Gujarat High Court
Champakbhai Parsottambhai Patel vs State Of Gujarat And Ors. on 11 January, 2001
Equivalent citations: AIR2001GUJ200, (2001)2GLR1814
JUDGMENT J.N. Bhatt, J.
1. By this petition under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, challenge, at the instance of the appellant-original petitioner, is against the order passed in Tax Appeal No. 17 of 1998 by the Director of Transport, Gujarat State which came to be confirmed in, Special Civil Application No. 9282 of 1998, by the Learned single Judge on 31-8-2000, on the main premise that, the appellant cannot be fastened with liability for payment of arrears of Motor Vehicles Tax as he had sold the vehicle.
2. In order to appreciate the merits of this appeal and challenge against it, a few relevant material facts may be highlighted, here as under :-
1. The appellant-original petitioner is doing a business of Travel Agent, at Anand. The petitioner is the owner of some luxury buses.
2. Out of them, one luxury bus bearing No, GTG-4444 had already been sold to the respondent No. 3, one Mr. D. N. Patel, as per the case of the original petitioner, and therefore, the petitioner is not liable for the payment of arrears of tax in respect of the said vehicle.
3. The said vehicle was also transferred by the respondent No. 3 Mr. D. N. Patel to respondent No. 4 one Mr. R. N. Patel.
4. The respondent No. 2 - R.T.O. issued a notice of recovery of arrears of tax under Section 3, as an arrear of land revenue, under Sees. 12, 14 & 18 dated 18-6-1998, whereby, the petitioner was directed to show cause, as to why an amount of Rs. 2,03,125/- inclusive of penalty be not recovered from him. The petitioner had challenged the same by filing Tax Appeal No. 17 of 1998, before the Director of Transport under Section 14 of the Bombay Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the B.M.V. Tax Act, 1958).
5. The said appeal came to be rejected by holding the amount of arrears of vehicle tax mentioned in the notice with penalty, the original petitioner is liable to pay.
6. Being aggrieved by the said order of the Appellate Authority, the petitioner challenged the same by tiling S.C.A. No. 9282 of 1998 by invoking the provisions of Art. 226 of the Constitution of India which came to be rejected by the Learned single Judge, on 31-8-2000, and hence this appeal against that order of the learned single Judge by invoking the aid of the provisions of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.
3. At the admission stage, we have heard the learned counsel of the appellant-original petitioner, at marathon length. We have, dispassionately, examined the impugned judgment and order of the learned single Judge, the Appellate Authority and the entire records. On behalf of the appellant-original petitioner, it was contended that the liability for arrears of tax in respect of the said bus is wrongly fastened on him since the said vehicle was already transferred. This contention in our opinion is rightly not accepted by the Appellate Authority and by the learned single Judge.
4. We have found from the record that after giving a notice of transfer of vehicle by the petitioner to the respondent No. 2 under Section 31 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, and under Section 50, the petitioner was called upon by the respondent No. 2 concerned R.T.O. to complete the application for transfer as the same was not in consonance with the provisions of Section 50 of the Motor Vehicles Act, read with, the prescribed Form 29 and 30. In that, it was pointed out by the respondent No. 2 that following 3 material requirements were not satisfied. The petitioner was, therefore, called upon to complete the application for transfer (1) to submit the registration book in respect of the said vehicle, (2) to submit the insurance certificate in the name of the transferee, (3) to submit a prescribed proforma duly signed by the hire-purchase party - financier, as regards cancelling endorsement made in the hire-purchase agreement in respect of the said vehicle. The petitioner as well as the respondent No. 3 were called upon to comply the aforesaid defects for transferring the said vehicle through their Advocates. Letters written by the respondent No. 2 in this behalf were not responded much less complied. The Appellate Authority has in clear terms observed in this behalf in the impugned order that despite such letters by the respondent No. 2-R.T.O., the original petitioner has failed to complete the application for transfer as required under Section 50 in prescribed Form 29 & 30 under the Rules. It was, therefore, held that there was no transfer of vehicle and since the name of the petitioner continued as a registered owner of the said vehicle, it is he who is liable for payment of arrears of vehicle tax in respect of the said bus.
5. It would be interesting to mention that the Appellate Authority has also, alternatively considered the provisions of Section 8(2) of the Tax Act, 1958 and has held that even if the transfer of the ownership is made in respect of the vehicle but not effected in the record of the R.T.O. and the name of the original owner continues as a registered owner, the liability of the petitioner is concurrent. So on both the counts, the liability of the petitioner is held against him. In other words, on both the counts the petitioner is liable for payment of arrears of vehicle tax with amount of penalty which was questioned by the petitioner before filing the aforesaid writ petition.
6. At this stage, let us have a look into the relevant provisions of transfer of ownership provided in Section 50 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 since the contention is advanced before us that the report of fact of transfer had already been submitted in the office of respondent No. 2, and it is yet not considered and finalised, and therefore, the provisions of Section 50 relating to transfer of ownership of vehicle cannot be said to have not been observed. Such a submission prima facie may appear to be subtle, but not sound and sustainable when one gets into the reality of the whole provision of Section 50. Section 50 as such provides a scheme and mechanism, as to how, in each case transfer of ownership can be effected. The report of the fact of transfer is required to be submitted in statutory prescribed Form 29 and 30 which is popularly known as T.T.O. form. That is the first requirement but not the last one. Mere submission of a report without compliance of the provisions of Section 50 read with Rule 55 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and Rule 55 of the Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989. The scheme for transfer as envisaged in Section 50, evidently, provides that the report about transfer of vehicle is to be submitted in the manner prescribed by the Central Government to the Registering Authority within whose jurisdiction the transfer is to be effected and shall simultaneously send a copy of the said report to the transferee. This is very clear from the plain perusal of Section 50(1)(a)(i). In our opinion, there is no compliance of the provision of Section 50 as nothing is brought on record that the report made by the original petitioner was as per the mandate and the provisions of Section 50(1)(a)(i).
7. The following aspects are not satisfied :-
a. The copy of the said report does not seem to have simultaneously been sent to the transferee respondent No. 3.
b. The report of the original-petitioner is not in prescribed manner as provided in Section 50.
In this connection, the modus or manner or submission of the report of transfer is statutorily prescribed in Rule 55, Rule 55(1) clearly provides that where the ownership of a motor vehicle is transferred, the transferor shall report the fact of transfer to the Registering Authorities. It is not in dispute that such a report was sent by the original-petitioner. Such a report was not complete in view of the entire provisions of Rule 55 and it was pointed out to the petitioner by the respondent No. 2.
8. Rule 55(2) provides that an application for the transfer of ownership of a motor vehicle shall be made by the transferee in Form 30 and shall be accompanied by (1) certificate of registration, (2) certificate of insurance and (3) appropriate fees as prescribed in Rule 81. It is very clear from the record that the transferee respondent No. 2 had not filed any application for transfer of ownership of the said luxury bus as required under Rule 55(2). Despite this, the respondent No. 2 authority more than once intimated to the petitioner about non-observance of the provisions of sub-rule (2) of Rule 55. It was also, pointed out that Form 30 was not filed by the respondent No. 3, transferee. Instead, it was filed by the respondent No. 4. Despite this, the respondent No. 2 authority requested the petitioner to comply the provisions of Rule 55(2) and to submit the necessary documents. Nothing has been done in this behalf.
9. It is, therefore, very clear that Form 29 under Rule 55(1) is a notice of transfer of ownership of a Motor Vehicle by the registered owner to the Registering Authority. Mere submission of a report without further or full compliance of the provisions of Section 50 read with Rule 55 and in absence of report in prescribed Form 29 by the transferor and report in prescribed Form 30 by the transferee. It cannot be said even for a moment that there was a valid complete compliance of the provisions relating to transfer of the ownership. Therefore, the vehement and repeated contention that report having once been filed in Form No. 29 by the transferor and until it is rejected, the liability of the transferor for payment of arrears of tax would not arise is absolutely meritless apart from being factually unsustainable. Even otherwise, the R.T.O. could not effect the transfer in the Record, since according to the petitioner, third respondent is the transferee, whereas, the third respondent does not claim to be the transferee. This claim is made by the fourth respondent. Therefore, it has to be straightaway thrown over the board. We are, therefore, satisfied with the conclusion of the Appellate Authority and the confirmation by the learned single Judge on this point is fully justified.
10. When there is no transfer in terms of the statutory provisions in the light of the provisions of Section 50 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 read with Rule 55 of 1989 of the Central Rules and prescribed form thereunder. The liability for arrears of tax obviously without any doubt would be on the part of the registered owner.
11. Alternatively also, the learned single Judge has considered the original petitioner liable even if the transfer of vehicle as alleged is held to be proved in view of the provisions of Section 8(2) of the B.M.V. Tax Act, 1958. It would be necessary to refer the said provision which fully supports the conclusion recorded by the learned single Judge and diametrically opposite to the contention advanced before us on behalf of the original petitioner. Section 8 reads as under :-
"8. Liability to pay arrears of tax of persons succeeding to the ownership, possession or control of motor vehicles (1) If the tax leviable in respect of any motor vehicle remains unpaid by any person liable for the payment thereof, and such person before having paid the tax has transferred the ownership of such vehicle or has ceased to be in possession or control of such vehicle, the person to whom the ownership of the vehicle has been transferred or the person who has possession or control of such vehicle shall also be liable to pay the said tax to the Taxation Authority.
(2) Nothing contained in this Section shall be deemed to affect the liability to pay the said tax, of the person who has transferred the ownership or has ceased to be in possession or control of such vehicle."
12. It is quite evident from the perusal of the aforesaid provisions and particular sub-section (2) that nothing contained in these Sections had been deemed to effect the liability to pay the motor vehicle tax of the person who has transferred the ownership or has ceased to be in possession or control of such vehicle. Section 8(2) in our opinion does not absolve the registered owner or the transferor from payment of arrears of motor vehicle tax, even if the liability to pay arrears of tax of persons succeeding to the ownership having possession or control of motor vehicles is fastened under Section 8(1). If the tax leviable in respect of any motor vehicle remains unpaid by any person liable for the payment thereof, and such person or owner of vehicle before having paid the tax has transferred the ownership of such vehicle or even if he has ceased to be in possession or use or occupation of the vehicle or control thereof, such person is also liable to pay the arrears of tax to the concerned authority under the Motor Vehicles Act. It is, therefore, very clear and amply evident that the original-petitioner is liable for payment of arrears of tax.
13. In support of the vehement submissions advanced before us, reliance is placed on 2 decisions of this Court. Firstly, reliance is placed on "M/s. Kaushik Transport Company v. State of Gujarat reported in AIR 1990 Guj. 102 : 1990 (1) GLR 21." It is a decision of the Division Bench of this Court. It is submitted on the strength of the said decision that the registered owner of the vehicle cannot be held liable having once informed the Registering Authority about the transfer and requesting to cancel his name as registered owner and his request having not been rejected by the concerned Authority. Thus, it is pleaded on behalf of the original-petitioner that he cannot be held liable to pay taxes under the Act after lapse of long time.
14. We have carefully and dispassionately examined and evaluated the decision relied upon. Firstly, the interpretation is made in the light of the facts of that case. Secondly, the interpretation of the provisions of Sees. 3 & 4 of the B.M.V. Tax Act, 1958 along with the provisions of Section 31 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 prior to 1978 Amendment have been made in the light of the facts of that case. Thirdly, no question was posed or raised in relation to the interpretation or applicability of the provisions of Section 8 of the B.M.V. Tax Act, 1958. Section 31 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 as it stood before its amendment in 1978 was interpreted and it was held that the registered owner who had intimated to the Registering Authority about the transfer of vehicle and had requested to cancel his name as registered owner of the vehicle which was not rejected by the authority despite lapse of 7 years could not be held liable. So is not the fact situation and reality in the present case. Firstly, there was no compliance of the provisions of Section 50 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 relating to the transfer of ownership of the vehicle which was provided in the old Motor Vehicles Act of 1939 in Section 31 and that too as it stood before its amendment in 1978. It appears from the said decision of this Court that there was no question of non-compliance of the relevant provisions as it then stood in the Old Act in Section 31, whereas in the present case, in Section 50 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 there was no compliance. On the contrary, the Registering Authority repeatedly after receipt of the report under Form 29 from the transferor who is a original-petitioner to comply with the provisions of Section 50 with Rule 55(2) and in prescribed Form No. 30. As observed hereinbefore, the respondent No. 3 i.e. alleged transferee had not at all submitted requisite information by filling Form 30 under Rule 55(2). Thus, the fact situation is not comparable. Again it appears from the said decision that there was no question of applicability or interpretation of the provisions of Section 8 of the B.M.V. Tax Act, 1958. Thirdly, there was an amendment in the provisions of Section 31 of the Old Act after 1978 and the question posed before this Court in that case was about the applicability and interpretation of Section 31 as it then stood in the old 1939 Motor Vehicles Act. The question which has been surfaced before us in this matter is relating to the applicability and the interpretation of the provisions of Section 51 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The parameters, the mode of manner in which the vehicle could be transferred when it is sold or transferred by the registered owner to the third party has been provided the entire scheme and the machinery articulated statutorily in Section 50 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 read with Rule 55 (2) of the Bombay Motor Vehicle Tax Act, 1958 and the forms prescribed are Form 29 and 30, the transferee is obliged to send a report about the factum of transfer in Form 29. Upon receipt of such a form, the Registering Authority under the Motor Vehicles Act is not obliged to straightaway transfer the vehicle in the name of the transferee mentioned in the form. In fact, it is a intimation of transfer by the registered owner to the Registering Authority intimating the name of the transferee also. A copy of such report is required to be sent statutorily to the transferee, whereas, the compliance is successfully made of Form 29 under the Central Motor Vehicles Rules but requirement of Form 30 must be complied with. In the present case, we have no hesitation in finding that there was no compliance at all of the provisions of Section 50 read with Rule 55(2) and the material requirements of statutorily prescribed Form 30 to be sent by the transferee of the vehicle. How could it be said in such a fact situation that there was a complete transfer which would mandate and compel the Registering Authority to transfer the vehicle in the name of the transferee? Therefore, the submission which is based on the premise that the report sent by the transferor of the Motor Vehicle (present case) luxury bus who is of the original unsuccessful petitioner before the learned Judge which could not be said to be in complete compliance of the statutory mandate. Until the whole scheme is complied with, it was not possible for the Transferring Authority to transfer the name of the transferee in place of the original registered owner so as to fasten the liability for the arrears of vehicle tax on the part of the transferee. In our opinion, therefore the liability for payment of arrears of Motor Vehicle Tax right from 1993 obviously would be on the part of the original owner. Like that registered owner until the transferee is statutorily effected and as mandated in Section 50 read with Rule 55(2) and also in light of the prescribed Form 29 and 30, until the entire process is, successfully, complied with the liability for payment of motor vehicle tax would be on the part of the original owner i.e. registered owner and he cannot be permitted to avail the constitutional remedy enshrined in Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. No Authority could be directed with the help of prerogative writ of not to act in statutory discharge of the function as a registering authority under the Motor Vehicles Act. The Appellate Authority, in our opinion, upon correct evaluation and interpretation, rightly held the present appellant-original petitioner accountable for payment of arrears of tax running into more than Rs. 2,00,000/-. We are also very clear that even if transfer is held to be valid assuming that the contentions advanced before us is correct and sustainable then also the provisions of Section 8(2) of the Bombay Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958 would not absolve the original owner or registered owner of the vehicle from the payment of liability of arrears of motor vehicles tax. The statutory design and desideratum is amply clear from the plain perusal of the provisions of Section 8 which undoubtedly prescribed the liability of payment of arrears of motor vehicle tax even in a case of transfer concurrently on the part of the registered owner as well as the transferee. The learned single Judge has alternatively dealt upon meticulously on this aspect and we find fully in agreement with the proposition propounded. Therefore, alternatively also, the vehement submission raised before us to thwart the liability for the payment of arrears of Motor Vehicle Tax under the Motor Vehicles Act is without any substance and deserves to be rejected,
15. Reliance is also placed on a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Harivadan Kanaiyalal v. State of Gujarat, 1973 GLR 515. We have been taken through this decision. We have also given our anxious consideration and we find that the decision which is relied on was in relation to the fixity of liability of the registered owner to pay tax in view of the provisions of Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the B.M.V. Tax Act, 1958, while imposed the liability on the registered owner to pay tax, he continued to remain liable even after transfer of vehicle if the transfer is not effected to the appropriate Authority. However, in view of the provisions of Section 16(1)(a)(i) such a concurrent liability cannot be fastened on the transferor insofar as the question of criminal liability is concerned. Obviously, the criminal jurisprudence to which we have wedded, undoubtedly celebrated principle and the legislative exposition in language employed in Section 16(1)(a)(i). Insofar as the criminal liability is concerned, even in case of concurrent liability, in a similar situation insofar as civil liability is concerned, the same cannot be fastened on the transferor. Section 17 is also very clear which provides that criminal liability cannot be fastened on the transferor even in case of defaulting registering owner. When the possession and enjoyment of the vehicle is with the Registered owner or the transferor, this decision in our opinion is not relevant so far as the applicability and the interpretation of the provisions of Section 8 is concerned. On the contrary, insofar as the provisions of Section 8 prescribes concurrent liability of the registered owner along with the transferee in case of a default or non-compliance of the provisions relating to the transfer of property and resultant transfer of name before the Registering Authority would run against the submissions raised before us. It is observed in the said decision that the concurrent liability arising under Section 8(2) must be preceded by a compliance of the provisions from transferring the ownership of the vehicle. It is, therefore, clear that even for absolving oneself from the liability from payment of arrears of motor vehicle tax, it must be, successfully, shown that necessary formalities prescribed and mandated in law have been followed. Mere tendering an application or a submission of a report by the registered owner of the vehicle without full compliance of the provisions of Section 50 read with Rule 55(2) and non-submission of Form 30 by the transferee would not affect the liability for payment of such arrears of tax on the part of the registered owner only on the ground that such an incomplete application was not rejected. This ground or submission is without any substance and is rightly not accepted by the Appellate Authority as well as the learned single Judge. In our opinion, this appeal is totally meritless, and before we prorogue this judgment as we have found from the records of the present case about the conduct of the original petitioner, we would like to highlight the following aspects :-
a. The conduct of the petitioner is a relevant factor since he has sought to avail constitutional prerogative writ power which are extraordinary, discretionary, plenary any persons who has attempted to misuse or abuse the process of Court or whose conduct is found to be condemnable in view of other facts would be robbed of seeking such a constitutional prerogative writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India.
b. The original-petitioner had also filed Civil Suit being Civil Suit No. 39 of 1998 in the Court of Civil Judge (S.D.) at Nadiad against the respondent Nos. 2 & 4 which came to be withdrawn by the petitioner being plaintiff in that suit on 13-8-1998, unconditionally. We are told at the Bar that the Court Fees Inspector had raised objection for shortfall in payment of court fees. The Court Fees Inspector by his order dated 24-3-1998 directed the plaintiff of that suit -- petitioner before us to pay an amount of Rs. 5000 -- 30 already = Rs. 4970. It is also admitted before us that without paying or complying with the order of the Court Fees - Inspector, the plaintiff in his ingenious way withdrew the suit on 13-8-1998. It is also stated before us at the time of hearing of this appeal that the said amount is so far not paid by the appellant-original petitioner. This aspect speaks volumes about the unclean and unfair conduct of the original petitioner.
c. Not only that the petitioner had also filed writ petition before this Court being Special Civil Application No. 4830 of 1998 in respect of the substantially same cause of action. It was also withdrawn unconditionally.
d. Thereafter, the petitioner filed on 11-8-1998 Misc. Civil Application No. 1335 of 1998 in Special Civil Application No. 4830 of 1998 which also came to be rejected by this Court, e. The petitioner also initiated a criminal complaint against the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 on 15-9-1997 which came to be registered with C.R.No. 75 of 1997 on the premise that the luxury bus has been sold off in scrap market.
16. We were shocked to find from the order of the learned single Judge that the petitioner though he was directed to produce on record the complete details of the properties in his possessions, movable as well as immovable, he failed to do so. See the audacity of the petitioner who had deliberately flouted the order of the writ Court. It is the duty of the party to comply with the direction of the order of the Court having once been passed. Till today, we do not know as to why or what prompted the petitioner not to produce the documents or to comply with the directions of the learned single Judge. This shows the conduct of the petitioner who has started on a voyage to seek extraordinary, equitable, discretionary and plenary jurisdiction with equal extraordinary ojbectionable conduct with highly inequitable attitude. The learned single Judge has, therefore, mildly and liberally rightly observed that the petitioner has not come with clean hands. It is in this context, the learned single Judge was left with no alternative but he was constrained to observe that the judicial process and that too of writ Court, the petitioner has made all attempts and efforts to abuse and misuse and that is the reason why the learned single Judge directed the petitioner to pay Rs. 5000/- as special costs of the petition to the State of Gujarat within a period of one month from the date of receipt of the writ or certified copy and again we are sorry to say that the same direction is yet not observed or complied with despite the time-limit stipulated by the learned single Judge in the impugned order has passed away. We feel that the amount of Rs. 5000/- directed to be paid by way of special costs is also on a lower side in- the light of enormity of uncleanliness and unhealthy conduct in seeking the constitutional remedy and magnitude of objectionable conduct on part of the petitioner and the abuse and misuse of process of the Court and that too under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.
17. The judicial review is one of the basic features and characteristics or our Constitution. Articles 32 & 226 are the powerful and vetripotent provisions to advance the cause of judicial review for public good, public policy and public interest. There is a legislative and long historical background behind incorporation of such provisions in our Constitution. The Constitutional Courts are armed with such extraordinary plenary, equitable, discretionary, constitutional powers so as to advance the cause of justice and public good and not to retard and not to allow the party to perpetrate the illegality. The scope of the power of the Writ Court has been extensively-examined, explored and expounded in catena of judicial pronouncements. Article 226 is couched by the Founding Fathers of the Constitution in such a way and in such comprehensive phraseology, ex facie, it confers wide powers on the High Court to reach injustice and to see illegality into right shape. But a person who tries to use to shield his illegality and to further perpetuate under the guise of bona fide transferor of a vehicle should be appropriately shown his role and status viz-a-viz the significance and soundness of the constitutional judicial review legal missile incorporated in Art. 226 of the Constitution of India.
18. In reality, anyone of the aforesaid grounds narrated by us is, ipse dixit, efficient and sufficient to dismiss the appeal summarily. However, we have instead of dismissing the appeal only on such ground have highlighted in the foregoing paragraphs the uncalled for and unwarranted conduct leading to abuse and misuse the process of the Court. There is no slightest hesitation in our mind that this Letters Patent Appeal is absolutely baseless, meritless and frivolous and deserves to be dismissed with the following further directions :-
1. The Court Fee Inspector who has assessed the shortfall of the Court fees in a Civil Suit which was filed by the petitioner before the Civil Suit at Nadiad and which has remained unpaid shall expeditiously take action for recovery upon the receipt of the writ of this Court and upon verifying that till date the same has been paid by the petitioner or not. In either case, he shall submit the report to the Registrar of this Court within a period of one month after the receipt of the copy of the writ either for complete recovery or progress made till then in recovery of the deficit Court fees in relation to the aforesaid Civil Suit filed by the petitioner before the Civil Court at Nadiad, which in turn shall be placed before us.
2. The Competent and Concerned Officer, Original Transport Officer is directed to recover the full amount of arrears of motor vehicle tax which is being, by one or other reason evaded and avoided by the petitioner including penalty and with permissible interest as expeditiously as possible and preferably within one month after the receipt of the copy of the writ of this Court and shall report to the Registrar of this High Court who in turn shall place the report before us.
3. The learned single Judge has directed the original petitioner - appellant herein to pay special costs which is quantified at Rs. 5000/- within a stipulated time which is admittedly not paid so far. The appellant shall pay the -amount of costs within a period of one mondi from today before this Court and shall produce the receipt thereof before the Registrar, who in turn shall place before us. In case, if the amount of costs is not deposited within two months from today, the original-petitioner shall be liable to pay interest at the rate of 15% p.a. from the date of default till the date of payment before this Court.
4. The Joint Registrar (Judicial) of this High Court is directed to transmit the certified true copies at the government cost to the following authorities as early as possible but not later than one month and in the event of any difficulty, it will be open for him to seek further orders from our Bench :-
1. Regional Transport Officer.
2. The concerned Court Fees Inspector who has passed the order of recovery of deficient Court fees in Civil Suit No. 39 of 1998 which was filed in the Civil Court, Nadiad.
19. After having taken into consideration the overall painful not panoramic, factual situation and the highly condemnable conduct of the petitioner, the facts and circumstances, order of the authorities below and the impugned order of the learned single Judge while viewed in the light of the latest propositions of law and underlined design and desideratum of the provisions of Art. 226, this Letters Patent Appeal is deserved to be rejected being totally meritless. This Appeal is accordingly rejected.
20. Appeal dismissed.