Madras High Court
Beardsell Ltd. (Formerly Known As ... vs State Of Tamil Nadu on 28 October, 1991
Author: A.S. Anand
Bench: A.S. Anand
JUDGMENT Kanakaraj, J.
1. The only question involved in this batch of cases is whether nylon twine variously called nylon fishnet twines, knitting yarn, etc., dealt with by the assessees come under entry 18 of the First Schedule to the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 (hereinafter called "the Act") or should properly be taxes as a multi-point item under section 3(1) of the Act. According to the assessees the goods fall under entry 18 of the First Schedule of the Act, but according to the Revenue it is a multi-point item under section 3(1) of the Act. In many cases the Revenue succeeded before the Tribunal while in some cases the assessees succeeded. In some of the cases the Joint Commissioner, exercising suo motu powers under section 34 of the Act set aside the orders in favour of the assessees. There are also a few writ petitions challenging the action of the third respondent either in revising or proposing to revise the assessment orders, and holding that nylon twine is taxable as a multi-point item. Depending upon our ultimate decision, the fate of each case shall be determined at the end of our judgment.
2. However, we will refer to the facts of T.C. No. 391 of 1991 for a proper understanding of the arguments and authorities cited before us in relation to the issues involved in the cases. For the assessment year 1983-84 the appellant in T.C. No. 391 of 1991 had returned a total and taxable turnover of Rs. 10,49,194 and Rs. 10,598.60, respectively. On scrutiny of the accounts it was found that the assessees had claimed exemption on the sale of nylon fishnet twines, the turnover in respect of which was Rs. 8,69,704.03. For this and certain other defects the assessing authority determined the total and taxable turnover to his best of judgment. Nylon fishnet twines were assessed at five per cent. On appeal, the assessees contended that the turnover relating of nylon fishnet twine would fall under entry 18 of the First Schedule of the Act and inasmuch as the assessees had purchased the same from registered dealers the second sales at their hands were not taxable. This contention was accepted by the appellate authority. On suo motu revision, it was held, following Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Sarin Textile Mills , that yarn is distinct from twine. Therefore the goods dealt with the assessees could not be equated to staple "artificial silk yarn or staple fibre yarn". The Joint Commissioner after following the procedure prescribed by law resorted the order of the assessing authority and set aside the order of the appellate authority.
3. Before proceeding further it will be convenient to notice the wording of entry 18 of the First Schedule to the Act.
"18. Artificial silk yarn and staple fibre yarn. At the point of first sale in the State."
First and foremost let us now consider how the entries in the First Schedule are to be understood. In Chennakesavalu v. Commissioner, Board of Revenue (C.T.) [1981] 47 STC 403 (Mad.) it is observed as follows :
"There is First Schedule to this Act which gives a list of goods in respect of single point tax leviable under sub-section (2) of section 3. A perusal of that list will clearly show that the articles are not listed according to the source material out of which they are made, but according to their independent existence, commonly recognised as separate and distinct goods or commodities."
In State of Tamil Nadu v. Gopal Nair and Sons [1982] 51 STC 257 (Mad.) it is observed as follows :
"The question as to whether a particular article or commodity falls within the scope of a particular expression used in the Sales Tax Act has to be determined with its nomenclature in commercial parlance. In commercial parlance, if a person goes and asks for soap, he would not be given shaving cream. The cream under consideration is commercially a different commodity. It, therefore, follows that the Tribunal, in so far as it held that the shaving creams fell within the scope of entry 37, is clearly wrong and therefore, the article could only be treated as coming within the multi-point levy."
In Union of India v. Gujarat Woolen Felt Mills the following observations are apposite :
"The well-known rule in interpreting items in statutes like the one we are concerned with is that 'resort should be had not to the scientific or the technical meaning of such terms but to their popular meaning or the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them, that is to say, to their commercial sense'."
We need not go on multiplying the decisions on this point, because it is now well-settled principle of law that articles are not listed according to the source material out of which they are made and the items in the Schedule have, therefore, to be interpreted according to the popular meaning or the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them and resort should not be had to the scientific or the technical meaning of such terms.
4. One doubt which may arise on a first reading of the entry is whether nylon twine or nylon yarn will at all come within the words "artificial silk yarn". We find that this issue is no longer res integra because, as early as in Kishnichand Chellaram v. Joint Commercial Tax Officer [1968] 21 STC 367 (Mad.) the issue had been settled. In that case the stand of the Government of India that man-made fibres like nylon, terylene, terene, decron, etc., were artificial silk and actually and technically the above products are textiles coming under the category of "artificial silk", was accepted by the Division Bench of this Court, after referring to the literature on the subject. More recently in Sirsilk Ltd. v. Textiles Committee the following observations are apposite :
"The passages quoted above clearly show that even in the sphere of textile technology distinction between 'fibre' and 'filament' has reached a vanishing point. They further show that both nylon and rayon are 'artificial silk' yarn in contradistinction to genuine silk."
For the sake of completeness we may also refer to Bhagwan Ganesh Pai Company v. State of Kerala [1971] 28 STC 460 (Ker) where there is a terse finding following Kishnichand Chellaram's case [1968] 21 STC 367 (Mad.) that nylon yarn is artificial silk yarn.
5. Now comes to the crucial question whether yarn is same thing as twine because the assessees had dealt with nylon twined, whereas the entry relates to artificial silk yarn. It will be relevant to notice the fact situation in respect of the nature and use of the goods with by the assessees. In one of the writ petitions, namely, Writ Petition No. 2251 of 1987 the following passage gives a clear picture of the nature of the goods :
"I state that nylon twine is used for the purpose of making into nylon fishnet fabrics or webbings. I submit that nylon twine (netting yarn) falls under the category of man-made filament yarn, non-cellulosic and other than textured. Nylon yarn is manufactured from a commercial product known as caprolactum by treatment by heat and pressure. This material is polymerised. It is then extruded in the form of needles and chopped into small pellets which are known as polymer chips. These chips, after certain treatment, are melted and pressed through spinnerettes. The filaments so obtained are wound together on bobbins and are further stretched and twisted to produce nylon yarn of various deniers. Usually, nylon multi-filament yarn is made up of a number of filaments which are held together by a twist. Nylon twine (netting yarn) is produced by giving a ply twist and a cable twist to strands of 210 denier nylon yarn. Nylon twine is mainly used for making nylon fishnet fabrics called webbings. Nylon yarn being manufactured by a chemical process from a non-cellulosic base is known as artificial silk or rayon and accordingly, for the purpose of excise duties and taxation, is classified under tariff item 18 of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944. There is an Indian Standard Specification called nylon netting yarn (nylon twine) No. 4402-1967 and 4401-1981 which correctly described nylon twine as netting yarn."
6. The above averment in one of the writ petitions has not been disputed before us by the Revenue. All the three counsel who addressed us for various assessees had in fact adopted this fact situation relating to their goods.
7. We will now do well to refer to the dictionary meaning of the relevant word "artificial", defined as being in opposition to the word "natural". This word need not detain us further because we have already held that nylon and rayon will come within the words "artificial silk product". The word "yarn" is defined in the Oxford Dictionary as fibre of cotton, wool, silk, flax, spun and prepared for use in weaving, knitting, etc. Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines "yarn" as "a continuous strand often of two or more plies that is composed of carded or combed fibres twisted together by spinning, filaments laid parallel or twisted together, or a single filament, is made from natural synthetic fibres and filaments or blends of these and as used in warp weft in weaving and for knitting or other interlacings that form cloth. The Mercury Dictionary of Textile Terms defines "yarn" as follows :
"A continuous strand of twisted fibres, whether animal, mineral, vegetable or synthetic, for use in weaving and knitting."
The word "twine" is not defined in the Mercury Dictionary of Textile Terms. While on the dictionaries, we may also notice the definition of the word "thread" because in some of the decisions, reference is made to the word "thread".
"Thread - A fine or slender cord made of two or more yarns of filaments twisted together and used of sewing pieces of material together."
The word "twine" is however defined in the Corpus Juris Secundum Volume XC, page 1017 (Trusts 160 to End - unite) :
"Twine - A strong thread composed of two or three smaller threads or strands twisted together, and used for various purposes, as for binding small parcels, making nets, and the like; and hence a small cord or string."
Similarly the word "yarn" is defined in Corpus Juris Secundum Volume 101, page 645 (Workmen's Compensation 782 to End - Zoning) : "Yarn - In one sense the word "yarn" means any fibrous material from a natural source, whether animal, mineral, or vegetable, that is made for use in weaving, knitting, embroidery, etc., loosely, thread. Originally thread of and kind spun from natural fibres, vegetable or animal, or even mineral, but now, more usually, thread prepared for weaving as distinguished from sewing thread of any sort; something which is only spun, and produced longitudinally by the process of spinning; spun, or twisted fibre; spun wool, also a quantity of such spun material; the product of spinning a silver; woollen thread; also thread of other material. The term is also applied to stout woollen thread used for knitting, etc.,; and also to any of the threads forming the strand of a rope."
8. The Corpus Juris Secundum thus goes to show that yarn means any fibrous material that is made for use in weaving, knitting, embroidery, etc. On the contrary "twine" means a strong thread composed of two or three smaller threads or strands twisted together, and used for binding small parcels or making nets and the like. Beyond this we do not think that the dictionaries help us in understanding the words "yarn and twine" with particular reference to the entry 18 of the First Schedule of the Act with which alone we are concerned.
9. Mr. R. Gangadharan appearing for the petitioners in the writ petitions has also referred to the English-Tamil Pocket Dictionary to suggest that both twine and yarn mean more or less the something in Tamil as "nool" or "twisted nool".
10. We will now refer to a set of decisions relating to cotton yarn and cotton thread. The first case is Deputy Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax and Sales Tax v. Khader Kunhi Sons [1976] 37 STC 227 (Ker). Though the Kerala High Court remitted the matter back to the Tribunal, there was a categorical expression of opinion on the crucial question. In that case the assessees had sold "twisted cotton fishing twine". The Tribunal relying on the judgment of this Court in Madura Mills Company Limited v. Government of Madras [1970] 25 STC 407 (Mad.) held that the goods sold were really "cotton yarn". The Kerala High Court relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ganesh Trading Co. v. State of Haryana [1973] 32 STC 623 and held as follows :
"When cotton yarn is understood as the thin thread spun out of cotton which is utilised for the purpose of making twine, cord, rope, etc., would it be possible to call the particular article - the article is not before us now - cotton yarn. It the common man would not understand the substance sold by the dealer in these cases as 'cotton yarn' and if in the commercial world it is not known or could not be known as 'cotton yarn' the article would not fall under item No. 4(ii) of the Second Schedule to the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963."
The decision is no doubt strongly relied upon by the Revenue. In Mohta Trading Co. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax [1976] 38 STC 11 the Allahabad High Court held that "cotton yarn on cops and cones" is an entirely different commodity from "cotton sewing thread on cops and cones". It was held that they are two distinct and well-known commodities available for sale, that they are separate thing in ordinary parlance and their uses are also distinct and separate. No doubt this judgment also supports the Revenue. In Srinivasa Distributing Agencies v. State of Orissa [1981] 48 STC 453 the Orissa High Court held that between "yarn" and "thread" there is not much of a manufacturing process and the identity of the material is not lost. The important aspect of the case referred to by the Orissa High Court was that with considerable amount of ease, the thread can be unrolled and resorted to the earlier position of yarn. In our opinion this character of the cotton thread that is adverted to by the Orissa High Court, namely, that it can be unrolled and resorted to the earlier position of yarn, is a singular characteristic of a cotton thread, that has led to some other later judgments of this Court to which we will make a reference a little later. Before coming to the decisions of our High Court on cotton thread there is one other interesting judgment of the Rajasthan High Court in Commercial Taxes Officer v. Sakariya Textiles [1986] 61 STC 247. Pachrangi dori is said to be a very thin string. It is a bunch of some cotton threads of five colours which are intertwined and twisted. It was held that the mere act of twisting, braiding, colouring, dyeing or bunching of cotton yarn into a single cord does not bring into existence new commercial product. It was also held that cotton thread is made from cotton yarn. In order to make cotton thread, few cotton yarns are braided and intertwined but the yarn does not lose its identity. In State of Tamil Nadu v. R. V. Krishniah Chetty [1990] 78 STC 422 a Division Bench of this Court held that sewing thread is not different from cotton yarn and both are one and the same commodity. In holding so they followed Madura Mills Company Limited v. Government of Madras [1970] 25 STC 407 (Mad.), Muthusawari Pillai & Sons v. State of Tamil Nadu [1977] 39 STC 359 (Mad.) and did not agree with Deputy Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax and Sales Tax v. Khader Kunhi Sons [1976] 37 STC 227 (Ker.). In Muthusawari Pillai & Sons v. State of Tamil Nadu [1977] 39 STC 359 (Mad.) it was held that the yarn does not lose its character as yarn merely by reason of its consisting of a bunch of threads, as in the case of doubling and twisting together of two or more threads to make a stronger or firmer thread in order to manufacture a specified kind of textile. They held that a bunch of spun thread could also come within the definition of "cotton yarn" if it can be used for the manufacture of any textile. Similarly in State of Tamil Nadu v. K. R. Lakshmana Pillai [T.C. (R) No. 1249 of 1991 dated March 25, 1991] a Division Bench of this Court took the view that the assesses who purchased cotton yarn from the State and rerolled the same as rolls and balls to suit the convenience of the users and thereafter sold them, continued to be cotton yarn and was not liable to tax. It was contended in that case that cotton yarn sold as cotton yarn thread retains its character as cotton yarn. That stand was upheld by this Court. The assessees also relied on State of Tamil Nadu v. Vaithilingam [1980] 46 STC 297 (Mad). But that decision in out opinion, will not at all apply because the question was whether cotton thread was used to make the textile or ply. In that case, there was a finding that the cotton thread was so used and therefore it came within entry 3 of the Second Schedule of the Act. The Revenue relies on Yacub Hussain v. State of Tamil Nadu [1980] 46 STC 470 (Mad.). The Division Bench following the observation of the Supreme Court in Porritts & Spencer (Asia) Ltd. v. State of Haryana [1978] 42 STC 433 held that the purpose for which the commodity is used is often a guiding factor to determine its character. Judged by such considerations, the Division Bench held that the different ropes in question could not by any stretch of imagination be classified as yarn.
11. In dealing with the above judgments of this Court, holding that cotton yarn does not lose its character, when two or more strands are twisted together to make a thread, the main consideration which weighed with the court was that cotton thread can be easily rewound or restored as yarn, as pointed out by the Orissa High Court in Srinivasa Distributing Agencies v. State of Orissa [1981] 48 STC 453. We cannot lose sight of the fact that the cotton yarn and cotton thread are totally different from "nylon yarn" and "nylon twine". The latter goods being either mineral fibres or synthetic fibres attain a different character when twisted together. We are not therefore inclined to follow the judgments relied on by the assessees relating to cotton yarn and cotton threads wherein a view has been expressed that the cotton thread retains its character as cotton yarn, even after being twisted to make thread, to the commodity in question before us.
12. We will now refer to two cases dealing with woollen yarn and woollen fabrics. In Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Sarin Textile Mills the question was whether the article "carpet woollen yarn" is covered by the term "yarn" mentioned in the notification issued under the U.P. Sales Tax Act. The goods were popularly known as "kati" and the question was whether it was "yarn" or "woollen goods". The Supreme Court held that "woollen carpet kati" is only a raw material from which woollen goods are prepared. They opined that "woollen carpet kati" is neither "yarn" nor "woollen goods" and that it is an unclassified item. In Union of India v. Gujarat Woollen Felt Mills the assessees manufactured non-woven felts from the woollen fibres and they were treated as "woollen fabrics" covered by entry 21 to the First Schedule of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. However the assessees later found that they were not liable to pay excise duty and sought for refund of the amount and succeeded before the Gujarat High Court. In dealing with the question the Supreme Court held that the felts did not fall under "woollen fabrics". It was held that a plain reading of the entry did not support the case of the Revenue. It was also held that the intention was not to cover non-woven material which was wool based in the entry.
We will now take up the cases dealing with nylon, rayon and other polyester spun fabrics. In Garware Nylons Ltd. v. Union of India (1980) ELT 249 the Bombay High Court had to consider an identical question with which we are concerned. The petitioners in that case were manufacturing nylon twine. Under item 18 of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944, excise duty is payable on nylon yarn. Nylon yarn used for making fishnets having been exempted, the petitioners were allowed to clear nylon twine as per the exemption notification. From March 1, 1975 item 68 was introduced in the First Schedule, which was more or less in the nature of a residuary clause. From then onwards the excise authorities took the view that nylon twine will not come under item 18 as nylon yarn, but only under the residuary item 68. The Division Bench held that nylon twine is considered as a specific type of nylon yarn being a twisted or cabled yarn. They also held that twine was a special type of yarn which was prepared for special purposes namely to make it suitable for being utilised in the manufacture of fishnets or ropes. The Division Bench ultimately referred to Dunlop India Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1977 SC 597, Madura Mills Company Limited v. Government of Madras [1970] 25 STC 407 (Mad.) and Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Sarin Textile Mills and rendered the following findings :
"In the present case also, if we consider the characteristics of yarn as laid down in the above case by the Supreme Court, twine satisfies both the tests. It is a spun strand and it is primarily meant for use in weaving, fishing nets and in rope-making."
In the very same decision a separate concurring judgment was rendered by Masodkar, J., concurring with the view expressed by Mrs. Justice Sujatha V. Manohar. However, Masodkar, J., had his own reservation about the reasoning of the other learned Judge, but concurred with the ultimate finding. This case is the sheet anchor, on which considerable reliance is placed by all the counsel in this batch of cases. But with respect, we are unable to concur with the ultimate findings of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court. The Supreme Court in Dunlop India Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1977 SC 597 had pointed out that in a fiscal statute, meaning given to articles should be the one as people in the trade and commerce, conversant with the subject, generally treat and understand in the usual course. It was also laid down that once an article is classified and put under a distinct entry the basis of classification is not open to question. Having referred to the above judgment and having found that nylon twine is undoubtedly special type yarn suitable only for manufacture of fishnets, the Division Bench in our opinion, we say with respects, was not right in holding that nylon twine satisfied the two tests in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Sarin Textile Mills and that it must be deemed to be yarn.
13. The next judgment Sainet Private Ltd. v. Union of India (1984) 18 ELT 141 is also from the Bombay High Court and it relies on the earlier judgment in Garware Nylons Ltd. v. Union of India (1980) ELT 249 (Bom). But in the latter case the issue was slightly different because the petitioners in that case were carrying on the activity of making fishnets. The question was whether the fishnets fall within the tariff item 22 called "man-made fabrics", and offers no assistance to us in this case. In Polesanapalli & Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1988) 9 SISTC 33 the Andhra Pradesh High Court came to the conclusion as follows :
"It is true that commercially speaking a fishing net is a different goods than the nylon yarn, but, having regard to the fact that essentially it is nylon yarn only twined in a particular fashion, we are of opinion that it still retains the character of nylon yarn, i.e., artificial silk yarn, within the meaning of the entry."
With respect, we are not inclined to follow this judgment also, because once the Bench had come to the conclusion that nylon fishing net twine is commercially different article than nylon yarn, there was no scope for holding that nylon twine can be brought within the entry relating to the nylon yarn.
13-A. We are, therefore, of the opinion that "nylon twine" and "nylon yarn" are separate and distinct commercial commodities, each one being separately and popularly understood commercially by those who deal in these commodities. The character of "nylon twine" and "nylon yarn" is distinct and separate, even if the source material is the same."Nylon twine" cannot be considered to be "nylon yarn" in common parlance either.
14. The view taken by us has the support of the Supreme Court in Aditya Mills Ltd. v. Union of India . In that case two varieties of yarn on which duty had already been paid under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, which are doubled together and the resultant yarn is called by another name. It was held that the resultant yarn was separate and distinct item. Two piles of polyester spun yarn and one ply of rayon filament yarn were doubled in that case and called "PPRF yarn". The Supreme Court held that it was a new substance with a distinct name and character and the moment a commercially new commodity comes into being, it loses its character as the polyester yarn or rayon yarn. They have referred to a number of earlier judgments of the Supreme Court as well as in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Sarin Textile Mills . It is significant to note that they have referred to very same two tests for finding out whether the article continues to be yarn or not and observed as follows :
"The question is not whether it is mixture of two yarns where as a process of mixing a separate and distinct goods known in the market as such, comes into being. For ascertaining the correct meaning of a fiscal entry reference to a dictionary is apt to be a somewhat delusive guide, as it gives all the different shades of meaning. The correct guide is the context and the trade meaning. The trade meaning is always to be given preference."
It is for this reason we are not inclined to follow the decision of the Bombay High Court in Garware Nylons Ltd. v. Union of India (1980) ELT 249. In Importex International (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala [1991] 81 STC 351, the Kerala High Court had to deal with an identical question. In that case the petitioners were dealers in nylon fishnets. In that case, a subsidiary question arose relating to the classification of nylon twine. The stand of the Government was that nylon twine was not nylon yarn within the meaning of entries 42 and 156 of the Kerala Act. For the purpose of proper appreciation of this decision we are extracting the said entries 42 and 156 of the Kerala Act :
"42. Artificial silk yarn, synthetic polyester fibre, polyester fibre yarn and staple fibre yarn".
"156. Plastics and articles made of plastics including plastic pipes".
The Kerala High Court then proceeded to extract the stand of the Government, that nylon fishnet twine would not come within the ambit of either of the above entries, but should be taxed as general goods. The Kerala High Court put their seal of approval on the said stand of the Government.
15. Reliance was also placed at the Bar on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Alladi Venkateswarlu v. Government of A.P. [1978] 41 STC 394 relating to parched rice and puffed rice being the same as rice. The Revenue on the other hand placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ganesh Trading Co. v. State of Haryana [1973] 32 STC 623 to the effect that paddy after dehusking was different from paddy as such. We may also notice two other judgments which throw light on the issue. In J.K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. v. Union of India it was held that after the yarn is produced it is sized and thereafter, subjected to a process of weaving the same into fabrics. It was held that the assessees were liable to pay excise duty on the yarn which was obtained at an intermediate stage and again after being processed in an integrated process for weaving the same into fabrics.
In Ess Dee Carpet Enterprises v. Union of India after noticing that weaving means to form a fabric by interlacing the yarn on a loom, the Supreme Court observed as follows :
"Thus the activity of the weaving involves passing of the weft through the warp. While doing so even if there are any knets in the yarn still the activity is weaving. The mere fact that there is knotting of the yarn, the fabric which is ultimately produced does not cease to be a textile fabric."
16. We have already noticed the difference between cotton yarn, twine and fabrics on the one hand and woollen yarn and fabrics and nylon yarn, twine and fishnets on the other hand. We would like to make it clear that our judgment is restricted to the case of the "nylon yarn and nylon twine". We have also noticed one significant characteristic in cotton threads being rewoven or retwisted into cotton yarn with ease. On the other hand once nylon yarn is made into a nylon twine, the process cannot be reversed and it would not be possible to restore twine into yarn. Mr. C. Natarajan, learned counsel for the petitioner, was at pains to point out that what was sold by the assessees were either described as nylon twine or fishnet yarn or cabled yarn. The fact remains that they were not yarn pure and simple. When a person wants to make fishnets he will only ask for nylon twine and not nylon yarn. Commercially, nylon twine is a known product, different from nylon yarn and used solely for making fishnets and ropes. In these cases the following facts are not disputed :
(1) Yarn is manufactured into twine for the purpose of making fishnets.
(2) Fishnets can be made only from nylon twine.
(3) Fishnets cannot be made straightway from nylon yarn.
(4) Nylon yarn when converted into nylon twine cannot be recovered back as yarn by any process. In other words the process of making yarn into twine is irreversible.
The entry 18 of the First Schedule to the Act only refers to artificial silk yarn. Therefore no other type of yarn material like "nylon twine" by whatever name called can be brought within the entry. In this connection reference may be made to entries 18-A, 18-B and even entry 19 of the Act, which show that when the Legislature wanted to include other types of yarn, they did make specific mention of the same in the entries. Similarly the learned Government Pleader refers to several other entries in the First Schedule of the Act which specifically included all other items coming under the generic description of a particular word. He argues that nylon twine which is not in the Schedule is sought to be brought in indirectly by the assessees by doing violence to the plain language of the entry. We find, in view of our discussion, force in his submission.
17. For all the above reasons we are inclined to accept the case of the Revenue that nylon twine manufactured for the purpose of making fishnets will not come within the entry 18 of the First Schedule to the Act. No other entry also will cover the item and consequently it will have to be taxed only as a multi-point item under section 3(1) of the Act. Consequently, T.C. Nos. 80 of 1989, 87 of 1989, 446 of 1989 and 391 of 1991 which are appeals against the orders of the Joint Commissioner holding that the goods in question should properly be taxed under section 3(1) of the Act, have to be dismissed and they are accordingly dismissed. Tax Case Nos. 2104 of 1984 and 1140 of 1987 are revision petitions against orders of the Tribunal holding in favour of the Revenue. Accordingly, these two tax revision cases are also dismissed. Tax Revision Cases Nos. 718 to 720 of 1986, 20 to 24 of 1991, 26 to 29 and 31 of 1991 are preferred by the Revenue against the orders of the Tribunal holding in favour of the assessee. These tax revision cases are therefore allowed and the orders of the Tribunal are set aside.
18. Writ Petition Nos. 5146 to 5148 and 5176 of 1983 are against the notice dated May 19, 1983, March 25, 1983, May 19, 1983 and April 2, 1983, respectively, in respect of assessment years 1977-78 to 1980-81 and they seek to quash the notices issued by the statutory authorities for assessment of the turnovers by bringing the turnover of twine under section 3(1) of the Act. These writ petitions are also dismissed and the authorities are directed to proceed in accordance with law.
19. Writ Petition No. 2497 of 1985 is against the assessment order dated March 1, 1985 for the year 1982-83 and the same is dismissed, leaving it open to the petitioner to have recourse to his remedies, if any, under the law. Writ Petition No. 7625 of 1986 is also against a notice dated July 24, 1986 for the year 1983-84 and the writ petition is dismissed, leaving it open to the petitioner to resort to his remedies, if any, in accordance with law. Writ Petition Nos. 2251, 2252 and 10258 of 1987 seek to issue a writ of mandamus against the respondents not to assess the turnover of nylon twine except under item 18 of the Act. The prayer cannot be granted in view of our finding rendered above. Consequently these writ petitions are also dismissed. We direct each of the parties to bear his or their own costs.
20. Assessees' appeals and petitions dismissed and State's petitions allowed.