Kerala High Court
Thoufeeq vs State Of Kerala on 4 December, 2024
Author: Bechu Kurian Thomas
Bench: Bechu Kurian Thomas
O.P.(Crl.) No.123/24 1
2024:KER:91186
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BECHU KURIAN THOMAS
WEDNESDAY, THE 4TH DAY OF DECEMBER 2024 / 13TH AGRAHAYANA, 1946
OP(CRL.) NO. 123 OF 2024
AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 19.12.2023 IN CRL.RP NO.23/2023 OF
SESSIONS COURT, PALAKKAD
AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 10.02.2023 IN CMP NO.709/2020 IN CC
NO.473/2018 OF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE OF FIRST CLASS, PATTAMBI
PETITIONER/REVISION PETITIONER/DEFACTO COMPLAINANT:
THOUFEEQ,
AGED 43 YEARS, S/O HAMSA HAJI,
CC MANZIL,
VALAVANNUR, TIRUR TALUK,
MALAPPURAM DISTRICT, PIN - 676551
(MANAGING PARTNER, M/S SHALIMAR GRANITE,
PUTHIYA ROAD, VALLAPUZHA,
PALAKKAD),
BY ADVS.
SRI.V.M.KRISHNAKUMAR
SMT.P.R.REENA
SRI.RANJITH THAMPAN (SR.)
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS/STATE & ACCUSED:
1 STATE OF KERALA
REPRESENTED BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT OF KERALA,
ERNAKULAM, PIN - 682031
2 STATION HOUSE OFFICER,
PATTAMBI POLICE STATION,
PATTAMBI, KERALA, PIN - 679303
O.P.(Crl.) No.123/24 2
2024:KER:91186
3 VARGHESE,
AGED 55 YEARS, S/O OUSEPH,
MANDY HOUSE,
CHIRANGARA, KORATTY SOUTH POST,
THRISSUR, PIN - 680308
(MANAGING PARTNER, M/S SHALIMAR GRANITE,
PUTHIYA ROAD, VALLAPUZHA,
PALAKKAD),
BY ADVS.
SRI.C.N.PRABHAKARAN, PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
SRI.PAULSON M.J.
SRI.JINO JOSE
THIS OP (CRIMINAL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 04.11.2024,
THE COURT ON 04.12.2024 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
O.P.(Crl.) No.123/24 3
2024:KER:91186
"C.R."
BECHU KURIAN THOMAS, J.
--------------------------------
O.P.(Crl.) No.123 of 2024
---------------------------------
Dated this the 4th day of December, 2024
JUDGMENT
The question that arises in this case is whether a Magistrate is precluded from directing registration of an FIR, despite the commencement of proceedings under section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
2. Petitioner challenges an order of discharge of the accused in C.C. No.473/2018 on the files of the Judicial First Class Magistrate's Court, Pattambi. Petitioner was the defacto complainant in Crime No.661/2017 of the Pattambi Police Station. The crime was registered alleging that the accused and the defacto complainant along with CWs 2 and 3 had started a partnership business by the name 'M/s.Shalimar Granite'. During the period between 2010- 2016, the accused allegedly forged the partnership deed and other documents for cheating the defacto complainant and others and fraudulently obtained property and subsequently submitted those documents to the authorities knowing that those are forged and thereby committed the offences under sections 406, 417, 465, 468 and 475 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short 'IPC'). In a nutshell, the complainant alleged that the partnership deed contained a forged schedule, which was not part of the original deed and listed the private properties of the petitioner and that of his brother, who was not O.P.(Crl.) No.123/24 4 2024:KER:91186 even a partner of the firm.
3. After the complaint was filed before the Judicial First Class Magistrate's Court, Pattambi, the learned Magistrate proceeded to conduct an enquiry under section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short 'Cr.P.C') and called for a report from the Station House Officer. By communication dated 09.10.2017, the SHO stated that since the accused was not cooperating with the enquiry and as documents are required to be recovered, without the registration of a crime, the actual facts cannot be brought to light. On the basis of the aforesaid report, the learned Magistrate had initiated an enquiry under section 202 Cr.P.C, and issued an order under section 156(3) Cr.P.C on 02.01.2017 directing registration of a crime by forwarding the complaint to the SHO. Pursuant thereto, the police registered an F.I.R as Crime No.661/2017 of Pattambi Police Station and after completing the investigation, a final report was filed on 16.04.2018 alleging offences punishable under the sections mentioned earlier. After receipt of the final report, the learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence as C.C. No.473/2018. After the accused entered appearance, he filed an application as CMP No.709/2020 for a discharge.
4. The learned Magistrate allowed the discharge application by Ext.P8 impugned order, after concluding that though the accused had committed the offences under sections 465, 416 and 471 IPC, the registration of the crime and consequent submission of the final report was based on a complaint which was mistakenly forwarded to the police for investigation. It was however observed that that the allegations regarding the offences under sections 406 O.P.(Crl.) No.123/24 5 2024:KER:91186 and 417 IPC are groundless.
5. The order of discharge was challenged by the petitioner before the Sessions Court, Palakkad. However, by the impugned order dated 19.12.2023 in Crl.R.P No.23/2023, the learned Sessions Judge dismissed the said revision and affirmed the order of discharge. Petitioner challenges the aforesaid two orders.
6. Sri. Ranjith Thampan, the learned Senior Counsel instructed by Sri. V.M.Krishnakumar, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the order of discharge of the accused for the offences under sections 465, 468 and 471 of IPC is patently erroneous and is liable to be interfered with. According to the learned Senior Counsel, even after initiating proceedings under section 202 Cr.P.C, nothing prevented the learned Magistrate from referring the case under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. The learned Senior Counsel vehemently contended that the powers of the Magistrate to order investigation are not curtailed by the proceedings initiated under section 202 Cr.P.C. It was also submitted that since the report of the SHO indicated that recovery of documents was essential and without registration of a crime the offences cannot be probed into effectively, the learned Magistrate was justified in directing registration of an F.I.R.
7. Sri. Paulson M.J., the learned counsel appearing for the 3 rd respondent on the other hand contended that the decisions of the learned Magistrate as well as that of the Sessions Court do not warrant any interference as the same are legally and factually proper and no perversity can be attributed to them. It was further submitted that since registration of the F.I.R itself was without O.P.(Crl.) No.123/24 6 2024:KER:91186 authority, the very foundation was illegal and hence the discharge of the accused was just and proper. The learned Counsel submitted that after taking cognizance of the offence, the Magistrate could not have directed the registration of an FIR.
8. I have considered the rival contentions.
9. The facts of the case are hardly disputed. The accused was being proceeded against for the offences under sections 406, 417, 465, 468 and 471 IPC. The Magistrate discharged the accused for all the above offences. Since the Magistrate found that the allegations under sections 406 and 417 IPC are groundless on the basis of the materials collected by the Investigating Officer, the discharge of the accused for those offences does not warrant any interference.
10. As far as the offences under sections 465, 468 and 471 IPC are concerned, the learned Magistrate found that there are sufficient grounds to presume that the accused had committed those offences. However, the accused was discharged solely on the ground that the complaint was mistakenly forwarded for registration of the F.I.R.
11. After concluding that there are materials to justify the criminal proceeding for the offences under sections 465, 468 and 471 IPC, the learned Magistrate discharged the accused solely because the proceedings under section 202 Cr.P.C had started and the FIR was directed to be registered during that process. In this context, it is necessary to extract section 202 Cr.P.C as well as section 156 of Cr.P.C.
O.P.(Crl.) No.123/24 7
2024:KER:91186 "202. Postponement of issue of process.
(1) Any Magistrate, on receipt of a complaint of an offence of which he is authorised to take cognizance or which has been made over to him under section 192 may, if he thinks fit, [and shall, in a case where the accused is residing at a place beyond the area in which he exercises his jurisdiction]. [Inserted by Act 25 of 2005, Section 19 (w.e.f. 23-6- 2006).] postpone the issue of process against the accused, and either inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit, for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding :
PROVIDED that no such direction for investigation shall be made -
(a) where it appears to the Magistrate that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Session; or
(b) where the complaint has not been made by a Court, unless the complainant and the witnesses present (if any) have been examined on oath under section 200.
(2) In an inquiry under sub-section (1), the Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, take evidence of witnesses on oath :
PROVIDED that if it appears to the Magistrate that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, he shall call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath.
(3) If an investigation under sub-section (1) is made by a person not being a police officer, he shall have for that investigation all the powers conferred by this Court on an officer-in-charge of a police station except the power to arrest without warrant."
"156. Police Officer's power to investigate cognizable cases.
(1) Any officer-in-charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII.
(2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate.
(3) Any Magistrate empowered under section 190 may order such an investigation as above mentioned."
12. Under section 156 Cr.P.C, the Magistrate has the discretion either to direct the registration of a case or to conduct an inquiry, if the situation so O.P.(Crl.) No.123/24 8 2024:KER:91186 warrants. In a recent decision in XYZ v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others [(2023) 9 SCC 705], the Supreme Court observed that in cases where a detailed probe or retrieval of documents is necessary, it is only appropriate that the Magistrate directs an investigation by the police after registering an F.I.R.
13. However if a Magistrate, instead of directing the registration of an F.I.R., proceeds to examine the complainant and postpones the issue of process, he is entitled to inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation by a police officer for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding with the case. The title of the section itself indicates that it is a stage when the issue of process has been postponed. The scope of inquiry under section 202 Cr.P.C has been considered by the Supreme Court in National Bank of Oman v. Barakara Abdul Aziz and another [(2013) 2 SCC 488] where the Court held that investigation under Section 202 CrPC is different from the investigation contemplated in Section 156 as the former is only for enabling the Magistrate to decide whether or not there is sufficient ground for him to proceed further. The scope of inquiry under Section 202 CrPC is, therefore limited to (i) the ascertainment of truth or falsehood of the allegations made in the complaint on the materials placed by the complainant before the court; (ii) for the limited purpose of finding out whether a prima facie case for the issue of process has been made out; and (iii) for deciding the question purely from the point of view of the complainant without at all adverting to any defence that the accused may have.
14. In this context, it is also relevant to refer to the decision in Ramdev O.P.(Crl.) No.123/24 9 2024:KER:91186 Food Products Private Limited v. State of Gujarat [(2015) 6 SCC 439], wherein after referring to Section 156(3) and Section 202(1) the Court observed that though the two provisions are in two different chapters of the Code unless the context otherwise requires, the same expression in two provisions of an enactment must be interpreted in the same sense. It was further held that the report sought under section 202 Cr.P.C has only a limited purpose of deciding "whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding." The Court further observed that when the procedure under S.202 is initiated, it is a reflection that even after taking cognizance, the Magistrate has not yet decided to proceed further.
15. While interpreting section 190 Cr.P.C, it has been held in several cases that section 202 Cr.P.C falls within the post-cognizance stage while section 156(3) Cr.P.C is at the pre-cognizance stage. Earlier, Supreme Court decisions have observed that once cognizance is taken, the Magistrate cannot revert to the pre-cognizance stage and direct an FIR to be registered under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. Reference in this context has to be made to the decision in Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy and Others v. V. Narayana Reddy and Others [(1976) 3 SCC 252] which was followed in Tula Ram and Others v. Kishore Singh [(1977) 4 SCC 459]. After referring to the other decisions, Supreme Court had, in the latter case laid down the following propositions:
"Thus on a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, the following legal propositions emerge :
1. That a Magistrate can order investigation under Section 156(3) only at the pre-cognizance state, that is to say, before taking cognizance under Sections 190, 200 and 204 and where a Magistrate decides to take cognizance under the provisions of Chapter 14 he is not entitled in O.P.(Crl.) No.123/24 10 2024:KER:91186 law to order any investigation under Section 156(3) though in cases not falling within the proviso to Section 202 he can order an investigation by the police which would be in the nature of an enquiry as contemplated by Section 202 of the Code.
2. Where a Magistrate chooses to take cognizance he can adopt any of the following alternatives :
(a) He can peruse the complaint and if satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding he can straightaway issue process to the accused but before he does so he must comply with the requirements of Section 200 and record the evidence of the complainant or his witnesses.
(b) The Magistrate can postpone the issue of process and direct an enquiry by himself.
(c) The Magistrate can postpone the issue of process and direct an enquiry by any other person or an investigation by the police.
3. In case the Magistrate after considering the statement of the complainant and the witnesses or as a result of the investigation and the enquiry ordered is not satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding he can dismiss the complaint."
16. A series of decisions have followed the dictum laid down in Tula Ram's case (supra) which remained settled as a proposition of law. In the instant case, the learned Sessions Judge also relied upon the decision in Srinivas Gundluri and Others v. M/s. Sepco Electric Power Construction Corporation and Others [(2010) 8 SCC 206] and held that once cognizance is taken, the Magistrate cannot revert to the pre-cognizance stage and direct an FIR to be registered under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. Srinivas Gundluri's case (supra) also had relied upon the decision in Tula Ram's case.
17. However, in Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya and Others v. State of Gujarat and Another [(2019) 17 SCC 1], a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the legal position in Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy's case (supra) was not good law. It was held as follows:
"27. Whereas it is true that Section 156(3) remains unchanged even O.P.(Crl.) No.123/24 11 2024:KER:91186 after the 1973 Code has been brought into force, yet the 1973 Code has one very important addition, namely, Section 173(8), which did not exist under the 1898 Code. As we have noticed earlier in this judgment, Section 2(h) of the 1973 Criminal Procedure Code defines "investigation" in the same terms as the earlier definition contained in Section 2(l) of the 1898 Criminal Procedure Code with this difference - that "investigation" after the 1973 Code has come into force will now include all the proceedings under the CrPC for collection of evidence conducted by a police officer. "All" would clearly include proceedings under Section 173(8) as well. Thus, when Section 156(3) states that a Magistrate empowered under S.190 may order "such an investigation", such Magistrate may also order further investigation under Section 173(8), regard being had to the definition of "investigation" contained in Section 2(h).
28. Section 2(h) is not noticed by the aforesaid judgment at all, resulting in the erroneous finding in law that the power under Section 156(3) can only be exercised at the pre-cognizance stage. The "investigation" spoken of in Section 156(3) would embrace the entire process, which begins with the collection of evidence and continues until charges are framed by the Court, at which stage the trial can be said to have begun. For these reasons, the statement of the law contained in paragraph 17 in Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy (supra) cannot be relied upon." (emphasis supplied)
18. To better comprehend the above proposition, it is necessary to extract paragraph 17 of Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy's case (supra) which reads as below:
"Section 156(3) occurs in Chapter XII, under the caption: "Information to the Police and their powers to investigate"; while Section 202 is in Chapter XV which bears the heading "Of complaints to Magistrates". The power to order police investigation under S.156(3) is different from the power to direct investigation conferred by S.202(1). The two operate in distinct spheres at different stages. The first is exercisable at the pre-O.P.(Crl.) No.123/24 12
2024:KER:91186 cognizance stage, the second at the post-cognizance stage when the magistrate is in seisin of the case. That is to say in the case of a complaint regarding the commission of a cognizable offence, the power under Section 156(3) can be invoked by the Magistrate before he takes cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(a). But if he once takes such cognizance and embarks upon the procedure embodied in Chapter XV, he is not competent to switch back to the pre-cognizance stage and avail of Section 156(3). It may be noted further that an order made under sub-section (3) of Section 156, is in the nature of a peremptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise their plenary powers of investigation under Section 156(1). Such an investigation embraces the entire continuous process which begins with the collection of evidence under Section 156 and ends with a report or charge-sheet under Section
173. On the other hand, Section 202 comes in at a stage when some evidence has been collected by the Magistrate in proceedings under Chapter XV, but the same is deemed insufficient to take a decision as to the next step in the prescribed procedure. In such a situation, the Magistrate is empowered under Section 202 to direct, within the limits circumscribed by that section, an investigation "for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding." Thus the object of an investigation under S.202 is not to initiate a fresh case on police report but to assist the Magistrate in completing proceedings already instituted upon a complaint before him." (emphasis supplied).
19. The statement of law laid down in paragraph 17 of the above judgment is the underlined portion. As per the judgment in Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya's case, the statement of law in paragraph 17 of Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy's case is not good law. Of course, the question in Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya's case was regarding the power of the Magistrate to order further investigation. However, the observations in paragraphs 27 and 28 of the said judgment even if it is assumed to be an obiter dictum, is nevertheless binding on the High Courts as held in Sarwan O.P.(Crl.) No.123/24 13 2024:KER:91186 Singh Lamba and Others v. Union of India and Others [(1995) 4 SCC 546] and Municipal Committee, Amritsar v. Hazara Singh [AIR 1975 SC 1087]. Hence it has to be perceived that there is no embargo on the Magistrate reverting to section 156(3) Cr.P.C even after commencing the proceedings under section 202 Cr.P.C. Thus there is no illegality if the Magistrate exercises the power under section 156(3) Cr.P.C, even at the post cognizance stage, but before the charges are framed. A Magistrate is thus not precluded from directing registration of an FIR in appropriate cases, despite the commencement of proceedings under section 202 Cr.P.C.
20. In this context, it needs to be mentioned that there was a time when confusion prevailed regarding when cognizance is to be taken in a case. The Supreme Court finally held in R. R. Chari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (AIR 1951 SC 207) that cognizance is taken at the initial stage when the Magistrate applies his judicial mind to the facts mentioned in the complaint or a police report or upon information received from any other person that an offence has been committed. The words employed in section 200 Cr.P.C that "A Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence..." created the doubts. However, in the new statute i.e., Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita 2023, the position has been made clear as evident from the first proviso to section 223. The aforementioned provision reads as follows: "provided that no cognizance of an offence shall be taken without giving the accused an opportunity of being heard". Hence after the coming into force of the new statute, cognizance is taken only after the accused appears and he is heard. This is a marked departure and sets at rest the confusion regarding when the cognizance was O.P.(Crl.) No.123/24 14 2024:KER:91186 taken.
21. Be that as it may, in the instant case, the accused was discharged solely on the ground that the complaint was wrongly forwarded for registration of the F.I.R after cognizance was taken, during the stage of section 202 Cr.P.C. In view of the decision in Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya's case, there is no restriction on a Magistrate exercising such powers. Hence, the procedure adopted by the learned Magistrate in the instant case is neither irregular or illegal.
22. Accordingly, the order dated 10-02-2023 in C.M.P No.709/2020 in C.C. No.473/2018 on the files of the Judicial First Class Magistrate's Court, Pattambi, is set aside to the extent it has discharged the accused under sections 465, 468 and 471 IPC. The impugned order of the Sessions Court, Palakkad in Crl.R.P No.23/2023 is also set aside to the above extent.
The original petition is allowed as above.
Sd/-
BECHU KURIAN THOMAS JUDGE vps O.P.(Crl.) No.123/24 15 2024:KER:91186 APPENDIX OF OP(CRL.) 123/2024 PETITIONER'S/S' EXHIBITS Exhibit P1 TRUE COPY OF THE ACTUAL PARTNERSHIP DEED DATED 16.12.2006 EXECUTED BETWEEN C.C.THOUFEEQ, C.C.HAMZA HAJI, M.O.VARGHESE AND K.S.BINOY Exhibit P2 TRUE COPY OF THE PARTNERSHIP DEED 16.12.2006, FORGED BY THE 3RD RESPONDENT AS OBTAINED BY PETITIONER UNDER THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION ACT FROM THE TALUK OFFICE PATTAMBI Exhibit P3 TRUE COPY OF CMP NO.1473/2017 FILED BEFORE THE JUDICIAL FIRST CLASS MAGISTRATE COURT PATTAMBI Exhibit P4 TRUE COPY OF REPORT OF THE POLICE SUB INSPECTOR, PATTAMBI POLICE STATION IN CMP NO.1473/2017 DATED 09.10.2017 Exhibit P5 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER IN CMP NO.1473/2017 DATED 02.09.2017 OF THE COURT OF THE JUDICIAL FIRST CLASS MAGISTRATE, PATTAMBI Exhibit P6 TRUE COPY OF THE FIR IN CR. NO.661/2017 OF THE PATTAMBI POLICE STATION Exhibit P7 TRUE COPY OF THE FINAL REPORT IN CR.
NO.661/2017 OF THE PATTAMBI POLICE STATION DATED 16.4.2018 SUBMITTED BEFORE THE JUDICIAL FIRST CLASS MAGISTRATE COURT PATTAMBI Exhibit P8 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER OF THE COURT OF THE JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE OF FIRST CLASS PATTAMBI IN CMP NO.709/2020 IN CC NO.473/2018 DATED 10.02.2023 Exhibit P9 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER OF THE COURT OF SESSION, PALAKKAD DIVISION IN CRL.R.P. NO.23/2023 DATED 19.12.2023 RESPONDENT'S/S' EXHIBITS O.P.(Crl.) No.123/24 16 2024:KER:91186 Exhibit R3-1 TRUE COPY OF THE AGREEMENT FOR SALE DTD.
12/05/2006 Exhibit R3-2 TRUE COPY OF THE ORIGINAL PARTNERSHIP DEED DTD. 16/12/2006 Exhibit R3-3 TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DTD. 22/09/2017 IN B.A. NO.5500/2017 Exhibit R3-4 TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DTD. 06/12/2017 IN B.A. NO.7938/2017 Exhibit R3-5 TRUE COPY OF THE CONSENT WITH APPROVED PLAN TO ESTABLISH CRUSHER UNIT DTD. 13/11/2007 IN POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD PALAKKAD Exhibit R3-6 TRUE COPY OF CONSENT NO.PCB/RO/PLKD/ICE-
R/03/2010 OF KERALA STATE POLLUTION CONTROL
BOARD DTD. 12/04/2010
Exhibit R3-7 TRUE COPY OF CONSENT NO.
PCB/RO/PLKD/ICE/03/2014 OF KERALA STATE
POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD DTD. 26/02/2014
Exhibit R3-8 TRUE COPY OF THE APPLICATION WITH APPROVED
SITE PLAN IN VALLAPUZHA GRAMA PANCHAYATH
Exhibit R3-9 TRUE COPY OF THE CONSENT TO OPERATE M/S
SHALIMAR GRANITE QUARRY DTD. 30/11/2010 IN
POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD PALAKKAD
Exhibit R3-10 TRUE COPY OF THE LICENSE DTD. 11/05/2016 IN
VALLAPUZHA GRAMA PANCHAYATH
Exhibit R3-11 TRUE COPY OF APPLICATION DTD. 13/08/2015 WITH
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY C.C THOUFEEQ TO THE
MINING AND GEOLOGY DEPARTMENT
Exhibit R3-12 TRUE COPY OF APPLICATION DTD. 13/08/2015 WITH
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY C.C THOUFEEQ TO THE
MINING AND GEOLOGY DEPARTMENT
Exhibit R3-13 TRUE COPY OF THE BALANCE SHEET AS ON
31/03/2008 WITH SCHEDULE
Exhibit R3-14 TRUE COPY OF COMPLAINT DTD. 20/02/2016 TO SHO
PATTAMBI
O.P.(Crl.) No.123/24 17
2024:KER:91186
Exhibit R3-15 TRUE COPY OF COMPLAINT DTD. 22/02/2016 TO
SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE,PALAKKAD
Exhibit R3-16 TRUE COPY OF COMPLAINT DTD. 17/06/2016 TO SHO
PATTAMBI
Exhibit R3-17 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 08/09/2016 IN
WP(C) 30098/2016 OF THIS HON'BLE COURT
Exhibit R3-18 TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED 25/10/2016 IN
CONTEMPT CASE NO.1688/2016 OF THIS HON'BLE
COURT
Exhibit R3-19 TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DTD. 11/01/2017 IN
WP(C) NO: 39372/2016 OF HON'BLE HIGH COURT OF
KERALA
Exhibit R3-20 TRUE COPY OF THE MINUTES DTD. 07/12/2013
Exhibit R3-21 TRUE COPY OF THE MINUTES DTD. 10/07/2014
Exhibit R3-22 TRUE COPY OF THE MINUTES DTD. 12/11/2013
Exhibit R3-23 TRUE COPY OF THE MINUTES DTD. 09/09/2009
Exhibit R3-24 TRUE COPY OF AGREEMENTS EXECUTED BY K.S BINOY
Exhibit R3-25 DISCHARGE PETITION IN CRL. M.P NO: 709/2020
IN CC NO.473/2018 DATED 18/01/2020 BEFORE THE
JFCM PATTAMBI
Exhibit R3-26 COUNTER AFFIDAVIT DATED 01/12/2016 IN WP(C)
23175/2016
Exhibit R3-27 REPLY COUNTER AFFIDAVIT DATED 18/10/2016 IN
WP(C) 30098/2016