Sunder Lal Chourasia vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 24 January, 2012

[Cites 7, Cited by 1]

Madhya Pradesh High Court

Sunder Lal Chourasia vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 24 January, 2012

This appeal is directed by the appellant under section 374(2) of the Cr.P.C being aggrieved by the judgment dated 7.4.1999 passed by the Special Judge, Chhindwara (constituted under the Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act (in short `the Act') in Special case No.52/95 whereby he has been convicted under section 3(1)(x) of the Act with a direction to undergo for RI six months with fine of Rs.1000/-. In default of depositing the fine, further RI 1 month has been awarded.

2. The facts giving rise to this appeal in short are that on dated 5.7.95 at about 21.35 in the night, the complainant Rajendra Kumar Chouria (Chamar) lodged the FIR as Crime No.303/95 at P.S. Junardeo contending that at about 8 O' Clock in the evening of 5.7.95, he accompanied with his friends, namely, Shyam, Ramesh and Badrudeen Quereshi was standing in front of Rampura Cycle Shop. At the same time, appellant, who was posted as Junior Engineer in the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board, Suwai came there on his motorcycle and by abusing him with filthy language, also by (2) taking name of his caste "Chamar Sale" asked him that he has set right so many persons like him at Ghansor and he will see him also. Such activity of the appellant had annoyed him as well as to his friends. As per further averments, the complainant was also asked by the appellant saying that if he will not follow his instructions then he will make arrangement for his suspension from the department. As per further averments of the FIR, the complainant was working in the same department as subordinate of the appellant. On such report, the offence of section 294,506 of the IPC and section 3(1)(x) of the Act was registered. The same was investigated. On completion of the same, the appellant was charge-sheeted for his prosecution under the aforesaid sections. On evaluation of the charge sheet, only charge of section 3(1)(x) of the Act was framed against the appellant. He abjured the guilt, on which, the trial was held in which as many as four witnesses were examined by the prosecution while two witnesses were examined in defence on behalf of the appellant. On appreciation of the evidence, after holding guilty to the appellant under the aforesaid offence, he was punished with the above-mentioned punishment.

3. Shri Y.P.Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant after taking me through the record of the trial court as well as the impugned judgment argued that the investigation was not carried-out by the competent investigating officer as provided under Rule 7 of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Rules, 1995 (in short `the Rules'), according to which the investigation of the impugned case for the aforesaid offence under the Act could be carried-out only by such Police Officer who is not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police and such Investigating Officer should be appointed by the State Government/ Director General of Police or the Superintendent of Police, as per the (3) scheme provided under such Rules. So, firstly, in such premises, the investigation was carried out by the incompetent person, the inspector or sub insptector of police, the impugned conviction under the Act, is not sustainable because the charge sheet itself was not entertainable in the lack of the investigation by the proper authority. In support of this contention, he placed his reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Chunnilal alias Chunni Singh-2010(II) MPJR(SC) 249. Besides this, on merits of the matter, he argued that on accepting the entire evidence as it is, even then, in the lack of any document or the certificate of caste showing caste of the complainant/victim covered under the Act, mere on the oral testimony of the complainant/victim or other witnesses, the trial court should not have held him to be the person of such community covered under the Act. He also said that it is apparent fact on record that neither such certificate was obtained in the investigation nor produced or proved by the prosecution in any manner. In such premises, he said that in the lack of such material evidence, the appellant deserves for acquittal in the matter. He further argued that looking to the nature of the case, in order to rebut the evidence regarding caste of the complainant, the appellant could not get the opportunity of cross-examination of the Investigating Officer namely, T.R.Hindolia the Sub Inspector of Police of the case because he was not examined by the prosecution on account of his death. It was also argued that on account of some departmental dispute there was earlier enmity between the appellant and the complainant who was working as subordinate clerk of the appellant but such aspect was also not taking into consideration. Even the evidence adduced by the appellant in his defence was not considered with proper approach. He further argued that after more than 15 years from the date of the incident, even after (4) extending acquittal to the appellant from the aforesaid charge, on account of non-framing the charge of section 294,506 of the IPC, the case should not be remanded back to the trial court for holding the trial under such sections. In support of this contention he said that the appellant should not suffer because of non-framing the charge of above-mentioned section of the IPC and prayed for extending acquittal to the appellant by setting aside the impugned conviction by allowing this appeal.

4. On the other hand, Shri Rakesh Kesharwani, learned Panel Lawyer by justifying the impugned conviction and sentence of the appellant under the aforesaid provision of the Act said that the same being based on proper appreciation of evidence, so also on the basis of unrebutted testimony of complainant Rajendra Kumar (PW 2), do not require any interference at this stage. In response of some query of the court, he fairly conceded that the investigation of the impugned case, was neither carried-out by any Deputy Superintendent of Police or any officer above the rank of such Officer nor any specific order in this regard was passed either by the State Government or by any other senior officials of the Police. With these submissions, he prayed for dismissal of this appeal.

5. Having heard the counsel at length, keeping in view their arguments, I have carefully gone through the record of the trial court along with the impugned judgment. Before proceeding further, as ready reference, I would like to reproduce Rule-7 of the Rules enacted under the Act which has came into force since 31.3.95 before registration of the impugned offence. The same reads as under :-

"7. Investigating Officer.-

(1) An offence committed under the Act shall be investigated by a police officer not below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police. The investigating (5) officer shall be appointed by the State Government, Director-General of Police, Superintendent of Police after taking into account his past experience, sense of ability and justice to perceive the implications of the case and investigate it along with right lines within the shortest possible time.

(2) The investigating officer so appointed under sub-

rule (1) shall complete the investigation on top priority within thirty days and submit the report to the Superintendent of Police who in turn will immediately forward the report to the Director-General of Police of the State Government.

(3) The Home Secretary and the Social Welfare Secretary to the State Government,Director of Prosecution the officer-in-charge of Prosecution and the Director-General of Police shall review by the end of every quarter the position of all investigations done by the investigating officer. "

Undisputedly, the impugned case was registered with respect of the incident of dated 5.7.95 on the same day and on such date the aforesaid Rule was in existence and according to it, the investigation of the impugned case, with respect of the offence covered under the Act, should have been carried out by the Police Officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police. But as per deposition of Mr. Mudrika Prasad (P.W.1) Sub Inspector of Police, after registration of the FIR Ex.P/3 by Mr N.P.Devalia Inspector of Police appellant was arrested by T.R.Hindolia, Sub Inspector of Police by preparing arrest memo (ExP/1. The spot map (Ex.P/2) which was the material part of the investigation, was also prepared by T.R.Hindolia Sub Inspector of Police. It also appears from the other papers available on record that further investigation of the case was carried-

out by other Police officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police. It is noted that before recording the evidence in the matter, said Sub Inspector T.R.Hindolia passed away. In such premises, the prosecution had not examined him. So, apparently, the investigation was not carried-

out by the competent authority prescribed under the aforesaid Rule-7 of the (6) Rules. In such premises, even at the initial stage, the charge sheet filed by the prosecution in respect of the offence covered under the Act, was not sustainable and pursuant to it, the impugned conviction of the appellant under section 3(1)(x) of the Act could not be sustained. As such, the trial court has committed grave error in convicting the appellant under the aforesaid section of the Act without considering the aforesaid legal position, therefore, the approach of the trial court in this regard, deserves to be and is hereby set aside.

6. My aforesaid view is fully fortified by the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Chunnilal alias Chunni Singh (supra) cited by the appellant's counsel in which it was held as under :-

"6. By virtue of its enabling power it is the duty and responsibility of the State Government to issue notification conferring power of investigation of cases by notified police officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police for different areas in the police districts. Rule 7 of the Rules provided rank of investigation officer to be not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police. An officer below that rank cannot act as investigating officer. The provisions in section 9 of the Act, Rule 7 of the Rules and section 4 of the Code when jointly read lead to an irresistible conclusion that the investigation to an offence under section 3 of the Act by an officer not appointed in terms of Rule 7 is illegal and invalid. But when the offence complained are both under the IPC and any of the offence enumerated in section 3 of the Act the investigation which is being made by a competent police officer in accordance with the provisions of the Code cannot be quashed for non- investigation of the offence under section 3 of the Act by a competent police officer. In such a situation the proceedings shall proceed in appropriate Court for the offences punishable under the IPC notwithstanding investigation and the charge sheet being not liable to be accepted only in respect of offence under section 3 of the Act for taking cognizance of that offence."

In view of the aforesaid principle of the Apex Court if the impugned (7) case is examined then it is apparent that besides the aforesaid offence of the Act, the charge-sheet was also filed with respect of the offence of section 294, and 506 of the IPC. There is no disputed on the legal proposition that in the lack of investigation of the case by the proper authority, even after quashing or excluding the change of any section of the Act, the case could have been proceeded further to hold the trial for the aforesaid offence of IPC.

7. It is undisputed fact that on framing the charge by the trial court, the charge of section 294 and 506 of the IPC was not framed against the appellant and being aggrieved by such order, neither the State Government nor the complainant, has come to this court, either by way revision at the interlocutory stage or against the final judgment of the trial court. So, in the lack of any such proceeding, at the instance of the State or the complainant, after more than 15 years from the date of the incident, I do not find fit to remand the matter to the trial court with a direction to frame the aforesaid charge of the offence and hold fresh trial in that regard.

8. In the aforesaid premises, keeping in view the provision of section 222(1) of the Cr.P.C, I have gone through the charges framed by the trial court. In such charge, I have found that the material ingredients of the offence of section 294 and 506 of the IPC are mentioned, although while framing the charge no such specific sections of the IPC are mentioned in the same. It is needless to state here that all the aforesaid factual matrix of the case stated in the charges were denied by the appellant, on which, the trial was held against him. So, in such premises, it could be said that the appellant has faced the trial with full understanding that by mentioning the necessary facts of the charge of section 294 and 506 of the IPC has been framed against him. So, mere non-mentioning the section 294 and 506 IPC (8) specifically in the framed charge, does not stop the hands of the court to examine the matter keeping in view such angle also. In the aforesaid premises, keeping in view the ingredients of section 294 and 506 of the IPC, the case is being examined by me.

9. It is apparent fact from the FIR itself that the complainant was working as subordinate clerk in the office of the appellant and, on account of some departmental work there was some earlier enmity between the appellant and the complainant and, in such premises, such enmity could not be said to be the enmity on account of caste of the appellant covered under the Act. Rajendra Kumar (P.W.2) on recording his deposition categorically stated that the alleged incident took place on the public road in front of Rampura cycle Shop where he accompanied with his friends Shyam, Ramesh and Badruddin Quereshi was on evening walk. He also stated about the alleged abuse but he has not stated the specific particulars regarding alleged criminal intimidation given by the appellant to the victim. It is stated that the alleged incident took place at about 8 O' Clock in the night while the complainant had stated that the incident took place at abut 7 O' clock in the evening. On perusal of the deposition of aforesaid examined all three witnesses, the fact regarding previous enmity between the appellant and the complainant has been established.

10. Undisputedly, the supporting witnesses, Rajendra (PW 2) and Ramesh (P.W.4) are the nearest friends of the appellant. So, in such premises, their depositions has to be examined carefully by the Court keeping in view the evidence led by the appellant in his defence. The appellant has examined two witnesses in his defence. Out of them Pramod (D.W.1) who was also working as UDC in the same department, on recording his deposition has categorically stated that the complainant was (9) working as LDC under the subordination of the appellant and there was fraction between the appellant and the complainant because on account of the political approach of the complainant and on account of such approach, he was interfering in the regular work of the department. He was also not working in accordance with the direction of the senior official. Various correspondence and complaints in this regard were received from the public against the complainant, on which, being senior officer of the department appellant gave him some notices and, on account of that the complainant had enmity with the appellant. In such premises, this possibility could not be ruled out that due to such enmity, with the assistance of the nearest friends, by fabricating the false story the appellant was falsely implicated by the complainant in the matter. It is apparent fact that even on cross- examination of this defence witness at length, the defence of the appellant regarding departmental dispute with the complainant has not be destroyed. The testimony of this witness is further supported by the documents relating to the complaint proceedings of the complainant Ex.D/1 to D/8 proved by Mr. P.Balaram Moorty (D.W.2) the Executive Engineer of the same department.

11. Keeping in view the aforesaid defence evidence, on examining the case, I am of the view that mere on the aforesaid testimony of the complainant/victim and his above mentioned friends, namely, Shyam (P.W.

3) and Ramesh (P.W.4) the person like appellant could not be convicted under any of the aforesaid offence, unless the story putforth by these witnesses is supported by some independent witnesses or independent source of the evidence. I deem fit to mention here that as per prosecution the alleged incident took place in the evening on busy main market where so many shop-keepers and other independent persons were present but out (10) of them none of them was examined nor any explanation regarding their not examination has been putforth by the prosecution on record.

12. It is settled proposition of the law that where there is serious animus between the accused and the complainant party then unless the story putforth by the prosecution and complainant is supported by the independent source of the evidence, the accused could not be convicted mere on the testimony of such complainant and his interested witnesses having the enmity with the accused. Such principle was laid down by the Apex Court in the matter of Bir Singh and others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh-AIR 1978 SC-59 in which it was held as under :-

"9. Where all the eye-witnesses examined by the prosecution had serious animus against the accused and were interested in implicating the accused and neither independent witnesses were examined nor any reasonable explanation was given by the prosecution, the Court would be justified in drawing an adverse inference against the prosecution."

Placitum

13. In view of the aforesaid even on taking into consideration the language of the charge framed by the trial court with respect of the offence of section 294 and 506 of the IPC also, the appellant could not be convicted for such offence in the matter. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the impugned judgment being perverse, infirm and contrary to the law, deserves to be set aside.

14. Therefore, by allowing this appeal, the impugned judgment of the trial court holding conviction and sentence against the appellant under section 3(1)(x) of the Act is hereby set aside and he is acquitted from such charge. In the available circumstances, the appellant is also acquitted from the charge of section 294 and 506 of the IPC. The amount of fine, if (11) deposited, be refunded to the appellant after proper verification. The bail bonds of the appellant are hereby discharged.

15. The appeal is allowed as indicated above.

(U.C.MAHESHWARI) JUDGE MKL

Unlock Advanced Research with PRISMAI

Madhya Pradesh High Court