Delhi District Court
Vilcon Rubber Industries vs M/S. Krishna Bearing Company on 10 January, 2022
IN THE COURT OF SH. SANJAY SHARMA-II : ADDL. SESSIONS JUDGE-03,
(CENTRAL): TIS HAZARI COURTS, DELHI
Criminal Revision No. 184/2021
CNR No.: DLCT01-013175-2021
Vilcon Rubber Industries
Through its partner: Mr. Vinay Grover
16, Rani Jhansi Road,
(Basement) Motia Khan,
New Delhi-110055
..... Petitioner
VERSUS
M/s. Krishna Bearing Company
Prop.: Mr. Vikesh Kumar Aggarwal
B-3, Jhotwara Road, Nahri Ka Naka,
D.P. Colony, Jaipur-302 016, Rajasthan
..... Respondent
Date of Institution : 05.10.2021
Date of Arguments : 06.01.2022
Date of Judgement : 10.01.2022
JUDGEMENT
1. The criminal revision petition under Section 397 of 'The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973' (Hereinafter referred to as 'the Cr.P.C.') is directed against order dated 13.07.2021 (Hereinafter referred to as 'the impugned order') arising from complaint case vide CC No. 502/2020 titled as 'Vilcon Rubber Industries vs. M/s. Krishna Bearing Company' under Section 138 of 'The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881' (Hereinafter referred to as 'NI Act') whereby Ld. MM-06 (NI Act), Central, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi (Hereinafter referred to as 'the trial Court') dismissed an application under Section 143A NI Act filed by the petitioner seeking interim compensation i.e. Rs. 30,050.20/- being 20% of the cheque amount.
Crl. Revision No. 184/2021 Vilcon Rubber Industries vs. M/s. Krishna Bearing Company Page1/19BRIEF FACTS:
2. The petitioner (Hereinafter referred to as 'the complainant') instituted a complaint case, through its partner, namely, Mr. Vinay Grover, under Section 138 NI Act against the respondent on the averments that the complainant is engaged in business of manufacturing and supply of 'automobile spare parts'. The respondent had entered into a 'Dealership Annual Scheme' whereby the respondent agreed to Plan 2 and 3 to avail extra discount of 6% and 8% on annual sale of Rs.
24,00,000/- and 36,00,000/- respectively. The complainant supplied 'automobile spare parts' to the respondent and the respondent made payments against the said transactions. The complainant is maintaining a ledger account regarding the said supply of 'automobile spare parts' to the respondent. As per ledger account, an amount of Rs. 1,50,251/- was due against the respondent. In order to discharge the said liability, the respondent instructed the complainant to present Cheque No. 000603 dated 23.09.2019 in the sum of Rs. 1,50,251/- drawn on 'ICICI Bank, Vidyadhar Nagar Branch, Jaipur-302 023' issued in favour of the complainant. On presentation, the said cheque was returned unpaid with the remark 'PAYMENT STOPPED BY DRAWER' vide intimation memo dated 26.09.2019. On assurance of the respondent, the complainant again presented the said cheque for encashment. The said cheque was again returned unpaid with the remark 'PAYMENT STOPPED BY DRAWER' vide intimation memo dated 02.11.2019.
Crl. Revision No. 184/2021 Vilcon Rubber Industries vs. M/s. Krishna Bearing Company Page2/193. The complainant sent demand notice dated 19.11.2019 to the respondent through courier. The respondent was served with the demand notice on 21.11.2019. The respondent replied the said notice vide reply dated 28.11.2019. The respondent denied liability to make payment of the cheque amount. Therefore, the complainant filed the complaint case under section 138 NI Act against the respondent. THE DEFENCE OF THE RESPONDENT:
4. Pursuant to summoning order dated 15.01.2020, the respondent appeared. The trial Court explained substance of accusations to the respondent as required under Section 251 of the Cr.P.C. The response of the respondent is as under:
"Q. Have you understood the notice? A. Yes.
Q. Do you plead guilty or have any defence to make? A. I do not plead guilty. I claim trial.
Q. Do you admit your signature on the cheque in question?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you fill the particulars on the cheque in question including amount, date and name of payee? A. I did not fill the particulars on the cheque. The same was blank signed cheque.
Q. Did you receive legal notice from the complainant? A. Yes. I had received the legal notice from the complainant.
Q. Do you admit the bank return memo dated 02.11.2019?
A. Yes.Crl. Revision No. 184/2021 Vilcon Rubber Industries vs. M/s. Krishna Bearing Company Page3/19
Q. Do you have anything else to say? A. I had given two cheques bearing No. 603 and 604 to the complainant as security in the month of February, 2019. Thereafter, as my accounts with the complainant stood settled, I demanded my cheque back. The complainant refused to return the cheque and thereafter, on his refusal, I instructed my bank to stop payments of the said cheque. I have been falsely implicated in the present case by the complainant. I had given the said cheques as security in the February-March, 2018."
THE APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 143A NI ACT:
5. The complainant sought interim compensation to the extent of 20% of the cheque amount on the grounds as under:
(a) That notice was framed on 21.10.2020 wherein the respondent has not pleaded guilty and claimed trial;
and
(b) That the case is fixed for evidence which will take time.
REPLY FILED BY THE RESPONDENT TO THE APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 143A NI ACT:
6. In the reply, the respondent responded to the said application as under:
(a) The said provision is 'discretionary' and not 'mandatory';
(b) Discretion must be exercised on 'case to case basis' on examination of facts of each case;
(c) The said cheque was issued as a 'security cheque' and the respondent settled account with the complainant, there was no legally enforceable debt;
(d) The complainant did not return the said cheque and therefore, the respondent instructed his banker to stop payment of the said cheque;Crl. Revision No. 184/2021 Vilcon Rubber Industries vs. M/s. Krishna Bearing Company Page4/19
(e) The delay in the decision of the case cannot be a sole ground for directing payment of interim compensation; and
(f) The respondent has not caused any delay in the progress of the case.
THE IMPUGNED ORDER:
7. Vide the impugned order, the trial Court dismissed the application under Section 143A NI Act. The relevant part of the impugned order is as under:
"13. Perusal of the record reveals that no case for exercise of discretionary power to grant interim compensation to the complainant is made out at this stage for the following reasons:
(a) The accused has taken a prima facie plausible defence in the notice of accusation that the cheque in question was issued as security for an amount which stood cleared between the parties. Further, the cheque in question was dishonoured on the ground of 'Stop Payment' instructions issued by the accused himself.
(b) The case was instituted on 06.01.2020 wherein the accused was summoned on the very first date of hearing i.e. 15.01.2020. Thereafter, the case was listed for 28.05.2020 for appearance of accused. Due to intervening COVID 19 first wave, the case was adjourned en bloc to 13.10.2020 wherein the accused entered appearance on the first date of hearing.
Notice was framed on the very next date of hearing i.e. 21.10.2020. Application u/s 145(2) of the accused was allowed on 02.12.2020 and thereafter the case was listed for complainant's evidence. On 05.02.2021, the instant application was moved. The record does not indicate any volitional non-compliance or deliberate attempt on the part of the accused to protract the proceedings. The Accused has been regular in appearance and in defending the instant case.
Crl. Revision No. 184/2021 Vilcon Rubber Industries vs. M/s. Krishna Bearing Company Page5/19The proceedings have been conducted reasonably expeditiously and almost every hearing has been an effective date of hearing with both parties duly represented, save and except the period of suspension of Court functioning due to COVID-19 first and second wave."
GROUNDS OF REVISION:
8. Feeling aggrieved by the impugned order, the complainant preferred the revision on the following grounds:
(a) The impugned order was passed without application of judicial mind and appreciation of legal principles and facts of the case;
(b) The trial Court did not consider that an order under Section 143A NI Act is an interlocutory order and it does not determine any right or liability of the parties;
(c) In Rajesh Soni vs. Mukesh Verma, Crl. M.P. 562/2021 decided on 30.06.2021, Hon'ble High Court of Chhattisgarh held as under:
"12.....Section 143A of the Act, 1881 has been drafted in such a manner that it secures the interest of the complainant as well as the accused, therefore, from perusal of aims and object of amended Section 143A of the Act, 1881, it is quite clear that the word 'may' may be treated as 'shall' and it is not discretionary but of directory in nature.";
(d) The trial Court did not consider that in Rajesh Soni vs. Mukesh Verma (supra), Hon'ble High Court of Chhattisgarh examined judgement of Hon'ble High Court of Madras in LGR Enterprises & Anr. vs. P. Anbazhagan, Crl. M.P. Nos. 7576 and 7578 / 2019 decided on 12.07.2019 as under:
"18. The judgement cited by learned counsel for the petitioner also indicates that the Judicial Magistrate First Class has to pass a reasoned order for determining quantum of compensation, which is payable to the victim looking to the facts and circumstances of each case, but does not suggest any iota that grant of compensation as per Section 143A of the Act, 1881 is of discretionary in nature.";Crl. Revision No. 184/2021 Vilcon Rubber Industries vs. M/s. Krishna Bearing Company Page6/19
(e) The view of the trial Court that power under Section 143A NI Act is discretionary and defence of the accused would be a factor in decision of such application is against judgement in Rajesh Soni (supra);
(f) The trial Court did not appreciate that the observation contained in para No 13 of the impugned order is as if it is deciding the case on merits;
(g) The trial Court did not consider that the defence of the accused cannot be taken into consideration while deciding an application under Section 143A NI Act;
(h) The trial Court did not consider judgement of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in V.S. Yadav vs. Reena, Crl. Appeal No. 1136/2010 dated 21.09.2010 that "7.....Mere pleading not guilty and stating that the cheques were issued as security, would not amount to rebutting the presumption raised u/s. 139 of N.I. Act. If mere statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. or under Section 281 Cr.P.C. of accused of pleading not guilty was sufficient to rebut the entire evidence produced by the complainant / prosecution, then every accused has to be acquitted.";
(i) The trial Court did not appreciate that the observation that the defence that the said cheque is a security cheque is plausible and there is no ground to exercise power under Section 143A NI Act is grave injustice;
(j) The trial Court did not consider that the respondent admitted transaction with the complainant till August, 2019 whereas that he instructed his banker to stop payment in March, 2019, in reply dated 28.11.2019;
(k) The trial Court did not appreciate judgement of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Suresh Chandra Goyal v.
Amit Singhal, Crl. L.P. 706/14 dt. 14.05.15, as under:
"62. Section 138 of NI Act does not distinguish between a cheque issued by the debtor in discharge of an existing debt or other liability, or a cheque issued as a security cheque on the premise that on the due future date the debt which shall have crystallized by then, shall be paid. So long as there is a debt existing, in respect whereof the cheque in question is issued, in my view, the same would attract Section 138 of NI Act in case of its dishonour.";Crl. Revision No. 184/2021 Vilcon Rubber Industries vs. M/s. Krishna Bearing Company Page7/19
(l) The trial Court did not consider judgement in Madhu Verma vs. Manish Sharma, Crl. Revision No. 168/2019 decided by Ld. ASJ, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi on 28.08.2019 that the trial Court is not required to consider strength of defence under Section 143A NI Act;
(m) The trial Court did not consider that regular appearance of the accused has no significance in the decision of an application under Section 143A NI Act;
(n) The trial Court did not consider that pandemic has aggravated financial hardship of the complainant as the respondent is trying to evade payment of legal dues;
(o) The trial Court did not consider that there is presumption in favour of the complainant and the onus lies upon the respondent to prove his innocence;
(p) The trial Court did not consider that the respondent admitted transactions in respect of which the said cheque was issued as security and the respondent instructed his banker to stop payment thereof;
(q) The trial Court did not consider that issuance of the said cheque as security for payment of outstanding dues would not exonerate penal liability under NI Act;
and
(r) The trial Court did not appreciate that security cheque is an acknowledgement of liability on the part of its drawer that the holder may use such cheque as an alternate mode of discharging his liability;
APPEARANCE:
9. I have heard arguments of Ms. Geetanjali Tiwari, Advocate for the complainant and Ms. Samvedna Verma, Advocate for the respondent and carefully examined the trial Court record and perused written arguments filed by the parties.
Crl. Revision No. 184/2021 Vilcon Rubber Industries vs. M/s. Krishna Bearing Company Page8/19CONTENTIONS OF THE COMPLAINANT:
10. Ld. Counsel for the complainant contended that criminal revision petition against an order under Section 143A NI Act is maintainable. She relied on judgement in Hitendra vs. Shankar, Crl. Writ Petition 1848 of 2019 decided by Hon'ble High Court of Bombay on 11.12.2019. She further relied on judgement of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Madhu Limaye vs. The State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551. She contended that power under Section 143A NI Act is not discretionary. She contended that such view is direct contravention of ratio of the law laid down in Rajesh Soni vs. Mukesh Verma (supra). She contended that the defence of the accused is not relevant for the decision of an application under Section 143A NI Act. She contended that twin requirements for application of 143A NI Act are that the case must be a summon or summary trial and the charge should have been framed and the accused should have pleaded not guilty. She contended that substance of accusations under Section 251 of the Cr.P.C. was put to the respondent on 21.10.2020 to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. She contended that pre-requisites required for application of under Section 143A NI Act are fulfilled and the complainant was entitled to interim compensation under Section 143A NI Act. She contended that a cheque issued as a security cheque is a negotiable instrument and encashable. She contended that merely because a cheque was issued as security is no ground to avoid liability under NI Act.
Crl. Revision No. 184/2021 Vilcon Rubber Industries vs. M/s. Krishna Bearing Company Page9/1911. Ld. Counsel for the complainant contended that a security cheque is an acknowledgement of liability on the part of its drawer that holder of the cheque may use it as an alternate mode of discharging his liability. She contended that the said cheque was issued as a security is not a ground for dismissal of the application under Section 143A NI Act. She relied on judgement in V.S. Yadav vs. Reena (supra) and Suresh Chandra Goyal vs. Amit Singhal (supra). She contended that the trial Court did not consider admission of the respondent that he had transactions with the complainant till August, 2019, as mentioned in reply dated 28.11.2019, whereas the respondent issued instruction to his banker to stop payment of the said cheque in March, 2019. She contended that the defence of the respondent cannot be considered by the trial Court as it would amount to a decision on the merits of the case. She contended that the impugned order deserves to be set-aside. CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT:
12. Ld. Counsel for the respondent contended that an order under Section 143A NI Act is an interlocutory order and revision petition is barred against such order under Section 397 (2) of the Cr.P.C. She contended that the power conferred on the trial Court under section 143A NI Act is a discretionary power and it should be exercised on a 'case to case basis' on consideration of facts of each case. She contended that any other interpretation would not be conducive to fundamental right of an accused to defend himself.
Crl. Revision No. 184/2021 Vilcon Rubber Industries vs. M/s. Krishna Bearing Company Page10/1913. Ld. Counsel for the respondent contended that the said cheque was issued as a security cheque and this fact is mentioned in 'Dealership Annual Scheme'. She contended that the respondent settled account with the complainant. She contended that the complainant did not return the said cheque and therefore, the respondent instructed his banker to stop payment against the said cheque. She contended that there was no legal enforceable debt or liability against the respondent on the date of presentation of the said cheque. She contended that the complainant has not filed any document to demonstrate that there was any legally enforceable debt or liability against the respondent in respect of which the said security cheque was presented for encashment. She contended that delay in conclusion of the case cannot be a sole ground for seeking interim compensation. She contended that the respondent has not caused any delay to the trial of the case. She relied on judgement in LGR Enterprises vs. P. Anbazhagan (supra). She contended that the trial Court has discretion to order interim compensation under Section 143A NI Act and such discretion can only be exercised on examination of defence of the respondent. She contended that a prima facie opinion of the trial Court on plausibility of the defence raised by the respondent cannot be equated to an expression on merits of the case. She contended that there is no legal infirmity, illegality or perversity in the impugned order. She prayed for dismissal of the revision petition.
Crl. Revision No. 184/2021 Vilcon Rubber Industries vs. M/s. Krishna Bearing Company Page11/19WHETHER A CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION IS BARRED AGAINST AN ORDER UNDER SECTION 143A NI ACT?
14. In Madhu Limaye vs. State of Maharashtra (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court of India held as under:
"13.....There may be an order passed during the course of a proceeding which may not be final in the sense noticed in Kuppuswami's case, but, yet it may not be an interlocutory order - pure or simple. Some kinds of order may fall in between the two. By a rule of harmonious construction, we think that the bar in sub-Section (2) of Section 397 is not meant to be attracted to such kinds of intermediate orders. They may not be final orders for the purposes of Article 134 of the Constitution, yet it would not be correct to characterise them as merely interlocutory orders within the meaning of Section 397 (2). It is neither advisable, nor possible, to make a catalogue of orders to demonstrate which kinds of orders would be merely, purely or simply interlocutory and which kinds of orders would be final, and then to prepare an exhaustive list of those types of orders which will fall in between the two."
15. In Hitendra vs. Shankar, 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 5644, Hon'ble Bombay Court held as under:
"11. In order that an order would be "interlocutory order", it will have to be seen as to whether the rights of a person are affected.
12. Here in this case, the learned Magistrate applied that provision of law which was not at all applicable to the case in hand before him, therefore, definitely it had affected the right of the accused. Consequently it cannot be said that, the order which was passed by the learned Magistrate was purely "interlocutory order" as contemplated under Section 397(2) of Code of Criminal Procedure....."Crl. Revision No. 184/2021 Vilcon Rubber Industries vs. M/s. Krishna Bearing Company Page12/19
16. An order allowing or dismissing an application under Section 143A NI Act decides right or liability of the complainant or the respondent for interim compensation. Such an order cannot be termed as a pure or simple interlocutory order. Such an order is not passed in aid of the proceedings. An order under Section 143A NI Act cannot be termed as an interlocutory order. An order under Section 143A NI Act is an intermediary order. A criminal revision petition under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. is maintainable against an order dismissing the application under Section 143A NI Act.
WHETHER THE POWER CONFERRED ON THE TRIAL COURT UNDER SECTION 143A NI ACT IS DIRECTORY OR MANDATORY?
17. The power under Section 143A NI Act is directory and not mandatory. Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in JSB Cargo & Freight Forwarder Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. vs. State & Anr., Crl. M.C. 2663/2021 decided on 26.11.2021 considered judgement in Rajesh Soni vs. Mukesh Verma (supra), LGR Enterprises & Ors. vs. P. Anbazhagan (supra) and held as under:
"51.....it becomes apparent that the provision of Section 143A of the NI Act, 1881 has essentially to be held to be 'directory' and cannot be termed to be 'mandatory' to the effect that the Trial Court has mandatorily to award the interim compensation under Section 143A of the NI Act, 1881 in all proceedings tried under Section 138 of the NI Act, 1881 on the mere invocation thereof by a complainant and thereby order in terms of Section 143(2) thereof, the interim compensation to the tune of 20% of the amount of the cheque invoked."Crl. Revision No. 184/2021 Vilcon Rubber Industries vs. M/s. Krishna Bearing Company Page13/19
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT HAS THE POWER TO CONSIDER STRENGTH OF THE DEFENCE OF THE RESPONDENT UNDER SECTION 143A NI ACT?
18. The power under Section 143A NI Act is directory. It envisages exercise of such power after due application of judicial mind. The reasons are soul of a judicial order. It provides foundation for the edifice of the conclusion reached by a Court of law. Any order bereft of reason is against rules of natural justice. A party to a lis is entitled to know the reasons which impelled a judicial authority for reaching to a particular conclusion. Any order sans reason would cause more harm than strengthening the justice delivery system. A rational and reasoned order is conducive to the concept of impartiality, transparency and fair trial. A judicious exercise of discretion involves application of judicial mind to facts and circumstances of the case and the material produced for examination of the Court. Such an exercise of jurisdiction for a limited purpose for deciding an application under Section 143A NI Act cannot be termed as a final expression on merits of the case. Such prima facie opinion is taken only for deciding an application under Section 143A NI Act. The contention that consideration of strength of the defence of the respondent caused grave prejudice or injustice to the complainant is without merit. A prima facie opinion about strength of the defence cannot be considered as final opinion on merits. The trial Court has power to consider strength of the defence for deciding an application under Section 143A NI Act.
Crl. Revision No. 184/2021 Vilcon Rubber Industries vs. M/s. Krishna Bearing Company Page14/1919. In JSB Cargo & Freight Forwarder Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. vs. State & Anr. (supra), Hon'ble High Court of Delhi held as under:
"53. Furthermore, the observations of the learned Trial Court to the effect that even if it be assumed that the provisions of Section 143A of the NI Act, 1881 is discretionary in nature, the Court is still clothed with the powers to grant interim compensation to the complainant after providing sufficient reasons, it is essential to observe that the award of interim compensation in terms of Section 143A of the NI Act, 1881 has to be after providing sufficient reasons and whilst taking the same into account, the determination of interim compensation directed to be paid by the petitioners herein to the extent of the maximum of 20% of the cheque amount to the complainants without even considering the submissions that have been sought to be raised by the petitioners in relation to bank statements of the complainant and without resorting to the provisions of Section 294 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 cannot be held to be within the contours of Section 143A of the NI Act, 1881 to be with sufficient reasons. Furthermore, there are no inherent powers conferred on a criminal court of a Magistrate dehors enabling provisions of a statute."
(underlined by this Court) WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT HAS EXERCISED DISCRETION JUDICIOUSLY?
20. This Court does not find any merit in the contention of Ld. Counsel for the complainant that the trial Court erred in making observation that the respondent raised a prima facie plausible defence that the said cheque was issued as a security for an amount which stood cleared. This Court does not find merit in the contention of Ld. Counsel for the complainant that admission of transactions by the respondent with the complainant till August, 2019 was not considered.
Crl. Revision No. 184/2021 Vilcon Rubber Industries vs. M/s. Krishna Bearing Company Page15/1921. This Court does not find any merit in the contention of Ld. Counsel for the complainant that the defence that the said cheque was issued a security would not exonerate the respondent. This Court does not find any merit in the contention of Ld. Counsel for the complainant that issuance of a security cheque is an acknowledgement of liability on the part of the respondent as an alternate mode of discharging his liability.
22. The complainant stated that an amount of Rs. 1,50,251/- was due from the respondent. The complainant stated that the respondent has admitted that he had business transactions with the complainant till August, 2019 whereas the said instructed to stop payment of the said cheque was issued in March, 2019, as stated in reply notice dated 28.11.2019. The respondent, in reply to notice of accusations under Section 251 of the Cr.P.C., stated that he had issued Cheque No. 603 (the said cheque) and Cheque No. 604 to the complainant in the month of February, 2019 and thereafter, he settled his account with the complainant. He stated that he demanded the said cheque but the complainant refused to return the said cheque and thereafter, he instructed his banker to stop payment of the said cheque. It may be relevant to note that Cheque No. 000603 (the said cheque) and Cheque No. 000604 in favour of the complainant drawn on 'ICICI Bank Ltd.' are mentioned as 'security' on the bottom of 'Dealership Annual Scheme'.
Crl. Revision No. 184/2021 Vilcon Rubber Industries vs. M/s. Krishna Bearing Company Page16/1923. In reply dated 28.11.2019, the respondent stated that he had issued the said blank cheques to the complainant as security and this fact is mentioned on the bottom of 'Dealership Annual Scheme'. Though there is a presumption in favour of the complainant under Section 139 NI Act, however, the respondent is entitled to raise a probable defence that there was no legally enforceable debt or liability against him. The respondent is entitled to lead evidence or cross-examine the complainant to test veracity of the case of the complainant. The veracity of the case of the complainant and the defence raised by the respondent can only be decided after taking evidence in the case. However, mere statement that the said cheque was issued as a security cheque cannot be considered as an admission. Such statement must be read in conjunction with the defence of the respondent that he settled account with the complainant and there was no legally enforceable liability against him on the date of presentation of the cheque. The issue whether the respondent was liable to pay an amount of Rs. 1,50,251/- to the complainant towards the material supplied to him as on 23.09.2019 which entitled the complainant to fill and present the said cheque for encashment towards discharge of legally enforceable liability can only be adjudicated after trial.
24. The judgements in V.S. Yadav vs. Reena (supra) and Suresh Chandra Goyal vs. Amit Singhal (supra) were delivered on the basis of evidence recorded during trial. Therefore, the said judgements are not applicable, at this stage.
Crl. Revision No. 184/2021 Vilcon Rubber Industries vs. M/s. Krishna Bearing Company Page17/1925. In view of the objective behind the insertion of Section 143A NI Act on 01.09.2018, delay caused by the drawers by resorting to delaying tactics to stall decision of cases pertaining to cheques dishonour cases is a relevant consideration. This is not the case where the respondent is protracting the proceedings. It cannot be said that the respondent has raised the defence with a view to prolong the decision of the case.
26. The trial Court exercised discretion vested in it under Section 143A NI Act judiciously on consideration of facts and circumstances of the case and strength of the defence of the respondent. There is no arbitrariness or perversity or irrationality in the discretion exercised by the trial Court. CONCLUSION:
27. The impugned order does not suffer from any legal infirmity or material illegality or jurisdictional error which would occasion injustice, if it is not set-aside. Accordingly, the criminal revision petition filed by the petitioner is dismissed. A copy of the judgement be sent to the trial Court alongwith trial Court record. Revision file be consigned to record room.
Digitally signedSANJAY by SANJAY SHARMA SHARMA Date: 2022.01.10 15:12:53 +0530 Announced in the open Court SANJAY SHARMA-II on this 10th January, 2022 Addl. Sessions Judge-03 (Central) Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi Crl. Revision No. 184/2021 Vilcon Rubber Industries vs. M/s. Krishna Bearing Company Page18/19
Vilcon Rubber Industries vs. M/s. Krishna Bearing Company Crl. Revision No. 184/2021 CNR No.: DLCT010131752021 10.01.2022 Proceedings convened through Video Conferencing. Present : Ms. Geetanjali Tiwari, Advocate for the petitioner.
Ms. Samvedna Verma, Advocate for the respondent.
Vide separate judgement, the criminal revision petition filed by the petitioner is dismissed. The revision file be consigned to record room.
Digitally signedSANJAY by SANJAY SHARMA SHARMA Date: 2022.01.10 15:13:08 +0530 Sanjay SharmaII ASJ03, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi 10.01.2022 Crl. Revision No. 184/2021 Vilcon Rubber Industries vs. M/s. Krishna Bearing Company Page19/19