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[Cites 6, Cited by 0]

Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi

S. K. Seth vs Rites Ltd Through Its on 6 September, 2011

      

  

  

 CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
PRINCIPAL BENCH
NEW DELHI

Original Application No.4191 of 2010

This the 6th day of September, 2011

HONBLE SHRI JUSTICE V. K. BALI, CHAIRMAN

HONBLE DR. VEENA CHHOTRAY, MEMBER (A)

S. K. Seth,
2286, B-2, Vasant Kunj,
New Delhi.								        Applicant

( By Shri R. Vasudevan with Shri Harish Sharma, Advocates )

Versus

1.	RITES Ltd through its
	Managing Director,
	Scope Minar, Laxmi nagar,
	New Delhi-110092.

2.	Chairman,
	RITES Ltd.,
	Scope Minar, Laxmi Nagar,
	New Delhi-110092.

3.	Union of India through
	Secretary, Ministry of Railways,
	Rail Bhawan,
	New Delhi-110001.					   Respondents

( By Shri G. S. Chaturvedi, Advocate )

O R D E R

Justice V. K. Bali, Chairman:

The applicant tendered his resignation on 2.3.2010 giving three months notice, and sent reminder on 9.9.2010. His resignation was accepted on 5.10.2010 with effect from 25.10.2010. Before the effective date of acceptance of resignation, i.e., 25.10.2010, vide corrigendum dated 22.10.2010, acceptance of resignation was withdrawn and instead the applicant has been proceeded departmentally for major penalty. The question that has been raised by the applicant for our adjudication is as to whether acceptance of resignation on 5.10.2010 would bring about a complete and binding contract between the parties from which the respondents could not wriggle out, and, therefore, the corrigendum dated 22.10.2010 would be illegal. The obvious plea raised by the respondents to the contrary is that acceptance of resignation could be withdrawn before 25.10.2010.

2. The facts for dealing with the limited controversy, which alone have been raised during the course of arguments, would reveal that the applicant came to be employed with the respondent RITES Ltd., the first respondent herein, in 1986 and earned several promotions, ultimately becoming Executive Director on 8.8.2008. It is his case that due to his poor health and family circumstances, he decided to resign from service of the first respondent, and, therefore, tendered his resignation on 2.3.2010 giving three months notice as required in terms of clause 6.1 of General Conditions of Service as contained in Chapter II of Human Resource Management Manual of the respondent, which reads as follows:

An employee may resign from his employment in RITES by giving notice of not less than 3 months in the case of a regular employee and one month in the case of a temporary employee of his intention to resign. While every effort will be made to accept the resignation within the stipulated period of receipt of notice, resignation will not become effective until it is accepted by the management. The applicant finding no response from the respondent even after expiry of three months notice period, submitted a reminder on 9.9.2010 conveying that in view of the circumstances he was placed in, it would not be possible for him to continue his services with the respondent beyond 30.9.2010. Consequent to the letter aforesaid, the competent authority accepted resignation of the applicant vide office order dated 5.10.2010 w.e.f. 25.10.2010, after completion of formalities, including vigilance clearance, as per pleadings made by the applicant himself in the O.A. Order dated 5.10.2010 reads as follows:
The resignation tendered by Mr. S. K. Seth, ED(P&C)/Emp. No.0479 has been accepted by the Competent Authority w.e.f. 25.10.2010 (A.N.). He may be relieved of his duties by the controlling officer from the aforesaid date after ensuring that nothing is due from him. It is the case of the applicant that in furtherance of acceptance of resignation by the competent authority, the first respondent also issued office order dated 8.10.2010 making arrangements to appoint a General Manager to work in place of the applicant to perform the duties till now being performed by the applicant. However, on receipt of a complaint, the Manager (Vigilance) of the respondent, on 12.102010 sought some details and clarifications from the applicant in respect of a flat purchased by him in Gurgaon. It is the case of the applicant that he furnished the entire information and clarifications in that regard within a few days, i.e., by 19.10.2010. As it was not feasible to receive vigilance clearance before 25.10.2010, the vigilance cell vide office order dated 22.10.2010 informed the first respondent that vigilance clearance for all purposes with regard to acceptance of resignation of the applicant was withdrawn till CVC first stage advice was received. Office order dated 22.10.2010 reads as follows:
The undersigned is hereby directed to communicate that the vigilance clearance for all purposes with regard to acceptance of resignation of Sh. S. K. Seth, ED(P&C) is hereby withdrawn till CVC Ist Stage Advice is received.
CVO desires that strict compliance should be adhered to before taking any further decision in the matter. Pursuant to the office order aforesaid, a note was put up to the Managing director on 22.10.2010 itself, which reads as follows:
CVO has now conveyed to ED/CS that since a reference has been made to CVC, vigilance clearance is withdrawn for all purpose. Hence resignation by Sh. Seth cannot be accepted. In view of the present status the office order dated 5.10.2010 conveying acceptance of resignation by the Competent Authority hence have to be withdrawn and fresh order issued on non-acceptance of his resignation. The note aforesaid was put up to ED/CS on the same day, who noted as follows:
Draft as amended to intimate that withdrawal is till advice from CVC is received. On the same day, the note aforesaid was put up before the Director Finance who observed to the effect that since the applicant was involved with the settlement with the Government of Tanzania and he was also involved in the project of Beira concession in Mozambique and critical issue of tariff & take or pay agreement was in concluding stage, he may not be relieved till 31.12.2010 before putting up to the Managing Director, the competent authority. It is, however, the case of the applicant that the said suggestion was rejected by the competent authority on 22.10.2010 itself, as under:
It is clarified that the withdrawal of OO No.RR/17/2010 is only on a/c of withdrawal of vig. clearance till advice from CVC is received. Therefore, since the resignation has already been accepted after all other formalities/clearances have been obtained, it can be withheld only for vig. clearance. Consequent upon the office notings, the first respondent issued a corrigendum office order dated 22.10.2010 stating that the order dated 5.10.2010 conveying the acceptance of resignation was withdrawn. Along with copy of the corrigendum endorsed to the applicant, the respondent also enclosed copy of advice dated 22.10.2010 received from vigilance cell. It is the case of the applicant that keeping in view the office note whereby the competent authority rejected all recommendations for issuing an order withholding the acceptance of resignation and directing withholding of effective date of resignation only till receipt of the first stage advice from CVC, the corrigendum dated 22.10.2010 would have to be read in such a manner that the effective date is postponed only till receipt of the first stage advice from CVC, which would be so as the corrigendum stated that it was issued with the approval of the competent authority. It is the case of the applicant that consequently, immediately on receipt of the first stage advice from CVC finding nothing against the applicant, his resignation would become effective and the applicant would be deemed to have been relieved from service, all other formalities admittedly having been completed. In short, the case of the applicant is that acceptance of his resignation once communicated to him, could not be withdrawn and at best, it would be postponed till the date of first stage advice of CVC was received on 3.11.2010, as directed by the competent authority.

3. The applicant has also made pleadings as regards departmental proceedings against him and the grounds set out in the Original Application challenging the same, but we make it absolutely clear that nothing based upon the said pleadings was urged during the course of arguments.

4. Pursuant to notice issued by this Tribunal, the respondents have entered appearance and by filing their counter reply hotly contested the case of the applicant. By way of preliminary submissions/objections it has been pleaded that the OA is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed as the applicant has suppressed and concealed the material facts and has tried to mislead this Tribunal by projecting incorrect facts. He is stated to have incorrectly stated before this Tribunal that the Chairman would not be the competent authority to initiate disciplinary action against him as the competent authority in his case would be the Board of Directors. It is pleaded that since the applicant is still working with the respondents, he is well aware that the disciplinary authority for major penalty proceedings in respect of the officers of his cadre is the Managing Director instead of the Board of Directors as per revised notification dated 13.12.2007. the plea taken by the applicant that he demitted office on 25.10.2010 has been denied by stating that the applicant himself attended the office till 29.10.2010, whereafter he sent application for sick leave from 1.11.2010 to 7.11.2010. The applicant is also stated to have suppressed a vital fact from this Tribunal that he received the salary for the full month of November, 2010 including the deductions on account of provident fund, telephone charges and vehicle maintenance charges. There are other preliminary objections also, but since nothing based thereon has been urged during the course of hearing, there would be no need to make a mention of the same. On merits of the controversy, it is inter alia pleaded that acceptance of resignation of the applicant did not become effective till 25.10.2010, and prior to the said date the acceptance was withdrawn on 22.10.2010. The applicant was communicated about the investigation of his conduct in the functioning of TRL in terms of letter dated 1.11.2010, whereby the applicant was informed of the process of initiating disciplinary proceedings against him for major penalty. It is pleaded that the applicant was in-charge of the operations of TRL in Tanzania at RITES Head office, in respect of which his conduct is under investigation, and that he was well aware of the situation having gone awry in respect of the operation he was heading, which became clear in August, 2010 itself. It is further pleaded that the applicant was well aware of the fact that heads may roll for the mismanagement and functioning of the TRL, and as such he sent the communication dated 9.9.2010. Vigilance clearance in respect of acceptance of resignation is stated to be one of the essential requirements, which was withdrawn by the CVO till CVC fist stage advice was to be received, and that in fact the acceptance of resignation would be finally taken by the competent authority based upon the vigilance clearance, and, therefore, the letter dated 22.10.2010 cannot be linked to the receipt of the first stage advice of CVC only. Even otherwise, before receipt of the first stage advice of CVC, the competent authority in terms of its letter dated 1.11.2010 informed the applicant about the contemplation of disciplinary action consequent upon the irregularities committed by him in projects at Tanzania. It is denied that the resignation of the applicant would be effective after receipt of the advice of CVA. Even otherwise, the applicant had submitted a leave application till 7.11.2010 as also he has received the salary for the full month of November, 2010, and as such, to contend that the effective date of acceptance of resignation is postponed only till receipt of first stage advice from CVC would not be correct. The acceptance of resignation was withdrawn in terms of letter dated 22.10.2010 before the expiry of the date communicated to the applicant, i.e., 25.10.2010, and since the acceptance of resignation was to be effective from a future date, it was open to the respondents to withdraw the same prior to the date communicated to the applicant. Vigilance clearance is stated to be only one of the pre-requisites for resignation and acceptance of resignation is subject to prevailing circumstances. It is pleaded that the employer-employee relationship is still existing between the applicant and the first respondent and the applicant is amenable to the disciplinary action, if any, to be initiated against him pursuant to investigations being conducted and be being found accountable for the lapses. The office order dated 22.10.2010, it is pleaded, was personally handed over to the applicant, which he took but refused to give acknowledgement, whereupon the letter was sent on the same day at the residential address of the applicant by speed post.

5. From the pleadings of the parties, it appears that the respondents are proceeding against the applicant on the allegation that he was instrumental in formation of TRL, a joint venture of the first respondent in Tanzania and that it was a reckless venture undertaken without application of mind and gross mismanagement, and the applicant failed to judge the project properly and to guide the management providing inputs. Gross mismanagement on the part of the applicant is alleged to have caused loss of reputation specially in African world, and the serious acts of omissions and commissions have caused financial losses amounting to Rs.32.84 crores of investment made by the first respondent apart from providing for Rs.63 crores in the accounts for the year 2008-09. It is on this allegation that the second respondent vide order dated 1.11.2010 conveyed that it had decided to initiate disciplinary proceedings for major penalty against the applicants.

6. The applicant has filed rejoinder, but as nothing based thereon has been urged during the course of arguments, there would be no need to refer to the contents thereof.

7. We have heard the learned counsel representing the parties and with their assistance examined the records of the case. The only contention raised by Shri Vasudevan, learned counsel representing the applicant during the course of arguments is that once resignation of the applicant was accepted, it would severe the employer-employee relationship between the applicant and the first respondent, and, therefore, the corrigendum withdrawing acceptance of resignation would be wholly illegal. We have no hesitation whatsoever in rejecting the only contention of the learned counsel as noted above in the facts and circumstances of this case. Present, as admitted, is not a case where resignation may be deemed to have been accepted if no orders thereon are passed within a period of three months. Admittedly, in the present case as per relevant rules and regulations, the resignation would be effective from the date the same is accepted. It is no doubt true that the resignation tendered by the applicant on 2.3.2010 for which reminder was sent by him on 9.9.2010, was accepted on 5.5.2010, but the same was to be effective from 25.10.2010. We have already in detail mentioned the developments that took place in between 5.10.2010 and 25.10.2010. It is before arrival of 25.10.2010 that the acceptance of resignation of the applicant was withdrawn  to be precise, on 22.10.2010. The relationship of employer and employee existed between the applicant and the respondent RITES up to 25.10.2010 and before that if the respondents had withdrawn the acceptance of resignation of the applicant, in our view, no exception can be had to the same.

8. Learned counsel representing the applicant would have number of judicial precedents to cite, but, in our view, none of the same is attracted to the facts of the present case. Reliance of the learned counsel on two decisions of the Honble Supreme Court in Raj Kumar v Union of India [AIR 1969 SC 180] and North Zone cultural Centre & another v Vedpathi Dinesh Kumar [AIR 2003 SC 2719] is wholly misplaced. In fact, the said judicial precedents would not be relevant for the purposes of decision on the point as noted above. The facts in the case of Rajkumar (supra) would reveal that the petitioner therein was a member of the Indian Administrative Service. He requested the Government to relieve him from service, which the Government accepted, but before communication of the order accepting his resignation reached him, he withdrew his offer of resignation. The question debated and adjudicated in the case aforesaid was as to whether the date when resignation was accepted would be the effective date or the same would be effective when it is communicated to the concerned employee. The facts would show that the petitioner had withdrawn his resignation before it was communicated but after it was accepted. What has been held is that it would be the date of acceptance of resignation which is to be relevant, and it is thereafter if the employee may withdraw the resignation, that he cannot be permitted to do so irrespective of the fact that the same had been communicated to him later in point of time, and before which date he withdrew the resignation. North Zone Cultural Centre (supra) holds the same position in law.

9. Learned counsel representing the applicant then relies upon the judgment of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in N. Dinakara Shetty v Union of India & others [2005 (6) Bom. C.R. 470, Writ Petition No.162/2001 decided on 6.5.2005]. It was a case where the employee of the respondent Bank had sought direction against the Bank to treat his application for voluntary retirement as withdrawn and to continue him in service and not to relieve him with effect from 31.5.2001. The Bank had introduced pension regulations of 1995, which inter alia provided that on or after 1.11.1993 an employee who had completed 20 years of qualifying service could retire from service by giving notice of not less than three months in writing to the appointing authority. The regulations also provided that the qualifying service of an employee retiring voluntarily under the said regulations was to be increased by a period not exceeding five years, subject to the condition that the total qualifying service rendered by such employee shall not in any case exceed 33 years and it does not take him beyond the date of superannuation. Thereafter vide circular dated 23.11.2000, the Bank introduced a scheme for voluntary retirement, which came into force on 1.12.2000 and was to remain in force until 31.1.2001. The object of the scheme was to enable the Bank to make available human resources possessing skills matching with current and future requirements, of different age groups in right proportions to maintain a well balanced age profile enabling proper succession, planning and in optimum numbers at all levels in tune with the organizational structure and business strategies, who are highly motivated, committed, flexible and responsive to change. The petitioner submitted an application on 6.12.2000. He submitted the said application as irrevocable and unconditional under the said scheme and cited reasons in support of his application. In terms of columns 4 and 5 of the application, the petitioner stated that he had opted for pension under the regulations of 1995, and that he had also sought voluntary retirement under regulation 29. He requested the authorities to waive the requisite notice of three months for seeking voluntary retirement under the said regulations. In terms of column 3 of the application, the petitioner stated that he would ensure closure of all his liabilities due to the Bank before being relieved from service, and in terms of sub-column (a) of column 8, he mentioned what were his liabilities. Vide letter dated 28.2.2001 he was informed that his application for voluntary retirement under the said regulations was accepted by the competent authority, subject to his complying with all the relevant provisions of the scheme. He was also informed that he would be relieved from service on 31.5.2001. This was apparently because clause 11.13.0 of the scheme provided that if due to administrative exigencies, the Bank was unable to relieve any such employee from service, the date of relieving would be postponed for a reasonable period, but not later than one year from the date of acceptance. He was also informed by way of clarification that his application was considered under the said scheme and, therefore, he was ineligible for addition of five years remainder of service, whichever is lower, for purpose of determining pension as well as commutation of pension available under regulation 29. He was also informed that the Bank reserved its right to reject his application any time before relieving him from service in case there was any contemplated disciplinary action initiated or to be initiated against him. After the petitioners application dated 6.12.2000 was accepted by the Bank vide letter dated 28.2.2001, the petitioner vide his letter dated 10.4.2001 informed the Bank that he had inadvertently submitted his voluntary retirement application, which was accepted by them vide letter dated 28.2.2001. He informed that he was now completely upset about his decision which was taken by him due to his domestic problems and mental pressure, which had since eased and he felt that his decision was wrong and, therefore, he sought permission to withdraw his application dated 6.12.2000, and sought an opportunity to continue in service of the Bank. On the facts as mentioned above, it was urged on behalf of the petitioner that as he was to be relieved on 31.5.2001, he was entitled to withdraw his application under VRS even after acceptance as the jural relationship between the petitioner and the Bank could be terminated only after the petitioner was relieved from service. Counsel representing the respondent Bank would, however, contend that the petitioners application was under a specially funded scheme and was not a normal application under normal regulations, which provided for voluntary retirement and, therefore, the provisions which would be normally applicable in case of normal retirement or resignation would not be applicable to his case. The second submission made on behalf of the petitioner was that the acceptance was conditional. It was conditional in that it was accepted subject to the payment of all the dues as per the condition contained in clause 11.7.0 of the scheme. It was also conditional in that the petitioner was denied and was informed that he was ineligible for additional five years remuneration of service for the purpose of determining pension as per regulation 29. Counsel representing the Bank would, however, contend that the petitioner had not taken these pleas in either of his letters of withdrawal dated 10.4.2001, as well as 15.5.2001, nor in the petition, as originally filed and they were introduced for the first time by amendment during the hearing of the petition on or about 20.3.2005. the petitioner was bound to comply with clause 11.7.0 of the scheme by which the employees were informed that all amounts payable under the scheme would be subject to prior settlement, repayment in full of all loans, advances, dues etc. Moreover, the petitioner in terms of column 8 of his application dated 6.12.2000 had clearly undertaken to ensure closure of all his liabilities to the Bank before he was relieved from service and not only that, he had also mentioned what were his liabilities in sub-column (a) of column 8 of his application for voluntary retirement dated 6.12.2000, and only because the Bank in their letter dated 28.2.2001 informed the petitioner that he had to comply with clause 11.7.0 of the scheme, it would not mean that the petitioners application for voluntary retirement was accepted conditionally. That was only a clarification mentioned by the Bank in terms of clause 11.7.0 of the scheme and the undertaking given by him. The contention raised by the counsel on both counts as mentioned above was repelled and the petition was dismissed. It is not understandable as to what advantage the applicant would derive from this judgment. Present is a simple case where acceptance of resignation by the employees has been withdrawn before the effective date of its acceptance.

10. Reliance placed by the learned counsel representing the applicant on another judgment of Calcutta High court in Aditya Nath Banerjee v State Bank of India [2005 LawSuit(CAL) 539 = 2006 (2) LLJ 74] is equally misplaced. Brief facts of the case aforesaid reveal that the petitioner sought resignation on 11.10.2001. He submitted his resignation in prescribed manner on 28.12.2001 through proper channel. He was informed vide letter dated 19.4.2002 that his prayer for resignation had been duly forwarded to the appropriate authority for consideration. Vide another letter dated 2.5.2002 the petitioner was asked to appear for an interview before the 2nd respondent on 6.5.2002 at the zonal office. He appeared in terms of the letter aforesaid before the 2nd respondent and narrated his problem. He was verbally advised by the 2nd respondent to seriously consider about withdrawal of his resignation. The 3rd respondent vide letter dated 12.6.2002 intimated the petitioner that his resignation had been accepted by the appropriate authority with immediate effect, but before leaving the Bank the petitioner was to liquidate the Banks loan advances as mentioned therein. After receipt of the letter dated 12.6.2002 the petitioner allegedly intended to serve a copy of the representation dated 30.6.2002 before the 2nd respondent through the 3rd respondent praying for withdrawal of his resignation. It was his case that the said letter could not be served on 13.6.2002, but the office of the 3rd respondent duly received the same on 14.6.2002, i.e., before the date the resignation was to become effective. One plea that was taken in support of the petition was that in terms of the letter dated 12.6.2002 the petitioner neither liquidated the loan advances of the Bank nor submitted his claim for terminal benefits in terms of the letter dated 15.6.2002 and accordingly the letter dated 14.6.2002 communicating the decision of appropriate authority regarding acceptance of resignation had not become final. In the facts as mentioned above, the question that came to be decided was as to whether the resignation submitted by the petitioner was accepted before the withdrawal, and whether in a prospective resignation withdrawal can be made before the receipt of the communication of the acceptance. The High Court held as follows:

50. It is a fact that the petitioner time to time sent resignation letters and reminders thereof though all not before the appropriate authority. Now, Bank authorities stated through their letter dated June 12, 2002 that the appropriate authority has accepted his resignation with immediate effect and in that letter Bank authorities also stated that he will be relieved from the Branch from the close of business on June 15, 2002. Therefore, acceptance on the part of the Bank can be said to be effective from June 12, 2002. In this regard best reliance can be placed in the judgment reported in North Zone Cultural Centre v. Vedapathi Dinesh Kumar (supra) where the effective date has been defined or clarified and it has also been observed that communication of acceptance of resignation is not a mandatory requirement and the resignation becomes effective from the date of its acceptance and not from the date on which the acceptance is communicated to the employee. In this judgment the Honble Apex Court clarifying the position of communication or defining the word communication actually reiterated the stand taken by the Honble Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Khemi Ram (supra).
51. Considering the above position or considering the ratio of the judgments delivered by the Honble Apex Court as referred to above and also getting the instant case tested in the light of the above referred judgments I am of the opinion that the resignation of the petitioner has been duly accepted by the Bank and the petitioner now cannot ask for reinstatement. The Bank authorities are, however, directed to pay off the petitioner all his dues within a period of four weeks from the date of communication of the order. This judgment, in our view, also would be of no assistance to the applicant.

11. The judgment relevant in this case that appears to us would be of the Honble Supreme Court in Power Finance Corporation Ltd. v Pramod Kumar Bhatia [66 (1997) Delhi Law Times 573 (SC)]. The facts of the case aforesaid reveal that the respondent Pramod Kumar Bhatia while working in the appellant corporation applied for voluntary retirement pursuant to the scheme framed by the Corporation to relieve the surplus staff. Initially, by proceedings dated 20.12.1994, the Corporation accepted his resignation subject to the clearance of the outstanding dues. The acceptance was to be given effect from 31.12.1994. By letter dated 6.1.1995, he requested for deduction of a sum of rs.37,521.20 out of the outstanding dues. He also requested that he may be formally relieved from service of the corporation, and his service period for which ex gratia was payable be informed to him and his dues be paid immediately. It was urged on behalf of the appellant Corporation that acceptance of voluntary retirement of the respondent was conditional one, and that he himself understood that unless he was relieved of the duties after payment of outstanding dues, the voluntary retirement would not become effective. In the meanwhile, realizing the mistake committed by the appellant for effecting the voluntary retirement scheme which was not to apply to it as there was no surplus staff with it, the appellant withdrew the scheme. Therefore, there was neither the scheme nor a concluded order of voluntary retirement of the respondent relieving him from the duties. The High Court, it was urged, was not right in holding that the order dated 20.12.1994 had created vested right in the respondent and the same could not be divested by subsequent orders. Upholding the contention aforesaid, it was held that It is now settled legal position that unless the employee is relieved of the duty, after acceptance of the offer of voluntary retirement or resignation, jural relationship of the employee and the employer does not come to an end. Since the order accepting the voluntary retirement was a conditional one, the conditions ought to have been complied with. Before the conditions could be complied with, the appellant withdrew the scheme. Consequently, the order accepting voluntary retirement did not become effective. Thereby no vested right has been created in favour of the respondent. The High Court, therefore, was not right in holding that the respondent has acquired a vested right and, therefore, the appellant has no right to withdraw the scheme subsequently. The appeal was allowed. In the present case, it is the common case of the parties that even though the resignation of the applicant may have been accepted on 5.10.2010 the same was to be effective from 25.10.2010. There was a significant development between 5.10.2010 and 25.10.2010. The applicant was stated to be not clear from vigilance angle. Acceptance of resignation was conditional on vigilance clearance of the applicant, and before the effective date could arrive, because of non-clearance of the applicant from vigilance angle, acceptance of resignation was withdrawn. The order withdrawing acceptance of resignation, in our view, cannot be faulted. The same is perfect and in accordance with law.

12. Finding no merit in this Original Application, we dismiss the same, leaving, however the parties to bear their own costs.

( Dr. Veena Chhotray )			    	       		       ( V. K. Bali )
         Member (A)				   		         Chairman

/as/