Karnataka High Court
Sri H C Somanna vs The State Of Karnataka on 24 September, 2025
Author: S.G.Pandit
Bench: S.G.Pandit
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 24TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2025
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. G. PANDIT
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K.V.ARAVIND
WRIT PETITION NO.22849/2018 (S-KAT)
BETWEEN:
SRI. H.C. SOMANNA
S/O LATE CHAMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS
WAS WORKING AS
JUNIOR ENGINEER
(NOW UNDER AN ORDER OF
COMPULSORY RETIREMENT)
R/AT DR. B.R. AMBEDKAR STREET
HONNURU VILLAGE,
YELENDUR TALUK
CHAMARAJANAGAR DISTRICT-571441.
... PETITIONER
(BY MS. ARCHISHMA S. KALLUARAYA, ADV. FOR
SRI M LOKESH, ADV.)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
REP. BY ITS SECRETARY
WATER RESOURCES DEPARTMENT
VIKASA SOUDHA
BANGALORE-560 001.
2
2. THE KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTHA
REP. BY ITS REGISTRAR
M.S. BUILDING
BANGALORE-560 001.
3. THE CHIEF ENGINEER
CAUVERY NEERAVARI NIGAM LIMITED
SOUTH RANGE
MYSORE- 570 001.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. B SUKANYA BALIGA, AGA FOR R1
SRI VENKATESH S ARBATTI, ADV. FOR R2
SRI B.S. GAUTHAM, ADV. FOR R3)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226
AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO
CALL FOR RECORDS FROM THE RESPONDENTS AND
QUASH THE IMPUGNED ORDER OF THE KARNATAKA STATE
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL DATED 02.02.2018 PASSED
IN APPLICATION NO.2004/2017 (ANNEXURE-A) AND
CONSEQUENTLY ALLOW THE SAID APPLICATION
NO.2004/17 FILED BY THE PETITIONER BEFORE THE
KARNATAKA STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL.
THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDER ON 03.09.2025 COMING ON THIS
DAY, S.G.PANDIT J., PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT
and
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE K.V. ARAVIND
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CAV ORDER
(PER: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT)
The petitioner, a compulsorily retired Junior
Engineer is before this Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India assailing order dated 02.02.2018
in Application No.2004/2017 passed by the Karnataka
State Administrative Tribunal at Bengaluru (for short,
'the Tribunal') rejecting petitioner's challenge to the
order of penalty of compulsory retirement dated
25.02.2017 (Annexure-A10).
2. Brief facts of the case are that, while the
petitioner was working as Junior Engineer at the office
of the Cauvery Neeravari Nigama Niyamith,
Santhemaralli, Kollegal Taluk, Chamarajanagar
District, articles of charge dated 15.03.2013 came to
be issued against the petitioner alleging that he
demanded and accepted bribe of Rs.10,000/- on
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02.07.2009 from complainant Sri.D.Ningaraju, a
Class-III Civil Contractor for inspecting the work done
by him and for making payment of the bill amount.
The Enquiry Officer nominated by the second
respondent conducted a detailed enquiry and
submitted a report dated 28.03.2016 holding that the
charges are proved against the petitioner. Along with
the recommendation of the Upa-Loykaukta dated
12.04.2016, the enquiry report was forwarded to the
first respondent - State Government. The first
respondent - State Government issued second show
cause notice dated 23.05.2016 enclosing enquiry
report providing an opportunity to the petitioner to
submit his reply. The petitioner is said to have
submitted his reply to the second show cause notice
on 27.06.2016. Thereafter, the impugned order dated
25.02.2017 imposing penalty of compulsory
retirement on petitioner is passed.
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3. In the meanwhile, against the petitioner
trial was conducted in Special Case No.35/2011 for
the offence punishable under Section 7, 13(1)(b) read
with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988 (for short, '1988 Act') by the Principal District
and Sessions Judge, Chamarajanagar on the same
incident of demanding and accepting bribe and was
acquitted of the charges vide judgment dated
18.06.2015.
4. Questioning the penalty of compulsory
retirement, the petitioner was before the Tribunal in
the above stated Application and the Tribunal under
impugned order dated 02.02.2018 refused to accept
the petitioner's contention by observing that the
charge against the petitioner is proved on the material
on record. Questioning the order of the Tribunal as
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well as order of penalty of compulsory retirement, the
petitioner is before this Court in this writ petition.
5. Heard learned counsel Ms.Archishma S.
Kalluraya, learned counsel for Sri.M.Lokesh, learned
counsel for petitioner, Smt.B.Sukanya Baliga, learned
Additional Government Advocate for respondent No.1
and Sri.Venkatesh S. Arbatti, learned counsel for
respondent No.2. Perused the entire writ petition
papers.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner
vehemently contended that there is no material on
record to prove the charge against the petitioner and
that the Disciplinary Authority without taking note of
the fact that the petitioner was acquitted of the same
charge before the Criminal Court, imposed penalty of
compulsory retirement. Learned counsel would submit
that the petitioner has been honorably acquitted in the
7
criminal case and no benefit of doubt is extended to
the petitioner and that when the petitioner is
acquitted of the same charges in the criminal
proceedings, the first respondent ought to have closed
the enquiry. It is submitted that there is no cogent
evidence placed on record in the departmental
proceedings to prove the charge. Learned counsel
would also submit that when the judicial forum has
acquitted the petitioner, the finding therein shall have
to be given preference over the findings of the Enquiry
Officer.
7. Learned counsel would also submit placing
reliance on the decision of UNION OF INDIA AND
OTHERS VS. GYAN CHAND CHATTAR1 that the
charge of corruption cannot be proved merely based
on conjectures and probabilities. Learned counsel for
the petitioner also placed reliance on the decision of
1
(2009) 12 SCC 78
8
the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of RAM LAL VS.
STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS2.
8. Learned counsel referring to the evidence
of PW1 to PW3 before the Enquiry Officer would
submit that the evidence would not support the case
of the Disciplinary Authority. It is also submitted that
there was no demand for bribe amount and the
Disciplinary Authority has failed to prove the demand
and acceptance. Learned counsel for the petitioner
would submit that the Tribunal without appreciating
the evidence on record has dismissed the petitioner's
application. Thus, it is prayed to allow the writ
petition.
9. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for
the respondents would vehemently submit that the
petitioner was acquitted before the Sessions Court by
2
(2024) 1 SCC 175
9
extending benefit of doubt and it observed that the
bribe amount is recovered from the petitioner.
Learned counsel would invite attention of this Court to
evidence of PW1 and submits that he has
unequivocally supported the case of the Disciplinary
Authority, so also PW2 - shadow witness. It is further
submitted that, based on the evidence on record in
the departmental proceedings, charge is held to be
proved against the petitioner, wherein, the charges
are to be proved on the principles of preponderance of
probabilities. Further, it is submitted that evaluation of
evidence in both the proceedings are different. Thus,
they pray for dismissal of the writ petition.
10. Having heard the learned counsel
appearing for the parties and on perusal of the entire
writ petition papers, the point which falls for our
consideration is as to,
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"Whether the impugned order of the
Tribunal as well as impugned order of
penalty of compulsory retirement
warrants interference at the hands of this
Court?"
11. Answer to the above point would be in the
Negative for the following reasons:
The jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India to interfere with the order of
penalty in departmental proceedings is very limited.
Moreover, this Court would not sit as an Appellate
Authority against the order of penalty or order passed
by the Tribunal. Judicial review is limited to examine
as to whether there is any violation in the decision
making process and it is not open to examine the
decision itself.
12. The departmental proceedings and criminal
proceedings are two distinct proceedings with different
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objectives. The degree of proof required to prove the
charges in both the proceedings are different. In the
departmental proceedings, the charges are to be
proved on the principles of preponderance of
probabilities and in criminal proceedings the charges
are to be proved on the principles of strict rules of
evidence and beyond reasonable doubt.
13. In the case on hand, the charge against the
petitioner is demanding and accepting bribe of
Rs.10,000/- from the complainant, one
Sri.D.Ningaraju, a Class-III Civil Contractor for
inspecting the work and for making payment of the
bill amount. Before the Enquiry Officer, PW1 to PW3
are examined, PW1 being the complainant, PW2 being
the shadow witness and PW3 being the Investigating
Officer, all of whom have supported the case of the
Disciplinary Authority. PW1 - complainant has
categorically stated that the DGO asked him how
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much amount he has brought and he gave bribe
amount of Rs.10,000/-. The DGO - petitioner received
it from his right hand, counted it and kept it in his
right side pant pocket. In the cross-examination,
nothing contrary is elicited and PW1 has stood by his
statement. PW2 has also supported the case of the
Disciplinary Authority and he has categorically stated
that upon hand wash of the DGO i.e., petitioner, his
hands turned pink. It is true that the findings of the
criminal proceedings will have bearing on the
departmental proceedings, if the petitioner is
acquitted of the charges honorably. However, upon
entire reading of the judgment in the criminal
proceedings i.e., Special C.No.35/2011, it cannot be
said that the petitioner is honorably acquitted. The
bribe amount is recovered from the DGO. The criminal
Court observes that mere recovery of amount from
the custody of the accused or mere possession of the
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amount in the custody of the accused does not help
much to show that illegal gratification was accepted
by the accused by making demand for the same. The
criminal Court mainly proceeded to acquit the
petitioner solely on the ground that there is no
demand. However, in the departmental enquiry, PW1
- the complainant is categorical in his statement that
there was a demand and he paid bribe amount of
Rs.10,000/- to the DGO who kept the said amount in
his right side pant pocket. Therefore, in the instant
case, the finding of the criminal Court would have no
bearing on the departmental proceedings.
14. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed
reliance on the case of GYAN CHAND CHATTAR
(supra) to contend that where allegation of demanding
and accepting bribe is involved, the degree of proof
required in a departmental proceedings is much more
than preponderance of probabilities. The Hon'ble Apex
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Court in subsequent decision i.e., STATE OF
KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER VS. UMESH3 has observed
that the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in
paragraph 21 of GYAN CHAND CHATTAR (supra) are
not ratio decidendi of the case and those observations
were made while discussing the judgment of the High
Court. In UMESH (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court was
considering the effect of acquittal in criminal case on
departmental enquiry and at paragraphs 16, 18 and
19, it is held as follows:
"16. The principles which govern a
disciplinary enquiry are distinct from those
which apply to a criminal trial. In a prosecution
for an offence punishable under the criminal
law, the burden lies on the prosecution to
establish the ingredients of the offence beyond
reasonable doubt. The accused is entitled to a
presumption of innocence. The purpose of a
disciplinary proceeding by an employer is to
enquire into an allegation of misconduct by an
3
(2022) 6 SCC 563
15
employee which results in a violation of the
service rules governing the relationship of
employment. Unlike a criminal prosecution
where the charge has to be established beyond
reasonable doubt, in a disciplinary proceeding,
a charge of misconduct has to be established
on a preponderance of probabilities. The rules
of evidence which apply to a criminal trial are
distinct from those which govern a disciplinary
enquiry. The acquittal of the accused in a
criminal case does not debar the employer
from proceeding in the exercise of disciplinary
jurisdiction.
17. xxxxxxxxxx
18. In the course of the submissions, the
respondents placed reliance on the decision
in Union of India v. Gyan Chand Chattar [Union
of India v. Gyan Chand Chattar, (2009) 12 SCC
78 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 129] . In that case,
six charges were framed against the
respondent. One of the charges was that he
demanded a commission of 1% for paying the
railway staff. The enquiry officer found all the
six charges proved. The disciplinary authority
agreed with those findings and imposed the
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punishment of reversion to a lower rank.
Allowing the petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution, the High Court observed that
there was no evidence to hold that he was
guilty of the charge of bribery since the
witnesses only said that the motive/reason for
not making the payment could be the
expectation of a commission amount. The
respondent placed reliance on the following
passages from the decision : (SCC pp. 85 &
87, paras 21 & 31)
"21. Such a serious charge of
corruption requires to be proved to the
hilt as it brings both civil and criminal
consequences upon the employee
concerned. He would be liable to be
prosecuted and would also be liable to
suffer severest penalty awardable in
such cases. Therefore, such a grave
charge of quasi-criminal nature was
required to be proved beyond the
shadow of doubt and to the hilt. It
cannot be proved on mere probabilities.
***
31. ... wherein it has been held that the punishment should always be proportionate to the gravity of the misconduct. However, in a case of corruption, the only punishment is dismissal from service. Therefore, the charge of corruption must always be 17 dealt with keeping in mind that it has both civil and criminal consequences."
19. The observations in para 21 of Gyan Chand Chattar case [Union of India v. Gyan Chand Chattar, (2009) 12 SCC 78 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 129] are not the ratio decidendi of the case. These observations were made while discussing the judgment [Union of India v. Gyan Chand Chattar, 2002 SCC OnLine Guj 548] of the High Court. The ratio of the judgment emerges in the subsequent passages of the judgment, where the test of relevant material and compliance with natural justice as laid down in Rattan Singh [State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh, (1977) 2 SCC 491 :
1977 SCC (L&S) 298 : (1977) 1 SLR 750] was reiterated : (Gyan Chand Chattar case [Union of India v. Gyan Chand Chattar, (2009) 12 SCC 78 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 129] , SCC p. 88, paras 35-36) "35. ... an enquiry is to be conducted against any person giving strict adherence to the statutory provisions and principles of natural justice. The charges should be specific, definite and giving details of the incident which formed the basis of charges. No enquiry can be sustained on vague charges.
Enquiry has to be conducted fairly, 18 objectively and not subjectively. Finding should not be perverse or unreasonable, nor the same should be based on conjectures and surmises. There is a distinction in proof and suspicion. Every act or omission on the part of the delinquent cannot be a misconduct. The authority must record reasons for arriving at the finding of fact in the context of the statute defining the misconduct.
36. In fact, initiation of the enquiry against the respondent appears to be the outcome of anguish of superior officers as there had been an agitation by the railway staff demanding the payment of pay and allowances and they detained the train illegally and there has been too much hue and cry for several hours on the railway station. The enquiry officer has taken into consideration the non-existing material and failed to consider the relevant material and finding of all facts recorded by him cannot be sustained in the eye of the law."
(emphasis supplied) On the charge of corruption, the Court observed in the above decision that there was no relevant material to sustain the conviction of the respondent since there was only hearsay evidence where the witnesses assumed that the motive for not paying the railway staff "could be" corruption. Therefore, the standard 19 that was applied by the Court for determining the validity of the departmental proceedings was whether (i) there was relevant material for arriving at the finding; and (ii) the principles of natural justice were complied with."
15. The judgment in the case of RAM LAL (supra) would also not aid the case of the petitioner, inasmuch as, in the said case the charge was that the delinquent therein had altered his date of birth in the marks sheet issued by the Government Secondary School. The Hon'ble Apex Court, noticing that in the criminal proceedings the Appellate Court while acquitting the delinquent had recorded that in the original marks sheet (Ex.P3) the date of birth was correctly shown, held that in view of the findings recorded in the criminal case, the findings recorded in the disciplinary proceedings cannot be allowed to stand.
2016. The Enquiry Officer based on material and evidence, particularly PW1 has rightly concluded that the charges are proved against the petitioner. There is no reason to disagree with the finding of the Enquiry Officer.
17. There is no merit in any of the contentions raised by the petitioner and accordingly writ petition stands dismissed.
Sd/-
(S.G.PANDIT) JUDGE Sd/-
(K.V.ARAVIND) JUDGE NC CT: bms