Madras High Court
Prema vs K.V. Rami Reddi on 29 February, 2000
Equivalent citations: 2000(3)CTC617
ORDER
1. The Civil revision petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the procedural irregularity alleged to have been committed by the Seventh Assistant City Civil Judge, Chennai, while pronouncing the judgment in O.S.No.584 of 1996.
2. The case of the revision petitioner is as follows:
She filed the said suit before the Seventh Assistant City Civil Court against the respondent herein for specific performance to enforce a sale agreement dated 20.10.1988. According to her, she had paid the entire sale consideration as evidenced by certain documents. Even though the respondent had not denied the payment specifically in the written statement, the petitioner had proved the payment also by filing the income-tax returns. The lower Court did not accept the said payment and came to the conclusion that the petitioner was not entitled to the relief of specific performance, but, however, directed the respondent herein to pay a sum of Rs.2 lakhs to the petitioner within three months from 24.3.1999. According to the petitioner, the lower Court, even without dictating the judgment to the Stenographer, transcribing and signing the same, simply endorsed in the plaint docket sheet to the effect that the petitioner was not entitled to the said relief.
3. The prayer in the revision is for setting aside the plaint docket order dated 24.3.1999 on the ground of nullity. There was a complaint given by the petitioner before the then Acting Chief Justice. The Seventh Assistant City Civil Judge was suspended and on the basis of the report submitted by the Vigilance Officer, the order of suspension had been revoked. The petitioner apprehended that the learned Judge might have signed the judgment after the order of suspension had been revoked. According to the petitioner, she had not even asked for the alternative prayer for the repayment of the amount paid to the respondent.
4. The points raised in the memorandum of grounds and argued by Mr.G. Masilamani, learned Senior Counsel are as under:
The lower Court, even without giving the reasons for disbelieving the case of the petitioner, has rendered a decision dismissing the suit. Under Order 20 Rule 1 and Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the judgment shall be dated and signed by the Judge in the open Court at the time of pronouncing the same and when once it is signed, it shall not afterwards be altered or added to, save as provided by Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure or on review and in the instant case, even without pronouncing the judgment and even without signing the same final decision was taken by the learned Judge and to that effect an endorsement in the 'A' Diary was also made on 24.3.1999 at about 5.30 p.m. The learned Judge had dictated the pleadings, arguments of both parties and the framing of issues on 24.3.1999 and the operative portion was dictated only on 25.3.1999 during lunch time and the decision rendered on 24.3.1999 itself is non est in the eye of law and a nullity. The learned Judge was not justified in passing a final order in the suit in the first instance and thereafter giving reasons for arriving at to such a conclusion. The vital issue had not been decided at the time the decision was given. The mandatory provisions of Order 20 Rules 1 and 2 had not been followed. The learned Senior Counsel pointed out that no sanctity could be attached to the decision when reasons are given after the date of pronouncement. Order 20 Rule 4 (2) is not satisfied as also Rules 5 and 6. The learned Senior Counsel drew an analogy from the provisions of Order 41 Rules 30 and 31 relating to appeals. He also relied on the following judgments in support of his contention:
(1) Smt. Swaran Lata Ghosh v. Harendra Kumar Banerjee and another, and in particular paragraph 6; (2) Balraj Taneja and another v. Sunil Madan and another, ; (3) Chowaram Bachan v. Thanaram, and (4) Beni Madho Prasad Singh v. Adit and others, .
4. (a) Countering the arguments of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner Mr.A.L.Somayaji, learned Senior Counsel for Mr.A.K. Raghavalu for the respondent, submitted that four issues and an additional issue had been framed, 391/2 pages had been transcribed though the entire judgment had been dictated by the learned Judge and that the transcribed part of it covered the vital issues 1 to 3 and that the stenographer was half way through the fourth issue and the additional issue. A reasonable inference should be drawn that all the issues had been dictated to the Stenographer and on the date the judgment was pronounced, viz. 24.3.1999 the judgment must be deemed to have been completed.
5. The learned Senior Counsel also, relied on the following judgments in support of his contentions:
(1) Iqbal Ismail Sodawala v. The State of Maharashtra and others, ; (2) Vinod Kumar Singh v. Banaras Hindu University and others, ; (3) Puwada Narasimhamurthy v. Gadi Satyavathi and others, ; (4) Smt. Basanti Devi and others v. Abdul Sattar and others, and (5) Surendra Singh and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh, .
The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that this is not a case where the judgment has not been dictated, the main issues had been answered and it is wholly unnecessary to interfere under Article 227 of the Constitution and set at naught the decision which had been lawfully rendered.
6. The suit was filed on 11.8.1995. Trial was completed on 13.3.1999 and arguments also heard on the same day. It was posted for judgment on 24.3.1999. The 'A' Diary endorsement on 24.3.1999 is to the following effect:
"In the result the suit is dismissed with costs of the plaintiff. However, the defendant is directed to pay a sum of Rs. 2 lakhs within two months to the plaintiff."
The plaintiff's Counsel, it is alleged, made a request to the learned trial Judge to permit her to peruse the judgment. It was informed by the learned Judge that the judgment was being typed and she could peruse the same only in the evening. On coming to know that the judgment was delivered even before it was ready, a complaint was given to the then Acting Chief Justice. There was a vigilance investigation. There was suspension and revocation of suspension subsequently. According to the revision petitioner the operative portion of the answers to the issues was dictated to the Stenographer only on 25.3.1999 during lunch hour and that the judgment was not complete and ready even on 25.3.1999.
7. The learned Senior Counsel is well-founded in his submission would be evident from the records made available pursuant to the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the learned Judge. It is seen from the said records that the learned Judge had commenced the dictation of the judgment on 23.3.1999, completed the pleadings on that day, continued the dictation on 24.3.1999 and completely dictated the judgment upto issues 1 to 3 and according to the learned Judge, the findings on issues 1 to 3 will decide the finding on issue 4 and the fifth issue is only a conclusion, that would ultimately result in the context of the findings in support of the other issues as to whether the plaintiff would be entitled to specific performance. The findings on issues 1 to 3 having been given on 24.3.1999, the learned Judge dictated under issue 5 that in view of his findings on issues 1 to 3 the plaintiff is not entitled to specific performance and according to the learned Judge, the findings on issues 1 to 3 are sufficient and will decide the remaining issues 4 and 5 and the result of the suit. It is the further stand of the learned Judge that issues 3 and 4 were overlapping and he desired to group issues 3 and 4 and record his findings. There was pressure of work for disposals to reach the norms and he dictated the result under issue 6 and the operative portion of the judgment at about 5.30 p.m. The Stenographer had taken the portion of the judgment dictated by the learned Judge and then she wrote the result portion in longhand on the note paper and sent the papers to the learned Judge when he was on the dais. He pronounced the judgment and initialled it in open Court. Since it was 5.45 p.m. and the learned Judge was tired, he could not peruse the judgment on that day. Next day he reached Court early and perused the judgment and he then noticed that issues 4 and 5 had not been specifically covered. He therefore dictated those issues. Issue No.4 is whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part and whether the defendant was not ready. The allegation in the plaint is that the defendant had not produced the title deeds and extended the time. These allegations were already met under issues 2 and 3 and in respect of issue No. 4, the learned Judge had merely reiterated the findings already recorded under issues 2 and 3. Under issue 5 he had merely stated that in view of his findings on other issues, it followed that the plaintiff is not entitled to specific performance. The finding in respect of issue 6 had already been dictated and transcribed in the notes paper, which alone is usually read out and initialled. At about 3 p.m. on the 25th the Counsel for the plaintiff represented in open Court that she wanted to peruse the judgment. The learned Judge permitted her without any hesitation to peruse the judgment as he had completely dictated the entire judgment and he "was under the impression that his Stenographer would have typed all the portions of the judgment. Even the Stenographer had mentioned that on 25.3.1999 morning the learned Judge had dictated issues 4 and 5 and she had taken the notes in shorthand note book. According to the learned Judge, due to the mistaken impression that all the issues had been dealt with, he had on 24.3.1999 dictated the operative portion of the judgment and noticing the omission he had on 25.3.1999 dictated the remaining issues 4 and 5. As according to the learned Judge, the findings already recorded under issues 1 to 3 warranted the dismissal of the suit and the operative portion of the judgment was consistent with the findings under issues 1 to 3 and the issues 4 and 5 did not require any separate discussion since they had been practically covered under issues I to 3 and under the bona fide impression that all the issues had been dealt with and dictated, he had pronounced the judgment on 24.3.1999.
8. From the foregoing it would be clear that on the date the judgment was stated to have been pronounced the learned Judge had not given his decision on issues 4 and 5. May be the decision on issues 1 to 3 will impinge on the decision under issues 4 and 5. The question is whether there had been a valid pronouncement of judgment on 24.3.1999. It is under these circumstances we have to examine the contentions of the learned Senior Counsel on either side.
9. Section 2(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure defines 'judgment' as follows:
" 'Judgment' means the statement given by the Judge of the grounds of a decree or order."
There should be a statement of the grounds of the decision for what the learned Judge does with the case to constitute a judgment.
10. Section 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the Court, after the case has been heard, shall pronounce judgment and on such judgment a decree shall follow. After the pronouncement of the judgment, the Court is bound to prepare and pass a decree.
11. We are now not concerned with what a decree is. Under Order 20 Rule 1 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Madras Amendment).
"(1) The Court, after the case has been heard, shall pronounce judgment in open Court, either at once or on some future day, of which due notice shall be given to the parties or their pleaders.
(2) The judgment may be pronounced by dictation to a shorthand-writer in open Court, where the presiding Judge has been specially empowered in that behalf by the High Court."
Order 20 Rule 3 requires that, "the judgment shall be dated and signed by the Judge in open Court at the lime of pronouncing it and when once signed, shall not afterwards be altered or added to save as provided by Section 152 or on review."
Rule 4 (1) talks about judgment of a Court of Small Causes and Rule 4 (2) says that the judgments of other Courts shall contain a concise statement of the case, the points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for such decision.
Rule 5 says that in suits in which issues have been framed, the Court shall state its finding or decision with the reason therefor, upon each separate issue, unless the finding upon any one or more of the issues is sufficient for the decision of the suit.
Rule 6 provides that the decree shall agree with the judgment.
12. According to Mr.G. Masilamani, learned Senior Counsel, none of the requirements enjoined by the various sections and orders referred to supra is satisfied in the instant case and in the eye of law there is no judgment. The learned Senior Counsel also seeks to draw analogy from the provisions of Order 41 Rules 30 and 31 relating to appeals.
"Order 41 Rule 30 (1): The Appellate Court, after hearing the parties or their pleaders and referring to any part of the proceedings, whether on appeal or in the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred to which reference may be considered necessary, shall pronounce judgment in open Court either at once or some future day of which notice shall be given to the parties or their pleaders.
(2) Where a written judgment is to be pronounced, it shall be sufficient if the points for determination, the decision thereon and the final order passed in the appeal are read out and it shall not be necessary for the Court to read out the whole judgment, but a copy of the whole judgment shall be made available for the perusal of the parties or their pleaders immedi-ately after the judgment is pronounced."
Order 41 Rule 31 requires that, "The judgment of the Appellate Court shall be in writing and shall state:
(a) the points for consideration;
(b) the decision thereon;
(c) the reasons for the decision; and
(d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled;
and shall bear the date on which it is pronounced and shall be signed by the Judge or by the Judges concurring therein."
The learned Senior Counsel also referred to a number of decisions, which will be referred to in due course.
13. As. against the above contentions by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Somayaji, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent, as already noticed, submitted that the dictation of the judgment had been completed before the judgment was actually pronounced, the Stenographer had transcribed 391/2 pages and completed dealing with issues 1 to 3 and part of issue 4 and the additional issue and there should be a reasonable inference that all the issues had been dictated to the Stenographer before the judgment was pronounced on 24.3.1999. The learned Senior Counsel is not well-founded in his submission in view of what I have already recorded.
14. The learned Senior Counsel relied on Iqbal Ismail Sodawala v. State of Maharashtra and others, . The question arose in that case as to whether a convicted person be said to be lawfully imprisoned if at the time of his conviction the trial Judge dictates the judgment, but does not sign the same because that having not been transcribed. While dealing with that question the Supreme Court observed as follows:
"The Code of Civil Procedure is essentially a Code of Procedure and like all procedural law, is designed to further the ends of justice and not to frustrate them by the introduction of endless technicalities. At the same time, it has to be borne in mind that it is procedure that spells much of the difference between rule of law and rule by whim and caprice. The object of the Code is to ensure for the accused a full and fair trial In accordance with the principles of natural justice. If there be substantial compliance with the requirements of law, a mere procedural irregularity would not vitiate the trial unless the same results in miscarriage of justice. In all procedural laws certain things are vital. Disregard of the provisions in respect of them would prove fatal to the trial and would invalidate the conviction. There are, however, other requirements which are not so vital. Non-compliance with them would amount to an irregularity which would be curable unless it has resulted in a failure of justice."
That was a case where the trial Judge omitted to sign the judgment at the time of its pronouncement because of its having not been transcribed. The fact remains that in that case the entire judgment had been dictated to the Stenographer.
15. In Firm Gokal Chand v. Firm Nand Ram, AIR 1938 PC 292 the case was heard by a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court. The judgment in that case was actually delivered by one of the two Judges with whom the other Judge concurred. The judgment was pronounced on a particular date, but the Judge who delivered the judgment went on leave before signing it and the other Judge signed it. Order 41 Rule 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure required that the judgment of the Appellate Court should be in writing and should at the time it was pronounced be signed and dated by the Judge or by the Judges concurring therein. The Privy Council considered the question as to whether the judgment was a nullity because of the failure of one of the Judges to sign the same. The Judicial Committee observed as follows:
"The Rule does not say that if its requirements are not complied with the judgment shall be a nullity. So startling a result would need clear and precise words. Indeed the Rule does not even state any definite time in which it is to be fulfilled. The time is left to be defined by. what is reasonable. The Rule from its very nature is not intended to affect the rights of parties to a judgment. It is intended to secure certainty in the ascertainment of what the judgment was. It is a rule which Judges are required to comply with for that object. No doubt, in practice Judges do so comply, as it is their duty to do. But accidents may happen. A Judge may die after giving judgment but before he has had a reasonable opportunity to sign it. The Court must have inherent jurisdiction to supply such a defect. The case of a Judge who has gone on leave before signing the judgment may call for more comment, but even so the convenience of the Court and the interest of litigants must prevail. The defect is merely an irregularity."
The Privy Council referred to Section 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure wherein it is stated that, "No decree shall be reversed or substantially varied, nor shall any case be remanded, in appeal on account of any error defect or irregularity in any proceedings in the suit, not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Act."
Although the above section dealt with appeals from original decrees, Section 108 applied to appeals from appellate decrees. The Judicial Committee came to the conclusion that the defect mentioned above was an irregularity not affecting the merits of the case or jurisdiction of the Court and is no ground for setting aside the decree.
16. In Surendra Singh and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the decision of the Privy Council was referred to and it was observed that, "Section 537 of the Code of Civil Procedure does as much the same thing on me criminal side as Sections 99 and 108 do on the civil."
In Surendra Singh's Case, death sentence had been awarded. The case in the High Court was heard by a Bench of two Judges. The judgment was signed by both of them, but it was delivered in Court by one of them after the death of the other. It was held that there was no valid judgment and the case should be reheard. In paragraphs 10 and 11 of the said Judgment the Supreme Court observed as follows:
"In our opinion, a judgment within the meaning of these sections (Section 537 of the Cr.P.C. and Sections 99 and 108 of the C.P.C.) is the final decision of the Court intimated to the parties and to the world at large by formal "pronouncement" or "delivery" in open Court. It is a judicial act which must be performed in a judicial way. Small irregularities in the manner of pronouncement or the mode of delivery do not matter but the substance of the thing must be there; that can neither be blurred nor left to interference and conjecture nor can it be vague. All the rest the manner in which it is to be recorded, the way in which it is to be authenticated, the signing and the sealing, all the rules designed to secure certainty about its content and mailer can be cured; but not the hard core, namely, the formal intimation of the decision and its contents formally declared in a judicial way in open Court. The exact way in which this is done does not matter. In some Courts the judgment is delivered orally or read out, in some only the operative portion is pronounced, in some the judgment is merely signed after giving notice to the parties and laying the draft on the table for a given number of days for inspection.
(11) An important point therefore arises. It is evident that the decision which is so pronounced or intimated must be a declaration of the mind of the Court as it is at the time of pronouncement. We lay no stress on the mode or manner of delivery, as that is not of the essence, except to say that it must be done in a judicial way in open Court. But, however it is done, it must be an expression of the mind of the Court at the time of delivery. We say this because that is the first judicial act touching the judgment which the Court performs after the hearing. Everything else up till then is done out of Court and is not intended to be the operative act which sets all the consequences which follow on the judgment in motion. Judges may, and often do, discuss the matter among themselves and reach a tentative conclusion. That is not their judgment. They may write and exchange drafts. Those are not the judgments either, however heavily and often they may have been signed. The final operative act is that which is formally declared in open Court with the intention of making it the operative decision of the Court. That is what constitutes the 'judgment'."
In paragraph 14 the Supreme Court has observed as follows:
"As soon as the judgment is delivered, that becomes the operative pronouncement of the Court. The law then provides for the manner in which it is to be authenticated and made certain. The rules regarding this differ but they do not form the essence of the matter and if there is irregularity in carrying them out it is curable. Thus, if a judgment happens not to be signed and is inadvertently acted on and executed, the proceedings consequent on it would be valid because the judgment, if it can be shown to have been validly delivered, would stand good despite defects in the mode of its subsequent authentication."
17. The question is whether in the instant case the judgment has been validly delivered. If it is a mere procedural irregularity in that the Judge concerned had not signed the judgment, then the judgment thus rendered cannot be invalidated.
18. Vinod Kumar Singh v. Banaras Hindu University and others, is relied on by the learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Somayaji for the proposition that once the stage to pronounce judgment is reached and the Court pronounces the judgment, the same should not be reopened unless there be some exceptional circumstances or a review is asked for and is granted. In the case before the Supreme Court, the records showed that the judgment was pronounced in open Court and the writ petition was allowed. However, the judgment was not signed. The Bench concerned released the case and issued direction that the case be listed for further hearing. The Supreme Court held that, "In the absence of exceptional circumstances, the judgment delivered orally in open Court must be taken to be final."
The Supreme Court referred to it's earlier decision in Surendra Singh's Case, and followed the same.
19. Having regard to the facts of the present case, in my view, the decision does not help the case of the respondent.
20. In Puvvada Narasimhamurthy v. Gadi Satyavathi and others, a learned single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court referred to the judgment in Holtby v. Hodgson, 1889 (24) QBD 103 wherein it is observed as follows:
"The expression "whether" where any judgment is pronounced by the Court or a Judge in Court is intended to contrast with the well-known expression the Court or a Judge in many other rules, that is to say, to exclude the case of a Judge sitting in Chambers; and the intention of the rule clearly is that, from the moment when the Judge has pronounced judgment and entry of the judgment has been made, the judgment is to take effect not from the date of the entry, but from the date of its being pronounced, it is an effective judgment from the day when it is pronounced by the Judge in Court."
The learned Judge has further observed as follows:
"Moreover, under Order 20 Rule 1, C.P.C. the Court after the case has been heard, shall pronounce judgment in open Court by dictation to Shorthand Writer, wherever it is permissible. It bears the date on which it is pronounced. The date of the judgment is never altered by the date on which the signature has been put subsequently. The date of the decree under Order 20, Rule 7, C.P.C. would also be the date on which the judgment was pronounced. It is therefore clear that under the C.P.C. stress is laid upon the pronouncement or delivery of the judgment as a judicial act, which has got legal effect."
21. This decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court would apply only when the judgment has been fully dictated. The mere fact that a major issue has been answered by the learned Judge in the judgment already dictated will not by itself lead to the conclusion that the judgment had been delivered.
22. In Smt. Basanti Devi and others v. Abdul Sattar and others, the decision of the Privy Council in Firm Gokal chand etc., AIR 1938 PC 292 was referred to and followed. The facts were also identical.
23. In Smt. Swaran Lata Ghosh v. Harendra Kumar Banerjee and another, in a suit in which the pleadings of the parties raised substantial issues of fact for trial, the trial Court after holding a lengthy trial merely decreed the claim without delivering a judgment and in the appeal in which several grounds on merits were raised, the High Court also merely recorded that the plaintiff had sufficiently proved the case, it was held by the Supreme Court that "there had been no real trial of the defendant's case". It would be worthwhile to reproduce paragraph 6 of that judgment.
"Trial of a civil dispute in Court is intended to achieve, according to law and the procedure of the Court, a judicial determination between the contesting parties of the matter in controversy. Opportunity to the parties interested in the dispute to present their respective cases on question of taw as well as fact, ascertainment of facts by means of evidence tendered by the parties and adjudication by a reasoned judgment of the dispute upon a finding on the facts in controversy and application of the law to the facts found, are essential attributes of a judicial trial. In a judicial trial the Judge not only must reach a conclusion which he regards as just, but, unless otherwise permitted, by the practice of the Court or by law, he must record the ultimate mental process leading from the dispute to its solution. A judicial determination of a disputed claim where substantial questions of law or fact arise is satisfactorily reached, only if it be supported by the most cogent reasons that suggest themselves to the Judge; a mere order deciding the matter in dispute not supported by reasons is no judgment at all. Recording of reasons in support of a decision of a disputed claim serves more purposes than one. It is intended to ensure that the decision is not the result of whim or fancy, but of a judicial approach to the matter in contest; it is also intended to ensure adjudication of the matter according to law and the procedure established by law. A party to the dispute is ordinarily entitled to know the grounds on which the Court has decided against him, and more so, when the judgment is subject to appeal. The Appellate Court will then have adequate material on which it may 'determine whether the facts are properly ascertained, the law has been correctly applied and the resultant decision is just. It is unfortunate that the learned Trial Judge has recorded no reasons in support of his conclusion, and the High Court in appeal merely recorded that they thought that the plaintiff had sufficiently proved the case in the plaint."
24. In Beni Madho Prasad Singh v. Adit and others, a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, in a case where the judgment of the High Court in a civil case had been dictated and transcribed had not been signed, had gone to the extent of saying that there was no final disposal of the case as according to the learned Judges so long as the transcript had not been signed, the power of the Court to reconsider its order or rehear a case was not put an end to. In that case, the stage of dating and signing the judgment was not reached and it was. therefore held that, "the jurisdiction of the Court to reconsider its order, if it deems desirable, and order a rehearing of the case continued and by reason of the provisions contained in Rule 3 or Order 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, jurisdiction of the Court to reconsider and rehear a case will cease only when a judgment has been signed."
The Bench of the Allahabad High Court also referred to the provisions of Order 41 and Rule 31 as amended by the Allahabad High Court and concluded that the case had not been legally disposed of by the Court.
25. In Chowaram Bachan v. Thanuram and others, a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court relied on Surendra Singh's Case, and held that, "the declaration by a Judge of his Intention of what his 'judgment' is going to be, or a declaration of his Intention of what final result it Is going to embody, is not a judgment until he had crystallised his intentions into a formal shape and pronounced it in open Court as the final expression of his mind."
The Bench distinguished the decision of the Privy Council in Firm Gokal Chand's Case, AIR 1938 PC 292 in the following manner:
"The Code of Civil Procedure does not envisage the writing of a judgment after deciding the case by an oral judgment and it must not be resorted to and it would be against public policy to ascertain by evidence aliunde what the 'judgment' of the Court was, where the final result was announced orally but the 'judgment', as defined in the Code of Civil Procedure embodying a concise statement of the case, the points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for such decision, was finalised later on."
26. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in Balraj Taneja and another v. Sunil Madan and another, in an extreme case where written statement had not been filed before the Court it has been held that, "the Court ought not to act blindly or mechanically and pass judgment. The Court ought to be cautious and only on being satisfied that there is no fact which needs to be proved despite being in admission, should proceed to pass a judgment."
That was a case where no written statement was filed in a suit for specific performance. A decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff under Order 8 Rule 10. The Division Bench confirmed it. Having regard to the specific pleadings by the plaintiff that the defendants had obtained the requisite income-tax clearance though they had insisted that they had obtained the certificate and had sent it to the plaintiff and the plaintiff denying that the certificate had been obtained and sent to him, it was held that, "the non-filing of the written statement would not resolve the controversy and the Court was clearly in error in passing a decree under Order 8 Rule 10. C.P.C."
The Supreme Court in paragraphs 41 and 42 has observed as follows:
"41. There is yet another infirmity in the case which relates to the "judgment" passed by the single Judge and upheld by the Division Bench.
42. "Judgment" as defined in Section 2(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure means the statement given by the Judge of the grounds for a decree or order. What a judgment should contain is indicated in Order 20 Rule " 4 (2) which says that a judgment "shall contain a concise statement of the case, the points for determination, the decision thereon, and the reasons for such decision".
It should be a self-contained document from which it should appear as to what were the facts of the case and what was the controversy which was tried to be settled by the Court and in what manner. The process of reasoning by which the Court came to the ultimate conclusion and decreed the suit should be reflected clearly in the judgment."
The Supreme Court referred to and approved the decision of the Karnataka High Court in Thippaiah v. Kuri Obaiah, ILR 1980 (2) Kar. 1028 wherein it has been said that, "the Court must stale the grounds for its conclusion in the judgment and the judgment should be in conformity with the provisions of Section 2(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure."
as also the decision of the Patna High Court in Dineshwar Prasad Bakshi v. Parmeshwar Prasad Sinha, wherein it has been held that, "the judgment pronounced under Order 8 Rule 10 must satisfy the requirement of "judgment" as defined in Section 2(9) of the Code."
27. If that is the position even with regard to non-contested matters, in the case of contested matters it is mandatory that the judgment should be complete in all respects before it is delivered.
28. In. S.M. Mukerji v. Union of India, it has been held by the Supreme Court that, "the need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. A decision without reasons is like grass without root. The requirement to record reasons is one of the principles of natural justice as well. Where a statute required recording of reasons in support of the order, it must be done by the authorities concerned."
29. It has already been noticed that the learned Judge had not completed the judgment before he delivered his decision, it should be deemed that there is no judgment in the eye of law. He had not completed the judgment. There was no earthly reason why he should venture to give his decision. The least that he could have done was to reopen the case, complete the judgment and then pronounce the same. There was no particular hurry to deliver the judgment on the 24th. He had reserved orders on the 12th. He could have delivered the judgment on the 25th or even on 27th. Heavens were not going to fall. Inasmuch as there was no judgment in the eye of law on the date he purported to pronounce the judgment, the judgment now available should be held to be no judgment at all. The civil revision petition will stand allowed and the "judgment" dated 24.3.1999 will stand set aside. The matter is remitted to the present Seventh Assistant City Civil Judge, who will hear arguments afresh, and give a decision. There will, however, be no Order as to costs. Consequently, the miscellaneous petitions C.M.P.Nos.10253 to 10255/99 are closed.