Madras High Court
Lalitha vs Parameswari Alias Ramabai And Ors. on 26 April, 2001
Equivalent citations: AIR2001MAD363
Author: R. Jayasimha Babu
Bench: R. Jayasimha Babu
JUDGMENT K. Gnanaprakasam, J.
1. This letters Patent Appeal has been filed against the decree and judgment of the learned single Judge of this Court in A. S. No. 1187ofl994 dated 4-3-1999. The core question raised in this appeal is as to whether the adoption of a female, prior to the passing of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (78 of 1956) is valid under law?
2. One Parameswari alias Ramabai filed a suit in O.S. No. 11 of 1984 on the file of the Sub-Court, Thiruvallur for partition and separate possession of 1/2 share, claiming that she was the adopted daughter of Kuppusamy Naicker. The said Kuppusamy Naicker had three wives. His first wife Neelammal died issueless. His second wife, Rajammal, the first defendant also died issuelss. The second defendant is the daughter born to the third wife.
3. The case of the plaintiff's is that she was adopted by Kuppusamy Naicker and Rajammal (the first defendant) as per Hindu rites and customs before the birth of the second defendant. Kuppusamy Naicker had left all the items of the suit properties. During the pendency of the suit, the second wife of Kuppusamy Naicker died and therefore, the plaintiff made a claim for l/2share in the suit properties.
4. The first defendant, in her written statement denied the factum of adoption of the plaintiff by Kuppusamy Naicker. The plaintiff is the daughter of Angammal, younger sister of the first defendant. The father of the plaintiff was leading a wayward life and therefore, the first defendant brought her sister Angammal and kept with her as medical treatment had to be given for her. The marriage of the plaintiff took place with the help of Kuppusamy Naicker and at the request of the plaintiff, she was allowed to stay with her husband to look after the cultivation. But, the plaintiff and her husband became jealous of the income of Kuppusamy Naicker and therefore, they have been asked to leave the village in the year 1974 and that thereafter, the plaintiff and her husband started to live in the village of the plaintiffs husband.
5. Based upon the above said pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issue among other issues :--
"Whether it is correct to say that the plaintiff is the adopted daughter of the deceased Kuppusamy Naicker?"
The trial Court also considered as to whether the adoption pleaded by the plaintiff was proved and was there any custom in the family of the plaintiff for adoption of a female child, and if so, was it proved by the plaintiff.
6. The trial Court, after taking into consideration the evidence and the materials placed before it, came to the conclusion that the plaintiff has not proved the validity of the adoption and the evidence tendered by witnesses were contradictory with each other and declined to accept the case of the plaintiff.
7. The trial Court further considered the question whether under Hindu law, a female could be taken on adoption and came to the conclusion that among Hindus, it was not at all possible to adopt a female child, prior to the enactment of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act. The trial Court declined to accept the case propounded by the plaintiff and dismissed the suit.
8. As against the said decree and judgment; the plaintiff preferred an appeal to this Court in A.S. No. 1187 of 1984. Learned single Judge, on an analysis of the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 5 and also considering the documents Exs. A-3 to 17 came to the conclusion that the adoption pleaded by the plaintiff was proved and allowed the appeal. Aggrieved by the same, the second defendant has come up on appeal.
9. Kuppusamy Naicker was the owner of the suit properties, that he had three wives, that the first defendant is the second wife and the second defendant is the daughter of third wife, are not in dispute. The first wife died prior to the marriage of the second wife. The plaintiff was adopted before the second defendant was born, to the third wife. The natural parents of the plaintiff are Narayanaswami and Angammal. The plaintiff examined herself as P.W, 1 and also had examined four other witnesses, including her husband Manivannan, P.W. 5. The plaintiff, in her evidence had stated that she was adopted in the year 1944 when she was three months old child. She had studied up to fifth standard and Ex. A-3 is the school record, wherein the name of Kuppusamy Naicker is mentioned as her father. In the year 1958, puberty function was celebrated, and an invitation was printed, Ex. A-4, wherein it is stated:
(Vernacular matter omitted--Ed.) Ex. A-5 is the handwritten betrothal function letter, wherein it is stated:
(Vernacular matter omitted--Ed.) And it was duly signed by R. Kuppusamy Naicker, the adoptive father of the plaintiff. Ex. A-6 is the printed invitation card, wherein it is stated:
(Vernacular matter omitted--Ed.) Ex. A-7 is the Marriage Invitation letter, wherein it is stated:
(Vernacular matter omitted--Ed.) Ex. A-8 is the horoscope of the plaintiff, wherein she was described as the adopted daughter of KuppusamyNaicker. Ex. A-13 is the Registration Copy of the Mortgage deed dated 18-2-1964 executed by Kuppusamy Naicker to Hindu Sasvatha Nidhi, Mylapore wherein the. purpose for which he borrowed the loan amount is stated at page 13 wherein it is stated:
(Vernacular matter omitted--Ed.) Ex. A-16 is the acount book kept and maintained by Kuppusamy Naicker, in which there are so many entries, indicating the presentation and gifts made to the plaintiff at the time of the celebration of puberty function, kist paid to the Government and so on and so forth and a relevant portion has been marked as Ex. A-17, showing the presentation made at the time of plaintiff's marriage. By relying upon all these documents, the plaintiff asserted that she was the adopted daughter of Kuppusamy Naicker.
10. The plaintiff's mother Angammal was examined as P.W. 2, who in her evidence has stated that, "My sister Rajammal took Ramabai on adoption and brought her up. Kuppusamy Naicker is the husband of Rajammal. While Ramabai was taken on adoption by Rajammal, she was aged three months. The sacred fire was burnt and after pouring water in my hand and by keeping a sacred vessel (Kalasam) I handed over the child to Rajammal (objected by the defendant's counsel on the ground that is not pleaded") Kuppusamy Naicker and his second wife Gunummal were present."
11. One Kannappa Naidu was examined as P.W. 2, who in his evidence has stated that, "Angammal and Narayanasamy gave the adoption to Kuppusamy and D-l Gunapushanam. I knew the same in person". But, in the cross-examination, he had stated that, "Just before the commencement of adoption function, I went away". One Madurai Reddy was examined as P.W. 4, wherein he has stated that, 'The plaintiff is the daughter of Kuppusamy Naicker by way of adoption. 1 knew the same personally. The sacred vessel was placed and 10 persons were invited and further Kamakshi lamp was lighted and in the presence of lyyampadasamy Appasamy and in the presence of Kuppusamy Naicker and Rajammal, Angammal was gave". But, in the cross-examination, he had stated that, "Only Angammal performed all the rites pertaining to the adoption. Only her mother poured water from the hand."
12. On the other hand, the defendants have denied the adoption. It is contended that there was no custom also in the community to give a female in adoption and therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to claim adoption and she had no right in the suit properties. It is further submitted that adoption of a female child, prior to the passing of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 was not legal. On behalf of the defendants, the second defendant Lalitha was examined as D.W. 1, who denied the factum of adoption. She, in her evidence had deposed that, "The plaintiffs mother Angammal came to our house while she was indisposed and during that time, I was aged of 7 years, Therefore, I knew the visit very well. At that time, the plaintiff was aged 13 or 14 years. Kuppusamy Naicker gave only monitory help for the purpose of plaintiffs marriage and Kuppusamy Naicker did not perform the puberty function nor printed any invitation and she denied the claim of the plaintiff that Kuppusamy Naicker treated as the adopted daughter."
13. Learned single Judge has framed the following points among other points for consideration:--
"1. Whether the alleged adoption of the appellant/plaintiff by Kuppusamy Naicker in the year 1946 is true and proved in evidence?
2. Whether the custom prevailed are permitted for the adoption of a female and whether the same is proved to the requirements of law?
14. Learned single Judge, after having made elaborate discussion and also relying upon various decisions for and against, came to the conclusion that the adoption of the plaintiff by Kuppusamy Naicker is true and valid and also further concluded that the plaintiff has proved the custom of adopting the female child in her community and allowed the appeal.
15. In the above said background, the questions that arise for our consideration in this appeal are:
"1. Whether the plea of the plaintiff that she is the adopted daughter of the deceased Kuppusamy Naicker is true and acceptable?
2. Whether the adoption of a female child in the family of Kuppusamy Naicker was permissible under law?"
16. Learned advocate for the appellant has submitted that prior to the introduction of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (78 of 1956) adoption was confined only to males. Under Hindu Law, the object of Adoption was twofold: (1) to secure the performance of the funeral rites of the person to whom the adoption is made and (2) to preserve the continuance of his lineage. If a person, male or female was merely brought up by another person in his family, he cannot be equated that he/she was adopted by the family, in which he/she was brought up.
17. Learned advocate for the appellant/ defendant has submitted that adoption of a female child was against the very purpose of adoption, for which he relied upon the decision in the case of Gangabai v. Anant, (1989) ILR 13 Bom 691, wherein it was observed:
'The point which arises in this case is one which appears to have come before the Courts now for the first time. It relates to the validity of an adoption of a daughter by a Brahmin. ..... .The adoption of a daughter appears opposed to the very purpose and history of adoption. "Males only need sons to relieve them from the debt due to ancestors" Colebrook's Digest, BK, V.T. 273, Comm. The adoption of a daughter is not warranted by any Smrtti; it is supported only by some Puranic Instances. In the result, it was held that the adoption is invalid."
18. The appellant/defendant contended that a female cannot be adopted and to support his submission, he relied on the case of Chandrasekhara v. Kulandaivelu, . The said decision was rendered by a three Judges Bench and Subbarao, J. as he then was speaking for the Bench has observed (Paras 13 and 14):
"The next question is, what is the object of adoption? It would be unnecessary and even be pedantic if we attempted to consider the old Hindu Law texts at this very late stage in the evolution of Hindu law on the subject, for the law on this aspect had been fully and adequately considered by the Judicial Committee from time to time. It would be sufficient if we noticed a few of the leading decisions on the subject.
Sir James W. Colvile, speaking for the Judicial Committee, in Collector of Madura v. Mootoo Ramalonga Sethupathy, (1867-69) 12 Moo Ind App 397 at P. 442 (PC) observed :
"The power to adopt when not actually given by the husband can only be exercised when a foundation for it is laid in the otherwise neglected observance of religious duty, as understood by Hindoos".
The Judicial Committee again speaking through Sir James W. Colvile in Sri Ragunathav. Sir Brozo Kishore, (1875-76) 3 Ind App 154 at Page 193 (PC) re-stated the principle with some modification thus :
"It may be the duty of a Court of Justice administering the Hind Law to consider the religious duty of adopting a son as the essential foundation of the law of adoption, and the effect of an adoption upon the devolution of property as mere legal consequence."
But, he hastened to add:
"But, it is impossible not to see that there are grave social objections to making the succession of property -- and it may be in the case of collateral succession, as in the present instance, the rights of parties in actual possession-dependant on the caprice of woman, subject to all the pernicious Influences which interested advisors are too apt in India to exert over women possessed of or capable of exercising dominion over property."
This caution given by the Judicial Committee is relied upon to emphasize the point that right to property of the last male-holder is a dominant consideration in the matter of taking a boy in adoption. But, if the passage was read along with that preceding it, it would be obvious that the Judicial Committee emphasized the performance of religious duty as an essential foundation of the law of adoption, though it did not fall to notice that the devolution of property was a legal consequence. In Vellanki Venkata Krishna Rowv. Venkata Rama Lakshmi Narsayya, (1876-77) 4 Ind App 1 at P. 14 (PC) the Judicial Committee through Sir James W. Colvile reiterated the Principle that adoption was made by a widow only in a bona fide performance of a religious duty. In Veerabasavaraju v. Balasurya Prasada Rao, 45 Ind App 265 at P. 273 : AIR 1918 PC 97 at P. 101, Mr. Ameer AH, delivering the judgment on behalf of the Board, appeared to strike a new note and lay more emphasis on property rights. The Board gave as one of its reasons why the consent of divided brothers was required, namely, that they had an interest in the protection of the inheritance. The Judicial Committee observed :
"It is true that in the judgment of this Board in the Ramnad case, (1867-69) 12 Moo Ind App 397 at P. 442 (PC) some expressions are used which might imply that the question of reversionary interest forms only a secondary consideration in determining what sapindas assent is primarily requisite, but the remarks that follow as to the right of co-parceners in an undivided family to consider the expediency of introducing a new co-parceners coupled with the observations of the Board in the subsequent case (1876-77) 4 Ind App 1 (PC), show clearly that rights to property cannot be left out of consideration in the determination of the question."
It may be said with some justification that till this stage the Judicial Committee had not clearly disclosed its mind, but was wavering between two positions, namely, whether religious duty was the sole object of adoption or whether proprietary interests had an equal or a subordinate place with or to that of a religious object. But, in Amarendra Mansingh v. Sanatan Singh, 60 Ind App 242 at P. 248 : AIR 1933 PC 155 at P. 158, the Judicial Committee reconsidered its earlier decisions, re-surveyed the entire law on the subject and veered round to the view that the validity of an adoption was to be determined by spiritual rather than temporal considerations. Sir George Lowndes observed:
"........... .It is clear that the foundation of Brahminical doctrine of adoption is the duty which every Hindu owes to his ancestors to provide for the continuance of the line and the solemnization of the necessary rites. .........."
"It can, they think, hardly be doubted that in this doctrine the devolution of property, though recognised as the inherent right of son, is altogether a secondary consideration.
"Having regard to this well-established doctrine as to the religious efficacy of sonshlp, their Lordships feel that great caution should be observed in shutting the door upon any authorised adoption by the widow of a sonlessman. . . . .Nor do the authoritative texts appear to limit the exercise of the power by any consideration of property."
This decision is therefore a clear pronouncement by the highest judicial authority of the time that the substitution of a son of the deceased for spiritual reasons is the essence of adoption and the consequent devolution of properly is mere accessary to it.
19. It has been held in Guddati Reddi Obala v. Ganapali Kandanna, (1912) 23 Mad LJ 493 that even an adoption of a dancing girl was invalid. Dhanraj Joharmal v. Soni Bai, (1925) 49 Mad LJ 173 : (AIR 1925 PC 118) speaks about the form of adoption and further states that a boy, who has lost both his parents cannot be adopted, it is stated.
"Under the Hindu Law, it is essential to the validity of an adoption that the child should be "given" to the adopter by the father, or, if he be dead, by the mother. No other person has the right, no can such right be delegated to anybody else. Consequently, a boy who has lost both his parents cannot be adopted."
20. The plaintiff let in evidence that there was a custom in her family to adopt a female, but there is no pleading. That in the absence of the pleading, plaintiff's case cannot be accepted. It has been held in the case of Kochan Kani Kunjuraman Kani v. Mathevan Kani, that:
"In order to prove a custom, the party has to plead in specific terms as to what is the custom that he is relying on and he must prove the custom pleaded by him."
21. The appellant further submitted that there is no registered document to prove adoption. In that context, he relied upon the case of Rahasa Pandlan v. Gokulananda Panda, , which deals with a case where, there is no registered documents executed in proof of the adoption in question. It was held (at P. 963 of AIR):
"In the case of an adoption which is not supported by a registered document or any other evidence of a clinghing nature if there exist suspicious circumstances, the same must be explained to the "satisfaction of the conscience of the Court by the party contending that there was such an adoption. Such is the position as an adoption would divert the normal and natural course of succession. Experience of life shows that just as there have been spurious claims about execution of a Will, there have been spurious claims about adoption having taken place. And the Court has therefore to be aware of the risk involved in upholding the claim of adoption if there are circumstances which arouse the suspicion of the Court and the conscience of the Court is not satisfied that the evidence preferred to support such an adoption is beyond reproach."
22. Relying on the above said decisions, the learned advocate for the appellant sub-mitted that the adoption of a female child was not known to Hindus. Though Kuppusamy Naicker did not have any child for some time, he got a female child through his third wife and prior to that, he had brought up the plaintiff, but, that does not mean that the plaintiff was adopted by Kuppusamy Naicker and the burden is heavily cast upon the plaintiff to prove that she is the adopted daughter of Kuppusamy Naicker. If the plaintiff pleads a custom, to the contrary, the same should be proved beyond all reasonable doubts and in the present case, the plaintiff had neither pleaded the custom nor she was able to establish the caste or community custom and in the absence of the same, there is no material to reach a conclusion that the adoption was valid. It was also submitted that the documents, Exs. A-3 to 7 produced by the plaintiff were marked subject to objection before the trial Court, and therefore mere marking of the documents does not mean, that the documents were held to be proved. Permitting a document to be marked by consent is only to facilitate the speedy trial of the case and the documents are marked subject to proof and relevancy and it does not mean the acceptance of the contents, proof, relevancy and correctness of the documents.
23. Per contra, learned advocate for the first respondent/plaintiff has submitted that the plaintiff was duly adopted as per the Caste custom and submitted that the custom, which was prevailing in the olden days ace mainly; (1) Local Custom; (2) Caste Custom and (3) Family Custom. Learned advocate for the respondent/plaintiff has submitted that adoption in this case took place long back i.e. somewhere in the year 1946, and therefore, the entire evidence of adoption may not be available, but a presumption in favour of the validity of the adoption has got to be drawn. To support his contentions, he relied upon the case of Moti Lal v. Sardar Mal, wherein the learned single Judge of the Court observed (at P. 46 of AIR) :
"After a lapse of several years, it is likely that the evidence of adoption may not be available and it may become difficult to find any witness who had eye-witnessed the ceremony of actual giving and taking in adoption. In such cases, if the party alleging adoption adduces some evidence of the factum of adoption, it may be regarded as sufficient to shift the burden on the other side to prove that the adoption did not take place. In such cases of old adoption, a presumption in favour of the validity of the adoption is naturally drawn from the status of the adopted son in the adopting family and its recognition by the members of the family for a number of years."
24. In Gouranga Sahu v. Bhaga Sahu, learned single Judge of the Court held that:
"Though the normal rule is that one who seeks to deflect the natural line of succession to property by alleging adoption must discharge that burden, in eases of ancient adoption every allowance for the absence of evidence to prove such fact must be favourably entertained and where there is long lapse of 36 years between the adoption and the time of its being questioned and during that period of interregnum a variety of transactions of open life and conduct on the footing that the adoption was a valid act have taken place, the initial burden necessarily shifts to the person who challenges its validity."
25. Learned advocate for the respondent/plaintiff further relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in L. Debi Prasad (Dead) v. Smt. Tribeni Devi, , wherein it is stated :
"For a valid adoption all that the law requires is that the natural lather shall be asked by the adoptive parent to give his son in adoption and that the boy shall be handed over and taken for this purpose. . ...,,.. .......Although the person who pleads that he had been adopted son, as a fact yet from the long period (nearly 54 years in this case) during which, he had been received as an adopted son, every allowance for the absence of evidence to prove such fact is to be favourably entertained."
26. Learned Advocate for the respondent/plaintiff also relied upon the case of V. M. Ramakrishna Mudaliar v. Smt. Nagammal alias Nagabushanammal, (1995) 2 Mad LJ 613 wherein it was held :
"In civil cause, we are concerned only about the probabilities of the case and the decision has to be arrived at on the preponderance of probabilities. When a person declares that a girl is his daughter, brings her up as his daughter declares before authorities that she is his daughter and gives her in marriage, there is nothing wrong in assuming that they have adopted that girl as their daughter."
27. In support of his contentions that the plaintiff was adopted by Kuppusamy Naicker, as per the family custom, learned advocate for the plaintiff advanced his argument by pointing out that on more than one occasion, he declared her as his daughter and relied upon the documents Exs. A-3 to A-8 and Ex. A-13, i.e., the School register, puberty function invitation card, betrothal card invitation, marriage invitation and the mortgage deed, executed by Kuppusamy Naicker.
28. It is further stated by the learned advocate for the plaintiff that P.W. 1, the plaintiff, was adopted at the time when she was three months old and P.W. 2, mother of the plaintiff had deposed that her sister had taken the plaintiff in adoption and her husband was also present at that time, and thereby she supports the case of the plaintiff that she was given in adoption.
29. Reverting back to the case of the appellant, it is submitted that adoption of a female child was not known to Hindu Law prior to passing of the Act in the year 1956 and admittedly, the plaintiff purported to have been adopted prior to passing of this Act. In Ex. A-3, the date of birth of the plaintiff is shown as 1-7-1946 and in Ex. A-8, the date of birth of the plaintiff is given as 6-9-1946. Though the date and month of the plaintiffs different, the year, in which the plaintiff was born is not in dispute and the evidence was that she was given in adoption at the time when the plaintiff was three months old. Then possibly the year in which the alleged adoption had taken place was 1946, which is prior to passing of the Act in the year 1956 and therefore, the Act is not applicable, and the Adoption, purported to have been taken place was not permissible under law.
30. Though the plaintiff is able to produce certain documents. Exs. A-4 to 7 and A-13 to 18, wherein she has been described as the daughter of Kuppusamy Naicker, the said recitals would not cloth her with any right as that of a daughter as the very adoption of a female child before passing of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 was not permissible. In the said context, any amount of evidence either oral or documentary adduced on behalf of the plaintiff to make it appear, as if she was recognised as the daughter of Kuppusamy Naicker cannot be countenanced for the simple reason that the very validity of the adoption itself is questioned and in the said context, those documents are of no avail.
31. The question whether a daughter's son can be adopted came for the consideration of this Court in the case of Mariammal v. Govindammal, , wherein this Court held that (at P. 16 of AIR) :
"A daughter's son cannot be adopted and it is invalid in law unless the custom of adopting a daughter's son is proved satisfactorily among the community to which the parties belong. When once a custom is pleaded, the said custom must be established by satisfactory evidence and this burden cannot be discharged by contending that the persons claiming the custom can be classified only as Shudras. Even if a rule of ancient Hindu Law is only recommendatory in nature. Yet when once custom is pleaded against the said rule, it is but necessary in order to uphold the said custom, the said custom should be established by satisfactory evidence as prevalent in the community, for a long time without any interruption. It is of the essence of special usages modifying the ordinary law of adoption that they should be ancient and invariable; and it is further essential that they should be established to be so by clear and unambiguous evidence. It is only by means of such evidence that the Courts can be assured of their existence and that they possess the conditions of antiquity and certainty on which alone their legal title to recognition depends.
32. We have already observed that the adoption of a female child was not permissible before the passing of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. The documents relied upon by the plaintiff to establish that she has been treated as a daughter are of no consequence and as it has been already been observed supra that the very adoption itself is invalid, any amount of documents relied upon by the plaintiff would not support her case that her adoption was valid in the eye of law.
33. The plaintiff is not able to establish the fact that there was a caste custom, by which, she was adopted and there is no prohibition in their caste for the adoption of a female child. The evidence tendered on behalf of the plaintiff to establish her case of adoption was very bleek and the factum of adoption was not established. Unless and until the plaintiff satisfies the Court that according to the custom, she was adopted, her case of adoption would go. It is further made out that adoption of a daughter is an exception to the general rule in Hindu Law and the exception has got to be pleaded and proved and in the instant case, the plaintiff has not pleaded the custom and proved the customary adoption. Even at the time when the plaintiff issued a notice through her advocate on 1-10-1974, Ex. A.11, she had not chosen to state the custom prevailing in her community.
34. Taking into consideration of all the abovesaid aspects and circumstances of the case and also the appraisal of the various rulings relied upon by the plaintiff and defendant for and against the adoption of a female child, we are of the considered opinion that the factum of adoption itself is questionable on the ground that prior to Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act. 1956, adoption of a female child was not known to Hindu Law and the same was not permissible. The plaintiff was also not able to bring home the family custom prevailed in the family, for adopting a female child and in the eye of law, it cannot be held that the plaintiff was the adopted daughter of late Kuppusamy Naicker. The mere fact that in the invitation card, printed for the puberty function, celebration of the marriage of the plaintiff and the school certificate, in which, the name of Kuppusamy Naicker finds a place, as the father of the plaintiff, would not establish that the plaintiff was adopted by Kuppusamy Naicker and as we have already adverted to that the adoption of a female child was not legal, we have to necessarily hold that the plaintiff is not the adopted daughter of Kuppusamy Naicker.
35. In this case, the equities are clearly in favour of the defendant/appellant, who is the naturally born daughter and who, in the normal course, is entitled to succeed to the properties of her father. The plaintiff who had been brought up by the defendant's father and who had been taken into a family at the time when they had no children cannot, in the light of the law as it stood prior to the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, claim a right in the properties. The plaintiff has also not proved any custom, as the kind of evidence required to establish custom of adoption of a girl, has not been adduced.
36. In the result, we set aside the decree and judgment of the learned single Judge and restore the decree and judgment of the trial Court. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.