Jammu & Kashmir High Court - Srinagar Bench
Jan Mohammad Shera vs Bharat Electronics on 19 April, 2024
Author: Javed Iqbal Wani
Bench: Javed Iqbal Wani
S. No. 197
Regular Cause List
IN THE HIGH C0URT 0F JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT SRINAGAR
OWP No. 471/2010
Jan Mohammad Shera ...Petitioner
Through: Mr. Altaf Haqani, Sr. Advocate. with
Mr. Shakir Haqani, Advocate.
Ms. Muneeba, Advocate.
v.
Union of India and others ...Respondent(s)
Through: Ms. Sufaya, Advocate vice
Mr. T. M. Shamsi, DSGI, for R-1.
Mr. Shafaqat Nazir, Advocate.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAVED IQBAL WANI, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
Oral
1. In the instant petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs:
"A writ, order of direction including one in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned order contained in Annexure-H passed by respondent No. 2.
A writ, order or direction including one in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned order contained in Annexure-A passed by respondents 3 and 4.
A writ, order or direction including one in the nature of Mandamus commanding upon the respondents to reinstate the petitioner into the service w.e.f. 17-02-1998, giving him all the benefits of pay and grade and seniority as admissible to him under rules. A writ, order or direction including one in the nature of Mandamus commanding upon the respondents to follow the mandate of Section 25-F, Section 25-G, Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act in letter and spirit and re-employ him into the service giving all the benefits of pay and grade, seniority and promotions."
2. The background facts under the cover of which the aforesaid reliefs have been prayed and as are stated in the petition reveal that the petitioner has been appointed as peon-cum-watchman in terms of Order No. Per/Estt/91-10611 B dated 17.07.1991 in J&K Bank (for short the Bank) and while posted in Branch Office, Nawakadal, came to be terminated in terms OWP No. 471/2010 1 of the order dated 17.02.1998 whereupon the petitioner raised an industrial dispute under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 (for short the Act of 1947) before the Conciliation Officer being the Assistant Labour Commissioner appointed by the Government of India being the "Appropriate Government" under and in terms of the Act of 1947 and on account of failure to yield any results the said industrial dispute raised by the petitioner before the Conciliation Officer led to the making of an order of reference dated 22nd August, 2003, passed by the respondent No. 1 herein under and in terms of Section 10 of the Act of 1947 to the Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court Chandigarh requiring it to pass an award on the said reference within a period of three months.
3. The Tribunal upon entering the reference and adjudicating upon the dispute passed the award dated 2nd December, 2009, holding the petitioner herein not entitled to any relief and accordingly answered the reference.
4. The petitioner herein has challenged, besides the said award passed by the Tribunal cum Labour Court also the order of termination of his services dated 17.02.1998 issued by the Bank while seeking his reinstatement as well in the Bank.
5. The petitioner has maintained the instant petition on the following grounds:
"i) For the order passed by respondent No. 2 is in total derogation of the mandate of reference made over to him by the "Appropriate Government" in terms of order dated 22-08-2003 (Annexure-B). As has been stated hereinabove by virtue of the said order dated 22-08-2003, the "Appropriate Government" had required the respondent No. 2 to adjudicate into the question as to whether the action of management of the respondents 3 & 4 in terminating the services of the petitioner, without complying with the provisions of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act was just fair and legal and that if it was not so to what relief the petitioner was entitle to and from which date. It is submitted that the respondent No. 2 while passing the order impugned has not at all adjudicated into the said question. In this behalf it would be proper to mention that on the own showing of respondents 3 and 4 it was an admitted case on behalf of the bank that the petitioners service had been terminated under clause 522(1) of the Sastry Award not by way of punishment but as a matter of simple termination and it was accordingly that according to the Bank itself, the petitioner was held as entitle to three months pay in lieu of notice as also to the terminal benefits. The petitioner submits that in the face of the stand of the respondent no. 3 and 4 contained in Annexure-A, it was mandatorily required for the respondent No. 2 to adjudicate as to OWP No. 471/2010 2 whether the mandate of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act had been followed by the respondents 3 and 4 or not. The respondent No. 2 was under a legal duty under Section 15 of the Industrial Disputes Act to adjudicate upon the reference made over to him and to return an award as to whether the conditions precedent for retrenchment of a workman under Section 25-F has been followed or not. At the cost of repetition, it may be relevant to submit that in terms of Section-25 of the Industrial Disputes Act no workman employee in any industry, being in continuous service for not less than one year could be retrenched unless he has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment or the wages of the notice period in lieu of such notice and that he has as well been paid at the time of retrenchment, compensation, equivalent to 15 days average pay, for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof and that the notice of retrenchment has been served on the "Appropriate Government" in the prescribed manner.
With respects it is submitted that the learned respondent No. 2 has not at all examined the said very vital question raised in the matter. He has as well obviously not gone into the requirement and effect and consequence of the mandate of law contained in Section 25-F and Section 25-H, which respectively envisage that an employer is empowered to retrench an workman who was the last person employed in a particular category and was as well entitle to re-employment. This was more so when after the retrenchment of the petitioner, the respondents engaged a huge number of employees in the post of Peon-cum-Watchman and did not consider the petitioner at all for re-employment. The petitioner most respectfully submits that by omitting to follow the mandate of reference, the respondent No. 2 has failed to act within the scope of jurisdiction available to him. He has obviously acted in an unjust and unfair manner and the order impugned leading the order impugned to be infested with an error apparent on the face of the record.
ii) For the order impugned contained in Annexure-H is also liable to be set aside in as-much-as the same is again suffering an error on the face of the record. It is submitted that notwithstanding the case of the petitioner, it was the admitted case of the respondent Bank as reflected by the order Annexure-A, that his services were ordered to be terminated by an order of "Termination Simpliciter, without attaching any stigma to the petitioner and it was. Accordingly that the respondents invoking the power under clause 522(1) of the Shastri Award had held the petitioner as entitle to payment of three months pay in lieu of notice as also to terminal benefits. In the face of the said specific stand of the respondent Bank, what was required for the respondent No. 2 to adjudicate upon, was to examine as to whether the said order contained in Annexure-A had been issued by the respondents bona-fide or as a measure of short cut to the requirement of disciplinary enquiry and thereby abuse the power available to them. The respondent No. 2 as well was required to examine that as to whether the petitioner had been paid the amount of three months pay in lieu of notice or the terminal benefits. In this behalf, it may be pertinent to submit that neither the respondents 3 & 4 paid the petitioner the wages for a period of three months in lieu of notice directly or through his savings Bank Account maintained by him at Branch office Nawakadal, Srinagar nor have they up to this date passed any order for release of terminal benefits in his favour. The respondent No. 2 was as well required to examine as to whether the order contained in Annexure- A was legally valid or based on bona fide exercise of power in as-much-
OWP No. 471/2010 3as the same had been issued actually as a1measure of punishment inflicting upon the petitioner on the basis of incriminating allegations, that too without holding any enquiry or affording him an opportunity of being heard. The petitioner respectfully submits that while passing the impugned order the respondent No. 2 ignored the stand of respondents 3 & 4 completely as also the effect and consequence of judgment of acquittal passed in his favour by the criminal court of competent jurisdiction and the contradictory stand taken by the respondents qua the FIR and the criminal case lodged in the matter, and thereby failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him, causing an error apparent on the face of the record in the whole proceedings.
iii) For the order impugned is also bad in the eye of law in as-much- as the order of termination of services of the petitioner contained in Annexure-Ahad been issued by the respondents as a measure of punishment and was styled in a manner so as to camouflage the same as an order of Termination Simpliciter by abuse of power and authority. As stated above,, on 27-01-1998, the petitioner had been subjected to grave state of physical torture and mental strain' by the Officer/Officials of the respondent bank on the pretext of alleged fraudulent withdrawal of an amount of Rs. 70,000/- from the Savings Bank Account of an account holder Mohammad Lateef Mattoo and having been kept under duress and in a state of coercion and undue influence for the night between 27th & 28th January, 1998 was forced to sign on a confessional statement. The family members of the petitioner were as well put in a state of intimidation, forcing them to deposit the amount of Rs. 70,000/- by raising a withdrawal from the Saving Bank Account of the petitioner's Sister at J&K Bank, Naidyar, Rainawari, Srinagar, which account had always carried a substantial credit balance with last deposit having been made by the petitioner's sister on 19-01-1998. The petitioner submits that despite of his specific stand of having been subjected to torture and his family to grave state of intimidation, no enquiry had been held by the respondent Bank nor was he ever permitted to lead his defence. The learned respondent No. 2 while passing the order impugned has completely failed to appreciate failure of the respondents to conduct the enquiry and their omission to permit him to lead defence to establish his innocence. The respondent No. 2has on the contrary treated the statement of admission attributed to the petitioner as voluntary without any supporting material, that too in spite of serious discrepancies and inconsistencies infesting the statements of the witnesses produced by the respondents. 3 & 4 before him. The respondent No. 2, with respects, it is submitted has failed to exercise his jurisdiction properly rendering his order as infested with serious error apparent on the face of the record.
iv) For, assuming though denying that the order of. retrenchment of the petitioner passed by the respondents 3& 4 was valid and in consonance with the mandate of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, yet, the respondents 3 & 4 failed to comply with the mandate of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, particularly so when after the issuance of the impugned order contained in Annexure-A a huge number of persons were appointed/engaged by respondent 3 & 4 in the posts of Peon cum Watchman. This aspect as well has been ignored by respondent No. 2 while answering the reference made over to him.
v) For the order passed by respondent No. 2 is as well liable to be set aside being not supported by any valid material available on record.
OWP No. 471/2010 4vi) For the order impugned is also legally invalid being in violation of minimum requirements of rules of natural justice and fair play. It is specifically submitted that in the proceedings before respondent No. 2 the petitioner was represented by a counsel stationed at Jammu. It is submitted that on the last date fixed for hearing of the matter, the counsel of the petitioner was not available and could not make it to reach to Chandigarh before respondent. No.2. The petitioner having appeared in person before respondent No. 2, solicited upon him for adjournment of the matter, enabling his counsel to appear in the matter on next date, especially when nobody as well had appeared on behalf of respondents 3 & 4 before him on the said date. The respondent No. 2 obviously without giving any effective opportunity to the petitioner proceeded to reserve the case for orders and decide the same vide the impugned order. The order impugned is liable to be set aside on this count as well."
6. Objections to the petition have been filed by the respondents, wherein the petition is being opposed inter alia, on the ground that the petitioner has raised disputed questions of facts not amenable to writ jurisdiction of this court stating further in the objections that the findings recorded by the Tribunal in the impugned award cannot be categorized as perverse findings as the said findings stand validly arrived at by the Tribunal on the plea of the fact of admission of guilt voluntarily made by the petitioner herein before the Respondent-Bank prior to the termination of his services.
Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
7. According to the counsel for the petitioner the Tribunal failed to deal with the reference made to it by the Central Government and in fact had gone beyond the said reference and in the process committed gross error and perversity while passing the impugned award.
8. On the contrary, the counsel for the respondent-Bank would vehemently contend that the Tribunal dealt with the reference validly and rightly inasmuch as the matter incidental thereto and consequently passed the award legally.
9. Before proceeding to address to the issues raised by the parties in the instant petition, it would be appropriate in the first instance to refer to the reference made by the Central Government on 22nd August, 2003, under and in terms of Section 10 of the Act of 1947 as also Section 10(1) and (4) of the Act of 1947 being relevant and germane herein:
OWP No. 471/2010 5NO-L-12012/157/2003-IR(B-I) Government of India/Bharat Sarkar Ministry of Labour/Shram Mantralaya New Delhi, Dated: 22-08-2003 ORDER NO..L-12012/157/2003 (IR(B-I)): Whereas the Central Government is of the opinion that an industrial dispute exists between the employers in relation to the management of Jammu and Kashmir Bank Srinagar Ltd. and their workmen in respect of the matters specified in the Schedule hereto annexed;
AND WHEREAS the Central Government considers it desirable to refer the said dispute for adjudication;
NOW THEREFORE, in exercise of powers conferred by clause (d) of sub- section (1) and sub-section (2A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) the Central Government hereby refers the said dispute for adjudication to the Cent. Govt. Indus. Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Chandigarh. The said Tribunal shall give its award within a period of three months.
The Schedule Whether the action of the management of Jammu and Kashmir Bank Limited, Central Office, M. A. Road near TRC, Srinagar Rambagh, Srinagar through its Chairman in terminating the services of Shri Jan Mohammad Shera, Peon-cum-Watchman w.e.f. 01-01-1998 without complying with the provision of Section 25-F, 25-G and 25-H, Industrial Dispute Act was just fair and legal? If not, what relief he is entitled to and from which date?
Ajay Kumar DESK Officer T. No. 23001150 Section 10(1) [Where the appropriate Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may at any time], by order in writing,--
(a) refer the dispute to a Board for promoting a settlement thereof; or
(b) refer any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to the dispute to a Court for inquiry; or 2 [(c) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, if it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule, to a Labour Court for adjudication; or
(d) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, whether it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule or the Third Schedule, to a Tribunal for adjudication:
Provided that where the dispute relates to any matter specified in the Third Schedule and is not likely to affect more than one hundred workmen, the appropriate Government may, if it so thinks fit, make the reference to a Labour Court under clause (c):] 3 [Provided further that] where the dispute relates to a public utility service and a notice under section 22 has been given, the appropriate Government shall, unless it considers that the notice has been frivolously or vexatiously given or that it would be inexpedient so to do, make a reference under this sub-section notwithstanding that any other proceedings under this Act in respect of the dispute may have commenced:OWP No. 471/2010 6
4 [Provided also that where the dispute in relation to which the Central Government is the appropriate Government, it shall be competent for that Government to refer the dispute to a Labour Court or an Industrial Tribunal, as the case may be, constituted by the State Government.) Section 10(4) Where in an order referring an industrial dispute to 2 [a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal] under this section or in a subsequent order, the appropriate Government has specified the points of dispute for adjudication, 3 [the Labour Court or the Tribunal or the National Tribunal, as the case may be], shall confine its adjudication to those points and matters incidental thereto."
10. Reverting back to the case in hand, the positive case set up by the petitioner herein before the Tribunal has been that the Bank terminated him from the services under clause 522 (1) of the Sastry Award without holding an enquiry and without complying with the provisions of the Section 25 (F), (G) & (H) of the Act of 1947, whereas the Bank in response to the case set up by the petitioner herein in its reply filed before the Tribunal had admitted the fact that the petitioner came to be terminated under clause 522 (1) of the Sastry Award, though by way of a discharge simpliciter, yet also contended that the said termination had resulted on account of an act of fraud committed by the petitioner while misappropriating an amount of Rs. 70,000/- (Rupees Seventy Thousand only) stating further that no formal enquiry was required to be conducted against the petitioner as the petitioner have had been given three months wages in lieu of notice required to be given in terms of clause 522 (1) of the Sastry Award, maintaining further in its reply filed before the Tribunal that the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act of 1947 did not apply to the case of the petitioner.
11. It is pertinent to note here that the making of reference dated 22nd August, 2003, by the Central Government in terms of Section 10 of the Act of 1947 has not been disputed by either of the parties or else thrown challenge to.
12. In the aforesaid backdrop, the first issue that emerges for consideration of this Court in the instant petition would be as to whether the Tribunal dealt with the reference dated 22nd August, 2003, in line and tune with the context it came to be made.
A deeper and closer examination of the reference indisputably tend to show that the Tribunal have had to render a decision on the issue as to whether the action of the Bank in terminating the services of the petitioner OWP No. 471/2010 7 without complying with the provisions of Section 25- F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was just fair and legal and if not the relief/s petitioner herein would be entitled thereto and from the date thereof.
13. However, before proceeding further in the matter, a reference to Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act of 1947 also becomes necessary hereunder:
"[25F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.
- No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until-
(a) the workman has been given one month 's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days 'average pay [for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess of six months; and
(c)notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government [or such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.] [25G. Procedure for retrenchment.--Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman.] [25H. Re-employment of retrenched workmen.--Where any workmen are retrenched, and the employer proposes to take into his employ any persons, he shall, in such manner as may be prescribed, give an opportunity 2[to the retrenched workmen who are citizens of India to offer themselves for reemployment and such retrenched workman] who offer themselves for re-employment shall have preference over other persons.]"
A bare perusal of Section 25-F postulates that the same has two fold underlying objects, firstly a retrenched employee must have one month's time available at his disposal to search for alternate employment and so should either be given one month's notice of the proposed termination or paid wages for the notice period and, secondly, the workmen must be paid retrenchment compensation at the time of retrenchment, or before, so that once having been retrenched there should be no need for him to go to his employer demanding retrenchment compensation, further suggesting that the compensation so paid is not only a reward earned by him for his previous OWP No. 471/2010 8 services rendered to the employer, but is also a sustenance to him for the period which may be spend by him in searching for another employment. A reference in this regard to the Judgment of the Apex Court passed in case titled as 'Pramod Jah v. State of Bihar' reported in 2003 (4) SCC 619 would be relevant.
The Apex Court in case titled as 'Mohan Lal vs. Bharat Electronics Ltd.' reported in 1981 (3) SCC 225 has also held that non compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F would be illegal and void ab initio and Compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F has been held to be mandatory in nature and character and a condition precedent by the Apex Court in case titled as 'Raj Kumar vs. Director of Education' reported in 2016 (6) SCC
541.
14. Keeping in mind the aforesaid position of law qua Section 25-F supra and reverting back to the case in hand, on perusal of the impugned award dated 02-12-2009 passed by the Tribunal manifestly tends to show that the Tribunal has failed to advert and address to the issues identified and crystallized in the reference and instead proceeded to deal with the validity of order of termination issued by the Bank against the petitioner herein which issue even cannot by any stretch of imagination said to be a matter incidental to the issue/s under section 10(4) covered by the reference. The law in this regard is no more res integra and stands settled in a series of Judgments passed by the Apex Court including in case titled as 'Delhi Cloth and General Mill Co. Ltd. v. The Workmen & others' reported in AIR 1967 SC 469 and in case titled as 'Pottery Mazdoor Panchayat v. The Perfect Pottery Co. Ltd.' reported in 1971 Lab. I. C. A27 wherein the consistent view of the Apex Court has been that the Tribunal must confine its decisions qua the reference made to it by the Appropriate Government and it cannot enlarge the scope of jurisdiction and decide the issues/points beyond the reference and that any deviation made by the Tribunal thereto would be without jurisdiction.
The Tribunal, thus, in view of the above, cannot, but, be said to have grossly erred and gone beyond the reference and in essence failed to deal with the reference made to it having resulted into passing of impugned award, which, as such, can safely be termed to be without jurisdiction.
OWP No. 471/2010 915. Having held that the Tribunal failed to deal with the reference inasmuch as had gone beyond the reference and passed the impugned award without jurisdiction, it is deemed appropriate to address to the issue of validity of the order of termination issued by the Bank against the petitioner in terms of clause 522 (1) of the Sastry Award.
16. As has been noticed in the preceding paragraphs, it is an admitted fact that the service of the petitioner herein came to be terminated by the Bank in terms of clause 522(1) of the Sastry Award, which clause for the sake of brevity and convenience is reproduced hereunder:
"In case not involving disciplinary action for misconduct and subject to clause (6) below, the employment of a permanent employee may be terminated by three month's notice or on payment or three month's pay and allowance in lieu of notice. The services of a probationer may be terminated by, one month's notice or an payment of a month's pay and allowance in lieu of notice."
A bare perusal of clause 522(1) supra reveals that the same postulates that the employment of a permanent employee can be terminated other than for an act of misconduct, by giving him three months notice or on payment of three months pay and allowances in lieu of the said notice.
17. Though a cursory look on the order of termination of the petitioner do not reveal the same to have been ordered for an act of misconduct, yet the Bank has admitted not only before the Tribunal, but before this court as well, in its pleadings, that the services of the petitioner came to be terminated for the act of misconduct i.e. alleged embezzlement of Rs. 70,000/- (Rupees Seventy Thousand). Thus under these circumstances, the respondents could not have taken recourse to the provisions of clause 522 (1) of the Sastry Award, but to the relevant provisions of the Sastry Award dealing with disciplinary action and procedure thereof qua an act of omission and commission committed by an employee of the Bank which disciplinary action and procedure is as well contained in the aforesaid Sastry Award amended from time to time and providing in clause 21 therein that an employee found guilty of misconduct may be dismissed without notice or compulsorily retired/removed from service/discharged with superannuation benefits and without disqualification from future employment, however, OWP No. 471/2010 10 subject to the following of a procedure provided in clause 19.12 requiring that an employee against whom disciplinary action is proposed or likely to be taken has to be given a charge sheet clearly setting forth the circumstances appearing against him so on and so forth, thus necessitating the holding of a departmental/disciplinary enquiry against a delinquent employee who has committed an act of misconduct.
In presence of the aforesaid provisions of the Sastry Award coupled with the fact that the respondents indisputably alleged the petitioner to have committed misconduct by embezzling an amount of Rs. 70,000/- (Rupees Seventy Thousand), were as such obliged, in law, to have followed the aforesaid provisions of the Sastry Award by holding a disciplinary enquiry in tune with the aforesaid procedure provided therein. The respondents however admittedly having made a complete departure there from the said procedure and instead having taken recourse to clause 522 (1) of the Sastry Award while terminating the services of the petitioner, in terms of the impugned order, which though having been couched in simple language to show that the said termination is simpliciter in nature, yet admittedly have terminated the petitioner on account of the alleged misconduct of embezzlement. Thus, in view of above, the only inescapable conclusion that can be drawn is that the Bank has grossly faulted qua the termination of the services of the petitioner while taking recourse to clause 522 (1) of the Sastry Award without holding a disciplinary enquiry in accordance with the procedure prescribed therein and has in the process violated the right and interest of the petitioner available to him under law.
18. In the aforesaid backdrop, indulgence of this court is warranted in exercise of extraordinary writ jurisdiction invoked by the petitioner, more so, in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in case titled as 'Union of India v.. Constable Sunil Kumar' reported in 2023 LivLaw (SC) 49, wherein it has been held that on the basis of irrationality or perversity qua the punishment of dismissal, there can be judicial review under Article 226, 227 and 32 of the Constitution.
19. Viewed thus, what has been observed, considered and analyzed hereinabove, the instant petition merits to be allowed. Accordingly by OWP No. 471/2010 11 issuance of writ of certiorari, the impugned award dated 02.12.2009 as also the impugned order of termination dated 17.02.1998 are quashed, as a consequence whereof, the Respondent-Bank is directed to reinstate the petitioner with liberty to hold a disciplinary enquiry against the petitioner for the alleged misconduct if the Bank chooses so, within a period of three months from the date a copy of this judgment is produced by the petitioner before the Respondent-Bank and the result of the said enquiry shall determine the fate of the services of the petitioner. In case no enquiry is held by the Respondent-Bank against the petitioner within the aforesaid timeframe, the Respondent-Bank shall deemed to have forfeited the said right of holding enquiry against the petitioner and the petitioner consequently shall be deemed to be in service entitled to all service benefits, except the back wages for the period the petitioner remained out of service pursuant to the order of termination dated 17.02.1998.
20. Disposed of.
(JAVED IQBAL WANI) JUDGE SRINAGAR 19.04.2024 Sakeena /isaaq Whether the Judgment is speaking: Yes/No Whether the Judgment is reportable: Yes/No OWP No. 471/2010 12