Gujarat High Court
Gujarat State Textile Corp Ltd & 2 vs State Of Gujarat & 2....Opponent(S) on 19 September, 2014
Author: Bhaskar Bhattacharya
Bench: Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J.B.Pardiwala
C/MCA/1257/2014 CAV JUDGMENT
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
MISC.CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR RESTORATION) NO. 1257 of 2014
In LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 616 of 2013
In SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 7800 of 1993
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. BHASKAR BHATTACHARYA
and
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA
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1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment ?
2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ?
3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the judgment ?
4 Whether this case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the
Constitution of India, 1950 or any order made thereunder ?
5 Whether it is to be circulated to the civil judge ?
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GUJARAT STATE TEXTILE CORP LTD & 2....Applicant(s)
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & 2....Opponent(s)
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Appearance:
MR SUBRAMANIAM IYER, ADVOCATE for the Applicant(s) No. 1 - 3
MR JS YADAV, ADVOCATE for the Opponent(s) No. 3
MR MG NAGARKAR, ADVOCATE for the Opponent(s) No. 1 - 2
NOTICE SERVED for the Opponent(s) No. 1
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CORAM: HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.
BHASKAR BHATTACHARYA
and
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA
Date :19/09/2014
CAV JUDGMENT
(PER : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA) Page 1 of 22 C/MCA/1257/2014 CAV JUDGMENT
1. This application is at the instance of the original petitioners of Special Civil Application No.7800/1993 for review of our order dated 17/1/2014 passed in the Letters Patent Appeal no.616/2013 by which we allowed the Letters Patent Appeal filed by the State of Gujarat and other two appellants quashing and setting aside the order passed by the learned single Judge in Special Civil Application No.7800/1993.
2. Controversy in the main writ-application :
2.1 The applicants herein filed a writ application with regard to extending the benefits of the 3rd and 4th Central Pay Commissions Scale of Pay, Dearness Allowance etc. to the employees of Technical & Officers Cadre working in the Textile Mills run by the appellant Corporation.
2.2 The case of the Union before the learned Single Judge was that the Government of Gujarat enacted the Gujarat Closed Textile Undertaking (Nationalization) Act, 1986 and the Company namely, the Gujarat State Textile Corporation Limited (for short, "the GSTC") was incorporated with a view to re-organize and reconstruct the eleven textile mills which were transferred and vested in the GSTC. The head office of the GSTC was set up at Ahmedabad. The Government of Gujarat accepted the recommendations of the 3 rd and 4th Pay Commissions and extended its benefits to all the employees employed in Government Corporation and accordingly, the revised pay scales were given to all the employees of such Government Corporations working in different units in different Page 2 of 22 C/MCA/1257/2014 CAV JUDGMENT parts of the State. The recommendations of the 3 rd and 4th Pay Commissions accepted and adopted by the Government for the employees of Government Corporations were also adopted by GSTC. However, the benefits of the 3rd and the 4th Pay Commissions were given to only those employees who were working in the Head Office of the Corporation. The benefits of the 3rd and 4th Pay Commissions were not extended to the employees such as technicians and other officers working in the mill units of the Corporation who are the members of the Gujarat State Textile Corporation Officers & Technicians Union.
2.3 Being aggrieved by such discriminatory treatment meted out to the employees working in the mill units, the Union approached this Court by way of a Special Civil Application No.7800 of 1993 and prayed for the following reliefs:
(A) To issue writ or writs in the nature of Mandamus and/or Prohibition and/or any other appropriate writ or writs or directions or orders.
(B) To direct the respondents by writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate writ or writs or directions to apply the service rules with effect from the date of making thereof to all the technicians and officers cadres mentioned above in the employment of the 1 st respondent Corporation and working in the eleven textile mills of the respondents without any distinction whatsoever.
(C) To direct the respondents to treat all the employees equally and to give benefits of scales of pay and dearness allowances etc as per 3rd and 4th Central Pay Commission recommendations to the technicians and officers cadres mentioned above working in the eleven textile mills run by the respondents as given to the employees working in the Head Office of the 1 st respondent Corporation and as given by the National Textile Corporation (Gujarat) Limited to its technicians Page 3 of 22 C/MCA/1257/2014 CAV JUDGMENT and officers working in textile units.
(D) To grant to the 2nd petitioner and the technicians and officers cadres working in the eleven textile mills who are members of our Union such other relief as justice may require.
(E) To allow this petition with cost (F) To direct the respondent including the newly added respondent, the Official Liquidator to pay to all the officers/employees who were working in the specified Mills under the Gujarat State Textile Corporation the arrears of the difference of salary which such employees would be entitled to under the 3rd and 4th pay commissions and be further pleased to direct the said respondents to pay to such employees the difference of compensation which is paid under VRS scheme after calculating the same as per the pay scales which the concerned employee may be entitled to under the 5 th pay commission.
3. The issue which fell for the consideration of the learned Single Judge was whether the members of the Union were entitled to receive the pay scales and other consequential benefits of the 3rd, 4th and 5th Pay Commissions as was paid to the other employees of the Corporation working at the Head Office.
4. The learned Single Judge took the following view:
i) The principle of equal pay for equal work has no mechanical application in every case and it requires consideration of the various dimensions of a given job.
ii) Normally the applicability of the principle of equal pay for equal work should be best left to be evaluated and Page 4 of 22 C/MCA/1257/2014 CAV JUDGMENT determined by an expert body and the courts should not undertake such an exercise.
iii) The burden to prove and establish parity for the purpose of invoking the doctrine of equal pay for equal work is on the workmen asserting such parity. Such onus has to be discharged by producing cogent and reliable evidence in that regard.
iv) When the nature of duties and responsibility is not equal, the question of equal pay would not arise, but at the same time the Court cannot ignore the fact that the employees working in the Mills have received a step-
motherly treatment at the hands of the Corporation and they would be entitled to have a pay revision at par with the employees working in the Head Office.
v) The Non-award staff who were members of the Union were forced to submit their resignation and such resignations were tendered without prejudice to their rights and contentions to raise objection as regards the voluntary nature of the resignation.
vi) The learned Single Judge directed to provide the revision of pay scales to the members of the Union not by invoking the doctrine or applying the doctrine of equal pay for equal work, but in view of the alleged step- motherly treatment and thereby thought fit to direct the Corporation to treat the Members of the Union at par with the employees working at the Head Office of the respondent-Corporation.
Page 5 of 22 C/MCA/1257/2014 CAV JUDGMENT5. Feeling dissatisfied with the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge, the Corporation came-up with the Letters Patent Appeal No.616/2013. By our judgment and order dated 17/2/2014 we took the following view:-
"21. In the present case we have noticed that the learned Single Judge has proceeded to grant the relief on the basis that the benefits deserve to be extended to the members of the union since there is a surplus of the funds and further an assurance was given by the learned counsel appearing for the original petitioners that only after all other liabilities of the Corporation were discharged that the payment be made to the Union.
22. We are unable to appreciate the line of reasoning adopted by the learned Single Judge. Even if there is surplus of funds or there are sufficient funds with the Corporation, by itself, would not justify the grant of benefits to the members of the Union if they are otherwise not entitled to claim.
23. It also appears from the materials on record that most of the members of the Union had resigned by availing of the benefit of the voluntary retirement scheme but have come forward with the case that such resignations were obtained under threat and duress and were not voluntary in nature. Whether the resignations were voluntary in nature or not is a pure question of fact which cannot be decided by way of affidavits, when such allegations are denied by affidavit. However, the fact Page 6 of 22 C/MCA/1257/2014 CAV JUDGMENT remains that the employees had availed of the benefit of the voluntary retirement scheme and had tendered their resignations.
24. In the overall view of the matter, we are convinced that this appeal deserves consideration and the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge is not tenable in law."
6. According to the applicants herein there is an error apparent on the face of the order passed by us dated 17/1/2014. The entire basis of this review application is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Chairman-cum- Managing Director, National Textile Corporation Ltd. and others Vs. NTC Ltd., Employees Union & others (2003) 11, SCC -31.
7. Mr. Subramaniam Iyer, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the applicants submitted that this Court failed to take into consideration a binding precedent of the Supreme Court referred to above resulting in a serious miscarriage of justice. Mr. Iyer submitted that his case before us at the time of hearing the Letters Patent Appeal was that his clients were denied wage rise since 1987, whereas the employees working in the Head Office of the Corporation were granted the wage rise as and when the Government accepted the recommendations of the 3rd, 4th and 5th Pay Commissions. According to Mr.Iyer, his clients' case was that they were not demanding parity of wages, but equal right to receive a wage rise as and when the employees of the Head Office would be given such a wage rise.
Page 7 of 22 C/MCA/1257/2014 CAV JUDGMENT8. In such circumstances Mr. Iyer, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of applicants prays that we should review our order and dismiss the LPA filed by the State of Gujarat and the other two appellants relying on the Supreme Court decision in the case of National Textile Corporation (supra.).
9. On the other hand this application for review has been opposed by filing affidavit-in-reply stating that there is no error worth the name in the order passed by this Court dated 17/1/2014 review of which is prayed for. According to the opponents under the Sick Textile Undertakings (Nationalization) Act, 1974 (for short "the Act of 1974") Award employees i.e. the workers under the Industrial Law have been continued in service. So far as the other officers were concerned, it was left to the Corporation to decide on the basis of expediency. The Corporation had offered them new appointment on the terms and conditions prevailing at the relevant point of time. According to the opponents there are two class of employees, one set of workers under the Industrial law and the other set of workers employed at the unit. The employees under the Industrial Law were given their dues in consultation with the Textile Labour Association and thereafter, were granted the benefit of the Voluntary Retirement Scheme.
10. According to the opponents no error not to speak of any error apparent on the face of the order could be said to have been pointed out by the applicants in this review application. In such circumstances, it is prayed that there being no merit in this review application the same deserves to be rejected.
11. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the Page 8 of 22 C/MCA/1257/2014 CAV JUDGMENT parties and having gone through the materials on record, the only question that falls for our consideration in this application for review is whether the applicants have been able to point out any palpable error going to the root of the matter, in our order dated 17th January, 2014.
12. Before entering into the merit of this application, it will be profitable to look into the provisions of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. Order 47, Rule 1 CPC reads as follows :
"REVIEW
1. Application for review of judgment.-
(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved -
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which, no appeal has been preferred,
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him may apply for a review of judgment to the court which passed the decree or made the order.Page 9 of 22 C/MCA/1257/2014 CAV JUDGMENT
(2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review or judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case on which he applies for the review.
Explanation : The fact that the decision on question of law on which the judgment of the court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment.
2. [Repealed by Act 66 of 1956]."
13. In order to appreciate the scope of a review, Section 114 CPC has to be read, but this section does not even adumbrate the ambit of interference expected of the court since it merely states that it "may make such order thereon as it thinks fit." The parameters are prescribed in Order 47 CPC and for the purposes of this lis, permit the party to press for a rehearing "on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the records or for any other sufficient reason". The former part of the rule deals with a situation attributable to the applicant, and the latter to a jural action which is manifestly incorrect or on which two conclusions are not possible. Neither of them postulate a rehearing of the dispute because a party had not highlighted all the aspects of the case or could perhaps have argued them more forcefully and/or cited binding precedents to the Court and thereby enjoyed a favourable verdict. This is amply evident from the Explanation to Rule 1 of Order 47 Page 10 of 22 C/MCA/1257/2014 CAV JUDGMENT which states that the fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment. Where the order in question is appealable, the aggrieved party has adequate and efficacious remedy and the court should exercise the power to review its order with the greatest circumspection.
14. The Apex Court in M/s. Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v/s. Government of Andhra Pradesh, reported in AIR 1964 SC 1372, held as follows :
"There is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterized as vitiated by "error apparent". A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error......where without any elaborate argument one could point to the error and say here is a substantial point of law which stares one in the face, and there could reasonably be no two opinions entertained about it, a clear case of error apparent on the face of the record would be made out."
15. In Meera Bhanja v. Smt. Nirmala Kumari Choudary, reported in AIR 1995 SC 455, the Supreme Court held that:
"It is well settled law that the review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47, Rule 1 CPC. In connection with the limitation of the powers of the court under Order 47, Rule 1, while dealing with similar jurisdiction available to the High Court while seeking to review the orders under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court, in the case of Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma Page 11 of 22 C/MCA/1257/2014 CAV JUDGMENT v. Aribam Pishak Sharma [AIR 1979 SC 1047] speaking through Chinnappa Reddy, J. has made the following pertinent observations:
"It is true there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude the High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter of evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found, it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be in the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an appellate Court to correct all manner of error committed by the subordinate court."
16. A perusal of Order 47, Rule 1 CPC shows that review of a judgment or an order could be sought : (a) from the discovery of new and important matters or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the knowledge of the applicant; (b) such important matter or evidence could not be produced by the applicant at the time when the decree was passed or order made; and (c) on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or any other sufficient reason.
17. In a very pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati and others, reported in Page 12 of 22 C/MCA/1257/2014 CAV JUDGMENT AIR 2013 SC 3301, the Supreme Court, in paras 15 and 16 of the judgment, has reiterated the well-settled principles as regards the scope and power of the Court to review, which read thus :
"15. Review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII, Rule 1 of CPC. In review jurisdiction, mere disagreement with the view of the judgment cannot be the ground for invoking the same. As long as the point is already dealt with and answered, the parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment in the guise that an alternative view is possible under the review jurisdiction.
Summary of the Principles:
16. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute:
(A) When the review will be maintainable:-
(i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him;
(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;
(iii) Any other sufficient reason.
The words "any other sufficient reason" has been interpreted in Chhajju Ram vs. Neki, AIR 1922 PC 112 and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos vs. Most Rev. Mar Poulos Athanasius & Ors., (1955) 1 SCR 520, to mean "a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule". The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India vs. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. & Ors., JT 2013 (8) SC 275.Page 13 of 22 C/MCA/1257/2014 CAV JUDGMENT
(B) When the review will not be maintainable:-
(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications.
(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.
(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case.
(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice.
(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected but lies only for patent error.
(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review.
(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched.
(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition.
(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived."
18. Bearing the aforesaid principles in mind, let us consider the claim of the applicants so as to find out whether any case has been made out for interference exercising review jurisdiction.
The question as regards the Court's power of review in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India came Page 14 of 22 C/MCA/1257/2014 CAV JUDGMENT up for consideration before a Full Bench of this High Court in Gujarat University v. Sonal P.Shah (AIR 1982 Guj 58). The Full Bench, after taking notice of the amendment made in Section 141 of the Civil Procedure Code to the effect that the word 'proceeding' used in that section did not include a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, held :
"(1) The provisions of the Civil P.C. of Order 47 are not applicable to the High Court's power of review in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution.
(2) The said powers are to be exercised by the High Court only to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors. (The epithet "palpable" means that which can be felt by a simple touch of the order and not which could be dug out after a long drawn out process of argumentation and ratiocination).
(3) The inherent powers through ex facie plenary are not to be treated unlimited or unabridged, but they are to be invoked on the grounds analogous to the grounds mentioned in Order 47. Rule 1, namely : (i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which the party seeking the review could not produce at the time when the earlier order sought to be reviewed was made, despite exercise of due diligence; (ii) existence of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; and
(iii) existence of any analogous ground. (These are the very three grounds referred to in Order 47, Rule 1, Civil P. C. and by declaration of law at the hands of the Supreme Court in the above case they are the hedges or Page 15 of 22 C/MCA/1257/2014 CAV JUDGMENT limitations of the High Court's power)."
19. Since the review application is substantially based on the decision of the Supreme Court referred to above, we should look into the same.
20. In the case before the Supreme Court the issue involved was regarding the claim of the staff/sub-staff engaged by the various Textile Mills under NTC for "equal pay for equal work". The staff working in the mills were claiming pay equal to or in parity with the pay scales prevailing for the staff working in the corporate offices of the mills. It was not in dispute before the Supreme Court that the office staff/ sub-staff was on the Central D.A. pattern, while the staff/sub-staff working in the Mills was on the variable Industrial D.A. pattern governed by Region-cum-Industry Awards. The Supreme Court noted that there had never been any parity in the pay scales between the staff working in the Corporate Offices of the NTC and its subsidiary and the staff working in the Mill. However, the Supreme Court also noticed that over the years i.e. parity between the pay scales of the staff working in the Corporate Offices and the staff working in the Mills which had led to tremendous discontents amongst the staff working in the mills and it was that discontentment which was the root cause of the entire litigation.
21. The plea of discrimination in the matter of Revision of Pay Scale between the staff working in the Corporate Offices/Head Quarter and the staff working in the mills was sought to be made by contending that the Office-staff was governed by the CDA pattern while the mill's staff was governed by the IDA Page 16 of 22 C/MCA/1257/2014 CAV JUDGMENT pattern.
22. In the aforesaid factual background and rival contentions canvassed on either side, the Supreme Court, in the case of CMD, NTC Corpn. Ltd. Vs. NTC Wbab & O) Ltd. Employees Union - (2003) 11 SCC 31, took the following view:
"8. On the other hand, the argument on behalf of the staff/sub staff of the Mills is that great injustice has been done to the workers working in the Mills. While their counterparts working in the corporate offices have been getting pay revisions in normal course as and when it is allowed to other Government servants, the staff working in the mills has been deprived of the said benefit. As a result of this, it is submitted that during the last two decades while the cost of living has gone up several times the salary and allowances of the workers working in the Mills have remained constant. The emphasis on behalf of the workers has been that there is equality and parity in the work and working conditions of the workers of the corporate offices and the workers working in the Mills. Therefore, it is a case for equal pay. On this aspect however, as noticed earlier, the National Industrial Tribunal found against staff of the Mills. The finding of the Tribunal was endorsed by the Sathyam Committee. In the face of the findings of the two fact finding bodies we find ourselves unable to take a different view on this issue. Neither necessary facts have been placed before us nor we would like to go into such a question of fact. We have no reason to differ with the finding of fact on this issue arrived at by the two independent bodies. So far as the claim of the staff based on the principle of equal pay for equal work is concerned, it is therefore, not tenable. When the work is not equal, the question of equal pay does not arise. But we cannot ignore the fact that the staff/sub staff working in the Mills has unfortunately received a step motherly treatment. They have not had a pay revision for years. The litigation has been pending for more than a decade. They have been told that the matter is subjudice. The Sathyam Committee noticed this sorry plight of the workers. The Committee gave some ad hoc relief to the workers. But Page 17 of 22 C/MCA/1257/2014 CAV JUDGMENT that is not enough. The Sathyam Committee noticed disparity in the pay scales of the two categories of workers which was 159% in 1987 and had risen to 642% in the year 2000. This is highly unjust and unfair. So far as the staff working in the mills is concerned we are told that all the mills are incurring losses and that does not justify any increase in the pay package of the workers. But the staff working in the corporate offices of the Mills is also staff of the parent body. If the mill is incurring losses the impact has to be on everyone connected with the mill, in whatever capacity. You cannot have double standards. When you give revised pay scales to office staff is there no financial burden?
9. In view of the fact that the nature of duties of the staff in the two categories has been found to be not at par, parity in pay scales may not be possible. Yet there can be no case for total denial of revision of pay to the staff/sub staff working in the mills.
10. Discrimination between the two categories of staff cannot be justified on the basis of applicability of the CDA pattern and the IDA pattern to the respective categories of staff. The IDA pattern cannot be taken to debar any revision of pay scales. The Central Government has to act as a model employer and such specious pleas on its part are highly improper and unjustified.
11. In our view, a case for relief to the staff/sub staff working in the Mills is definitely made out. The workers deserve some relief though not parity of pay scales with staff/sub-staff working in corporate offices, but certainly on account of revision of pay scales/increase of D.A. or emoluments from time to time as and when fell due during period of nearly three decades since when, no revision of their pay scale has been made.
12. Relief to what extent is the next question? Nothing has been placed before us nor has been brought to our notice which may enable us to spell out the extent of relief. Even on behalf of the workers the emphasis has been on the fact that they are entitled to revision of pay scales as in the case of staff in the headquarters or corporate offices. Nothing more has been urged. Even otherwise we feel we are ill-equipped to work out the extent of relief which can be granted to the workers in Page 18 of 22 C/MCA/1257/2014 CAV JUDGMENT the mills. Therefore, we direct the Central Government to take appropriate steps which if so required may include appointment of an expert to work out the extent of relief which ought to be granted to the workers in the mills. Some consideration may be had about the financial constraints, if any, but it cannot be to the extent of virtual denial of any benefit. Before taking a final decision in the matter, an opportunity of hearing be allowed to the management as well as to the workers to enable them to place their respective stands before the decision making authority. The decision should be taken within four months from the date of this judgment and the same should be implemented within two months thereafter."
23. On a plain reading of the observations of the Supreme Court noted above, it is evident that ultimately the Supreme Court left it for the Central Government to take appropriate steps which, if required, might include appointment of an Expert to work-out the extent of relief which ought to have been granted to the workers in the mills. The Supreme Court did not grant any relief as was prayed for. The Supreme Court also observed in Para-12 of its judgment that before taking final decision in the matter, an opportunity of hearing be also given to the management as well as to the workers to enable them to place their respective stands before the decision making authority.
24. The Supreme Court, in the case of Government of Karnataka v. Gowramma, reported in AIR 2008 SC 863, has pointed out [in paragraph 10] that Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclids theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of their context. The following observations Page 19 of 22 C/MCA/1257/2014 CAV JUDGMENT in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the said judgment are relevant, and are quoted below:-
"12. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper.
13. The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus:
"Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cordozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive.
*** *** *** Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it.""
25. What weighed with us while allowing the Letters Patent Appeal was the inconsistent findings recorded by the learned Single Judge, more particularly so far as the aspect of applying the doctrine of equal pay for equal work was concerned. The learned Single Judge proceeded to grant the relief in favour of the applicants herein on the basis that the benefits deserved to be extended to the members of the Union since there was surplus of the funds and further an assurance was given by the learned Counsel appearing for the applicant herein before the learned Single Judge that only after all other liabilities of the Corporation stood discharged that the payment be made to the Page 20 of 22 C/MCA/1257/2014 CAV JUDGMENT Members of the Union. We were not convinced with such line on reasoning adopted by the learned Single Judge. Assuming that there was surplus of funds with the Corporation by itself would not entitle the members of the Union to the claim, more particularly when from the materials on record we found that majority of the members of the union had resigned by availing of the benefits of the Voluntary Retirement Scheme, but at a belated stage came forward with a case that such resignations were obtained under threat and duress and was not voluntary in nature. Since such questions being pure questions of fact, we refrained from going into such inquiry.
26. In our opinion, even if we accept the arguments of Mr. Iyer that the Supreme Court's decision referred to above, covers the issue, yet the Supreme Court also left the entire issue for the Central Government to decide with the help of an Expert Body.
27. We are of the view that the decision of the Supreme Court should not be applied in a mechanical manner and should be appreciated and considered in the light of the facts and the issues which were before the Court.
28. For the reasons recorded above, we do not find any merit in this Review application and the same is, accordingly, rejected.
(BHASKAR BHATTACHARYA, C.J.) Page 21 of 22 C/MCA/1257/2014 CAV JUDGMENT (J.B.PARDIWALA, J.) Mohandas Page 22 of 22