Madhya Pradesh High Court
Sushil Ranjan Singh And Ors. vs State Of M.P. on 28 March, 2006
Author: Deepak Verma
Bench: Deepak Verma, R.K. Gupta
JUDGMENT Deepak Verma, J.
1. This is a petition under Section 482 CrPC 1973, primarily filed to challenge the remarks made by learned trial court in his judgment dated 28.2.2006 in Special Case No. 33/2005 presided over by Special Judge, Rewa and for quashment of the same.
2. Certain facts material for deciding the said petition are mentioned herein below:
Accused Jai Pratap Dubey was charged and prosecuted for commission of offences under Sections 294, 506B and 302 IPC and under Sections 3(1)(x) and 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short the 'Act') in the trial court, on the ground that on 20.7.2005 he had caused murder of Chhotelal Khatik; who belonged to Scheduled Caste Category, after having used abusive language against him.
3. Vide the impugned judgment, accused jai Pratap Dubey has been (Sic)
4. Applicatioin No. 1 was posted as SDO(P) in Police Station Dabhoum, Rewa on the relevant date. Application No. 2 was working as T.I at Police Station Jawa, Rewa and Applicant No. 3 was also working as S.I at Police Station Jawa, Rewa.
First information report was lodged on 20.7.2005 at Police Station Jawa by deceased himself with regard to commission of the aforesaid offences. On the said date, applicant No. 1 Sushil Ranjan Singh had gone to Rewa to attend an official meeting and was not available at Dabhaura. Since the report was lodged, it was recorded by applicant No. 13 B.D. Tripathi. With an intention to collect the necessary evidence in the case, without any loss of time, both applicant Nos. 2 and 3; Shiekh Dheeraj and B.D. Tripathi started investigation. They collected the necessary material and arrested the accused on the same day.
Obviously, they did so, so that the accused may not flee and other incriminating evidence against the accused may not be destroyed. Next day i.e. on 21.7.2003 on return of applicant No. 1 Sushil Ranjan Singh from Rewa, he once again completed the same procedure and put his endorsements on all the documents prepared by applicant Nos.2 & 3 the previous day. He also endorsed the statements of the witnesses recorded the previous day by applicant Nos.2 & 3, thus putting a seal of approval to all the actions that were taken in his absence by applicant Nos.2 & 3.
5. However, at the trial the learned trial court vide the impugned Judgment, specially para 28 of the same, passed remarks against the conduct of the applicants on the ground that applicant No. 2 Shiekh Dheeraj knew fully well that offence has been registered under the Act and he was not empowered to investigate the same, yet has done so. According to learned trial court, the same could have been done only by a police officer not below the rank of Dy. Superintendent of Police. Thus, it has been held that the applicants have willfully neglected their duties to be performed by them under the Act, which is punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than 6 months but which may extend to one year.
6. Section 23 of the Act, empowers the Central Government to make Rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act. Exercising the powers under Section 23 of the Act, Central Government has framed rules known as the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Rules, 1995 (hereinafter known as the Rules).
Under Rule 7, the Investigating Officer shall be not below the rank of Dy. Superintendent of Police and such Investigating Officer shall be appointed by the State Government/Director General of Police/Superintendent of Police after taking into account his past experience, sense of ability and justice to perceive the implications of the case and investigate it.
Sub Rule (2) further casts a duty on the Investigating Officer to complete the investigation on top priority basis within 30 days and submit the report to the Superintendent of Police who in turn will forward the same to Director General of Police.
7. In view of the aforesaid Rule, it is clear that investigation has to be conducted by a police officer not below the rank of a Dy. Superintendent of Police. Rules are silent with regard to the fact that in case Dy. Superintendent of Police is not available then who would be empowered to do it.
8. As has been mentioned hereinabove, on the relevant date when first information report was lodged by deceased, admittedly applicant No. 1 was not present at the Headquarter as he had gone to Rewa. Thus, in his absence applicant Nos. 2 & 3 acted bonafidely and recorded the first information report and proceeded further to investigate it. We also find from the proceedings that whatever was done by applicant Nos.2 & 3 was verified the next day a by Applicant No. 1 and had endorsed it. This would show' that if there was any lacuna in the investigation then the same was cured.
9. The learned trial court having taken into consideration that the investigation was initiated by applicant Nos.2 & 3, who on the relevant date were not holding the posts of Dy. Superintendent of Police, thus they were not empowered to do so. According to learned trial court, it should have been done only by applicant No. 1 who, on the relevant date, was empowered to initiate, and complete the investigation by virtue of the fact that he was holding the post of SDO(Police) which is equivalent to the post of Dy. Superintendent of Police.
The learned trial court, therefore, has passed remarks against the conduct of the applicants and has directed that copy of the judgment be sent to Inspector General of Police, Rewa and offence be registered against the applicants under Section 4 of the Act and they be prosecuted with accordingly.
10. Feeling aggrieved by the said remarks and the action directed to be taken pursuant to the same, this petition has been filed for quashment of the same under Section 482 CrPC.
11. The learned Counsel for the applicants, Shri Sandeep Singh has raised two grounds of attack for the same namely;
(i) That before passing the aforesaid remarks and directing prosecution of the applicants under Section 4 of the Act, neither any notice was issued to them nor any opportunity of hearing was afforded.
(ii) That Section 4 of the Act would not come into play as applicants had not willfully neglected their duties required to be performed by them under the provisions of the Act.
12. We shall now deal with the aforesaid two questions according to seriatim. Record of the case does not show, or reflect that before passing the remarks as contained in para-28 of the impugned judgment, applicants were either issued any show cause notices or were afforded any opportunity of hearing.
13. The learned Counsel for the respondent, Shri R.S. Patel, who appeared in the case was also not able to point out to us from the papers filed alongwith this petition that prior to passing of the remarks as contained in para-28 of the judgment any show cause notice was issued to the applicants or any opportunity of hearing was afforded.
Thus, it stood admitted that none of the applicants was issued any show cause notice or was afforded any opportunity of hearing before the said remarks came to be passed. Such a procedure that has been followed by the learned trial court is not known to law. ft hits the principles of natural justice as the order as been passed directing for their prosecution without even giving them any opportunity of hearing. By now, it is too well settled by large catena of judgments of the Supreme Court that no remarks could be made or no action could be directed to be taken against anyone unless one is issued a show cause notice and given an opportunity of hearing.
14. We may profitably refer to a judgment of the Supreme Court ( Dr. Raghubir Saran v. State of Bihar and Anr.) in which, it has been held that the High Court has inherent powers to expunge objectionable remarks in judgment or order of sub-ordinate court against stranger after it has become final.
In the case in hand, the Supreme Court was dealing with the provisions as contained in Section 561-A of the old Code of Criminal Procedure. The provisions under Section 561-A is analogous to the provisions of Section 482 of the present Code of Criminal Procedure.
Dealing with the said provisions, the Supreme Court has held that the remarks which were unwarranted may effect the reputation or even the career of such person. In such a case the appellate Court in a suitable case may judicially correct the observations of the lower Court by pointing out that the observations made by that Court were not justified or were without any foundation or were wholly wrong or improper as this can be done under the inherent powers of the Court which arc conferred on this Court by virtue of the provisions as contained under Section 482 CrPC.
In yet another judgment of the Supreme Court ( State of U.P. v. Mohammad Naim), it has been held that before making disparaging remarks against any persons ,or authorities whose conduct comes into consideration before courts of law in cases to be decided by them, it is relevant to consider;
(a) whether the party whose conduct is in question is before the court or has an opportunity of explaining or defending himself;
(b) whether there is evidence on record bearing on that conduct justifying the remarks; and
(c) whether, it is necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral part thereof to animadvert on that conduct.
Supreme Court has further held that judicial pronouncements must be judicial in nature and should not normally depart from sobriety, moderation and reserve.
Similar view has been expressed again by the Supreme Court in a judgment reported in AIR 2001 SC 93 ( Manish Dixit v. State of Rajasthan) wherein it has been held that castigating remarks made by Court against any person which are likely to have serious consequences on future career of a person concerned should not be made unless the person concerned has been given an opportunity of hearing in the matter in respect of the proposed remarks or strictures and such opportunity is basic requirement for otherwise offending remarks would be in violation of the principles of natural justice.
The earlier judgment of the Supreme Court as mentioned hereinabove, has been approved in this judgment.
15. In the light of the aforesaid discussion and keeping in mind that admittedly applicants were neither issued any notices nor were afforded any opportunity of hearing, we have no hesitation to hold that no such remarks could have been made against them. Thus, on ground No. 1 itself the said remarks are hereby expunged.
16. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, learned Counsel for the applicants contended that he does not press ground No. 2. Even though, according to him, applicants had acted bonafldely under the circular issued by Police Headquarter on 23.6.2001 which empowers an officer in-charge of the police station, in absence of Dy. Superintendent of Police, to initiate investigation and to complete the same. However, since the remarks are expunged on ground No. 1 itself learned Counsel for the applicants contended that it is neither necessary nor required to press ground No. 2.
17. Thus, without expressing any opinion on ground No. 2, we hold that the remarks were uncalled for and could not have been made. Thus, they are hereby expunged. Obviously, no action would be required by respondent/State pursuant to the said remarks as made by the learned trial court in para-28 of the judgment.
18. With the aforesaid direction this petition stands allowed to the extent mentioned hereinabove, with no order as to costs.