Karnataka High Court
Karnataka Electricity Board And Anr. vs Shah Kanji Devji Oil Mills on 20 June, 1996
Equivalent citations: ILR1996KAR2916, 1996 A I H C 5638, (1996) 3 KANT LJ 585, 1996 A I H C 5083, (1996) 3 KANT LJ 596
ORDER M.F. Saldanha, J.
1. This petition is the companion petition to C.R.P.NO. 2934/1993, See Editorial Note Supra which has been disposed of by the Court today. The plaintiffs who are the respondents to this petition had instituted a suit in the Court of the Munsiff at Hubli against the K.E.B. who are the petitioners before me praying for certain reliefs which essentially centered around a challenge to the action on the part of the K.E.B. in having disconnected the power supply to the plaintiffs rice mill. Whereas the K.E.B. contended that there were allegations of theft of electric power aggregating to over Rs. 6 lakhs against the plaintiffs 'unit, the defendants' contended that the allegations were unjustified and groundless. Basically, they pleaded before the Court that no notice was served on them, that this was a flagrant breach of the rules of natural justice and that therefore the power should be reconnected. The Trial Court granted this relief which came to be confirmed by the appeal Court and the defendants K.E.B. complied with the Court directions. At the stage when the issues were framed, the K.E.B. raised a plea that the suit itself was not maintainable and has challenged the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the suit and to try it principally on the ground that the Karnataka Electricity Board Recovery of Dues Act, 1976, provides for an alternate procedure in cases where action is contemplated or taken against the consumer. Briefly stated, it is the case of the Board that where there are well defined statutory provisions which provide for adequate relief to the consumer namely, that it is open to the consumer to get the power reconnected after depositing the whole or a proportionate part of the amount demanded and where the entire power vests in the Board to re-examine the correctness of the demand, that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is completely and totally barred. I need to clarify that Section 5 does empower an aggrieved consumer to fife a suit challenging the liability to payment but that will have to be done after following the procedure prescribed therein namely, after paying the dues, penalty costs etc., and this presupposes the fact that a notice of demand for dues, penalty etc., has been served under Section 4. Whereas it is the case of the Board that the filing of the present suit was totally and completely unjustified and that it was not maintainable, Mrs. Nesargi on behalf of the respondents submits that the suit was very much maintainable because the plaintiffs' first grievance was that no such notice of demand had ever been served on the plaintiffs irrespective of what the nature of the allegation against them was. She therefore submitted that the service of notice was condition precedent and that the Board had not done this. Secondly, it is contended that the action was abrupt and that the plaintiffs had no other remedy except to seek a mandatory relief and thirdly, the submission canvassed was that the law itself does not prescribe any prohibition against a consumer from approaching a Court and that under these circumstances, the Trial Court was perfectly justified in holding that the suit filed by the present plaintiffs was maintainable.
2. The argument canvassed in the present case on behalf of the petitioners seeks to rely heavily on the decision of this Court reported in the case of MAHABALESHWARA MADYASTA, v. KARNATAKA ELECTRICITY BOARD, . In a well considered judgment, this Court did have occasion to point out that it would not be open to a Court to grant a permanent injunction restraining the statutory body from performing its functions and duties. There are certain other aspects that fell for decision in that case with which we are not concerned. As far as the tenant aspect of the matter goes, the petitioners' learned Advocate submitted that where there are well defined provisions which require an aggrieved party to approach the authorities and where the provisions themselves specify that the grievance will have to be re-examined and where provision is made even for reconnection on payment of a reasonable or proportionate amount, that it is not open to the Civil Courts to not only interfere in the matter and pass judicial orders which would conflict with the decisions and functioning of the Board, but that on the other hand, that it is inappropriate for a Civil Court to adjudicate on the question regarding dues etc., when the power vests with the Board.
3. There is considerable substance in this grievance but I need to draw a clear distinction between the two aspects of the matter, the first is with regard to the broad question as to whether at all the jurisdiction vests in a Civil Court to entertain a dispute of this type in the first instance. The answer to that question Would have to be in the affirmative because there is no statutory bar that has been prescribed whereby an aggrieved party is prohibited from approaching the Court. Instances do arise whereunder it may be necessary in cases of grave urgency or emergency to approach a Civil Court for a temporary or transitory relief even in the first instance. It would therefore be incorrect and inappropriate to say that the Civil Courts jurisdiction is barred or that a Court can or should never entertains a dispute of this type. Experience has shown that the Civil Courts and even this Court have had to intervene on numerous occasions and grant transitory reliefs because the situation so warrants.
4. The second aspect of the matter basically concerns the question of entertaining and adjudicating a dispute. As far as this aspect goes, the petitioners' learned Advocate is justified when he points out that where there are specific statutory provisions not only empowering but also requiring the authorities to re-examine a dispute of this type, that the authorities must be permitted to carry out those functions. Not only are the authorities better suited to do so but this course of action is certainly more expedient. Under these circumstances, even if a transitory relief is absolutely essential, the right course of action would be for the Court to thereafter at the earliest point of time refer the disputing party to the concerned authority with appropriate directions to the authority to re-examine the matter and to pass appropriate orders. This can also be made time bound and necessary guidelines may be issued. Beyond this, it is wholly inappropriate for a Civil Court to embark upon an investigation into the facts and circumstances of such cases and decide on such issues as to the quantification of the amounts involved in the bills. I need to however add that this procedure will have to be followed in the first instance but nothing would preclude an aggrieved party from re-approaching the Court if the party does not receive adequate justice after having exhausted the remedy under the Act and the Rules.
5. In this view of the matter, the C.R.P. No. 2810/1994 partially succeeds. Even though the learned Trial Judge took the view that this was a case in which the intervention of a Civil Court was initially necessary, the continuation of the proceeding before the Civil Court was unjustified though it is held that there was no bar to entertain a dispute in the first instance. The ambit and scope of the intervention by the Civil Court is restricted and ought to have been confined to that stage.
6. The C.R.P. partially succeeds to this extent. However, in view of the directions issued in the companion C.R.P. whereby the proceeding has virtually been disposed of, it is unnecessary to issue any further directions in this matter. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.