Madhya Pradesh High Court
Grasim Industries Ltd. vs Bhawani Singh Shekhawat on 3 February, 2016
WP-2070-2015
(GRASIM INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs BHAWANI SINGH SHEKHAWAT)
03-02-2016
Parties as before this Court.
The petitioner before this Court M/s Grasim Industries Ltd has
filed this present petition being aggrieved by the order dated
25/02/2015, by which the learned trial Court has allowed the
application preferred by the defendants for taking documents on
record.
The petitionerâs contention is that the petitioner / company has
filed a civil suit for restraining the defendants to hold meetings in
front of the gate of the petitioner / company. While the witnesses
were being examined before the trial Court, the defendant no. 1
had cross-examined one witness Sawarmal ( PW-1). A question
was asked to Sawarmal by defendant no. 1 whether, he was aware
of the contents of the order dated 17/09/2014 or not. The
aforesaid order was not on record and the court has observed that
the document is not on record and such question cannot be asked.
Later on, the defendants had filed an application with a prayer to
take the document dated 17/09/2014 on record.
Contention of learned counsel for the respondent is that the land
in question was declared as government land and the document was very necessary for adjudication of the case. In those circumstances, the trial Court has allowed the application preferred by the defendants for taking the document on record. This Court has carefully gone through the order dated 25/02/2015 and the same reveals that the trial Court in order to decide the controversy between the parties, in the interest of justice, has allowed the application preferred by the defendants for taking the document on record and the same order also reveals that a liberty has been granted to the petitioner to submit document in rebuttal / cross-examination for taking his stand in respect of the document in question. The aforesaid order dated 25/02/2015 has been challenged by the petitioner / Grasim Industries Ltd. In the considered opinion of this Court, in order to decide the issue framed by the trial Court, the document dated 17/09/2014 was a certainly material document and the trial Court was justified in allowing the application by impugned order dated 25/02/2015. This Court does not find any ground to interfere with the impugned order as it does not suffer from any perversity or jurisdictional error.
The apex court in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil reported in 2010 (8) SCC 329 in paragraph 49 held as under:-
"49. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated:
(a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different.
(b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above.
(c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court.
(d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court.
(e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, 'within the bounds of their authority'.
(f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them.
(g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.
(h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised.
(i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India & others, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful.
(j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227.
(k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu.
(l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory.
(m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court.
(n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance.
Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above.
(o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality."
In light of the aforesaid judgment as there is no patent illegality committed by the trial court and the order passed by the trial court does not suffer from any jurisdictional error, this court does not find any reason to interfere with the order dated 25/02/2015. Accordingly, admission is declined.
No order as to costs.
(S.C.SHARMA) JUDGE