Karnataka High Court
Basappa Sangappa Unki vs Siddappa Bhimappa Hullyal on 11 October, 1990
Author: B.P. Singh
Bench: B.P. Singh
JUDGMENT B.P. Singh, J.
1. The sole question which arises for determination in this appeal is;-
"Whether the widows of Sangappa, namely Shivalingawwa and Shivawwa became absolute owners of the property bequeathed to them under a Will dated 10-5-1960 by their husband Sangappa providing for them only a life estate, having regard to the provisions of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act."
2. The facts of the case are not in dispute. Sangappa was the owner of the suit properties. He had two wives viz., Shivalingawwa and Shivawwa. He had no son. He had brought up the plaintiff/appellant as his son. It is an admitted fact that though he bestowed upon the plaintiff/appellant the love and affection of a son, the plaintiff/appellant was never adopted as a son. However, having regard to the love and affection which Sangappa and his two wives had for the plaintiff/appellant, a Will was executed on the 10th of May 1960 by Sangappa in respect of the suit properties, and that Will has also been signed by his two wives. In the Will it is stated that the properties mentioned therein are the properties of Sangappa and that after his death his two widows shall have possession and enjoyment of the properties for their life time without any right of alienation. After their death the properties shall go to the plaintiff/appellant as the absolute owner. There is therefore, no dispute that the Will of Sangappa created a life estate in favour of his two widows, and after their death an absolute estate in favour of the plaintiff/appellant.
3. It is also not in dispute that after Sangappa's death his two widows came in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties and later they sold the suit properties to respondent-1 on 21-10-1971 by registered sale deed. The plaintiff/appellant thereafter filed the instant suit for a declaration that the alienation made by the two widows was not binding upon him. The trial Court decreed the suit, but in appeal the learned Civil Judge set aside the decree and dismissed the suit holding that the widows having acquired a life estate under the Will in lieu of their pre-existing right of maintenance, their limited estate was enlarged into an absolute estate in view of the provisions of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. The correctness of this view has been assailed in this Appeal.
4. The learned Counsel for the appellant has relied upon two Decisions of the Supreme Court, I shall first consider the Judgments upon which reliance has been placed by Counsel for the appellant.
5. The first Judgment is . In that case a Bench of three Judges of the Supreme Court held that where a widow succeeded to the properties of her husband on the strength of a Will, she could not claim any rights in those properties over and above that given to her under the Will. Consequently the submission that her limited estate became an absolute estate by coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and particularly in view of the provisions of Section 14(1) of the Act, was negatived and it was held that the case was governed by the provisions of Section 14(2) of the Act. The Judgment of the Supreme Court is a brief Judgment and it does not refer to any earlier Decision of the Supreme Court.
The other Judgment relied upon by Counsel for the appellant is also a Decision of the Supreme Court rendered by a Bench consisting of two learned Judges . That was a case where the daughter took a life estate under the Will of the father. It was held that in view of the provisions of Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act which was applicable, the life estate would not be enlarged into an absolute state. The submission was noticed in paragraph 19 of the Judgment and it was rejected. There is no reference to any other Decision of the Supreme Court on the point.
6. I shall now consider the two Judgments relied upon by the respondent in support of the proposition that where a widow acquires a life estate under the Will and comes in possession of the properties bequeathed to her, she enlarges her limited estate into an absolute state in view of the provisions of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act.
In AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1944, a three member Bench of the Supreme Court after considering the provisions of Section 14 of the Act and referring to the decided cases of various High Courts concluded thus:-
"Now, Sub-section (2) of Section 14 provides that nothing contained in Sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a Will or any other instrument or under a decree order of a Civil Court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribed a restricted state in such property. This provision is more in the nature of a proviso or exception to Sub-section (1) and it was regarded as such by this Court in Badri Pershad v. Smt. Kanso Devi . It excepts certain kinds of acquisition of property by a Hindu female from the operation of Sub-section (1) and being in the nature of an exception to a provision which is calculated to achieve a social purpose by bringing about change in the social and economic position of women in Hindu Society, it must be construed strictly so as to impinge as little as possible on the broad sweep of the ameliorative provision contained in subsection (1). It cannot be interpreted in a manner which would rob Sub-section (1) of its efficacy and deprive a Hindu female of the protection sought to be given to her by Sub-section (1). The language of Sub-section (2) is apparently wide to include acquisition of property by a Hindu female under an instrument or a decree or order or award where the instrument, decree, order or award prescribed a restricted estate for her in the property and this would apparently cover a case where property is given to a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of maintenance and the instrument, decree, order or award giving such property prescribes limited interest for her in the property. But that would virtually emasculate Sub-section (1), for in that event, a large number of cases where property is given to a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of maintenance under an instrument, order or 3. Vaddeboyina Tulasamma and Ors. v. Vaddeboyina Sesha Reddy (Dead) by L. Rs. award would be excluded from the operation of the beneficient provision enacted in Sub-section (1), since in most of such cases, where property is allotted to Hindu female prior to the enactment of the Act, there would be a provision, in consonance with the old Sastric law then prevailing, prescribing limited interest in the property and where property is given to the Hindu female subsequent to the enactment of the Act, it would be the easiest thing for the dominant male to provide that the Hindu female shall have only a restricted interest in the property and thus make a mockery of Sub-section (1). The Explanation to Sub-section (1) which includes within the scope of that sub-section property acquired by a female Hindu at a partition or in lieu of maintenance would also be rendered meaningless, because there would hardly be a few cases where the instrument, decree, order or award giving property to a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of maintenance would not contain a provision prescribing restricted estate in the property. The social purpose of the law would be frustrated and the reformist zeal underlying the statutory provision would be chilled. That surely could never have been the intention of the Legislature in enacting Sub-section (2) It is an elementary Rule of construction that no provision of a statute should be construed in isolation but it should be construed with reference to the context and in the light of other provisions of the statute so as, as far as possible to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute. Sub-section (2) must therefore, be read in the context of Sub-section (1) so as to leave as large a scope for operation as possible to Sub-section (1) and so read, it must be confined to cases where property is acquired by a female Hindu for any pre-existing rights, under a gift, award the terms of which prescribe a restricted estate in the property."
It was further held that where property is allotted to a widow under an instrument, decree, order or award which prescribes a restricted estate for her in the property, Sub-section (2) of Section 14 would have, no application if the widow acquired the limited estate in lieu of satisfaction of her right to maintenance.
7. It appears that the Judgment of the Supreme Court in was not brought to the notice of the Court, because in paragraph 13 of the Judgment, Fazal Ali, J. observed that there was no Decision of the Supreme Court which was directly in point, though there were some Decisions which support the view taken by the Bombay High Court. Obviously the decision of the Supreme Court in was not brought to the notice of the Court, nor was it considered.
The Judgment of the Supreme Court in Tulasamma's case was followed in AIR 1978 Supreme Court 361. Even in this Judgment there is no reference to the earliest Judgment of the Supreme Court .
8. It appears that there is a conflict of Judicial opinion as evidenced by these Decisions of the Supreme Court. All Judgments of the Supreme Court are binding upon this Court and therefore it has to be seen as to which of them most appropriately apply to the facts of this case. In the instant case a submission was made before the Courts below that the widows having been given a life estate in recognition of their pre-existing right of maintenance, the case was governed by Section 14(1) and not Section 14(2) of Hindu Succession Act. That was precisely the question raised in AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1944 and AIR 1978 Supreme Court 361. This precise question was answered in favour of the party contending that such limited estate was enlarged into an absolute estate by application of the Rule under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, and that Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act did not apply to such a case. This specific point was neither raised nor considered by the Supreme Court in and though what was observed in those two Judgments would certainly help the plaintiff/appellant in this Appeal. The proposition of law stated in those two Judgments are wide enough and permit of no exception to the Rule laid down therein. However, since the question that arose in the instant appeal directly arose in AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1944, I hold that the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Tulsamma's case squarely governs this case. The learned Civil Judge was therefore right in dismissing the suit I may also notice the Judgment of the Supreme Court relied upon by learned Counsel for the appellant . That was a case where a will was made in favour of a separated brother's wife. It was held that she did not enlarge her limited estate into an absolute estate in view of the provisions of Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act. This case is clearly distinguishable because a separated brother's wife had no pre-existing right of maintenance which she could enforce against the property of her husband's separated brother. The right in her favour was created for the first time under the will and was not in recognition of any pre-existing right,
9. In the result, holding that the case is covered by the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1944, I dismiss this appeal.
No order as to costs.