Punjab-Haryana High Court
Ravinder Sood And Another vs Mohan Lal on 21 December, 2012
Author: K. Kannan
Bench: K. Kannan
C.R. No.6306 of 1999 -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATES OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
C.R. No.6306 of 1999
Date of Decision.21.12.2012
Ravinder Sood and another .....Petitioners
Versus
Mohan Lal .....Respondent
Present: Mr. Amit Rawal, Senior Advocate with
Mr. Gourav Rana, Advocate
for the petitioners.
None for the respondent.
CORAM:HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. KANNAN
1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment ? Yes
2. To be referred to the Reporters or not ? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? Yes
-.-
K. KANNAN J.
1. The landlord's petition for personal necessity filed under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 was dismissed before the Rent Controller. In appeal by the landlord, there was reversal of fortune for him when the appeal was allowed. The defeated tenant, who faced an order of ejectment, is before this Court in revision.
2. The landlord's contention relating to his bona fide personal necessity was founded on a plea that the property in the hands of the tenant namely the building in House No.43 was the only residential house, which he had and the other property in which he was actually in possession of, namely, the property in building No.53 was inadequate to the size of his family consisting of his wife, three grown up sons with the respective wives, daughters and the grand children. The landlord rested C.R. No.6306 of 1999 -2- his case on a plea that there was only one kitchen and a room at the first floor and the rest of the portions were in the occupation of his brothers. The landlord would contend that he had to take yet another property on rent in door No.66 at Mohalla 14 only on account of inadequacy of the premises, which he was in occupation of for accommodating of the members of his family in reasonable comfort. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the tenant would contest every one of these submissions and would point out to the wrong assumptions made by the Appellate Court with reference to the property occupied by him and the failure of the Appellate Court to take note of the availability of other buildings through ownership of his wife and son. This, according to him, was particularly relevant since the landlord was seeking for ejectment on the ground that the property was insufficient for accommodating all his sons with the respective families of spouses and children, besides his own wife, who according to the landlord was inconvenienced in her old age of having to climb up stairs. The learned counsel would contend that the entire building in door No.53 was a three storeyed building and apart from the fact that the application filed by the landlord showed not merely a room and a kitchen but additional room at the first floor, the whole of the remaining property was also in the hands of the landlord himself. The counsel would urge that the landlord had been fighting an independent litigation with his brothers and the decree copy filed before the Court would show that the property in door No.53 where he was in occupation was itself not a subject of litigation at all and family was admittedly litigating for joint properties that the family owned. No portion of the property in House C.R. No.6306 of 1999 -3- No.53 was ever claimed by any one of the brothers and his own statement that apart from his occupation of the 1st floor, the remaining properties of the ground floor and the 2nd floor were in the possession of the brothers and their families could not, therefore, be correct. It is also the contention of the counsel for the tenant that the ownership and occupation of the other buildings that the spouse and the son owned was also relevant when the landlord's bona fide requirement was sought on the ground of requirement of not only of himself but also of the requirement of his son and for his wife.
3. I cannot find any particular virtue in argument that in the suit filed for partition between the landlord and his brothers, the property in door No.53 was not subject of litigation. In what capacity the landlord was actually in occupation of door No.53 is not very clearly known either from the pleadings or from the evidence. I am prepared to assume that the property in door No.53 itself was not a property that belonged to the family of the landlord and his brothers and hence was excluded from the partition action. This may not by itself disprove that his brothers could not be in possession of any other portion of door No.53. Ownership and possession may not at all times be necessary to reside in the same portion. The case will have to be still seen from the evidence available whether the landlord's bona fides have been established by the alleged inadequacy of the building.
4. All that the landlord requiring an ejectment of residential building could be required to show in his pleading is that he is not occupying "any residential building" in the urban areas concerned and he has not vacated said building without sufficient cause after the C.R. No.6306 of 1999 -4- commencement of the Act besides showing that the building is required for his own occupation. The consideration of whether the landlord is occupying another residential building is seen from the context of whether such another building is sufficient for his own requirement. A mere possession of another building may not disentitle a landlord to seek for ejectment for his bona fide requirement. The typical example could be that yet another building, which is available may be inadequate. In this case that is precisely the point which is sought to be made that the building which he was in occupation of at door No.53 was not sufficient and that he had in possession only one room and a kitchen. As pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the tenant, rough sketch filed by the landlord himself proves that at the first floor apart from a room adjoining the kitchen, there is yet another room adjoining the stair case. If we must contend with the fact that the family consisting about 9 or 10 persons could not be accommodated in two rooms, then it would require to be shown that the property in the ground floor and the second floor were not in his occupation but they were in occupation of his brothers. That his brothers were in occupation of the remaining portion of the building was brought for the first time only in evidence and that was not even set out in the pleading. I am prepared to assume that strict rules of pleading may not be applied in rent control proceedings but if the bona fides of a requirement were to be established particularly in the context of the building which he was in occupation of was not sufficient by him, the ground for such insufficiency must be in some way surely established. It cannot merely be a matter of evidence. In this case even the evidence given by the C.R. No.6306 of 1999 -5- witness is not very clear. He does not say anywhere who is residing in the other portion of the house in door No.53.
5. This shows that in evidence he has merely attempted to say that the remaining portions of building are in occupation of other persons. The Appellate Court, however, has observed that the remaining portions of building are in occupation of his brothers. It is not very clear as to how the Appellate Court made such an inference when the evidence does not point out to the same.
6. If we must err on the wrong side for the benefit of the landlord by the only fact that the lower Appellate Court has taken such a finding then it must have shown that if the building in his own occupation was not sufficient, whether the landlord would be entitled to seek for ejectment even when his wife and son were possession of other properties. Setting out the requirements of bona fides, I have already outlined that apart from the fact that if he has not possessed of another building, it must be shown that he has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause. The textual content of this provision is only to ensure that a landlord, who is otherwise well provided for, shall not seek for ejectment of a tenant when he is placing his personal requirements as imminent. An occupation of another building or not vacating such building must be seen always in the context of how the landlord placed his own requirement. If the landlord's requirement for the demised premise is that his family is large and he, therefore, requires it and if any other member of that family, on whose behalf he is making a claim, has properties, the landlord is at least expected to explain as to how the ownership of other buildings in the names of his C.R. No.6306 of 1999 -6- wife and son for whose behalf as well he makes a claim for personal requirement are not sufficient. In this case, it is brought in the cross- examination of the landlord that house in Mohalla No.17 at Jalandhar Cantonment had been purchased by his wife Raj Rani. He has also admitted that the house after the purchase was rebuilt and it was a double storeyed house. Even apart from this, the other building which admittedly was in his possession was the property, which he had rented in House No.66. Another House No.43 was said to be the property belonged to his son. If the landlord, therefore, had one house in the name of the son, another house in the name of his wife and yet another house which he had rented apart from the property which he was already in occupation of, then unless the landlord had given clear evidence that the possession of other buildings in the name of his wife or son were not sufficient or they had been rented out by the wife or son and hence they were not themselves in position to secure vacant possession or the landlord was pleading for any specific inconveniences relating to the possession of the remaining building, the test of bona fides cannot be said to be satisfied. It is axiomatic that the landlord would dictate his own preferences and a tenant cannot decide for the landlord which building could be more suitable. If this is the test to be applied then the landlord must on disclosure of existence of another building must place appropriate evidence that other buildings were not sufficient or they were not convenient. Without either of such evidence, he cannot have the luxury of securing an eviction of the tenant from the property which he is in occupation of. The lower Appellate Court has not considered the existence of other buildings C.R. No.6306 of 1999 -7- which were admittedly in the names of his wife and son and how such ownership could still be discarded when the landlord was pleading for his bona fide personal requirement of himself, his wife and his sons.
7. Learned Senior Counsel also refers me to the fact that another portion of the same building, which was in occupation of yet another tenant, was sought to be evicted by the landlord but his action failed against the tenant both before the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority. Such an aspect is irrelevant for consideration in this case and I am not prepared to therefore take this as of any reference. Even without reference to the said circumstance, I would hold that the Appellate Court was not justified in reversing the decision of the Rent Controller and the reversal itself was occasioned by a wrong reading of the provision and without reference to the existence of other buildings, which has been discussed above.
8. The order of the Appellate Authority is consequently reversed and the revision filed by the tenant is allowed.
(K. KANNAN) JUDGE December 21, 2012 Pankaj*