Chattisgarh High Court
Smt. Santoshi vs Smt. Kirti Sahu And Ors. on 3 October, 2002
Equivalent citations: 2003(1)MPHT23(CG)
ORDER Fakhruddin, J.
1. The applicant has preferred this revision against the order dated 2-5-2001 passed by the Court below.
2. The brief facts of the case are that the non-applicant No. 1 preferred an Election petition under Section 20 of M.P. Municipalities Act, 1961 to challenge the election of the applicant as a Councillor of Ward No. 2 of Municipal Council Charoda, Bhilai. The election petitioner filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing the election petition. The application was opposed by the present applicant. The Court below by the impugned order has allowed the application and condoned the delay.
3. Learned Counsel for the applicant submits that the impugned order is illegal and contrary to law as there is no provision under the M.P. Municipalities Act for condonation of delay.
4. In the instant case the election petition was filed under Section 20 of the M.P. Municipalities Act. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act is relevant and quoted below :--
"20. Election Petitions.-- (3) No petition presented under Subsection (2) shall be admitted unless-
(i) it is presented within thirty days from the date of which the result of such election or nomination was notified in the Gazette;
(ii) it is accompanied by a Government Treasury receipt showing a deposit of two hundred rupees, in the case of election or nomination to Municipal Councils and one hundred rupees in the case of election or nomination to Nagar Panchayats."
5. Miss Sunita Jain, Advocate appearing for the respondents submits that the question regarding condonation of delay and applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not arise as the petition was filed within the stipulated period. It is submitted that the application for condonation was not required to be filed and it was filed due to misconception and wrong advice. It is further submitted that in this case the election petition itself was filed within the stipulated period as the notification was published on 28-6-2000 and the petition was filed on 28-7-2000. She submits that the date of notification has to be excluded while computing the limitation and excluding the date of notification, the period of 30 days was to expire on 28-7-2000 and the petition filed on 28-7-2000 was well within the period of limitation. On the point of computation, Counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Tarun Parsed Chatterji v. Dinanath Sharma, reported in (2000) 8 SCC 649 and contended that while computing the period of limitation, the date of limitation has to be excluded. Paragraphs 12 and 13 of the judgment are relevant and quoted below :--
"12. Section 9 says that in any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of the General Clauses Act, 1897, it shall be sufficient for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time to use the word "from", and, for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any period of time, to use the word "to". The principle is that when a period is delimited by statute or rule, which has both a beginning and an end and the word "from" is used indicating the beginning, the opening days is to be excluded and if the last day is to be included the word "to" is to be used. In order to exclude the first day of the period, the crucial thing to be noted is whether the period of limitation is delimited by a series of days or by any fixed period. This is intended to obviate the difficulties or inconvenience that may be caused to some parties......
13. It was argued that the language used in Section 81(1) that "within forty-five days from, but not earlier than the date of election of the returned candidate" expresses a different intention and Section 9 of the General Clauses Act has no application.
We do not find any force in this contention. In order to apply Section 9, the first condition to be fulfilled is whether a prescribed period is fixed "from" a particular point. When the period is marked by terminus a quo and terminus ad quem, the canon of interpretation envisaged in Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, require to exclude the first day. The words "from" and "within" used in Section 81(1) of the RP Act, 1951 do not express any contrary intention."
In Paragraph 14 of the aforesaid judgment, it has further been observed that--
"14..... The first day for the period of limitation is required to be excluded for the convenience of the parties and if the declaration of the result is delayed or is done late in the night, the candidate or elector would hardly get any time for presentation of the election petition. Law comes to the rescue of such parties to give full forty-five day's period for filing the election petition. Nevertheless, any petition presented on the date of election of the returned candidate would be certainly within the period of limitation as it is a presentation on the date of election of the returned candidate."
6. In the instant case, under the provisions of Section 20 (3) of the Act, the petition was to be filed within 30 days from the date on which the result of such election was notified in the Gazette. A copy of the notification has been filed. It was issued on 28-6-2000 and the election petition was filed on 28-7-2000. If the date of notification is excluded, then the petition filed on 28-7-2000 would be well within the limitation. Therefore, there was no question of condonation of delay.
7. Since the election petition itself has been held to be within limitation, it is not at all necessary to go into the question of condonation application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act or otherwise, as the same does not arise.
8. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, material on record and in view of the discussions made hereinabove, in the opinion of this Court, the petition filed itself is within limitation.
9. The revision is accordingly disposed of.
10. Cost as incurred.