Karnataka High Court
The Workmen Of Gowribidanur Sahakari ... vs The Management Of Gowribidanur ... on 21 September, 1988
Equivalent citations: 1989(1)KARLJ32, (1993)IIILLJ552KANT
ORDER Balakrishna, J.
1. This Writ Petition is directed against the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal in Ka-rnataka, Bangalore, dated 14.8.1985 in Misc. Application No, 3 of 1984 rejecting the application of the writ petitioner for setting aside the ex parte award passed in I.D. No. 2 of 1977 and for restoration of the original reference for disposal on merits.
2. It is not necessary to go into details of the case for the purpose of considering whether the 2nd respondent was justified in rejecting the application of the petitioner for restoration of the reference.
3. On 3.9.1984, the petitioner did not appear before the Tribunal even up to 4 p.m. and, therefore, the case was posted to the next day for passing an award. On 4.9.1984, the Tribunal passed an award rejecting the reference. Thereafter, the petitioner filed Misc. Application No. 3 of 1984 for setting aside the ex parte award. The Tribunal, after considering the application, held that there was no sufficient cause for non-appearance on 3.9.1984 and it, therefore, rejected the application. It is no doubt true that the petitioner had knowledge of the rejection of the reference on 21.9.1984 as admitted by the petitioner. But it is only after a lapse of 3 months the petitioner filed the application for setting aside the ex parte award. What the law contemplates is the right to file an application to set aside the ex parte award 30 days after the publication of the award. However, it is also a fact that at the relevant point of time, the award had not yet been published, but the Tribunal held that the non-publication of the award and the resultant delay in filing the application for setting aside the ex parte award cannot be regarded as a sufficient cause. I do not think that the Tribunal was justified in coming to such a conclusion because the law itself provides that an application could be filed for restoration only after 30 days subsequent to the publication of the award. Therefore, the Tribunal was in error as regards the question of delay.
4. It is no doubt true that adjudication of disputes and passing of awards should be expeditious and delay in disposal should be minimised to the extent possible. But in the circumstances of the case, on a perusal of the order passed by the Tribunal, I find that the Tribunal was more obsessed with the tendency of the petitioner to take numerous adjournments which resulted in procrastination of the proceedings than on any other tangible or valid ground. It is no doubt true that the conduct of the petitioner in dragging on the proceedings taking numerous adjournments ought not to be encouraged but, at the same time, an application for restoration of the reference and for setting aside an ex parte award, cannot be based on such considerations. It appears to me that the other ground on which the Tribunal has rejected the application for restoration, viz., on the question of delay in approaching the Tribunal for restoration is not valid as observed earlier. I do not see any justification for rejecting the application of the petitioner.
5. Particularly in cases wherein disputes are referred for adjudication before the Industrial Tribunal as between the labour and the management, it would invariably result in denial of justice if merely on the ground of absence before the Tribunal on a particular date of hearing the reference itself is rejected and the very purpose of adjudication defeated. What is of greater interest and importance is the necessity to dispose of a dispute referred to the Tribunal for adjudication on merits after enquiry and after affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the parties. Though the statute may not provide for a disposal of the dispute on merits in the absence of the parties, the requirements of justice demand that, in any event, adjudication ought to be on merits and exparte rejection of the reference does not amount to adjudication of a dispute.
6. For the reasons stated above, rule is issued and made absolute. The Writ Petition is allowed. The impugned order is quashed and Misc. Application No. 3 of 1984 is allowed. The Tribunal is directed to dispose of I.D. No. 2 of 1977 on merits and in accordance with law.