Bombay High Court
Tapi Valley Agro Food Products Company ... vs Dondaicha Warwade Nagar Parishad ... on 9 March, 2026
Author: Vibha Kankanwadi
Bench: Vibha Kankanwadi
2026:BHC-AUG:9909-DB
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
WRIT PETITION NO. 11247 OF 2025
Tapi Valley Agro Food Products Company
Dondaicha,
Through Power of Attorney Holder
Mr. Aftab Alam Jane Alam Rizvi,
Age: 50 years, Occu.: Service,
R/o. 640/2 Hussaini Compound,
Match Factory Lane, Kurla (West),
Mumbai 400 070. .... Petitioner
VERSUS
1. Dondaicha Warwade Nagar Parishad,
Dondaicha,
Taluka - Shinkheda,
District - Dhule.
2. The Chief Officer,
Dondaicha Warwade Nagar Parishad,
Dondaicha, Taluka - Shinkheda,
District - Dhule.
3. The President,
Through
The Chief Executive Officer,
Dondaicha Warwade Nagar Parishad,
Dondaicha, Taluka - Shinkheda,
District - Dhule.
4. The Deputy Commissioner,
Animal Husbandry Department,
Office of District Deputy Commissioner
of Animal Husbandry, Parola Road,
Dhule, District Dhule - 424 004.
5. Agricultural & Processed Food Products
Export Development Authority,
Ministry of Commerce & Industry,
Government of India
4th Floor, Unit No.3 & 4, Building No.2,
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Banking Complex, Sector-19A,
Vashi, Navi Mumbai,
Maharashtra - 400 704.
6. Ministry of Commerce,
Government of India
WRPH-P77, Vitthaldas Thackersey Marg,
Marine Line (Ease),
Mumbai - 400 020.
7. Union of India
Through the Ministry of Commerce,
Government of India. .... Respondents
......
Mr. Nitin Pradhan, Senior Advocate a/w Ms. Shubhada Khot, Advocate
i/b Mr. Hemantkumar F. Pawar, Advocate for Petitioner
Mr. V.D. Hon, Senior Advocate i/b Mr. Manish V. Bhamre, Advocate for
Respondents No.1 to 3
Mr. Abhijeet M. Phule, AGP for Respondent No.4
Mr. Krushna Solanke, Central Government Counsel for Respondents
No.6 and 7
......
CORAM : SMT. VIBHA KANKANWADI AND
HITEN S. VENEGAVKAR, JJ.
RESERVED ON : 04 FEBRUARY, 2026
PRONOUNCED ON : 09 MARCH, 2026
JUDGMENT [Per Hiten S. Venegavkar, J.] :-
1. Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith. With the consent of the
parties, the petition is taken up for final disposal at admission stage.
2. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is instituted
by a partnership firm claiming to be an agro-based enterprise operating
from Dondaicha, District Dhule, Maharashtra. The reliefs are directed
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substantially against respondent nos.1 to 3 (the Nagar Parishad and its
authorities) and seek (i) a direction to issue forthwith a No Objection
Certificate (NOC) to enable respondent no.4 to appoint veterinary
doctors for ante-mortem examination for running the slaughterhouse,
and for consequential inspection/approval processes of respondent no.5
(APEDA), and (ii) a direction to respondent nos.1 to 3 to reinstate and
renew the licences, permissions and NOCs which, according to the
petitioner, were in existence prior to the events surrounding Regular
Civil Suit No.3 of 2017. The cause action trigger pleaded is the
communication dated 17.02.2025 by which the Animal Husbandry
department informed the petitioner that the Nagar Parishad has refused
to grant NOC on the ground of pendency of civil appeal and alleged
cancellation of earlier permissions.
3. The factual background, as emerges from the pleadings and
documents placed on the record is that Gut No.123 at Dondaicha was
originally owned by one Baburao Banjara who donated the land on 8
August 2008 to the municipal body-respondent No.1 for a public
purpose. A Government Resolution dated 19.01.2009 is stated to have
contemplated implementation of an integrated housing/slum
development programme, and the State, through the Collector's
supervision, constructed a slaughterhouse on the donated land in 2010.
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The slaughterhouse was placed under the municipal council. As the
municipal body was allegedly unable to run and manage the
slaughterhouse for want of funds and manpower, therefore, it resolved
to lease it out through public auction. Pursuant to a public
tender/auction notice, the petitioner emerged as the highest bidder, and
after completing the process, was handed possession on 03.01.2011,
and a lease agreement for five years was executed on 17.012011. The
petitioner states that, given the nature of investment required, it applied
for extension of the tenure, and by resolution of the Standing
Committee dated 15.04.2011 the tenure was extended to 30 years with
effect from April 2011, culminating in a fresh agreement dated
24.05.2012. The petitioner asserts that it invested substantial amounts,
employed personnel, and obtained regulatory approvals including
pollution control consents, factory licence, food safety licence, ETP
NOC, APEDA-related documents, GST registration, MSME/Udyam
registration and ISO/HACCP certifications. The municipal council
passed Resolution No.12 dated 27.04.2012 approving commencement
and issued an NOC on 04.10.2012.
4. The dispute thereafter arose between the petitioner and
respondent No.1 due to slaughter house. Political opposition and
complaints that led to passing of Resolution to close the proceedings
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before the Collector by petitioner; and by order dated 16.05.2013
Collector stayed Resolution No.12, but the Divisional Commissioner,
Nashik by order dated 30.07.2013 set aside the Collector's order, which,
on the materials shown, was not challenged further and thus attained
finality. In 2017, the petitioner instituted Regular Civil Suit No.3 of
2017 seeking permanent injunction against respondents No.1 to 3 along
with the Exhibit-5 application. When the interim application (Exh.5)
was pending, the municipal General Body passed Resolution No.61
dated 01.03.2017 cancelling the 30-year agreement and purportedly
withdrawing NOCs/permissions issued in favour of petitioner for
constructing slaughter house. The trial court initially directed status quo
on 02.03.2017; later the interim order was vacated on 13.11.2017,
followed by sealing and taking possession of slaughter house on
15.11.2017, and also made communications to Animal Husbandry
Department that the slaughterhouse was sealed and the NOC stood
cancelled. The petitioner preferred appeal (Civil Appeal No.67 of 2017)
which led to directions for restoring status quo ante; subsequent writ
proceedings between the parties culminated in an order in Writ Petition
No.5580 of 2018 dated 12 September 2018 by which this Court directed
restoration of status quo ante as on 13.02.2017 in respect of possession,
directed de-sealing and protected the petitioner from dispossession
pending the suit, with directions for expeditious disposal of Civil Suit by
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Trial Court. Ultimately, the suit is stated to have been decreed on
31.01.2022 in favour of the petitioner granting perpetual injunction
protecting its peaceful possession, and Civil Appeal No.82 of 2022 filed
by the municipal council is stated to be pending without any stay. The
petitioner claims that despite the decree and absence of stay, respondent
nos.1 to 3 are refusing to facilitate the statutory/regulatory
requirements to restart operations, particularly the NOC required by
Animal Husbandry Department for appointment of veterinary doctors,
which is also needed for APEDA inspection/approval processes.
5. On the legal framework, the petitioner places reliance on
Section 49(2) of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats
and Industrial Townships Act, 1965 ("the 1965 Act"), which casts
obligatory duties on municipal councils, including making reasonable
provisions for matters such as markets and slaughterhouses; this
obligation is pleaded to be coupled with a duty to maintain hygienic
and regulated slaughtering infrastructure, and not to permit an
unregulated vacuum. The petitioner also refers to the municipal body's
long-standing conduct of permitting operations and issuing permissions,
and submits that refusal of NOC on the bare ground that an appeal is
pending, without stay, is arbitrary and defeats court orders and the
decree. The petitioner further relies on the prior order of this Court in
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Writ Petition No.5580 of 2018 as a binding inter-parties determination
at least to the extent that the municipal action of sealing and
dispossessing was interdicted and possession/occupation restored
pending adjudication, which adjudication has now resulted in a decree
in its favour.
6. Respondent nos.1 to 3 oppose the petition contending that the
general body resolution dated 01.03.2017 cancelling the agreement and
closing the slaughterhouse has not been challenged under the remedy
available under Section 308 of the 1965 Act, which empowers
supervisory authorities to suspend execution of municipal resolutions on
certain grounds; hence, according to them, the resolution remains
operative. It is also contended that the suit decree protects only
possession and does not, by itself, confer a right to conduct slaughtering
operations, especially when the 30-year agreement is unregistered and
allegedly contrary to Section 92 of the 1965 Act which restricts
transfer/lease of municipal immovable property without State sanction
and, in any event, permits leasing beyond certain periods only within
statutory limits. Public opposition, complaints, alleged illegal activities,
pollution concerns, and subsequent resolutions by neighbouring village
bodies are also relied upon to justify non-issuance of NOC.
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7. We have heard the respective Counsel for both the parties and
have also perused the documents annexed to the petition.
8. The first issue is maintainability. The petition seeks enforcement
of a public law duty such as issuance of an NOC and
renewal/reinstatement of municipal permissions in the face of a
subsisting decree which has not been stayed by the Appellate Court.
Availability of an alternate statutory route does not by itself bar a writ
when the impugned action is alleged to be arbitrary, in disregard of
binding judicial orders, and where the relief sought is essentially to
compel performance of a statutory/public duty and to quash an
administrative refusal founded on irrelevant considerations. The
Supreme Court has consistently held that the rule of alternate remedy is
a rule of discretion and not a rule of jurisdiction; writ jurisdiction may
be exercised, inter alia, where fundamental rights are affected, where
there is violation of principles of natural justice, where proceedings are
wholly without jurisdiction, or where the action is palpably
arbitrary/illegal. Reliance can be placed upon Whirlpool Corporation v.
Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1; Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian
Oil Corporation Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 107. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Harbanslal Sahnia (supra) held as under:
"7. So far as the view taken by the High Court that the remedy by way
of recourse to arbitration clause was available to the appellants and
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therefore the writ petition filed by the appellants was liable to be
dismissed is concerned, suffice it to observe that the rule of exclusion
of writ jurisdiction by availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of
discretion and not one of compulsion. In an appropriate case, in spite
of availability of the alternative remedy, the High Court may still
exercise its writ jurisdiction in at least three contingencies: (i) where
the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights;
(ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice; or (iii) where
the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires
of an Act is challenged. (See Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade
Marks [(1998) 8 SCC 1] .) The present case attracts applicability of
the first two contingencies. Moreover, as noted, the petitioners'
dealership, which is their bread and butter, came to be terminated for
an irrelevant and non-existent cause. In such circumstances, we feel
that the appellants should have been allowed relief by the High Court
itself instead of driving them to the need of initiating arbitration
proceedings."
9. In the present matter, the refusal is not an adjudication of
private contractual rights alone; it is an administrative obstruction that
directly impacts statutory and regulatory compliance and is asserted to
be contrary to binding court orders and a subsisting decree. The writ
petition is therefore maintainable.
10. The second issue is the effect of pendency of civil appeal without
stay. It is a statutory norm under Order XLI Rule 5 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 that an appeal does not operate as a stay of
proceedings under a decree or order appealed from except so far as the
appellate court may order. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Atma Ram
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Properties (P) Ltd. v. Federal Motors (P) Ltd., (2005) 1 SCC 705 has
reiterated the principles governing stay and the consequences of a
decree pending appeal. The position therefore is that, until stayed, the
decree remains operative and binds the parties. On the pleadings, it is
not disputed before us that Civil Appeal No.82 of 2022 is pending and
no stay has been granted. Respondent nos.1 to 3 cannot, in
administrative exercise, treat the decree as non-existent or inoperative
merely because they have filed an appeal. Their administrative decision
must proceed on the legal reality that the decree stands and governs the
parties' rights and obligations until stayed or reversed by higher courts.
11. The third issue concerns the respondents' reliance on alleged
infirmities of the 30-year agreement due to non-registration and
violation of Section 92 of Act of 1965. These contentions may well be
part of the appellate adjudication in the pending civil appeal, but they
cannot be used as a short route to defeat the operative decree and the
binding inter-parties judicial orders by unilateral administrative refusal.
Even on the legal plane, an unregistered lease deed, though
inadmissible to prove the lease as a transaction requiring registration,
can be looked into for collateral purposes such as nature and character
of possession and other limited purposes, depending on the issue
involved the Supreme Court has recently revisited this doctrine in M/s
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Paul Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. Amit Chand Mitra & Anr. , 2023 INSC
854 (Judgment dated 25.09.2023), with reference to earlier authority
including Rai Chand Jain v. Miss Chandra Kanta Khosla , (1991) 1 SCC
422. The trial court decree on the record, proceeds on lawful and
peaceful possession in accordance with the agreement between the
parties, and the Single Judge's order dated 12.09.2018 passed in Writ
Petition No.5580 of 2018 protected and restored possession/occupation
pending suit. Whether the municipal council could have executed a 30-
year instrument without State sanction under Section 92 of the 1965
Act, and the ultimate consequences in law, are issues for the appellate
court will decide; however, until the decree is stayed or reversed,
municipal authorities cannot, by administrative action, nullify its effect.
Further, Section 92 itself, as it stands in the statute, imposes restrictions
on transfer of municipal immovable property without State sanction
and regulates leasing powers; that regime is not a licence for arbitrary
administrative obstruction but a framework requiring the municipal
body to act lawfully, transparently and consistently.
12. The fourth issue is the legality of the reasons recorded in the
impugned refusal and the manner in which public opposition is pressed
into service. The communication dated 17.02.2025, as summarised in
the pleadings, rests principally on pendency of proceedings and alleged
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cancellation of NOCs/permissions. Public orders must be judged on the
reasons contained in them, and cannot be later supplemented by fresh
grounds in affidavits; the Supreme Court in Mohinder Singh Gill v.
Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405 has settled that an
order must stand or fall on its own reasons. Likewise, public orders
publicly made cannot be construed in the light of subsequent
explanations; Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji ,
AIR 1952 SC 16. Even otherwise, complaints and public opposition,
without a legally sustainable and procedurally fair determination of
statutory violations, cannot justify withholding in NOC that is required
for regulated operation, particularly where the petitioner is seeking to
appoint veterinary doctors and undertake compliance steps. If there are
objective statutory grounds to refuse or condition an NOC, the authority
must identify them, follow due process, and pass a reasoned order
consistent with law. Administrative action guided by extraneous
considerations, including political pressure or amorphous "resentment"
unconnected to a legal standard, is impermissible. Judicial review does
not substitute the decision, but it does examine the decision-making
process for legality, relevance of considerations, and absence of
arbitrariness, reliance can be placed for this position on Tata Cellular v.
Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651.
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13. The fifth issue is the character of the duty sought to be enforced
by authority. The petitioner is not praying this Court to run the
slaughter house on the basis of judicial orders. The petitioner asks for
issuance of an NOC and renewal/reinstatement of municipal
permissions so that the regulated framework for slaughtering, including
mandatory veterinary oversight and pollution control compliance, can
be operationalized. Section 49(2) of the 1965 Act enumerates
obligatory municipal functions and includes, inter alia, making
reasonable provision for civic amenities and facilities, including
slaughterhouses, as part of hygienic municipal administration. When a
municipal council has established/accepted a municipal slaughterhouse,
placed it under its supervision, and itself chosen to discharge its
management through a lease/tender arrangement, the council's
subsequent conduct must conform to law and cannot be arbitrary or
self-contradictory. Mandamus can issue to compel performance of a
public duty and to prevent public authorities from acting contrary to
law; the Supreme Court has explained the width of mandamus under
Article 226 where public duty exists in judgment of Andi Mukta
Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav
Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani, (1989) 2 SCC 691. In the said judgment,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
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"22. Here again we may point out that mandamus cannot be denied
on the ground that the duty to be enforced is not imposed by the
statute. Commenting on the development of this law, Professor de
Smith states: "To be enforceable by mandamus a public duty does not
necessarily have to be one imposed by statute. It may be sufficient for
the duty to have been imposed by charter, common law, custom or
even contract." We share this view. The judicial control over the fast
expanding maze of bodies affecting the rights of the people should not
be put into watertight compartment. It should remain flexible to meet
the requirements of variable circumstances. Mandamus is a very wide
remedy which must be easily available "to reach injustice wherever it
is found". Technicalities should not come in the way of granting that
relief under Article 226. We, therefore, reject the contention urged for
the appellants on the maintainability of the writ petition."
14. Issuance of an NOC in accordance with said Act is not a matter
of private benevolence; it is part of the statutory-regulatory chain by
which slaughterhouses are run under veterinary supervision and public
health safeguards. A refusal that is founded on irrelevant
considerations, and which effectively frustrates compliance, cannot be
sustained.
15. The sixth issue is the respondents' reliance on Section 308 of the
1965 Act as a bar because the petitioner did not separately challenge
the resolution of 01.03.2017 before the Collector. Section 308, as it
appears in the statute, is a supervisory mechanism for suspension of
execution of unlawful or improper municipal resolutions, initiated in
the statute by the Chief Officer sending a resolution to the Collector in
certain circumstances, and provides for decision-making by the
Collector/Director with further recourse. This provision does not
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operate as an ouster of writ jurisdiction, nor does it create a legal bar
that a municipal resolution, especially one whose implementation and
consequences have been the subject of multiple judicial orders and a
Courts decree can be deployed to defeat the operative decree by
administrative decision. More importantly, respondent nos.1 to 3,
having suffered a decree protecting possession and being in appeal
without stay, cannot insist that the petitioner must pursue multiple
parallel remedies as a precondition to receiving basic administrative
sanctions necessary to comply with veterinary and regulatory
requirements. The municipal body remains free to press all legal
contentions in the pending civil appeal until then, it must act
consistently with the decree and judicial directions binding between the
parties.
16. The seventh issue is the scope of relief. Respondent nos.1 to 3
argue that the decree protects only possession and not the right to
conduct slaughtering operations. This submission, in the present writ, is
beside the point to the extent the petitioner seeks an NOC for
appointment of veterinary doctors and renewal/reinstatement of
licences and permissions which are regulatory prerequisites for lawful
operation. If respondent nos.1 to 3 assert that the petitioner cannot
lawfully operate, the lawful course is to obtain appropriate judicial
orders and to proceed under statutory provisions with due process, not
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to prevent compliance steps by withholding an NOC on untenable
grounds. In this connection, it is relevant that the petitioner has placed
on record that certain licences/consents from competent authorities
issued by pollution control board, factory and food safety department
etc. still exist and are valid for stated periods, and the respondents do
not demonstrate any lawful order of competent statutory regulators
cancelling those permissions on merits. The municipal authority's
refusal, as pleaded, is based on pendency and past cancellation, not on
a current statutory disqualification adjudicated after due process. The
refusal therefore cannot sustain.
17. For all above reasons, we hold that the municipal council's
refusal as communicated to the Animal Husbandry authorities and in
turn to the petitioner founded merely on pendency of civil appeal and
on an assertion that earlier NOCs were cancelled, without addressing
the operative decree and without any stay in appeal/proceedings, is
illegal and unsustainable. Hence, we proceed to pass the following
order.
ORDER
(i) The impugned communication dated 17.02.2025 for refusal/objection issued by respondent nos.1 to 3 to issuance of NOC for appointment of veterinary doctors for the petitioner's slaughterhouse, is quashed and set aside.
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(ii) Respondent nos.1 to 3 are directed to issue, within two weeks from the date of this judgment, the requisite NOC to enable respondent no.4 to appoint veterinary doctor(s) for ante- mortem examination and allied statutory veterinary functions for the petitioner's slaughterhouse, subject to such standard conditions as are consistent with law.
(iii) Upon receipt of such NOC, respondent no.4 shall process the petitioner's request for appointment of veterinary doctor(s) in accordance with the statutory framework, and do so expeditiously, preferably within two (02) weeks thereafter, since the matter concerns regulated public health compliance.
(iv) As regards the prayer for reinstatement and renewal of licences/permissions/NOCs which were in existence prior to the events of 2017, respondent nos.1 to 3 cannot, by a blanket stand, obstruct renewal/restoration where the petitioner otherwise satisfies statutory requirements and where the competent authorities' approvals such as MPCB/FSSAI/factory licence are in force. Accordingly, respondent nos.1 to 3 shall, within two (02) weeks from the date of order process and issue municipal renewals/permissions/NOCs which are within their statutory domain and are required to operationalize the slaughterhouse in a regulated manner.
(v) Respondent no.5 (APEDA) shall thereafter deal with the petitioner's request for inspection/approval in accordance with its statutory scheme and guidelines, and taking into account the present order and the operative civil court decree.
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19. It is expressly clarified that all contentions of parties overlapping the issues already raised in pending Civil Appeal are left open to be adjudicated in the pending Civil Appeal No.82 of 2022 on its own merits without influenced by the observation of this Court in the present judgment and order. Nothing in this judgment shall be read as a final pronouncement on title or ultimate contractual enforceability beyond what is necessary to decide the legality of the impugned administrative refusal and the performance of public duties in the present writ jurisdiction.
20. Rule is made absolute in the above terms. No order as to costs.
[ HITEN S. VENEGAVKAR ] [ SMT. VIBHA KANKANWADI ]
JUDGE JUDGE
S P Rane