Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Hyderabad And Secunderabad Coconut ... vs The Director Of Marketing, Government ... on 19 August, 1992
Equivalent citations: 1993(1)ALT256
JUDGMENT D. Reddeppa Reddy, J.
1. The delicate issue for our decision is whether the present two writ petitions, viz. (1) W.P.No. 16814/1990 for directing the respondents 1,2 and 5 to allot plots to petitioners 2 to 12 in the market yard established under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh (Agricultural Produce and Live Stock) Markets Act, 1966, in the premises called "Mahaboob Mansion", Malakpet, Hyderabad, by way of implementing the directions of this Court in Writ Petition No. 6783/1981, dated 22-4-1991 and by reducing the area of plots in the approved plan, so as to meet the needs of all wholesale traders of Hyderabad city in agricultural produce; and (2) W.P.No. 14261/1991 for declaring the Government Memo No. 1240/ Agrl.VI(l)/80-l, dated 2-5-1980 and the Government Memo No. 1327/ Agrl. VI(l)/80-l, dated 23 5-1980 as illegal and for directing the respondents to cancel the allotment of plots measuring more than 200 square yards etc., are maintainable in the light of - (i) the order dated 194-1990 of the Supreme Court of India in Civil Appeal Nos. 1319 and 1320 of 1983, whereunder the approved plan relating to the said market yard was upheld subject to certain specified modifications and (ii) the Division Bench decision of this Court in Public Vigilance v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh, (D.B)., and if so, whether the petitioners 2 to 12 in the first writ petition and the sole petitioner in the second writ petition are entitled to allotment of plots in the said market yard? Sri U.N. Bachawat, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioners, has endeavoured to persuade us to consider the matter afresh since some of the legal propositions he seeks to raise now have not been raised in the case reported in Public Vigilance v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh, (D.B).
2. The points raised in both the writ petitions are interlinked. Therefore, we propose to dispose them of by a common order.
3. Though the facts of case are given in extenso in the case referred to supra (1), for the sake of convenience, we propose to state them, in brief, here also. They are as follows:-
4. In May 1972, the Andhra Pradesh Housing Board initiated proceedings for acquisition of "Mahaboob Mansion" comprising an area of Ac.42-25 guntas belonging to the Royal Family Trust, for the implementation of a housing scheme. In the negotiations held between the Housing Board and the Royal Family Trust, the price for the same was settled at Rs. 21/- per square yard. Thereupon, on the request of the Housing Board by its letter dated 14-12-1973, the Government of Andhra Pradesh, under G.O.Ms.No. 95, Housing, dated 29th July, 1974, permitted the Board to acquire the same. Thereafter, in the proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, the Land Acquisition Officer passed anawardonl6-l-1980determiningtheamountof compensation as Rs. 43,32,405/ - at the agreed rate of Rs. 21/- per square yard. On payment of the said amount, the possession of the premises was handed over to the Housing Board on 21-1-1980. Even during the pendency of the above land acquisition proceedings, the Agricultural Market Committee, Hyderabad, was requesting the Government of Andhra Pradesh to acquire the same land for establishing markets. Also, the Market Committee made negotiations with the Housing Board. Finally, the Government of Andhra Pradesh under G.O.Ms.No. 23, Housing, Municipal Administration and Urban Development Department, dated 29th March, 1980 accorded sanction to the Housing Board for the transfer of Ac.40-25 guntas of land in "Mahboob Mansion" on permanent lease for 99 years in favour of the Market Committee for the purpose of developing the same as a Commercial complex. In pursuance thereof, a registered lease deed dated 18-4-1980 was executed and the possession of the land was handed over to the Market Committee. Also, the Government in Memo No. 1.240/Agrl.VI(l)/80-l, dated 2-5-1980 permitted the Market Committee to sub-lease the plots in the Market Complex so established in "Mahboob Mansion" to traders/commission agents for 99 years. Accordingly, 442 plots covering an area of Ac.18-86 guntas, as shown in the plan approved by the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad, were allotted to various traders /commission agents who submitted their applications, within the prescribed time in response to the notification dated 27-5-1980 issued by the Market Committee. Then in the month of August 1980, registered lease deeds were also executed in their favour. Sometime thereafter, W.P.No. 8861 of 1981 was filed in this Court by an organization called "Malakpet Citizens Forum", questioning the validity of transfer of "Mahboob Mansion" by the Housing Board to the Market Committee. But it was dismissed on 7-6-1982. The matter was carried to a Division Bench in Writ Appeal No. 476 of 1982 and the same was allowed by Judgment dated 25-2-1983, holding that, ".... (i) The order of the learned single Judge in W.P.No. 8860 of 1981 dated 7th June, 1982, is set aside and the Writ Petition is allowed.
(ii) G.O.Ms.No. 23, Housing, Municipal Administration and Urban Development, dated 29th March, 1980 according sanction for the lease of 40-25 acres of land at 'Mahboob Mansion' in Malakpet dispensing with public auction, for 99 years to the Agricultural Market Committee, Hyderabad, as well as G.O.Ms.No. 200, Food and Agriculture, dated 31st March, 1980 giving permission to the Agricultural Market Committee, Hyderabad, to take over the extent of land of 40-25 acres sanctioned in G.O.Ms.No. 23, Housing, dated 29th March, 1980, are quashed.
(iii) The Memorandum of the Government bearing No. 1240/ Agrl.VI(l)/ 80-1, dated 2nd May, 1980 directing the Agricultural Market Committee to sub-lease the plots in the Market Complex at 'Mahboob Mansion' to traders on 99 years lease as per the terms and conditions of lease in accordance with the guidelines issued in Government Memo No .874 / Agri.IV/80-1, dated 11th April, 1980, is also quashed,
(iv) The Andhra Pradesh Hosuing Board shall immediately take over the possession of 40-25 acres of land at 'Mahboob Mansion' and submit a Housing Scheme to the Government in accordance with the Development Plan for the Hyderabad City approved in G.O.Ms.No. 414, Municipal Administration, dated 27th September, 1975, for the development of 'Mahboob Mansion' as a District Commercial Centre.
(v) The Agricultural Market Committee, Hyderabad, is directed to stop immediately construction on the land in question leased out to it and handover the possession of the land to the Andhra Pradesh Housing Board.
(vi) The Andhra Pradesh Housing Board shall pay to the Agricultural Market Committee the amount that has been collected by the Market Committee from the traders-sub-leases for the development of the land and construction thereon if any and the Agricultural Market Committee shall refund the amount to the traders-sub-leases cancelling the sub-leases granted to them."
5. Against the said judgment, two Civil Appeal Nos. 3919 and 3920 of 1983 were preferred to the Supreme Court of India, one by Eldulkanti Shankariah and two others and the other by the Hyderabad wholesale Food grains Dealers and Traders Market Development Society represented by its President and three others. During the pendency of the said appeals, the Supreme Court by its order dated 11th April, 1983, in C.M.P.Nos. 10522 and 10760 of 1983 directed the maintenance of status quo. Finally those appeals were disposed of by a common order dated 19th April, 1990 in terms of the memo of compromise. The relevant portions of the order and the memo of compromise read as follows:-
"The appeals above-mentioned being called on for hearing before this Court on the 19th day of April, 1990, upon counsel for the appearing parties herein filing Memo of Compromise duly signed by Counsel for the appearing parties herein and upon perusing the memo of compromise and hearing counsel for the appearing parties herein, THIS COURT DOTH take on record the Memorandurn of Compromise and DOTH by and with the consent of the appearing parties herein dispose of the appeals above-mentioned in terms of the said Memorandum of Compromise annexed hereto Schedule 'B'. AND THIS COURT DOTH FURTHER ORDER: THAT the order directing maintenance of Status Quo vide this Court's orders dated the 9th/llth April, 1983, passed in Civil Miscellaneous Petition Nos. 10522 and 10760 of 1983 be and is hereby vacated subject to Memorandum of Compromise mentioned above and annexed herewith;
AND THIS COURT LASTLY ORDER that this ORDER be punctually observed and carried into execution by all concerned."
"Memo of Compromise In these matters subject to this Hon'ble Court's kind approval, all the parties to these cases, (C.A.Nos. 3919 and 3920/83) i.e., Edulakanti Sliankaraiah & Co., and others, Malakpet Citizens' Forum and the Government of Andhra Pradesh, have agreed to the following terms by way of settlement finally. The same terms were approved by the Council of Ministers of Andhra Pradesh Government in its meeting held on 16-4-1990 as is clear from the resolution of the Council of Ministers which is enclosed to the letter No. 3333/D2 /81, dated 19-4-1990 addressed by the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Andhra Pradesh addressed to all the counsel connected in this matter and the said letter is enclosed herewith.
The terms of compromise agreed upon by all the parties are as under:-
1. A total area of 2.00 acres shall be allotted towards construction of buildings, houses or tenements for weaker sections on the same terms and conditions as are followed by Government in respect of beneficiaries under the A.P. Urban Development and Housing Corporation and without prejudice to the approved plan of the project.
2. A summer palace situated in the land shall be demolished in view of the fact that it has become dilapidated. The land that would be released as a result of demolition will be used for a public purpose such as setting up a school.
3. The beneficiaries under the Weaker Sections Housing Programme shall be identified in accordance with the prescribed norms and drawn from the immediate vicinity of the area in question. The process of identification shall be done in consultation with the representatives of the Malakpet Citizens' Forum, The A.P. Housing Board shall develop the whale area in accordance with the prescribed Town planning regulations providing for a separate approach road for the commercial portion.
4. That the judgment and order of Andhra Pradesh High Court dated 25-2-1983 in Writ Appeal No. 476 of 1982 may be set aside."
To enforce the said order of the Supreme Court, the Government of Andhra Pradesh, issued G.O.Ms.No. 37, dated 10th August, 1990. The terms of compromise have been incorporated in paragraph 9 of the said G.O. Also, it has been ordered in paragraph 10 that the rate at which the land has been allotted to the Agricultural Market Committee be enhanced to Rs. 23/- per square yard and that the Agricultural Market Committee be however compensated for the loss of two acres of land agreed to be allotted towards construction of houses. Thereafter, the construction of Khops, which was stopped in consequence of the order dated 25-2-1983 in Writ Appeal No. 476 of 1982 was resumed. At that stage, these two writ petitions an two other petitions - W.P.Nos. 338 and 1638 of 1991 were filed. W.P.Nos. 338 and 1638 of 1991 were for declaring that the 99 years lease issued by the Agricultural Market Committee to wholesale dealers and agents is ultra vires of Statutory power, mala fide etc., and for striking down the G.O., permitting such leases. They were heard by a Division Bench of this Court, of which one of us (Justice M.N. Rao) was member; but dismissed on 12-3-1982 as not maintainable on the ground that the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 3919 and 3920of 1983 dated 19th April, 1990, "cannot be interfered with by any court" and "any attempt, either directly or indirectly, to enquire into the validity or otherwise of the decree granted by the highest Court would be subversive of Judicial discipline and negation of the rule of law". (This decision of the Division Bench was reported in Public Vigilance v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh (1 supra). Somehow, the present two writ petitions were not heard then. Thus, they are now before us.
6. The following contentions were raised in the earlier two writ petitions - W.P.Nos. 338 and 1638 of 1991:
(a) In the public interest litigation, there could be no compromise;
(b) When once a public interest litigation was launched, it must be heard and finally decided on merits and under no circumstances it could be withdrawn;
(c) The compromise memo which formed basis for the decree granted by the Supreme Court does not constitute res judicata;
(d) The decree dated 19th April, 1990 of the Supreme Court does not bind the petitioners as they are not parties to the same;
(e) The compromise was an unholy one processed and engineered by the Government so as to deprive the citizens of the area of their right to residential quarters; and
(f) There could be no compromise in respect of an ultra vires action.
7. But, these contentions were not accepted in the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Narender Singh v. Surjeet Singh , Kausalya Devi Bogra v. Land Acquisition Officer, (1984) 2 SCC 325 at 332., Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir, , Prem Chand v. Excise Commissioner U.P. , Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India, , and Isaacs v. Robertson, (1984) 3 All.E.R. 140 at 143., and consequently the writ petitions were dismissed as not maintainable.
8. Despite the above judgment in respect of the very same property, Sri Bachawat, the learned counsel for the petitioners submits that since the order of the Supreme Court has been made by the consent of the parties thereto, it does not lay down any principle of law nor it binds this Court. We unhesitatingly accept the first part of the contention that the order of the Supreme Court does not lay down any principle of law; but we have to reject the second part that it does not bind us, as totally unsustainable. We must also say that the decisions of the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur, , Krishna Kumar v. Union of India and Ors., JT 1990 (3) SC 173 at 187., State of U.P. v. Messrs. Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd. ., The State of Punjab and Ors. v. Surinder Kumar and Ors., ., Messrs. Goodyear India Ltd., v. State of Haryana and Anr. ., and Lakshmi Shanker v. State (Delhi Administration) ., cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners do support the first part of the contention; but they are of no help as far as the second part of the contention is concerned. It would be necessary to notice the distinction between Article 141 and 142 of the Constitution of India. Article 141, which provides that, "Law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all Courts within the territory of India."
has no application to the present cases since the order dated 19-4-1990 of the Supreme Court of India in Civil Appeal Nos. 3919 and 3920/1983 does not declare any law. Nevertheless, it is certainly, an order passed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, which reads as follows:-
"142. Enforcement of decrees and orders of Supreme Court and orders as to discovery, etc.-(1) The Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, and any decree so passed or order so made shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India in such manner as may be prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is so made, in such manner as the President may by order prescribe.
(2) Subject to the provisions of any law made in this behalf by Parliament, the Supreme Court shall, as respects the whole of the territory of India, have all and every power to make any order for the purpose of securing the attendance of any person, the discovery of production of any documents, or the investigation or punishment of any contempt of itself."
9. Mere, it would be useful to refer to the relevant provisions of the Supreme Court (Decrees and Orders) Enforcement Order, 1954, made by the President of India in exercise of the powers conferred by Clause (1) of Article 142 and published in the Gazette of India (Extraordinary), Part II, Section 3, page 75, dated 14th January, 1954, which read as follows:-
"1. (1) This order may be called the Supreme Court (Decrees and Orders) Enforcement Order, 1954.
(2) It shall come into force at once.
2. Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law in force at the commencement of this order, any decree passed or order made by the Supreme Court, whether before or after such commencement including any order as to costs of, and incidental to, any proceedings in that Court shall be enforceable.
(a) where such decree or order was passed or made in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, -- in accordance with the provisions of law for the time being in force relating to the enforcement of decrees or orders of the Court or Tribunal from which the appeal to the Supreme Court was preferred or sought to be preferred; and
(b) in any other case, - In accordance with the provisions of law for the time being in force relating to the enforcement of decrees or orders of such Court, Tribunal or other authority as the Supreme Court may specify in its decree or order or in a subsequent order made by it on the application of any party to the proceeding."
10. The above provisions are clear and unambiguious. They make no distinction between the orders passed on merits and the orders made on the basis of concession or compromise. Therefore, it has been clearly held by this Court in the earlier two writ petitions that, "14. The Judgment of the Supreme Court dated 19th April 1990 cannot therefore be interfered with by any Court. If any one feels aggrieved, the only course open, according to our comprehension of law, is to seek a review of the judgment from the highest Court. There is no question of any party contending that the decision rendered by the highest Court in the Country is either non-est or contrary to law. The principle of law laid down by the Privy Council in ISAACS v. Robertson viz., "The... legal concepts of viodness and viodability form part of the English Law of contract. They are inapplicable to orders made by a court of unlimited jurisdiction in the course of contentious litigation. Such an order is either irregular or regular. If it is irregular it can be set aside by the court that made it on application to that court; if it is regular it can only be set aside by an appellate court on appeal if there is one to which appeal lies."
was approvingly cited by the Supreme Court in Union Carbide Corporation's case."
11. In the circumstances, we are of the firm view that it is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to enquire into the validity or otherwise of the order of the Supreme Court, dated 19-4-1990 in Civil Appeal Nos. 3919 and 3920 of 1983.
12. It is clear from the averments made in paragraph 7 of the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition that the petitioners were aware of the pendency of the proceedings before the Supreme Court for over 7 years. But, they failed to take any steps to approach the Supreme Court. Therefore, it is not permissible for the petitioners to claim benefit on par with the appellants in Civil Appeal Nos. 3919 and 3920 of 1983. It is necessary to note that if the matter had not been carried to the Supreme Court, the order of this Court in Writ Appeal No. 476/ 1982 dated 25-2-1983 would have become final, in which case there would not have been any occasion for the petitioners to claim allotment of plots in "Mahboob Mansion". In the circumstances, it looks evident that the petitioners want to claim benefits at the cost of others, which we cannot permit.
13. The mainreliefsoughtinW.P.No. 16814/1990 is to direct the respondents to allot plots to the petitioners 2 to 12 by rescheduling the area of plots, so as to meet the needs of all wholesale traders in agricultural produce of Hyderabad city. The relief sought for in W.P.No. 14261 /1991 is to declare clauses (i) to (ii) of the Government Memo No. 1240/Agrl.VI(l)/80-l, dated 2-5-1980 as illegal. We find it impossible to grant these reliefs without disturbing the order of the Supreme Court. Therefore, we have no option but to hold that these two writ petitions are not maintainable.
14. In view of our above finding, it would not have been necessary for us to consider the other points raised in the writ petitions, but for the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that notwithstanding the order of the Supreme Court, petitioners 2 to 12 in W.P.No. 16814/1990 are entitled to allotment of plots in view of the order of this Court dated 22-4-1987 by Justice K. Ramaswamy (as he then was) in W.P.No. 6783/1981. The said order reads as follows:-
"The petitioner-association claims that its members have been doing business in sale of watery coconuts and they are having shops a different places. When their shops are sought to be shifted to a market at Mahaboob Mansion, now sought to be constructed, they applied for allotment of the shop-cum-godowns. But the respondents are not taking any action. Accordingly, they are seeking to allot 11 plots to the members of the petitioner-association. In the counter-affidavit, it is stated that they are not doing any business in any shop and, therefore, they are not entitled to allotment. Allotment has to be made in terms of the direction issued by the Commissioner for marketing Development and, therefore, they cannot accede to the request. This being a disputed question, this Court cannot satisfactorily resolve the dispute. The individual members of the petitioner-association are, therefore, directed to approach the authorities with a request together with documentary evidence of the licences or the renewals thereof, giving the respective shop members, etc., so that they can verify and if they are doing the business, it is needless to mention that they are entitled to allotment as per the procedure in vogue."
15. This argument is seriously resisted by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents on various grounds, it is pointed out by Sri K. Subramanyam Reddy, that by virtue of the judgment dated 25-2-1983 in Writ Appeal No. 476 of 1982, G.O.Ms. No. 23, Housing, Municipal Administration and Urban Development, dated 29-3-1980 and all other consequential proceedings stood cancelled and as on 22-4-1987 the entire matter was seized by the Supreme Court of India. It is also pointed out by him that this position was not brought to the notice of the learned Judge. It is submitted by the learned Standing Counsel for the Agricultural Market Committee, Hyderabad, that the petitioners have not complied with the directions given by the learned Single Judge. It is pointed out by him that the petitioners 2 to 12 in W.P.No. 16814/1990 have not submitted their individual applications as directed by the learned judge. We find considerable force in these submissions. It cannot be disputed that as on 22-4-1987, the Agricultural Market Committee, Hyderabad, had nocontrol over the land in question in view of the judgment of this Court in Writ Appeal No. 476 of 1982 dated 25-2-1983 and the order of the Supreme Court dated 11-4-1983 directing the maintenance of Status quo. We are sure that the learned Judge would not have passed such an order, had he been apprised of the position that existed on 22-4-1987. Also it is admitted that the petitioners 2 to 12 in W.P.No. 16814/1990 have not submitted their individual applications as directed by this Court in its order dated 22-4-1987. Instead only a representation dated 2-5-1990 was made on their behalf by the first petitioner therein. However, it is argued by Sri Bachawat that there is no obligation on their part to submit individual applications. In this regard, his plea is that whatever a person can do himself, he can do it through his agent. He tried to sustain this plea, placing reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Subbarao v. I.T. Commissioner, . On careful examination of the said decision we find that it is against the petitioners, in view of the observations made in paragraph 4, which read as follows:-
"4. The first question whether the word 'personally' would exclude signature by an authorised agent on behalf of the partner was answered in the affirmative by the Madras High Court in Commr. of Income-tax v. Subba rao (A). This was one of the decisions quoted with approval by this Court in Commr. of Agricultural Income tax v. Keshab Chandra, (B) where the question was whether a Rule framed under the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act that the declaration in the return should be signed by the individual himself required that he should sign it personally, and it was held that it did so require. Sri K.S. Krishnaswami Ayyangar, learned counsel for the appellant, did not urge any grounds for differing from the above conclusion, and we must therefore, hold, in agreement with the views expressed in the above decisions, that the signature which is prescribed by the Rules is that of the partner himself, and that they are not complied with by the agent signing on his behalf."
16. On careful examination of the directions in Writ Petition No. 6783/1981 and the representation dated 2-5-1990, we have no hesitation to hold that the directions of this Court have not been complied with. That apart, the said directions have become ineffective and unenforceable in view of the Supreme Court order dated 19-4-1990.
17. The Agricultural Market Committee, Hyderabad, having considered the representation dated 2-5-1990, made by the President of the first petitioner-association in W.P. No. 16814/1990 issued proceedings No.AMCH/LC/3/90- 91/3641, dated 10-1-1991 stating that the members of the first petitioner-association have not complied with the directions given by this Court in Writ Petition No. 6783/1981 dated 22-4-1987 and that they are not entitled for allotment of plots in "Mahaboob Mansion" for the reason that they were not doing business at the relevant time in any of the six gunjes mentioned in clause (iii) of the Government Memo No. 1240/Agrl.Vl(l)/80-l, dated 2-5-1980. The said proceedings were sought to be questioned by filing W.P.M.P.No. 10284/ 1992 seeking amendment of the prayer in the writ petition. In this regard, it is argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that under Clause (iii) of the Government Memo dated 2-5-1980, the petitioners are also entitled to allotment of plots. To appreciate this contention it will be useful to refer to the said clause, which reads as follows:-
".....(iii) To allot the plots in market complex at Mahabub Mansion to the licenced traders and commission agents and to the members of the Hyderabad wholesale foodgrain dealers and trader Market Development Society, Hyderabad who are operating in Osmangunj, New Osmangunj, Muktyar Gunj, Maharaj Gunj, Kishan Gunj and Mahaboob Gunj."
18. It is his contention that the six gunjes namely, Osmangunj, New Osmangunj, Muktyargunj, Maharajgunj, Kishangunj and Mahaboobgunj mentioned in the said clause are referable only to the members of the Hyderabad wholesale foodgrain dealers and traders Market Development Society, Hyderabad, and the licensed traders and commission agents carrying on business in any other agricultural produce in Hyderabad are entitled to allotment of plots irrespective of their place of business.
19. In Dadaji v. Sukhdeobabu ., the Supreme Court observed as follows:-
"It is well known that punctuation marks by themselves do not control the meaning of a statute when its meaning is otherwise obvious..."
20. On careful examination of the language used in Clause (iii) of the Government Memo, dated 2-5-1980. We are satisfied that the entire scheme is meant only for the traders/commission agents carrying on business in the six gunjes mentioned therein. In the circumstances, we are of the view that the interpretation of the Supreme Court in M.K Salpekar v. Sunil Kumar, AIR 1988 SC 1841., and Mohd. Shabbir v. State of Maharastra, AIR 1979 SC 564, with regard to punctuation marks in Clause 13(3)(v) of the C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949, and Section 27 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 respectively, cannot be applied to the clause in question. Therefore, we hold that the petitioners, having failed to establish that they were carrying on business in the six gunjes, are not entitled to allotment of plots in the market established in "Mahaboob Mansion".
21. Sri Bachawat made some attempts to attribute mala fides to the respondents; but we find absolutely no material to substantiate this contention. Also, he argued that the entire scheme suffers from the vice of discrimination. He bases this plea on the ground that there is no justification to restrict the benefits of the scheme only to the traders/commission agents carrying on business in the six gunjes mentioned. We find no substance in this argument as it is clearly stated by the Government that the object of the scheme was to ease the congestion existing in the six gunjes. It is also brought to our notice that different market yards have been established for different commodities like fruits, vegetables etc., at different places like Gaddi Annaram and Gudimalkapur. Therefore, there is absolutely no justification to complain of discrimination against the present scheme. Moreover, we are not inclined to go into further details of the Scheme at this stage, when the same has already been approved by the Supreme Court of India and implemented by the Government of Andhra Pradesh.
22. It is argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the action of the government in permitting the allottees to use the shops for dealingin some non-nolified commodities is bad. It is further contended that some of the allottees, in violation of the terms and conditions of allotment, have further sub-let the portions of the shops allotted to them. We are not inclined to go into these aspects as they are not relevant for the purpose of the present writ petitions.
23. During the course of arguments, Sri S. Ramachandra Rao the learned counsel for some of the respondents, brought to our notice G.O.Ms.No. 984, dated 15-7-1992, which provides that the traders in coconut would be provided place in the market yard established in Gaddi Annarm. We do not propose to consider the effect of the said G.O. in these proceedings since the petitioners had no notice of the same.
24. Lastly, Sri Bachawat requests us to direct the respondents to allot some place somewhere in "Mahboob Mansion" to the petitioners. We are afraid we cannot accede to this request since the directions of the Supreme Court cover the entire area of Ac.40-25 guntas transferred to the Agricultural Market Committee, Hyderabad.
25. For these reasons, we hold that the writ petitions are not only not maintainable, but also devoid of substance on all other aspects. Accordingly, they are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.