVISION AND ARGUMENTS ADVANCED The revisionist has raised the following substantive contentions, some in revision petition and others during submissions of Ld. Counsel for the revisionist:
DLND010058642025 Page 6 of 20 Cr Rev 392/2025Kari Yadav Vs. Dinesh Singh a. The application is time-barred under the Limitation Act, though no specific provision pointed out;
b. The application for recovery is not maintainable in the absence of explicit grant of recovery rights in the original sentence order;
c. The complainant acted with malafide intention to harass and extort money;
d. Special reasons under the proviso to Section 421 were not recorded by the trial court;
e. The warrant of attachment does not specify the amount for which attachment has been issued;
f. By undergoing the default sentence, the liability to pay fine has been extinguished;
g. The trial court lacked application of judicial mind in passing the impugned order; and During the course of oral arguments before this Court, learned counsel for the revisionist reiterated these contentions, albeit with greater emphasis on the argument that completion of the default sentence extinguishes all liability for payment of fine.
4. The respondent-complainant, on the other hand, has relied upon the seminal judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Kumaran v. State of Kerala (2017) 7 SCC 476, and has urged that Section 421 DLND010058642025 Page 7 of 20 Cr Rev 392/2025 Kari Yadav Vs. Dinesh Singh read with Section 431 of the Code of Criminal Procedure explicitly empowers courts to recover fines even after sentences have been undergone, and that no special reasons are required where the fine is in the nature of compensation.
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
5. I now proceed to examine each of the substantial issues raised, not in the order in which they were presented, but in the order of their legal and logical importance.
6. The Nature and Character of Execution in Criminal Matters a. The first and most fundamental misconception harboured by the revisionist relates to the nature of execution in criminal matters. It is a cardinal principle of criminal procedure that the execution of a sentence is not a mere matter of discretion or time-limitation in the manner that execution of civil decrees may be. Rather, it is an obligation imposed upon the State through its courts to ensure that the orders of the court are effectuated.
b. Section 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is unambiguous in its language and uncompromising in its scope:
" When an offender has been sentenced to pay a fine, the Court passing the sentence may take action for the recovery of the fine in either or both of the following ways, that is to say, it may -
(a) issue a warrant for the levy of the amount by attachment and sale of any movable property belonging to the offender;DLND010058642025 Page 8 of 20 Cr Rev 392/2025
(b) issue a warrant to the Collector of the district, authorising him to realise the amount as arrears of land revenue from the movable or immovable property, or both, of the defaulter:
Provided that, if the sentence directs that in default of payment of the fine, the offender shall be imprisoned, and if such offender has undergone the whole of such imprisonment in default, no Court shall issue such warrant unless, for special reasons to be recorded in writing, it considers it necessary so to do, or unless it has made an order for the payment of expenses or compensation out of the fine under Section 357."
(emphasis supplied) c. This provision does not operate upon the logic of alternatives.
It does not suggest that payment of fine may be deferred or extinguished by the passage of time or the suffering of imprisonment. Rather, it establishes a continuing obligation:
the fine remains recoverable irrespective of whether default imprisonment has been undergone.
d. The Supreme Court of India, in the landmark judgment of Kumaran v. State of Kerala (supra), explicitly affirmed this principle. The Court observed that Section 421 Cr.P.C. provides for recovery of fine even after the sentence of imprisonment in default has been undergone. The rationale is manifest: the fine and the imprisonment in default are not mutually exclusive alternatives, but rather complementary mechanisms to ensure compliance with the court's order.
7. The Question of Limitation a. It is argued by the revisionist that the application for recovery is barred by limitation, as no application was made within the DLND010058642025 Page 9 of 20 Cr Rev 392/2025 Kari Yadav Vs. Dinesh Singh period of three years under the Limitation Act. This argument, while superficially attractive, collapses upon scrutiny. b. The Limitation Act applies to actions and applications of a civil nature. An application under Section 421 Cr.P.C. is not an action for the recovery of debt or money in the civil sense; rather, it is the court's exercise of its inherent duty to give effect to its own orders. The execution of a criminal sentence is not subject to limitation in the manner that execution of a civil decree is. Indeed, the doctrine of laches or limitation finds no application where the court is performing its duty to enforce the sentence.
c. The principle is well-established: the court's duty to execute its own orders is a continuing one, not circumscribed by time. It matters not whether the application seeking execution of sentence is filed six months after conviction or six years thereafter; the obligation to execute the order remains intact. To hold otherwise would be to permit the convicted person to purchase immunity from the court's orders merely by allowing time to pass--a doctrine as pernicious as it is unjust. d. Moreover, it is not the complainant's application alone that sets the execution machinery in motion. Even in the absence of an application by the complainant, it is the duty of the court, suo moto, to ensure that fines are recovered. The initiative of DLND010058642025 Page 10 of 20 Cr Rev 392/2025 Kari Yadav Vs. Dinesh Singh the complainant merely awakens the court's authority; it does not create that authority.
8. Maintainability of the Application: The Absence of Explicit Recovery Rights a. The revisionist has made much of the fact that the original order of sentence contains no explicit direction granting recovery rights to the complainant under Section 421 or 431 Cr.P.C. This contention, while superficially technical, is devoid of legal merit.
b. The authority to recover a fine does not require an explicit direction in the sentence order. Section 421 Cr.P.C. is itself a substantive law conferring the power of recovery. It operates independently and automatically upon the imposition of a fine. To require that the trial court explicitly invoke Sections 421 in the sentence order would be to read into the statute a condition that does not exist in its text.
c. Indeed, such a requirement would render many fines unrecoverable simply because trial courts, due to inadvertence, failed to include a boilerplate direction. The law cannot be so frail as to depend upon the mere formality of diction.
d. Moreover, the fact that the original sentence order is silent on recovery does not divest the court of its powers. The court DLND010058642025 Page 11 of 20 Cr Rev 392/2025 Kari Yadav Vs. Dinesh Singh always possesses the power to recover fines; it need not be granted anew in every application.
9. Special Reasons Under the Proviso to Section 421 a. Section 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides a proviso: special reasons must be recorded by the court in cases where the fine is to be recovered otherwise than for the payment of compensation. However, where the fine imposed is in the nature of compensation to the victim, no special reasons are required.
b. In the present case, the fine of ₹12,00,000/- was imposed as compensation to the victim, Dinesh Singh, who had suffered loss as a result of the revisionist's commission of an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. It was not imposed as a mere penal measure, but as a mechanism to restore the victim to his rightful position. c. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Kumaran v. State of Kerala, explicitly held that special reasons are not required where the fine is imposed as compensation. The reasoning is compelling:
where the fine is compensatory in nature, it partakes of the character of restitution, not punishment, and the requirement for special reasons applies only to punitive fines. d. The learned trial court, therefore, rightly did not record special reasons before issuing warrants of attachment.DLND010058642025 Page 12 of 20 Cr Rev 392/2025
Kari Yadav Vs. Dinesh Singh
10.The Specificity of the Amount a. It has been argued that the warrant of attachment fails to specify the amount for which attachment is being made. This argument, too, is untenable upon examination. b. The original sentence order contains an explicit statement of the amount: ₹12,00,000/- (twelve lakhs of rupees). It is manifest from the context that the warrant of attachment is for this amount. To suggest that there is ambiguity in this regard is to elevate form over substance and to ignore the elementary principle of interpretation that documents must be read with reference to their context.
11.The Extinguishment of Liability Through Suffering Default Imprisonment a. This is perhaps the most crucial argument, and it strikes at the heart of the revisionist's case. The revisionist contends that by undergoing the sentence of three months' imprisonment in default of payment of fine, he has thereby extinguished his liability to pay the fine itself.
b. This argument is manifestly incorrect and is contradicted by the express language of Section 421 Cr.P.C. The section does not provide that imprisonment in default shall extinguish the obligation to pay fine; rather, it provides that the fine shall be recoverable even after such imprisonment has been undergone.
DLND010058642025 Page 13 of 20 Cr Rev 392/2025Kari Yadav Vs. Dinesh Singh c. The distinction is not merely semantic; it is profound and consequential. When a court imposes a fine in default of which imprisonment is prescribed, it has created a graduated scheme of compulsion: the first lever is of fine; if that fails, the second lever is imprisonment. But the imprisonment does not replace the fine. The fine remains outstanding and recoverable, notwithstanding that the surrogate punishment has been exhausted.
d. To hold otherwise would be to render the default imprisonment a means by which the convicted person may purchase immunity from the financial obligation. The revisionist would thus be enabled to say: "I shall undergo three months' imprisonment in default, and thereby I shall have satisfied the court's order." This is precisely the mode of escape which the law does not permit.
e. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Kumaran, placed this matter beyond doubt. It was held that the fact that the accused has undergone the sentence of imprisonment in default does not mean that the fine is no longer recoverable. The fine and the imprisonment in default are not alternatives in the sense that the suffering of one extinguishes the other. Rather, they are complementary mechanisms to ensure that the court's order is ultimately complied with.
DLND010058642025 Page 14 of 20 Cr Rev 392/2025Kari Yadav Vs. Dinesh Singh f. This principle flows from a deeper jurisprudential conviction:
that the state, as the custodian of justice, cannot permit its orders to be evaded or rendered nugatory. If a convicted person may escape financial liability by mere passage of time and suffering imprisonment, the very authority of the court is undermined.
12.The Question of Malafide and Harassment a. The revisionist has alleged that the respondent-complainant has filed the application with malafide intention to harass and extort money. This allegation, advanced without material evidence or specific instances of harassment, is rejected as wholly unsubstantiated.
b. The respondent-complainant is entitled, both as a matter of right and as a matter of law, to apply for execution of the court's orders. The exercise of this right cannot be branded as harassment merely because it is inconvenient or financially burdensome to the revisionist. To accept this argument would be to transform the right to recover compensation. awarded into a discretionary indulgence, dependent upon the subjective sentiments of the convict.
13.The Absence of Application of Judicial Mind a. The revisionist has alleged that the learned trial court passed the impugned order without application of judicial mind and DLND010058642025 Page 15 of 20 Cr Rev 392/2025 Kari Yadav Vs. Dinesh Singh without going through the facts and law. This allegation must be rejected in toto.
b. The learned trial court, vide its order dated 12.06.2025, has:
i. Considered the documents placed before it, including the report of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate;
ii. Identified the immovable property registered in the name of the revisionist;
iii. Applied the provisions of Section 421 Cr.P.C.;
iv. Issued warrants of attachment in accordance with law;
v. Directed the Sub-Divisional Magistrate and the Collector to proceed with the attachment.
c. These steps demonstrate not a hasty or unmindful approach, but rather a methodical application of law to facts. The learned trial court has acted within its authority and has followed the legal procedure prescribed.
14.LEGAL PRINCIPLES ESTABLISHED BY KUMARAN v. STATE OF KERALA a. The respondent-complainant has placed primary reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Kumaran v. State of Kerala (2017) 7 SCC 476. This judgment, which bears directly upon the issues raised in the present revision petition, merits detailed examination. b. In Kumaran, Hon'ble Supreme Court held:
DLND010058642025 Page 16 of 20 Cr Rev 392/2025Kari Yadav Vs. Dinesh Singh i. Section 421 Cr.P.C. provides for recovery of fine even after the sentence of imprisonment in default of payment has been undergone. The section does not terminate the obligation to pay fine; it merely defers its enforcement during the period of imprisonment.
ii. The fine and the sentence of imprisonment in default are not mutually exclusive alternatives. Rather, they are complementary mechanisms designed to ensure compliance with the court's order.
iii. No special reasons are required where the fine is imposed as compensation to a victim. The requirement for special reasons applies only where the fine is punitive in nature, not where it is compensatory. (Para
27) c. These principles, authoritatively established by the Supreme Court, are directly applicable to the facts of the present case.
Indeed, it would be remiss for this Court not to draw upon the wisdom of the Supreme Court and to apply it to the instant matter.
d. The revisionist's attempt to distinguish the case of Kumaran on the ground that it involved a different set of facts, however, perusal of the judgment shows that it pertains to the case of recovery of fine imposed in a conviction u/s 138 NI Act, just DLND010058642025 Page 17 of 20 Cr Rev 392/2025 Kari Yadav Vs. Dinesh Singh like in the present case. The principle enunciated in that case is not tied to the specific set of facts; rather, it flows from the fundamental nature of criminal procedure and the court's authority to ensure that its orders are complied with.
15.THE VICTIM'S RIGHT TO RESTITUTION a. There is a deeper principle at work here, one that transcends the mere mechanics of procedure. It is the principle of restitution and restoration. When the law imposes a fine as compensation, it does so because the victim has suffered loss. The fine is not primarily a punishment to the offender; it is a mechanism of restoration to the victim. b. The revisionist's argument--that by suffering imprisonment he has discharged his obligation--effectively denies the victim of his right to restitution. It suggests that the victim's loss may be indefinitely postponed or ultimately forgone merely because the offender has undergone custody. This is a doctrine as repugnant to natural justice as it is to the letter of the law.
c. The modern criminal justice system has come to recognize that restitution to the victim is a cardinal principle. The fine imposed as compensation serves this purpose. To permit the offender to escape this obligation through the mere passage of time would be to undermine this principle and to render the victim's right a dead letter.
DLND010058642025 Page 18 of 20 Cr Rev 392/202516.CONCLUSION Upon a careful examination of all the issues raised before this Court, and upon a thorough perusal of the law and the facts, this Court is of the considered view that:
a. The application for recovery filed by the respondent-
complainant is maintainable and is not barred by any limitation.
b. The absence of explicit grant of recovery rights in the original sentence order does not divest the court of its authority to recover the fine. Section 421 Cr.P.C. operates independently to confer this authority.
c. Special reasons are not required where the fine is imposed as compensation to the victim, as is the case here.
d. The amount for which attachment is being made is sufficiently specified in the impugned order and in the original sentence order.
e. The suffering of imprisonment in default does not extinguish the obligation to pay fine. The fine remains outstanding and recoverable even after the default sentence has been undergone.DLND010058642025 Page 19 of 20 Cr Rev 392/2025
Kari Yadav Vs. Dinesh Singh f. No malafide is apparent in the respondent-complainant's application, and the allegation of harassment is without substance.
g. The learned trial court did apply judicial mind to the facts and the law and has rightly issued the warrants of attachment.
h. The principle established in Kumaran v. State of Kerala is directly applicable to the facts of the present case and lends robust support to the correctness of the impugned order.
17.The present revision petition is nothing but an attempt by the revisionist to escape the legitimate demands of the law through a combination of technical objections and philosophical arguments divorced from reality. The revisionist seeks to convert the court's benevolence--in extending a default imprisonment option--into a shield against payment of the decretal amount. This cannot be permitted.
18.It is of cardinal importance that courts remain steadfast in the enforcement of their orders. If orders are to be evaded with impunity, the very authority of the court is rendered nugatory, and the law itself becomes a plaything in the hands of those who are determined to circumvent it.
19.The revisionist has had his day in court. He has been tried, convicted, and sentenced. His appeals have been heard and dismissed. Now he seeks, through this revision petition, to undo what has been done and DLND010058642025 Page 20 of 20 Cr Rev 392/2025 Kari Yadav Vs. Dinesh Singh to escape what has been imposed. This cannot be the function of a revision petition.
20.In the result, the revision petition stands dismissed.
21.ORDER a. The Criminal Revision Petition No. 392 of 2025 is hereby DISMISSED.
b. The impugned order dated 12.06.2025, passed by Ld. JMFC, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi, is hereby AFFIRMED.
c. Copy of this order be sent to Ld. Trial Court, along with TCR, if any.
d. File be consigned to Record Room.
SAURABH Digitally signed by
Pronounced in open court on this PARTAP SAURABH PARTAP
SINGH LALER
SINGH
24th day of March, 2026 LALER
Date: 2026.03.24
17:29:27 +0530
(Saurabh Partap Singh Laler)
ASJ-05 New Delhi
Patiala House Courts Delhi
24.03.2026