Jharkhand High Court
Prakash Chandra vs The State Of Jharkhand ..... Opposite ... on 16 December, 2025
Author: Anil Kumar Choudhary
Bench: Anil Kumar Choudhary
[2025:JHHC:38298]
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Cr.M.P. No. 3599 of 2025
1. Prakash Chandra, aged about 63 Years, son of Late
Rameshwar Prasad Mahtha, resident of Flat No. 204,
2nd Floor, Subala garden, Amaghata, P.O. & P.S. K.G.
Ashram, District Dhanbad, Jharkhand.
2. Nandeshwar Rai, aged about 57 Years, son of
Satyanarain rai, resident of B/2 Astha Tara Mansion,
Polytechnic Road, Near Carmel School, P.O. and P.S.
Jharudih, Dhanbad, District Dhanbad, Jharkhand
...... Petitioner
Versus
The State of Jharkhand ..... Opposite Party
For the Petitioner : Mr. Indrajit Sinha , Adv.
Mr. Rishav Kumar, Adv.
For the State : Mr. P.K. Chatterjee, Spl. PP
PRESENT
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR CHOUDHARY
By the Court:- Heard the parties.
2. This criminal miscellaneous petition has been filed invoking the
jurisdiction of this Court under Section 528 of BNSS, 2023, with
the prayer for quashing and setting aside the entire criminal
proceeding as well as the order dated 24.01.2017 passed by
learned CJM Dhanbad in connection with Complaint Case no.
2479 of 2016 whereby and whereunder, learned CJM Dhanbad
has taken cognizance of the offence punishable under Section 33
of the Indian Forest Act, 1927.
3. The allegation against the petitioners is that the petitioner no. 1 is
the General Manager Lodhna Area, BCCL and the petitioner no. 2
is the Project Officer, M.O.C.P., South Tisra, BCCL and the
allegation is that the BCCL has constructed years ago, one
workshop over the forest land and also, prepared a kaccha road
approaching the said workshop. On the basis of the prosecution
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report submitted by the Forest Officer, learned Magistrate has
taken cognizance against the petitioners for having committed the
offence punishable under Section 33 of the Indian Forest Act.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the allegation
against the petitioners is false and there is no allegation that the
petitioners have constructed the workshop and road approaching
the same. It is then submitted that the petitioner no. 1 joined the
Lodna area post on 31.07.2015 and transferred out from Lodna
area to Sijua area on 25.07.2017 and the petitioner no. 2 was
transferred out from Lodna area to Bhowra area on 09.12.2017. It
is next submitted that no offence punishable under Section 33 of
the Indian Forest Act is made out against the petitioners even if
the entire allegations are considered to be true in their entirety.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioners relies upon the judgment of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Ravindranatha
Bajpe Versus Mangalore Special Economic Zone Ltd. and
Others reported in (2021) SCC Online 806, paragraph no. 24 and
25 of which reads as under :-
"24. In the case of Sunil Bharti Mittal (supra), it is observed by this Court in
paragraphs 42 to 44 as under:
"(iii) Circumstances when Director/person in charge of the affairs of the
company can also be prosecuted, when the company is an accused person
42. No doubt, a corporate entity is an artificial person which acts
through its officers, Directors, Managing Director, Chairman, etc. If such
a company commits an offence involving mens rea, it would normally be
the intent and action of that individual who would act on behalf of the
company. It would be more so, when the criminal act is that of conspiracy.
However, at the same time, it is the cardinal principle of criminal
jurisprudence that there is no vicarious liability unless the statute
specifically provides so.
43. Thus, an individual who has perpetrated the commission of an offence
on behalf of a company can be made an accused, along with the company, if
there is sufficient evidence of his active role coupled with criminal intent.
Second situation in which he can be implicated is in those cases where the
statutory regime itself attracts the doctrine of vicarious liability, by
specifically incorporating such a provision.
44. When the company is the offender, vicarious liability of the Directors
cannot be imputed automatically, in the absence of any statutory provision
to this effect. One such example is Section 141 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881. In Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels & Tours (P)
Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661, the Court noted that if a group of persons that
guide the business of the company have the criminal intent, that would be
imputed to the body corporate and it is in this backdrop, Section 141 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act has to be understood. Such a position is,
therefore, because of statutory intendment making it a deeming fiction.
Here also, the principle of "alter ego", was applied only in one direction,
namely, where a group of persons that guide the business had criminal
intent, that is to be imputed to the body corporate and not the vice versa.
Otherwise, there has to be a specific act attributed to the Director or any
other person allegedly in control and management of the company, to the
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effect that such a person was responsible for the acts committed by or on
behalf of the company."
25. In the case of Maksud Saiyed v. State of Gujarat, (2008) 5 SCC 668, in
paragraph 13, it is observed and held as under:
"13. Where a jurisdiction is exercised on a complaint petition filed in
terms of Section 156(3) or Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
the Magistrate is required to apply his mind. The Penal Code does not
contain any provision for attaching vicarious liability on the part of the
Managing Director or the Directors of the Company when the accused is
the company. The learned Magistrate failed to pose unto himself the correct
question viz. as to whether the complaint petition, even if given face value
and taken to be correct in its entirety, would lead to the conclusion that the
respondents herein were personally liable for any offence. The Bank is a
body corporate. Vicarious liability of the Managing Director and Director would arise provided any provision exists in that behalf in the statute. Statutes indisputably must contain provision fixing such vicarious liabilities. Even for the said purpose, it is obligatory on the part of the complainant to make requisite allegations which would attract the provisions constituting vicarious liability."
6. It is next submitted that in the absence of any role attributed to the petitioners in construction of workshop and road on behalf BCCL which admittedly took place much before the petitioners joined the BCCL, hence, the petitioners cannot be held responsible for having committed the alleged offence and therefore, continuation of the criminal proceeding will amount to abuse of process of law, hence, it is submitted that the prayer as made in this criminal miscellaneous petition be allowed.
7. Learned Spl. PP though opposes the prayer of the petitioners but fairly submits that encroachment of the forest land will not amount to any offence punishable under Indian Forest Act but it is submitted that entire criminal proceeding ought not be quashed at this nascent stage and hence, this Criminal Miscellaneous Petition being without any merit, be dismissed.
8. Having heard the submissions made at the Bar and after going through materials available in the record, it is pertinent to refer Section 33 of the Indian Forest Act:-
"33. Penalties for acts in contravention of notification under Section 30 or of rules under Section 32.--(1) Any person who commits any of the following offences, namely:--
(a) fells, girdles, lops, taps or burns any tree reserved under Section 30, or strips off the bark or leaves from, or otherwise damages, any such tree;
(b) contrary to any prohibition under Section 30, quarries any stone, or burns any lime or charcoal or collects, subjects to any manufacturing process, or removes any forest-produce;
(c) contrary to any prohibition under Section 30, breaks up or clears for cultivation or any other purpose any land in any protected forest;
(d) sets fire to such forest, or kindles a fire without taking all reasonable precautions to prevent its spreading to any tree reserved under Section 30, whether standing fallen or foiled, or to say closed portion of such forest;3 Cr.M.P. No. 3599 of 2025
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(e) [* * *]
(f) [* * *]
(g) [* * *]
(h) infringes any rule made under Section 32, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.
[(1-A) Any person who in a protected forest--
(a) leaves burning any fire kindled by him in the vicinity of any tree reserved under Section 30, whether standing, fallen or felled, or closed portion of any protected forest;
(b) fells any tree or drags any timber so as to damage any tree reserved as aforesaid, shall be liable to penalty which may extend to five thousand rupees in addition to such compensation for damage done to the forest as determined by a Forest-officer empowered under Section 68.] (2) Whenever fire is caused wilfully or by gross negligence in a protected forest, the State Government may, notwithstanding that any penalty has been inflicted under this section, direct that in such forest or any portion thereof the exercise of any right of pasture or to forest-produce shall be suspended for such period as it thinks fit."
9. Now coming to the facts of the case, there is absolutely no allegation against the petitioners of committing any of the acts or omission as mentioned in Section 33 of the Indian Forest Act and in the absence of the same, this court has no hesitation in holding that even if the entire allegations made in the offence report and prosecution report are considered to be in their entirety, still the offence punishable under Section 33 of the Indian Forrest Act is not made, hence, continuation of the criminal proceeding will amount to abuse of process of law. Therefore, this is a fit case, where the entire criminal proceeding as well as the order dated 24.01.2017 passed by learned CJM Dhanbad in connection with Complaint Case no. 2479 of 2016, be quashed and set aside qua the petitioners.
10. Accordingly, the entire criminal proceeding as well as the order dated 24.01.2017 passed by learned CJM Dhanbad in connection with Complaint Case no. 2479 of 2016, is quashed and set aside qua the petitioners.
11. In the result, this Criminal Miscellaneous Petition is allowed.
(Anil Kumar Choudhary, J.) High Court of Jharkhand, Ranchi Dated, the 16th December, 2025 Smita /AFR Uploaded on 03.01.2026 4 Cr.M.P. No. 3599 of 2025