Karnataka High Court
Valliappa Textiles And Allied ... vs State Of Karnataka By Its Secretary And ... on 24 January, 2006
Equivalent citations: ILR2006KAR1009, 2006(2)KARLJ26, (2006)IILLJ1000KANT
Author: H.N. Nagamohan Das
Bench: H.N. Nagamohan Das
ORDER PASSED UNDER SECTION 25-O OF THE I.D. ACT-HELD-In appropriate cases High Court is competent to quash an award or order passed under Section 25-O of the I.D. Act by exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. (B) INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947 - SECTION 25-O POWER OF THE GOVERNMENT TO ACCORD PERMISSION FOR CLOSURE OF INDUSTRY PLEADED AGAINST-HELD-The Government has taken into consideration the circumstances that led to financial crunch in the second respondent unit and also the efforts made by the second respondent and its directors to improve the situation, the frequent strikes, lockouts and suspension of work in the unit and also the non Co-Operation of workers, under utilisation of the unit and drop in the production- It is also not in dispute that all the workmen have received their dues from the second respondent in full and final settlement of all their claims and obtained their pension certificates-Govt. is justified in according permission for closure of the industry. Writ Petition is dismissed. ORDER H.N. Nagamohan Das, J.
1. In this writ petition the petitioner has prayed for a writ of certiorari to quash the order dated 26.2.1999 Annexure 'H' and order dated 14.6.1999 Annexure 'O' passed by first respondent-the Government of Karnataka permitting the second respondent to close their factory called Valliappa Textiles Limited, Hejjala, Bangalore district.
2. The second respondent factory was established in the year 1967 and engaged in the manufacture of cotton, viscos and polyester yarns. In the year 1993 there were 291 workers on the rolls of the second respondent factory. On 30.12.1998 the second respondent factory filed an application before the first respondent-Government of Karnataka under Section 25-O of the Industrial Disputes Act ('the Act' for short) for closure of the factory. The reasons for the closure, according to the management of second respondent factory are, that the textile industries are in the grip of unprecedented economic and financial crisis. The protection given to the textile industry has been withdrawn gradually as per the GATT regulations. Owing to financial crunch in countries like Indonesia, Kores, Japan and other Asian countries, the export of Indian Textiles drastically came down. The diversion of export oriented goods to the domestic market resulted in more supply and less demand and consequently, the prices came down. Since there was no demand, large number of power looms came to be closed. The other reason, according to the second respondent factory was, that workers union deliberately brought in indiscipline among the workers which has resulted in decreased production and reduction in the utilisation of installed capacity. There were lockouts, strikes and suspension of operations for nearly 18 months. This worsened the situation resulting in huge losses during the years 1995-% to 1998-99 and running the factory was beyond the control of the management of the second respondent.
3. The petitioner trade union representing the workers of second respondent factory filed objections before the Government opposing the closure. The petitioner contends that loss is due to poor maintenance of the machines, procurement of poor quality of cotton and due to mismanagement. The statement of audited accounts cannot be believed. The motive behind the closure is to get rid of the permanent workmen and to run the factory with contractor labourers. The lockouts and cessation of work for nearly 18 months was due to the feudalitic and bureaucratic behaviour of the management and workmen are not responsible for the same. The management is anti-labour and anti-union and application for closure of factory is not bonafide and the same is to victimise the workmen.
4. The first respondent-Government, after hearing both the parties and by considering the entire material, passed an order on 26.2.1999 according sanction for closure of the factory of second respondent as per Annexure "H" to the writ petition. Subsequently, the petitioner Union fifed a review petition before the Government on 12.3.1999 to review the order of closure. The Government, after hearing both the parties and on appreciation of material on record, rejected the review petition vide order dated 14.6.1999 as per Annexure "O" to the writ petition. It is these two orders of the first respondent, Annexure 'H' and 'O' are questioned in this writ petition.
5. Sri K. Subba Rao, Learned Senior Counsel and Sri K.S. Subrahmanya, Learned Counsel for petitioners contend, that the impugned orders are not speaking orders. The first respondent has not applied its mind to the fact situation of the case. It is contended, that the second respondent has not complied with the mandatory requirement of Section 25-O(2) of the I.D. Act. Despite objections raised by the petitioner regarding the authenticity of accounts the first respondent had not called upon the second respondent to produce the audited balance sheets. The first respondent has only considered the interest of second respondent management and not the interest of workers. Reliance is placed on the following decisions.
1. Barielly Electricity supply Company Limited v. The Workmen and Ors.
2 Associated Cement Companies Limited and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. 1998 (I) LLJ 599
3. Straw Products Limited v. Union of India and Ors. 1987 (I) LLJ 469
4. Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh and Ors. v. R.N. Gawande, Industrial Tribunal and President Industrial Court 1985 (II) 524
6. Per Contra, Sri M.R.C. Ravi Learned Counsel for second respondent contends, that in furtherance of the orders passed by the first respondent the second respondent has already colsed down its factory and terminated the services of workmen with effect from 16.6.1999. Nearly 90% of the employees have received their dues n full and final settlement of all their claims and obtained their pension certificates. He contends, that the present writ petition will not survive for consideration and it will only be academic in nature. He contends, that the present textile crisis is a worldwide phenomenon and several mills are closed in India including the second respondent factory due to financial and other problems. Despite all efforts the second respondent could not run the mill in an economically viable manner due to labour unrest. The first respondent, after fully examining the facts and after considering the material on record and applying its mind, had passed the orders of closure. He supports the impugned orders. Reliance is placed on the following decisions.
1. Associated Cement Companies Limited and Anr. v. Union Of India and Ors.1989 (1) LLJ 599
2. Laxmi Starch Limited and Anr. v. The Kundara Factory Workers Union and Ors.1992 LAB.I.C. 1337
7. Heard arguments on both the sides and perused the entire write papers. Though several grounds are taken in the memorandum of writ petition, finally the following are the only points that are principally canvassed. Further, on the basis of pleadings and the arguments submitted at the Bar, the following questions will arise for my consideration. They are;
1. What is the scope of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to interfere with the impugned order of Government under Section 25-O of the Industrial Disputes Act according permission for closure of industry?
2. Whether the Government is justified in passing the impugned orders under Section 25-O of the Industrial Disputes Act according to permission for closure of industry of second respondent?
ON QUESTION NO. 18. Article 226 of the Constitution of India reads as under:
226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs.-(1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, (***) every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including [writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose.]
9. In Gujarat Steel Tubes Limited v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha 1980 1 LLJ 137 Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer speaking for the Bench held that Article 226, however restrictive in practice, is a power wide enough, in all conscience, to be a friend in need when the summons comes in a crisis from a victim of injustice; and more importantly, this extraordinary reserve is unsheathed to grant final relief without necessary recourse to a remand. What the Tribunal may, in its discretion do the High Court too can, under Article 226, if facts compel to do so.
10. The Supreme Court of India in the case of The Controller And Auditor General Of India v. K.S. Jaganathan held:
20. There is thus no doubt that the High Courts in India exercising their jurisdiction under Article 226 have the power to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or to pass orders and give necessary directions where the Government or a public authority has failed to exercise or has wrongly exercised the discretion conferred upon it by a statute or a rule or a policy decision of the Government or has exercised such discretion malafide or on irrelevant considerations or by ignoring the relevant considerations and materials or in such a manner as to frustrate the object of conferring such discretion or the policy for implementing which such discretion has been conferred. In all such cases and in any other fit and proper case a High Court can, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226, issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or pass orders and give directions to compel the performance in a proper and lawful manner of the discretion conferred upon the Government or a public authority, and in a proper case, in order to prevent injustice resulting to the concerned parties, the Court may itself pass an order or give directions which the Government or the public authority should have passed or given had it properly and lawfuly exercised its discretion.
11. Keeping in view the law laid down by the Apex Court in the decisions referred to supra, the fact situation in the instant case is to be examined. Prior to the amendment of Section 25-O of the I.D. Act there was no machinery for an appeal or revision or review or adjudication against the orders passed by the Government under Sub-section 2 of Section 25-O of the Act. By Act No. 46 of 1982 with effect from 21.8.1984 Section 25-O of the Act came to be amended by inserting Sub-section (5) of Section 25-O of the Act providing that the appropriate Government may, either on its own motion or on an application made by the employer or any workman review its order granting or refusing to grant permission for closure of an industry. The object of Section 25-O(5) of the I.D. Act is to reconsider the entire matter including the facts and law omitted while passing the first order as well as the new developments that took place after the original order was passed. If the original order under Sub-section (2) or the review order under Sub-section (5) is against the object and spirit of Section 25-O of the Act or when it is found that the Tribunal or appropriate Government exceeded its authority, committed error of law apparent on the face of record or when findings are perverse in relation to fact situation, undoubtedly this Court can interfere. In appropriate cases this Court is competent to quash an award or order passed under Section 25-O of the Act and remand the matter or even decide the matter itself. Hence, I answer the question No. 1 by holding that this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can interfere with order of the Government passed under Section 25-O of the Act.
ON QUESTION NO. 212. The Supreme Court in the case of Excel Wear v. Union Of India struck down Section 25-O of the Act as the same was in violation of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Consequent to this decision of Supreme Court the Government by Act No. 46 of 1982 with effect from 21.8.1984 amended Section 25-O of the Act. The constitutional validity of amended Section 25-O of the Act came up for consideration before this Court in the case of Stumpp Schule v. State Of Karnataka 1989 (2) Lab L..J.4 and the Learned Single Judge struck down the amended Section. But, a Division Bench of this Court in appeal reversed the decision of Learned Single Judge and upheld the validity of amended Section 25-O of the Act. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of Division Bench upholding the constitutional validity of Section 25-O of the Act. The amended Section 25-O of the Act reads as under:
25-O. Procedure for closing down an undertaking.- (1) An employer who intends to close down an undertaking of an industrial establishment to which this Chapter applies shall, in the prescribed manner, apply, for prior permission at least ninety days before the date on which the intended closure is to become effective, to the appropriate Government, stating clearly the reasons for the intended closure of the undertaking and a copy of such application shall also be served simultaneously on the representatives of the workmen in the prescribed manner. Provided that nothing in this Sub-section shall apply to an undertaking set up for the construction of buildings, bridges, roads, canals, dams or for other construction work.
(2) Where an application for permission has been made under Sub-section (1), the appropriate Government, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the employer, the workmen and persons interested in such closure may, having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the employer, the interests of the general public and all other relevant factors, by order and for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such order shall be communicated to the employer and the workmen.
(3) Where an application has been made under Sub-section (1) and the appropriate Government does not communicate the order granting or refusing to grant permission to the employer within a period of sixty days from the date on which such application is made, the permission applied for shall, be deemed to have been granted on the expiration of the said period of sixty days.
(4) An order of the appropriate Government granting or refusing to grant permission shall, subject to the provisions of Sub-section (5), be final and binding on all the parties and shall remain in force for one year from the date of such order.
(5) The appropriate Government may, either on its own motion or on the application made by the employer or any workman, review its order granting or refusing to grant permission under Sub-section (2) or refere the matter to a Tribunal for adjudication.
Provided that where a reference has been made to a Tribunal under this subsection, it shall pass an award within a period of thirty days from the date of such reference.
(6) Where no application for permission under Sub-section (1) is made within the period specified therein, or where the permission for closure has been refused, the closure of the undertaking shall be deemed to be illegal from the date of closure and the workmen shall be entitled to all the benefits under any law for the time being in force as if the undertaking had not been closed down.
(7) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this section, the appropriate Government may, if it is satisfied that owing to such exceptional circumstances as accident in the undertaking or death of the employer or the like it is necessary so to do, by order, direct that the provisions of Sub-section (1) shall not apply in relation to such undertaking for such period as may be specified in the order.
(8) Where an undertaking is permitted to be closed down under Sub-section (2) or where permission for closure is deemed to be granted under Sub-section (3), every workman who is employed in that undertaking immediately before the date of application for permission under this section, shall be entitled to receive compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months.
13. Article 19(g) of the Constitution guarantees to all citizens the right to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. Article 19(6) empowers the State to impose restrictions on the right of citizens to start, carry on or close their undertakings. Now it is settled position of law that no right is absolute in its scope. Every right or freedom guaranteed in the Constitution can certainly be restricted, regulated or controlled by law in the interest of public order, morality, health, economy and the general public. Thus Section 25-O of the Act though called as procedure for closing down an undertaking, in reality it imposes restriction on the right of the employer to close down his industrial undertaking. Section 25-O of the Act specified that if an employer wants to close down his undertaking, has to apply to the appropriate Government in the prescribed manner for prior permission stating clearly the reasons for the intended closure of the undertaking. The employer is also required to serve a copy of such application to the representatives of the workmen in the prescribed manner. The appropriate Government after giving opportunity to the employer, the workmen and the persons interested in such closure and after enquiry as it thinks fit grant or refuse to grant permission to close the industry. While granting or refusing the permission the Government shall consider the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the employer, the interest of workers and the general public. It also provides for review of the order passed by the appropriate Government on its own motion or on an application made by the employer or workmen.
14. Section 25-O(2) of the Act specifies that the appropriate Government having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the employer, the interests of general public and all other relevant factors grant or refuse the permission to close the industry. In ASSOCIA TED CEMENT COMPANIES LIMITED v. UNION OF INDIA(Supra) a Division Bench of High Court of Gujarat explained the meaning of the phrase "the genuineness and adequacy of reasons" as under:
It is in this context that the meaning of the phrase the genuiness and adequacy of reasons' will have to be examined. As pointed out earlier, this requirement of Section 25-O(2) is in the nature of a restriction imposed upon the right of the employer to close down his business. Therefore, this phrase must be so construed as to make the restriction which is imposed on the right of the employer reasonable within the meaning of Article 19(6), because, as pointed out by the Supreme Court, the right to close down a business is not an absolute right and it can certainly be restricted, regulated or controlled by law in the interest of general public. If it is so construed as to enable the appropriate Government and the Tribunal to unreasonably restrict the right of the employer, disregarding its nature and the incidents, then that would render the Section ultra vires Articles 14 and 19(1)(g). The question whether the reasons given by the employer are genuine and adequate, will, no doubt, depend upon facts of each case. But the correct answer to the question as to which reasons should be regarded as genuine and adequate would not only depend upon facts of each case, but also on the correct meaning to be given to the words 'genuine and adequate'. Though a precise meaning cannot be given to these words as it is not possible to contemplate all possible situation which might arise compelling a person to close down his business, it will have to be held that the question must be decided in the context of the nature and incidents of the right which the employer has. A right to close down a business being an integral part of the fundamental right to carry on business, words 'genuine and adequate' must have that meaning which is consistent with the nature of that right. If the closure is bona fide or on account of unavoidable circumstances beyond the control of the employer then they will have to be regarded as genuine and adequate. In case of Excel Wear (supra) the Supreme Court after referring to Section 25FFF has further observed that the 'Explanation postulates the financial difficulties including financial losses or accumulation of undisposed stocks, etc. as the closing of an undertaking on account of unavoidable circumstances beyond the control of the employer....' The Supreme Court has further observed that a situation may arise both from the point of view of law and order and the financial aspect that the employer finds it impossible to carry on the business any longer. Such a reason has to be regarded as adequate.
15. The Kerala High Court in Laxmi Starch Limited v. Kundara Factory Workers Union (Supra) explained the importance of the interest of general public and all other relevant factors mentioned in Section 25-O(2) of the Act in the following words:
20. But, in such a situation, the question of bona fides is one of the essential factors. Legislature wanted to be strict in the matter in order to avoid situations of closure which are not unavoidable. That is because public interest may be involved in such closures which are not bona fide. Consequences may be loss of employment, nonavailability of products for the needs of the public, loss of marketing facilities for the producers of raw materials, danger to the economy of the country and the like. An employer who made sufficient fortune out of the venture may attempt to close it down without making earnest attempts to overcome difficulties. Refusal of permission, in such a situation, cannot be challenged as unreasonable restriction on the right to carry on business. It is up to the Government or the Industrial Tribunal, as the case may be, to probe into all the circumstances in order to arrive at a conclusion regarding the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons for closure tested in the light of the interest of the general public and all other relevant factors mentioned Section 25-O(2).
16. In the light of judicial pronouncement as stated above, it is required to examine the impugned orders of State Government granting permission for closure of the understaking of second respondent. From immemorial times India exported admirable textures produced by handloom and the spinning wheel. It was the British intruders who broke up the Indian handloom and destroyed the spinning wheel and introduced the twist into India. After independence the textile industry had the protection from international competition by imposing duties on imports etc. The second respondent contends, that this protection is being gradually withdrawn as per GATT Regulations. Cheap imports of textile are coming in a big way, making the local prices of textiles not competitive. Korea, Japan and other East-Asian countries which were importing 50% of Indian textiles have now stopped imports. These exporting mills have also started diverting the yam production to local markets making the position still worse. The buying power of large section of our country has come down and as a consequence the per-capita consumption of textile has also come down. Large number of power looms have shut down due to paucity of demand for clothes resulting in poor demand for yarn. Thus, the crisis in textile industry was beyond the control of the management, including the second respondent's textile mill. In addition to this crisis in the second respondent mill there were strikes, lockouts and suspensions of work for 18 months during 1995-96 and 1996-97. The cumulative effect of this situation resulted in low production and under-utilisation of the mill and ended in huge losses during the years 1995-96 and 1997-98. The second respondent incurred losses during these years in a sum of Rs. 11.46 crores as certified by the Chartered Accountant. The second respondent by borrowing funds at high rate of interest from banks and financial institutions made efforts to run the mill in an economically viable way. Despite all efforts by the second respondent there was no improvement and the losses continued and the financial institution refused to extend further financial support treating the second respondent mill as high risk unit as a non-performing asset. The First Respondent, after hearing both petitioner and the second respondent and by considering the rival contentions has satisfied as to the reasons provided by the second respondent as genuine and adequate. The conclusion of the First Respondent that the second respondent is undergoing severe financial crisis and the functioning of the industry in beyond the control and capacity of the second respondent is based on material on record and the same is in accordance with law and the procedure laid down in Section 25-O(2) of the Act.
17. The contention of the petitioner that the second respondent has not furnished the balance sheet, profit and loss accounts, and the audited reports of previous three years and thus there is statutory non-compliance of Rule 77(1) of Form QA, is unacceptable. The petitioner has produced copy of Form No. QA filed by the second respondent as Annexure A to the writ petitioner. A perusal of Form No. QA at Column Nos. 11 and 12 discloses that the second respondent had produced the profit and loss accounts for the years 1995-96, 1996-97, 1997-98 and 1998-99 and also the key figures from 1980 to 1998. The First Respondent in the impugned order observed as under:
The material available in the records, such as income tax returns, the notices issued by various financial institutions, the certificate of Chartered Accountant indicates, that the management is in serious financial difficulties.
That for the years 1995-96, 1996-97, 1997-98 and 1998-99 the mill has incurred a loss of Rs. 11.46 crores as certified by the Chartered Accountant.
18. The petitioner again contended before the First Respondent in the review petition stating that the management has not furnished the balance sheet, profit and loss accounts and audited reports of previous three years. The First Respondent in the review order dated 14.06.1999 answered this contention of petitioners as under:
With regard to non-furnishing the audited balance sheet for three years, it is to be stated that the audit report for the period ending 30th September 1997 also has the accounts for the previous years, covering a total period of thirty months. In addition, the union had obtained a copy of the accounts for the year ended 31st March 1995 from the Registrar of Companies which fact has not been denied by the union. From the aforesaid facts, it is clear that the required financial information of the company, spread over for a period of forty two months were available with the union. This informations were extensively cited during the arguments. In view of the above positions, no prejudice has been caused to the interest of the union.
The First Respondent by considering the contention of the petitioner and on appreciation of material on record and by applying its mind and by a reasoned order has rightly concluded that the financial loss in the mill was very acute and beyond the powers and control of the management. Therefore, there is no substance and merit in the contention of the petitioners that the second respondent has not complied with statutory requirement of Rule 77(1) of Form No. QA.
19. The petitioner contends, that it has disputed the authenticity of figures furnished by the second respondent and therefore the First respondent ought to have called upon the second respondent to produce the audited balance sheet. In support of this contention the petitioner relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of BAREILLY ELECTRICITY SUPPLY COMPANY LIMITED v. THE WORKMEN(Supra) wherein it is held that mere production of the balance sheet and profit and loss account does not amount to a proof of it or the truth of the entries therein. When entries in the accounts extract are challenged then they are to be proved by producing the books and speaking from the entries made therein. This contention of the petitioner is not acceptable to me. Firstly, in M/s. Bareilly case the dispute was relating to the rate of bonus to be paid to the workmen and in the present case the issue relates to grant of permission to close the unit of second respondent. Secondly, in the present case the second respondent produced the annual report of the company showing audited balance sheet and profit and loss account. In addition to this the second respondent produced audit report for the period ending 30.09.1997 which also contains the accounts for the previous years covering a total period of thirty months. The Chartered Accountant certified that the second respondent mill has incurred loss during the years 1995-96 to 1998-99. The First Respondent by considering the income tax returns, notices issued by various financial institutions and the certificate of the Charatered Accountant comes to the conclusion that the second respondent-management is in serious financial difficulties. The petitioner has not placed any material to substantiate its contention except the interested assertions that the figures contained the profit and loss account furnished by the second respondent as not correct. The First Respondent has rightly relied on the accounts certified by the auditors. The decision in M/s. Bareilly will not be of any help to the petitioner.
20. I decline to accept the contentions of the petitioner that without application of mind the First Respondent by only taking into consideration the interest of second respondent has passed the impugned orders. A reading of the impugned orders makes it clear that the First Respondent has not only taken into consideration the circumstances that led to financial crunch in the second respondent unit but also the efforts made by the second respondent and its directors to improve the situation, the frequent strikes, lockouts and suspension of work in the unit and also the non cooperation of workers, under utilisation of the unit and drop in the production. The First Respondent in its order dated 14.06.1999 held as under:
Another aspect that requires serious consideration of the Government is the desire of the management to stay in business. The primary consideration for those who are running the industries besides investment and profit is the "desire to be in business". Like all other professions this desire is an inalienable aspect, without which, the existence of the individual is meaningless. The mill has been functioning roughtly for a period of thirty years and the directors and the promoters have done their best to run the mill during hay days and difficult times. The promoters, as seen from the materials placed before the government have given personal guarantee and obtained loans for running the mill. The compelling need, under these circumstances, for the closure of the mill should be very acute and beyond the powers and control of the management. During the argument it was made clear by the counsel for the management that the frequent violences in premises of the mill and outside, by the workmen besides the financial difficulties is also one of the reasons to extinguish the desire to be in business. This fact though agonising will have to be accepted. It has been held by the courts that the right to close down an industry, though not a fundamental right, is an integral part of such right. All that the management has to show for the exercise of such an integral part of the fundamental right is the adequacy and genuineness of the reasons shown in the application for closure under Section 25-O of the Act. In this case the required ingredients have been amply demonstrated.
21. It is no doubt true that the closure of an industrial unit is likely to have adverse impact on the long term interest of the workers, share holders, creditors, depositors and the general public. It is therefore the legislature enacted the provisions of Section 25-O of the I.D. Act restricting the right of employer to close down the unit. Care is taken to protect the interest of workers under Sub-section 8 of Section 25-O of the I.D. Act providing for payment of compensation to workers in the events of closure of industrial unit. Otherwise in no case the closure can be allowed as it would always have impact on workers.
22. It is necessary to notice the developments that have taken place after the order of closure dated 26.02.1999 passed by the First Respondent-Government permitting the second respondent to close its factory. It is stated, pursuant to the order of closure, the second respondent has closed the factory and surrendered the factory license to the concerned authorities. The second respondent has produced copies of invoices for having sold the machines in the factory. It is state, that electrical power was disconnected to the second respondent factory in August, 1998. It is further stated, that the second respondent has sold the entire land and building to M/s. Software Technological Park Private Limited, Bangalore and handed over the possession of the same. It is also not in dispute that all the workmen have received their dues from the second respondent in full and final settlement of all their claims and obtained their pension certificates. In addition to this the State Bank of India initiated proceedings against the second respondent for recovery of dues before the Debt Recovery Tribunal and that an award is passed. Under these circumstances and in view of these developments, it is not possible to grant the relief prayed for by the petitioner. Accordingly, question No. 2 is answered in affirmative.
23. For the reasons stated above, the writ petition is rejected with no order as to costs.