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[Cites 8, Cited by 0]

Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)

Gajuwaka Gram Panchayat, Rep. By The ... vs Medisetti Venkata Suryanarayana And ... on 18 April, 1995

Equivalent citations: 1995(2)ALT113, 1995 A I H C 3686

JUDGMENT
 

Lingaraja Rath, J.
 

1. The defendant in the suit viz., Gajuwada Gram Panchayat, represented by the Executive Officer, Gram Panchayat, Gajuwaka, is the appellant before us. The suit was brought by the respondents claiming to have succeeded to the suit property on the strength of a will executed by their father who, they claim, purchased the property by two registered sale deeds dated 7-4-1964 and 15-7-1968 from one A.V. Bhanoji Rao. It is their case that though the land was being enjoyed peacefully after the purchase, yet the Grampanchayat was creating interference and obstructions to their possession and it has occupied the land for which they filed the suit for eviction and delivery of vacant possession of the land i.e., Survey No. 72/5 in Gajuwaka village corresponding to old Survey Nos. 58 and 59 measuring to an extent of Acs.2-79 cents. The suit was contested by the Gram Panchayat claiming the land to be inam land determined to be so under the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act (Act XXXVII of 1956) (hereinafter referred to as Tnam Abolition Act') and to have vested free of all encumbrances in the State Government. The Collector had granted the Gram Panchayat permission toconstructofficebuildingsonthelandbyproceedingsR.Dis.No.137/79dated 6-1-1979. It denied for the respondents to have any title or interest with the property. The suit was decreed by the learned trial Court which was con firmed in appeal by the learned Single Judge of this Court. In the appeal the findings were reached that the land in question was not an inam land under the Inam Abolition Act; that it was a Mokhasa land which is estate under the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari Act, 1948 (XXVI of 1948) (hereinafter referred to as 'The Estates Abolition Act'). The other findings reached were that even if the land is treated as tank-bed or local fund tank, yet it does not get vested under the Inam Abolition Act since the provision of suo motu vesting of such land in the State Government was provided in Section 2-A of the Inam Abolition Act which came into force only in June, 1975 by the Amending Act 20 of 1975 which had no retrospective effect. The land in question having been sold to the father of the plaintiffs-respondents much prior to that, no vesting took place in respect of the lands. A further conclusion was also reached that long before Section 2-A of the Inam Abolition Act came into force, the land had ceased to be a poramboke or tank-bed.

2. The learned Counsel for the appellant has assailed before us the judgments contending firstly that the finding that the land was estate under the Estates Abolition Act was reached beyond the pleadings of the parties as it was not the case of either of the parties; secondly that the land, being inam land, had vested free of all encumbrances in the State Government and the District Collector, being the authorised person to permit the Gram Panchayat to construct upon the land, the non-impleading of the State Government as party to the suit makes the suit had for non-joinder of necessary party; thirdly that the civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide the nature or tenure of the land as it is inam land, the question is solely entrusted to the Tahsildar under the Inams Abolition Act; fourthly that the plaintiffs had not obtained ryotwari patta either under the Inams Abolition Act or under the Estates Abolition Act and lastly that the matter should be remanded to the trial Court for proper determination as to whether the land is inam land or not.

3. So far as the first submission is concerned, it has no force as the respondents had come with the suit claiming the title to the land in them and seeking recovery of possession. It was not necessary for them to have pleaded the land as inam land or as estate under the Estates Abolition Act. It is not their case that the land being estate under the Estates Abolition Act, had got vested in the State and that they obtained ryotwari patta in respect of the land. It was only the appellant who raised the question of the land being inam under the Inams Abolition Act, to have been determined as such and to have vested in the State. It was hence for them to establish such fact and the learned Single Judge has, while considering such question raised, answered the same denying the land to be inam and instead held it to be estate as per the evidence on record. For the purpose, he took into consideration the description of the land in the sale deeds Exs.A-1 and A-2 registered respectively in the years 1964 and 1968 wherein the lands had been described as Mokhasa lands. The trial Court also had looked in to, while reaching the conclusion, a photostat copy of the order of the Special Tahsildar where Gajuwaka was described as Mokhasa village of A.V. Bhanoji Rao, the vendor of the land. Strictly speaking, the photostat copy could not have been looked into for the purpose as it had not been admitted into evidence. But there was ample evidence otherwise on the legal position as was discussed by the learned Single Judge to reach the conclusion. The learned Judge considered the fact that under the very definition of 'inam' under the Inams Abolition Act, any land which was estate under the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 was excluded from being inam and that a Mokhasa land, which was explained as jagir land in the Commentary of Sundararaja Ayyangar's Text Book on Land Tenure in the Madras Presidency, was excluded from the purview of the Inams Abolition Act.

4. While this question is being considered, the third submission urged by the learned Counsel for the appellant may be taken together with it. It is undoubtedly true that Section 14 of the Inams Abolition Act ousts the jurisdiction of the civil Court to set aside or modify any decision of the Tahsildar, the Revenue Court or the Collector under that Act unless the decision has been obtained by misrepresentation, fraud or collusion of parties. Hence if there was, in fact, any decision of the Tahsildar under Section 3 of that Act holding the land as inam, the decision could not have been varied by the Civil Court. But as has been rightly found by the learned Single Judge, no such decision of the Tahsildar was ever placed in evidence and that too in spite of the objection taken in that regard by the respondents. The question before the civil Court was hence not setting aside or modifying any decision of the Tahsildar regarding determination of any land as inam. The appellant-defendant did not take any steps to establish the inam character of the lands to have been decided. The jurisdiction of the civil Court hence was not ousted to entertain the suit.

5. The second and fourth submission of the learned Counsel may also be taken up together along with the question of suo motu vesting of the land in the State Government under Section 2-A of the Inam Abolition Act. The only provision regarding vesting of the land in the State Government under the Inam Abolition Act is as provided under Section 2-A of that Act. Admittedly that section was introduced in June, 1975. It is the submission of the learned Counsel that as the land is a poramboke and local fund tank comes under the provisions of Section 2-A and vested in the State Government. It was found by the learned Single Judge as well as the trial Court that the land had long since ceased to have such character. The sale deeds themselves describe the land as dry land. Ex.A-5, a letter dated 19th August, 1975, from the Collector to the Sarpanrh, stated that the land was being used as public lavatory upto 1969 and that the Grampanchayathad passed a resolution for digging a L.W.wellon it. It was also mentioned that Zilla Parishad, Visakhapatnam, had dug a well in the Koneru i.e., tank. The Sarpanch in his letter dated 20-6-1973 addressed to the Collector had stated that all the villagers were suffering from untold troubles due to lack of public lavatories, daily market and recreational places and the local fund Koneru was the only undisputed site to meet such needs of the public. The extract of Adangal Survey obtained from the village Headman showed the local fund Koneru to have become useless. From such facts, the finding was reached of the land not being in the nature of poramboke or a tank-bed. There is nothing shown to us to interfere with such finding of fact. Section 2-A of the Inam Abolition Act would obviously operate prospectively to vest only such lands which continue to enjoy the inam character on the date when the Section comes into force and cannot be resorted to vest lands which had ceased to be of that nature and sold as such much prior to the Section coming into force. As such since there is no case that the land had vested as inam in the State Government being poramboke or tank-bed, the question of State Government being impleaded as a party did not arise, and the mere fact that the District Collector granted permission to construct upon the lands would not defeat the title of the respondents if it otherwise inheres in them.

6. The submission that the respondents had not obtained ryotwari pattas in respect of the land either under the Inams Abolition Act or the Estates Abolition Act also does not commend itself to us. If the land was not inam, the question of obtaining ryotwari patta under the Inams Abolition Act does not arise. Similarly if the land was estate under the Estates Abolition Act, the question of vestingwill arise only if a notification under Sectionl(4)oftheEstatesAbolition Act is published as the estate would vest from the notified date whereupon the question of taking steps for obtaining the ryotwari patta in respect of the land would arise. It is not known as to whether such notification in respect of the and was published. Hence we do not want to enter into consideration of such a question here.

7. Lastly the learned Counsel for the appellant submits for remand of the case for determination as to whether the land is inam land or not. We do not find any merit in the submission since the appellant has misreably failed to even establish by prima facie evidence of the land to be inam. Apart from that, the learned Single Judge, while considering the question, on evidence, found the land to be in the Mokhasa village of the vendor. The learned Judge rightly took exception to the fact that the Grampanchayat though is supposed to be in possession of the records, yet did not place on record any decision of the Tahsildar under Section 3 of the Inam Abolition Act deciding the land to be inam. It rested statisfied with filing of a photostat copy only. No steps were taken even before the learned Single Judge or before us to file such decision of the Tahsildar as additional evidence. The Letters Patent Appeal itself has been filed five years back. It will be travesty of justice to allow the appellant to re- open the proceedings at this late stage. The suit itself was of the year 1981. Fourteen years have passed in the mean time. We find no justifiable reason to accede to the request of the learned Counsel.

8. In the result, the appeal has no merit and is dismissed with costs.