Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Manigiri Ramesh Babu vs S. Ziyaur Rahiman Reported In 2023 (1) on 17 December, 2025
APHC010527552025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3524]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
WEDNESDAY, THE SEVENTEENTH DAY OF DECEMBER
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM
CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL NO: 714/2025
Between:
1. MANIGIRI RAMESH BABU, S/O.ESWARAIAH, AGED ABOURT45
YEARS, HINDU, WORKING IN INDIAN ARMY, R/O.YALLUR VILLAGE,
GOSPADU MANDAL, NANDYAL DISTRICT.
...APPELLANT
AND
1. GAJULA VENUGOPAL, S/O.ESWARAIAH, AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS,
HINDU, BUSINESS R/O.H.NO.25/645U/S, SRINIVASA NAGAR,
NANDYAL TOWN AND DISTRICT.
2. GAJULA SREENIVASULU, S/O.ESWARAIAH, AGED ABOUT 48
YEARS, HINDU, BUSINESS, R/O.H.NO.25/646, SRINIVASA NAGAR,
NANDYAL TOWN AND DISTRICT.
3. PAV GROUP, REP. BY ITS PROPRIETOR, PABBATI VENU GOPAL,
S/O.VENKATAIAH, AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS, R/O.H.NO.2-428-118,
BALAJI COMPLEX, NANDYAL TOWN AND DISTRICT.
4. PABBATI VENU GOPAL, PROPRIETOR OF PAV GROUP,
S/O.VENKATAIAH, AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS, R/O.H.NO.2-428-118,
BALAJI COMPLEX, NANDYAL TOWN AND DISTRICT.
...RESPONDENT(S):
Appeal Under Section_____against orders Memorandum of Civil Misc.
Appeal to this Hon'ble Court against order and decree passed in I.A.No.1634
of 2025 in O.S.No.27 of 2025 dt. 20.08.2025 on the file of III Additional District
Judge, Kurnool at Nandyal,
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CMA_714_686_2025
CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL NO: 686/2025
Between:
1. MANIGIRI RAMESH BABU, S/O.ESWARAIAH, AGED ABOURT 45
YEARS, HINDU, WORKING IN INDIAN ARMY, R/O.YALLUR VILLAGE,
GOSPADU MANDAL, NANDYAL DISTRICT.
...APPELLANT
AND
1. GAJULA VENUGOPAL, S/O.ESWARAIAH, AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS,
HINDU, BUSINESS R/O.H.NO.25/645U/S, SRINIVASA NAGAR,
NANDYAL TOWN AND DISTRICT.
2. GAJULA SREENIVASULU, S/O.ESWARAIAH, AGED ABOUT 48
YEARS, HINDU, BUSINESS, R/O.H.NO.25/646, SRINIVASA NAGAR,
NANDYAL TOWN AND DISTRICT.
3. PAV GROUP, REP. BY ITS PROPRIETOR, PABBATI VENU GOPAL,
S/O.VENKATAIAH, AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS, R/O.H.NO.2-428-118,
BALAJI COMPLEX, NANDYAL TOWN AND DISTRICT.
4. PABBATI VENU GOPAL, PROPRIETOR OF PAV GROUP,
S/O.VENKATAIAH, AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS, R/O.H.NO.2-428-118,
BALAJI COMPLEX, NANDYAL TOWN AND DISTRICT.
...RESPONDENT(S):
Appeal Under Section_____against ordersbeg to Wise. Appeal to this
Honble Court present this Memorandum of Civil against order and decree
passed lANo. 1635 012025 in O.S.No. 27 012025 dt.20.08.2025 on the file of
III Additional District Judge, Kurnool at Nandyal,
Counsel for the Appellant:
1. S LAKSHMINARAYANA REDDY
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. MALLIDI ARUNA SRI SATYA
The Court made the following:
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CMA_714_686_2025
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM
CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL Nos.714 and 686 of 2025
COMMON JUDGMENT:(per Justice Maheswara Rao Kuncheam) Heard Sri S. Lakshminarayana Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff and Sri V.V. Ravi Prasad, learned counsel representing Ms.Malladi Aruna, learned counsel for the respondents/respondents. Perused the entire material available on record.
2. The plaintiff filed O.S. No.27 of 2025 on the file of the Court of III Addl. District Judge, Kurnool at Nandyal, for declaration of right and title of the plaintiff and recovery of possession of the land to an extent of Ac.0.03 cents / 500 links (169.59 Sq. yards) in Sy. No.663/5 of Moolasagaram Village, Nandyal Mandal and District (Erstwhile Kurnool District) (hereinafter called as 'subject land') from respondent Nos.3 and 4 and also for consequential permanent injunction retraining the respondents from interfering with possession over the subject land and to declare the document Nos.9361 & 9362 of 2024 dated 22.06.2024 executed by the respondent Nos.1 & 2 in favour of respondent No.3 represented by the respondent No.4 as null and void and also for mandatory injunction to demolish the constructions made in the ABCD 4 RNTJ & MRKJ CMA_714_686_2025 portion and also for restraining the respondents from alienating the subject land.
3. Along with the suit, the plaintiff filed I.A. No.1634 of 2025 seeking temporary injunction restraining the respondents from alienating or creating any sort of encumbrances over the subject land by way of sale, gift, lease or mortgage entering into an agreement of sale till the disposal of the main suit to others under Order XXXIX Rule 1 R/w. Section 151 C.P.C., in O.S.No.27 of 2025. The said I.A. was dismissed on merits and aggrieved by the Order of dismissal dated 20.08.2025, the plaintiff filed the present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.714 of 2025 before this Court by invoking Order XLIII Rule 1 C.P.C.
4. The plaintiff also filed I.A. No.1635 of 2025 seeking temporary injunction restraining the respondents from making further constructions in the subject land under Order XXXIX Rule 1 & 2 r/w. Section 151 C.P.C., in O.S.No.27 of 2025. The said I.A. was also dismissed on merits and aggrieved by the Order of dismissal dated 20.08.2025, the plaintiff filed the present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.686 of 2025 before this Court by invoking Order XLIII Rule 1 C.P.C. 5
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5. In view of common submissions advanced by the respective counsel on both sides, coupled with the nexus between the respective cases, we deem it appropriate to pass common orders. Case of the appellant/plaintiff:
6. It is the version of the plaintiff that he is working as Junior Commissioning Officer in the Indian Army at Pune, Maharashtra State. Originally, the subject land was sold to Z. William Stanley by Shakun @ Shekun Bee and Shaikmabusagari Rajia Begum @ Rajiabee through registered sale deed vide document No.6269/2014 dated 22.10.2014(Ex.P.2). Z. William Stanley executed a registered sale deed vide document No.2780/2018 dated 19.03.2018 in favour of Shaik Hussain Ali (Ex.P.3) and he in turn sold the subject land to Mulla Khader Hussain by way of registered sale deed vide document No.2472/2019 dated 02.03.2019 (Ex.P.4). Later, Mulla Khader Hussain sold the subject land to one Manigiri Pedda Eswaraiah, who is the father of the plaintiff by way of registered sale deed vide document No.8489/2020 dated 25.09.2020 (Ex.P.5). At last, the subject land was handed over to the plaintiff by his father through registered gift deed document bearing No.12580/2023 dated 15.11.2023 (Ex.P.6) and the plaintiff became the absolute owner and possessor of the subject land. 6
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7. While that being the position, respondent Nos.1 and 2 with an intention to grab the plaintiff's property by creating fake documents in their father's name Gajula Eswaraiah, acquired properties in Sy.No.662/2 to an extent of Ac.0.22 cents in Sy.No.663/6 to an extent of Ac.0.05 cents in Sy.No.662/1 an extent of Ac.0.30 cents and in Sy.No.663/5 of Mulasagaram Village, Nandyal Mandal and District by way of registered documents and in respect subject land by merely mentioning Sy.No.663/5 without mentioning the extent of land.
8. Respondent Nos.1 and 2 executed registered sale deed vide document bearing Nos.9361 and 9362 of 2024 dated 22.06.2024 in favour of respondent No.3 i.e., PAV Group represented by the 4th respondent and sold away the said extents, including the plaintiff's land in Sy.No.663/5, without mentioning the extent of land. Respondent Nos.1 and 2, with an intention to occupy the plaintiff's land, have colluded with respondent No.4, who is the proprietor of respondent No.3 PAV Group, by taking advantage of the plaintiff's absence in Nandyal town, as stated supra, the appellant/plaintiff is working in Indian Army presently at Pune, Maharashtra State.
9. It is the case of the plaintiff that respondent Nos. 3 and 4 have started construction by marking ABCD plan over the subject land and the plaintiff, having left with no other alternative remedy, has instituted suit in 7 RNTJ & MRKJ CMA_714_686_2025 O.S. No.27 of 2025 on the file of the Court of III Addl. District Judge, Kurnool at Nandyal for declaration of his right and title over the subject land and recovery of possession and also for mandatory injunction, etc. Also, the plaintiff filed I.A. Nos. 1634 and 1635 of 2025 in O.S. No.27 of 2025, for restraining the respondent Nos.3 & 4 from alienating the subject land to others and to stop illegal constructions that are being made by the respondent Nos.3 & 4 in respect of the subject land. Case of the respondents:
10. The respondents, while denying the averments made by the plaintiff, have stated that the plaintiff has never been in possession of the subject land.
11. According to the respondents, the vendors of the father of the plaintiff have no title and possession over the subject land and they have sold away the property with false and fabricated documents. Primarily, the land of an extent of Ac.0.30 cents in Sy.Nos.662/1 & 663/5 belong to Kunta Hydu Bai and his family members by way of registered partition deed between 18.06.1957 vide document No.1977/1975 and the said land of Ac.0.10cents was divided into three shares among three brothers i.e., 1/3rd share each to 1) Sarjan Ameena Bi, 2) Modin Sab and Hasu Bai & 3) Hussain Bi, through registered partition deed dated 18.06.1957(Ex.R.3). The land of an extent of Ac.0.22 cents in 8 RNTJ & MRKJ CMA_714_686_2025 Sy.Nos.662/2 and the land of an extent of Ac.0.05cents in Sy.No.663/6 belong to Bolleddula Pedda Narasimhulu &6 others, who executed registered general power of attorney in favour of Shaik Mahboob Saheb vide document No.27/1993 dated 12.04.1993(Ex.R.7).
12. After the death of Sarjan Ameena Bi, his legal heirs acquired the land in Sy.Nos.662/1 & 663/5 of an extent of Ac.0.08.019 cents and executed sale deed bearing document No.6192/2006dated 24.08.2006 (Ex.R.4) in favour of Koppula Venkata Subba Reddy & 3 others. From them, the said land fell into the hands of Gajula Eswaraiah, who is the father of respondent Nos.1 & 2 through registered sale deed bearing document No.1115/2007 dated 24.02.2007(Ex.R.5) and respondent Nos.1 & 2 inherited the land by way of a will deed vide document No.20/2019 dated 10.05.2019 executed by their father Gajula Eswaraiah.
13. Similarly, after the death of Modin Sab and Hasu Bai, his legal heirs have executed registered sale deed bearing document No.4538/1995 dated 12.07.1995 (Ex.R.11) in respect of land in Sy.No.662/1 and 663/5 of an extent of Ac.0.11 cents in favour of Abdul Munaf, who in turn executed registered sale deed vide document No.96/2002 dated 03.09.2002 (Ex.R.12) in favor of Gajula Lakshmi Devi (mother of respondent No.2). After the death of Gajula Lakshmi Devi, 9 RNTJ & MRKJ CMA_714_686_2025 respondent No.2 inherited the said land by way of registered will deed vide document No.2/2019 dated 10.05.2019 (Ex.R.13).
14. Since then, respondent No.2 is the absolute owner and possessor of the land of an extent of Ac.0.11cents and Ac.0.08.019cents in Sy.Nos.662/1 and 663/5.
15. Being the absolute owner and possessor of the land of extent of Ac.0.07 ½ cents in Sy.No.662/1 and Ac.0.02 ½ cents in Sy.No.663/5, Hussain Bee executed registered gift settlement deed bearing No.4526/1983 dated 19.11.1983 (Ex.R.10) in favour of his minor grandchild Mahboob Basha, who was represented by his mother Faizun Sabi.
16. Bolleddula Pedda Narasimhulu & 6 others being the owners of land of an extent of Ac.0.22 cents in Sy.No.662/2 and Ac.0.05 cents in Sy.No.663/6, in total extent of Ac.0.27 cents, have executed registered general power attorney deed dated 12.04.1993 in favour of Shaik Mahaboob Saheb, who later on has executed registered sale deed bearing document No.693/1994 in favour of Kande Venkata Rama Devi & 2 others. Subsequently, Kande Venkata Rama Devi & 2 others sold the land to the 1st respondent by way of registered sale deed vide document No.8130/2006 dated 15.11.2006(Ex.R.9). 10
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17. Since then, respondent No.1 is the absolute owner and possessor of the land of an extent Ac.0.22 cents in Sy.No.662/2 and Ac.0.05 cents in Sy.No.663/6, in total extent of Ac.0.27 cents.
18. Ultimately, respondent Nos.1 & 2 being the absolute owners and possessors of land of an extent of Ac.0.26.700 cents, Ac.0.10cents and Ac.0.14.751 cents in Sy.Nos.662/2, 663/6, 662/1 & 663/5, have executed registered general power of attorney bearing document Nos.9363, 9364 & 9365 of 2024 dated 21.05.2024 (Exs.R.16, R.18 & R.19) in favour of respondent Nos.3 and 4. Respondent Nos.1 & 2 executed registered sale deed vide document No.858/2025 dated 30.01.2025 (Ex.R.22) in favour of respondent Nos.3 & 4 in respect of Sy.Nos.662/2, 663/6, 662/1 & 663/5 of an extent of Ac.0.01.980 cents and Ac.0.03.260 Sq. links respectively.
19. Respondent Nos.1 & 2 executed registered development agreement vide document No.986/2025 dated 30.01.2025 (Ex.R.23) in favour of respondent Nos.3 & 4 in respect of Sy.Nos.662/2, 663/6, 662/1 & 663/5 of an extent of Ac.0.30 cents 260 Sq. links or 1464.6 Sq. yards and PAV towers-XIX apartment 1st floor 1100 Sq. yards Flat No.G3. 11
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20. Ever since the date of delivery of the possession, respondent Nos.3 & 4 have been in absolute possession of the same properties and are carrying out their constructions as per the contract with the buyers.
21. It is also stated that respondent No.3, after obtaining building permit order on 10.12.2024 from the concerned civil authority for the construction of apartment vide (Ex.R.20), has executed mortgage affidavit in favour of civil authority vide Ex.R.21 dated 30.11.2024. Submissions of the appellant/plaintiff counsel:
22. The learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff submitted that the orders under challenge are not only against the fundamental principles and also hit by the ground of perversity too. He drew the attention of this Court to the specific recitals of the documents relied on by the respondents i.e., registered sale deed bearing Nos.9361 & 9362 of 2024 dated 22.05.2024 (Ex.R.14 & Ex.R.15), and submitted that the documents do not contain the very extent of land in reference to Sy.No.663/5. He submitted that in the absence of such a vital point, the entire basis of the respondents' case is liable to be thrown out.
23. The learned counsel submitted that the Trial Court had grossly erred in believing the oral plea of fabrication against Ex.P.2 and discarded the entire case at the pre-trial stage and declining to pass 12 RNTJ & MRKJ CMA_714_686_2025 interim orders, which leads to multiplicity of legal proceedings in the lis, the same causes serious prejudice to the case of the appellant/plaintiff.
24. The learned counsel, while stating that appellant/plaintiff proved his strong prima facie case by way of registered documents i.e., Ex.P.2 to P.6, which have valid rights over the subject land i.e., Ac.0.03 cents (or) 169.59 Sq. yards in Sy.No.663/5 and the appellant/plaintiff has got a strong prima facie case, balance of convenience in his favour rather than the respondents. Hence, the orders under the appeal are liable to be allowed.
25. The learned counsel further argued that the Trial Court ignored the fact that the respondent No.3 has already executed registered documents in favour of others, as such, the theory of giving an undertaking Memo dated 11.08.2025, by the respondents does not arise at all. Nevertheless, the pivotal aspects of the case have not been taken into consideration by the Trial Court. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel for the appellant relied on the following dictums:-
1) Sheik Dada Miah Vs. S. Ziyaur Rahiman reported in 2023 (1) ALD 806.
2) Shefali Roy Vs. Hero Jaswant Dass reported in AIR 1992 Allahabad 254.
3) Satya Prakash Vs. I Addl. District Judge reported in AIR 2002 Allahabad 198.13
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4) M/s. Cosmopolitan Trading Corporation Vs. M/s. Engineering Sales Corporation reported in AIR 2001 Rajasthan 331.
5) Ayyanur Raja Vs. Periya Thalaimalaiyan reported in AIR 2004 Madras 482.
6) Chandu Lal Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi reported in AIR 1978 Delhi 174.
Submissions of the respondents counsel:
26. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the Trial Court, after going through all the aspects, had not granted any interim orders in favour of the plaintiff.
27. He further submitted that the learned Trial Court considered all the facts, including non-mentioning of the extent in the relevant registered document, but taking into account of comprehensive backdrop, the link documents arrived at its right conclusion in the lis
28. The learned counsel submitted that the very scope of appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1 C.P.C. is limited and the impugned orders are legally valid and sound.
29. The learned counsel also brought to the notice of this Court about the undertaking dated 11.08.2025 filed by the respondents and stated that it would suffice for the interest of the plaintiff, if any. 14
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30. He relied on the judgment rendered by the Erstwhile High Court of A.P. at Hyderabad, between Archidiocess of Hyderabad v. Dr. J. Jaswantha Rao to strengthen his case.
Analysis of the Court:
31. In view of the rival submissions advanced by the respective counsel, the following moot point arises for our consideration:-
Whether the orders under the appeal in not granting interim orders, are sustainable or not?
Consideration of the Court:
32. Before adverting to the facts and circumstances involved in the lis, we deem it appropriate to refer to Order XXXIX Rule 1 & 2 of C.P.C., which reads as under:-
".....1. Cases in which temporary injunction may be granted.--Where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise--
(a) that any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by any party to the suit, or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree, or
(b) that the respondent threatens, or intends, to remove or dispose of his property with a view to 4 [defrauding] his creditors,
(c) that the defendant threatens to dispossess, the plaintiff or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit], the Court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act, or make such other order for the purpose of staying and preventing the wasting, damaging, alienation, sale, removal or disposition of the property [or dispossession of the plaintiff, or otherwise causing injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in 15 RNTJ & MRKJ CMA_714_686_2025 dispute in the suit] as the Court thinks fit, until the disposal of the suit or until further orders.
2. Injunction to restrain repetition or continuance of breach.--
(1) In any suit for restraining the defendant from committing a breach of contract or other injury of any kind, whether compensation is claimed in the suit or not, the plaintiff may, at any time after the commencement of the suit, and either before or after judgment, apply to the Court for a temporary injunction to restrain the defendant from committing the breach of contract or injury complained, of, or any breach of contract or injury of a like kind arising out of the same contract or relating to the same property or right.
(2) The Court may by order grant such injunction, on such terms as to the duration of the injunction, keeping an account, giving security, or otherwise, as the Court thinks fit......"
33. A bare reading of the above provisions of C.P.C., transpires that Order XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) deals with temporary injunctions and interlocutory orders and its scope is to protect the rights of parties during the pendency of a suit so as to empower the Court to grant temporary injunctions under Rules 1 and 2 when there is a prima facie case, a balance of convenience, and a risk of irreparable injury if relief is denied. Further, these injunctions may restrain a party from committing acts like waste, damage, alienation of property, dispossession, or breach of contract until the suit is decided and under Rule 2A, Courts can punish for disobedience or breach of injunction orders.
34. Coming to the jurisdiction of appellate Courts while dealing with appeals governed by Order XLIII Rule 1 C.P.C., it is now a well-settled 16 RNTJ & MRKJ CMA_714_686_2025 legal principle, succinctly expounded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its landmark decision Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd., that:
"......14. In such appeals, the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of the first instance and substitute its own discretion, except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously or perversely, or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions.... The appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below.... If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion......."
35. It is pertinent to note that in Printers (Mysore) (P) Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph1, the Apex Court had held that ignoring relevant facts is also a ground for interfering with the discretion exercised by the trial court.
36. In Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh2, the Apex court on consideration of words "prima facie" its deliberation, "irreparable injury"
and "balance of convenience" held as under:
"...... 5. The burden is on the plaintiff, by evidence aliunde by affidavit or otherwise, to prove that there is "a prima facie case"
in his favour which needs adjudication at the trial. The existence of the prima facie right and infraction of the enjoyment of his property or the right is a condition precedent for the grant of temporary injunction. Prima facie case is not to be confused with prima facie title which has to be established on evidence at the trial. Only prima facie case is a substantial question raised, bona fide, which needs investigation and a decision on merits. Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. The Court further has to satisfy that non-interference by 1 1960 SCC OnLine SC 62 2 (1992) 1 SCC 719 17 RNTJ & MRKJ CMA_714_686_2025 the court would result in "irreparable injury" to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction and he needs protection from the consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but means only that the injury must be a material one, namely, one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages. The third condition also is that "the balance of convenience" must be in favour of granting injunction. The Court while granting or refusing to grant injunction should exercise sound judicial discretion to find the amount of substantial mischief or injury which is likely to be caused to the parties, if the injunction is refused and compare it with that which is likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction is granted. If on weighing competing possibilities or probabilities of likelihood of injury and if the Court considers that pending the suit, the subject- matter should be maintained in status quo, an injunction would be issued. Thus, the Court has to exercise its sound judicial discretion in granting or refusing the relief of ad interim injunction pending the suit......"
37. In Mohd. Mehtab Khan v. Khushnuma Ibrahim Khan3 the Apex Court emphasised the principles laid down in Wander's case and observed that while the view taken by the appellate Court may be an equally possible view and the mere possibility of taking such a view must not form the basis for setting aside the decision arrived at by the Trial Court in exercise of its discretion under Order XXXIX CPC. The basis for substituting the view of the Trial Court should be mala fides, capriciousness, arbitrariness or perversity in the order of the Trial Court.
38. In the case of Neon Laboratories Ltd. v. Medical Technologies Ltd4., the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the appellate Court should 3 (2013) 9 SCC 221 4 (2016) 2 SCC 672 18 RNTJ & MRKJ CMA_714_686_2025 not flimsily, whimsically or lightly interfere in the exercise of discretion by a subordinate court unless such exercise is palpably perverse. Perversity can pertain to the understanding of law or the appreciation of pleadings or evidence. In other words, the Court took the view that to interfere against an order granting or declining to grant a temporary injunction, perversity has to be demonstrated in the finding of the Trial Court.
39. In Seema Arshad Zaheer and Others v. Municipal Corpn. Of Greater Mumbai & others5, the Hon'ble Supreme Court discussed when a temporary injunction can be granted when the party seeking the injunction proves that it is a prima facie case, a balance of convenience, and irreparable injury to the party seeking the injunction.
40. In Ramakant Ambala Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi6, the Apex court, on consideration of the Printers' case referred to supra and other well settled legal principles observed as follows:-
"......23. It is pertinent to note that in Printers (supra), this Court had held that ignoring relevant facts is also a ground for interfering with the discretion exercised by the trial court. Furthermore, Viscount Simon LC in Charles Osenton & Co Vs. Johnston reported in 1942 A.C. 130, after stating the above, went on to quote Lord Wright's decision in Evans v. Bartlam reported in 1937 A.C. 473: "It is clear that the court of appeal should not interfere with the discretion of a judge acting within his jurisdiction unless the court is clearly satisfied that he was wrong. But the court is not entitled simply to say that if the judge 5(2005) 5 SCC 282 62024 11 SCC 351 19 RNTJ & MRKJ CMA_714_686_2025 had jurisdiction and had all the facts before him, the court of appeal cannot review his order unless he is shown to have applied a wrong principle. The court must, if necessary, examine a new the relevant facts and circumstances in order to exercise a discretion by way of review which may reverse or vary the order.
24. In Evans (supra) case, Lord Wright made it clear that while adjudicating upon the discretion exercised by the trial court, the appellate court is obliged to consider the case put forward by the appellant in favour of its argument that the trial court exercised its discretion arbitrarily or incorrectly in the circumstances......."
41. Further, in the very same Ramakant Ambala Choksi case, the Apex Court elaborated that:-
Meaning of the expression "perverse" as follows ....
"......34. Any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough7, the Court observed that a perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey 8, the Court defined "perverse" as "turned the wrong way"; not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct, etc. "....... 35. The expression "perverse" has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner:
(a) Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English, 6th Edn.
Perverse -- Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable.
(b) Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English -- International Edn.
Perverse -- Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable.
(c) The New Oxford Dictionary of English -- 1998 Edn. Perverse -- Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the Judge on a point of law......" 7 (1878) 1 LR Ir 331 8 106 NW 814: 127 Wis 47 (1906) 20 RNTJ & MRKJ CMA_714_686_2025
42. Very recently, the Division Bench of Delhi High Court in Newgen IT Technologies Limited v. Newgen software Technologies Limited9, has held under:
".....40. At the outset, we would note that the present appeals challenge the Impugned Order which is passed in the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the learned District Judge by way of Order XXXIX of the CPC. The Courts have time and again cautioned that in appeals challenging the orders passed by the learned Trial Court in the exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction, the Appellate Court will not interfere with, except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously or perversely or where the court has ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. The Appellate Court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion if it would have exercised its discretion differently but will only interfere if the discretion has been exercised in a perverse manner by the Trial Court......."
43. Thus, from the conspectus of the above legal principles, an appellate court, while hearing an appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1 CPC, has the duty to examine whether the trial court's order refusing injunction suffers from perversity, misreading of evidence, or non-application of the three settled principles. The Court emphasized that if the trial court ignores material evidence or fails to apply the legal tests of prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury, the appellate court is justified in interfering. The case ultimately reaffirms that appellate scrutiny of discretionary orders is justified when discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously.
9 2025 SCC OnLine Del 4462 21 RNTJ & MRKJ CMA_714_686_2025
44. Apropos to the facts set out by the respective parties in the lis are that the appellant/plaintiff's claim is with regard to the ownership of the subject land through registered gift deed document bearing No.12580 of 2023 dated 15.11.2023 (Ex.P.6), registered before the Joint Sub- Registrar, Nandyal executed by his father in his favour.
45. The appellant/plaintiff has also asserted that one Shakun Bee @ Shakun Bee and Shaik Raiza Begum @ Razia Bee acquired the land of an extent of Ac.0.07cents in Sy.No.663/5 of Mulasagaram Village, Nandyal Mandal and District from their ancestors and they in turn, sold the above land in favour of Z.Stanley Williams through registered document No.2780/2018 dated 19.03.2018 (Ex.P.3) to Shaik Hussain Vali.
46. Subsequently, the above said Shaik Hussain Vali sold an extent of Ac.0.03½ cents out of total Ac.0.07 cents to Mulla Khader Hussain through registered sale deed bearing No.2472/2019 dated 02.03.2019 (Ex.P.4). At last, the said Mulla Khader Hussain further executed registered sale deed bearing No.8489/2000 dated 25.09.2020 (Ex.P.5) in favour of the father of the appellant namely, M. Eswaraiah, who executed registered gift deed bearing No.12580/2023 dated 15.11.2023 (Ex.P.6) in respect of the subject land in favour of the appellant/plaintiff. 22
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47. Apparently, Ex.P.2 to Ex.P.6, relied on by the plaintiff are registered documents clearly containing the specific Sy.No.663/5 and extent of the subject land in the plaint, which proved the prima facie case of the appellant/plaintiff over the subject land.
48. Per contra, the respondents in their counter to the interlocutory applications stated that originally an extent of Ac.0.30 cents of land in Sy.No.662/1 & 663/5 of Mulasagaram Village, Nandyal Mandal and District belong to Kunta Hydu Bai and his family members by way of registered partition deed among them vide registered document bearing No.1977/1957 dated 18.06.1957(Ex.R.3). In the said partition deed, B Schedule property allotted to the share of Sarjan Ameena Bi and D Schedule property fell to the share of Hussain Bi. Thereafter, in view of several folds of execution of registered documents marked as Ex.R.4 to Ex.R.12, at last, the mother of respondent Nos.1 & 2 namely Gajula Lakshmi Devi executed registered will deed bearing document No.2/2019 dated 10.05.2019 (Ex.R.13) in respect of 'B' Schedule property which fell to the share of respondent No.2.
49. Similarly, according to the version of the respondents, the respondent No.1 acquired rights vide registered sale deed document bearing No.8130/2006 dated 15.11.2006 (Ex.R.9). Thus, respondent Nos.1 & 2 having absolute ownership rights and possession and 23 RNTJ & MRKJ CMA_714_686_2025 executed registered general power of attorney deed vide document bearing No.9363/2024 21.05.2024 (Ex.R.16), document bearing No.9364/2024 dated 21.05.2024 (Ex.R.18) and general power of attorney vide document bearing No.9365/2024 (Ex.R.19) 21.05.2024 in favour of respondent Nos.3 and 4 in respect of Sy.No.662/2- Ac.0.22cents), 662/6-Ac.0.05 cents, 663/1-Ac.0.30cents and 663/5-nil, total Ac.0.57cents.
50. Thereafter, respondent Nos.1 & 2 again on 22.05.2024 executed registered sale deed bearing document No.9361/2024 22.05.2024 (Ex.R.14), document No.9362/2024 dated 22.05.2024(Ex.R.15) in favour of respondent Nos.3 & 4. Subsequently, respondent Nos.1 & 2 executed registered sale deed bearing document No.2302/2025 dated 12.03.2025 (Ex.R.17) in favour of respondent Nos.3 & 4 pertaining to an extent of Ac.0.26.700 cents in Sy.Nos.662/2, 663/6, 662/1 & 663/5. Thus, respondent Nos.3 & 4 became absolute owners and possessors over the same and the respondents also claim possession and enjoyment over the above stated lands. In other words, both the parties relying upon the registered documents.
51. The learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff vociferously stated that even as per the version of the respondents' case, the link documents as well as the main documents claiming ownership and 24 RNTJ & MRKJ CMA_714_686_2025 possession by respondent Nos.2 & 3,do not contain specific extent of land in Sy.No.663/5. In the absence of the same, the very case set up by the respondents is liable to be thrown out. In this context, in order to arrive to the right conclusion, we deem it appropriate to extract the relevant registered documents and their schedules relied on by the respondents in the tabulated format below for the sake of comprehensive view:
Sl.
No. Document Vendor Vendee Schedule of Remarks
number, date property
& Exhibit
1. Registered Gajula Lakshmi G.Srinivasulu (R.2) (B Schedule No extent
will deed vide Devi property) mentioned in
document Sy.No.663/5
(Beneficiary)
No.2/2019
(Testator) Sy.No.662/1
dated
Ac.0.07 ½
10.05.2019 cents
(Ex.R.13)
Sy.No.663/5
Ac.0.03½
cents
Sy.No.662/1
Ac.0.11 cents
Sy.No.663/5
Total Ac.0.22
cents
Registered
2. sale deed Gajula PAV Group (R.3) Sy.No.662/2 No extent
bearing Venugopal (R.1) rep. by proprietor Ac.0.22 cents mentioned in
document P. Venu Gopal (R.4) Sy.No.663/5
No.9361/2024 & Sy.No.663/6
dated Ac.0.05 cents
22.05.2024(E
Gajula
25
RNTJ & MRKJ
CMA_714_686_2025
x.R.14) Srinivasulu(R.2)
Sy.No.662/1
Ac.0.30 cents
Sy.No.663/5
Total
Ac.0.57cents
Registered
3. sale deed Gajula PAV Group(R.3) Sy.No.662/2 No extent
bearing Venugopal (R.1) rep. by proprietor P. Ac.0.22 cents mentioned in
document Venu Gopal(R.4) Sy.No.663/5
No.9362/2024 & Sy.No.663/6
dated Ac.0.05 cents
22.05.2024
(Ex.R.15) Gajula
Srinivasulu(R.2) Sy.No.662/1
Ac.0.30 cents
Sy.No.663/5
Total
Ac.0.57cents
Registered
4. general Gajula PAV Group (R.3) Sy.No.662/2 No extent
power of Venugopal (R.1) rep. by proprietor Ac.0.22 cents mentioned in
attorney P. Venu Gopal (R.4) Sy.No.663/5
bearing & Sy.No.663/6
document Ac.0.05 cents
No.9363/2024
dated Gajula
21.05.2024 Srinivasulu(R.2) Sy.No.662/1
(Ex.R.16) Ac.0.30 cents
Sy.No.663/5
Total
Ac.0.57cents
Registered
5. sale deed Gajula PAV Group (R.3) Sy.No.662/2 No extent
bearing Venugopal (R.1) rep. by proprietor mentioned in
document P. Venu Gopal (R.4) Sy.No.663/6 Sy.No.663/5
No.2302/2025 &
dated
12.03.2024 Sy.No.662/1
(Ex.R.17) Gajula
Srinivasulu(R.2) Sy.No.663/5
26
RNTJ & MRKJ
CMA_714_686_2025
Total
Ac.0.26cents/
700 links
Registered
6. general Gajula PAV Group (R.3) Sy.No.662/2 No extent
power of Venugopal (R.1) rep. by proprietor mentioned in
attorney P. Venu Gopal (R.4) Sy.No.663/6 Sy.No.663/5
bearing &
document
No.9364/2024 Sy.No.662/1
dated Gajula
21.05.2024(E Srinivasulu(R.2) Sy.No.663/5
x.R.18)
Total
Ac.0.57cents
Registered
7. general Gajula PAV Group (R.3) Sy.No.662/2 No extent
power of Venugopal (R.1) rep. by proprietor Ac.0.22 cents mentioned in
attorney P. Venu Gopal (R.4) Sy.No.663/5
bearing & Sy.No.663/6
document Ac.0.05 cents
No.9365/2024
dated Gajula
21.05.2024 Srinivasulu(R.2) Sy.No.662/1
(Ex.R.19) Ac.0.30 cents
Sy.No.663/5
Total
Ac.0.57cents
52. By going through the above registered documents, which were marked from Ex.R.14 to Ex.19, it is crystal clear that respondent Nos.3 & 4 have not acquired any rights, title and possession over the subject land i.e., Sy.No.663/5 to an extent of Ac.0.30 cents/ 500 links in Sy.No.663/5 Moolasagaram Village, Nandyal Mandal and District. It is also apparent that the finding arrived at by the Trial Court is against the 27 RNTJ & MRKJ CMA_714_686_2025 weight of evidence and is, in fact, contrary to the material available on record. Such a conclusion not only overlooks the relevant evidence but also amounts to a clear misreading and misappreciation of the evidentiary record, thereby rendering the impugned finding unsustainable in law. Hence, the findings arrived at by the Trial Court as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the appellant, come under the ambit of perversity and the appellant/plaintiff prima facie, substantiated his assertions by way of registered documents in respect of the subject land. Whereas, the respondents have filed several documents, which do not contain the pivotal aspect of extent of land in Sy.No.663/5. The Apex Court in Printers (Mysore) supra observed that ignoring the relevant facts is also one of the grounds to interfere with the discretion exercised by the Trial Court.
53. So far as balance of convenience is concerned, it appears from a perusal of the orders under appeal that the Trial Court in its orders in para Nos.19 & 20 has merely relied upon the oral contention of the respondents without any prima facie proof and more so at the pre-trial stage itself. The said approach of the Trial Court that the registered sale deed dated 22.10.2014 (Ex.P.2) was a fabricated one and thrown out the very case of the appellant/plaintiff by discarding its subsequent registered documents is also unsustainable in law.28
RNTJ & MRKJ CMA_714_686_2025
54. The rejection of the plaintiff case by the Trial Court basing on the simple ground of fabrication of documents as per oral statement of the respondents is not legal and valid and it has also grossly violated the well settled legal principles in discarding the registered documents i.e., Ex.P.2. Indisputably, the alleged fabrication of Ex.P.2 by the respondents was not substantial in demonstrating their version. In the absence of primary pre-requisites, exclusively relying upon the oral submission made by the respondents that the registered documents relied upon by the plaintiff do not come under the parameters of the law. Entertaining the plea of fabrication at the pre-trial stage, before letting the evidence be presented by either party, results in serious prejudice and amounts to pre-judging the issue even before the commencement of the trial.
55. Another aspect involved in the lis is that the appellant/plaintiff contended that the averments made in the plaint as well as in I.A. even as per the version asserted by the respondents coupled with the recitals made in Ex.R.22 and Ex.R.23, which were registered documents prima facie establish that respondent No.3 has executed a registered sale deed vide Document No.858/2025 dated 30.01.2025 conveying an undivided 1/3rd share admeasuring Ac.0.30 cents-260 links, and has further executed a development agreement vide Document No.986/2025 29 RNTJ & MRKJ CMA_714_686_2025 dated 30.01.2025 on the very same day in favour of third parties. These successive transactions reveal that respondent Nos.2 and 3 have engaged in multiple dealings with respect to the subject land during the pendency of the dispute. If such multiplicity of proceedings is permitted to continue, it may likely give rise to unavoidable complications and may result in serious prejudice to the rights and claims asserted by the appellant/plaintiff. The possibility of third-party interests being created in the interregnum would not only complicate the adjudication of the suit but may also render the ultimate relief illusory.
56. It is pertinent to note that the Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C.) fundamentally aims to prevent multiplicity of proceedings, ensuring that parties are not drawn into unnecessary, repetitive, or parallel litigation concerning the same subject matter or arising between the same parties. In the present case, during the pendency of the lis, the respondents have proceeded to alienate the subject land in favour of third parties who are not parties to the suit, thereby creating further layers of complexity and exposing the appellant/plaintiff to the risk of additional proceedings. This type of conduct not only multiplies litigation but also has the inevitable effect and pave way for the delay in the adjudication of the main suit and frustrating the orderly administration of 30 RNTJ & MRKJ CMA_714_686_2025 justice. The said principle is also implemented through several procedural mechanisms which ensure that all claims related to a single cause of action are dealt with together in one suit like rules regarding the joinder of parties and causes of action, and also prevents matters that have already been decided or could have been decided in a previous suit from being raised again in a new one known as the doctrine of res judicata and constructive res judicata.
57. In Maharwal Khewaji Trust v. Baldev Dass10, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has unequivocally held that the object of a temporary injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC is to preserve the subject-matter of the suit in its existing condition, so that the final adjudication does not become illusory or infructuous. The Court observed that when the defendant's actions like raising constructions, altering the nature of the property, or creating third-party interests, are likely to cause irreversible prejudice or render the decree ineffective and the Court is duty-bound to restrain such acts.
58. In the case of Syed Abdulla v. Shaik Yasin 11, the Apex court has held as under:
10
(2004) 8 SCC 488 11 2025 SCC OnLine AP 846 31 RNTJ & MRKJ CMA_714_686_2025 " ....... 17. If during pendency of the suit, the appellants transferred the suit property or part thereof to third parties, that would also give rise to multiplicity of legal proceedings and complicate the suit proceedings. It would also give rise to the issue of the impleadment of the transferees, causing delay of the proceedings of the suit......."
59. While considering the vital ingredient of balance of convenience, the Court must weigh the competing needs and assess where the balance truly lies. This involves a comparative evaluation of the possible loss/injury or prejudice to each party, including all affected litigants before the Court, which plays a crucial role in arriving at a just finding in the lis.
60. Admittedly, even as per the case projected by the respondents as per their own documentary evidence available on record i.e., Ex.R.22 & Ex.R.23, clearly reveal that respondent No.3 represented by respondent No.4 executed both the registered sale deed as well as the registered development agreement on 30.01.2025 in favour of others. If interim orders are not granted, the respondents would have the opportunity to further alienate the subject land or any part thereof, and permitting such conduct to continue would result in serious and irreparable injury to the appellant/plaintiff. Accordingly, the balance of convenience lies in favour of the appellant/plaintiff.
32
RNTJ & MRKJ CMA_714_686_2025
61. Even the Memo of Undertaking, which indicates that the respondents would demolish the constructions if the appellant/plaintiff succeeds in the civil suit, does not adequately protect the interest of the appellant. This is because, as evident from Ex.R.22 and Ex.R.23, respondent Nos. 3 and 4 have also affected transactions in respect of the subject land. Consequently, the reasoning adopted by the Trial Court cannot be sustained. Further, the decision relied upon by the Trial Court in Archidiocess of Hyderabad v. J. Jaswantha Rao is distinguishable and does not apply to the facts of the present case. In that decision, the High Court of A.P. specifically observed that:-
"......6..........The question whether an order of temporary injunction should be or should not be granted always depend upon consideration of answers to the traditional questions relating to the balance of convenience and the existence of prima facie case. Ramalingaiah's case in my opinion docs not say that in every case where the defendant undertakes to demolish, the plaintiff's I.A. for the grant of a temporary injunction should be dismissed........."
62. Therefore, mere giving of undertaking by the respondents will not tighten the court's power to consider the case on the well settled legal principles.
33
RNTJ & MRKJ CMA_714_686_2025
63. So far as irreparable loss is concerned, a comparative assessment of hardship, mischief, or inconvenience clearly indicate that greater prejudice is likely to occur if the injunction is withheld. Considering the overall facts and circumstances, together with the well-settled legal principles discussed in the preceding paragraphs, it is evident that all three essential ingredients stand satisfied in favour of the appellant/plaintiff in the present case.
64. Yet another reason to set aside the impugned order of the Trial Court is that it relied on the fact that the respondents' building permit orders dated 10.12.2024 obtained by the respondents from the civil authorities after measuring the land and such reasoning cannot stand, as the civic authorities have no jurisdiction to adjudicate or determine title disputes between the parties. Matters relating to the declaration of rights and property ownership are exclusively determinable by competent civil courts, and administrative permissions or building permits cannot confer any legal right over the property in dispute.
65. Appellate Court intervention becomes indispensable where the refusal of an interim injunction is found on a misapplication of legal principles or a disregard of material circumstances. A Trial Court's order rejecting interim relief becomes perverse if it overlooks essential evidence, applies incorrect legal standards, or adopts a view that no 34 RNTJ & MRKJ CMA_714_686_2025 reasonable Court would take. In such circumstances, the Appellate Court is not constrained by the usual rule of non-interference. When the Trial Court's conclusion is untenable, suffers from perversity, or fails to properly consider the balance of convenience and irreparable prejudice, its discretion stands vitiated. In such cases, the Appellate Court is justified in setting aside the order to ensure that equity and justice are duly preserved.
66. It is trite to note that the primary object of a temporary injunction is to maintain the status quo and such relief is predicated on the legal principle ex debito justitiae (as a matter of right). However, before granting this relief, the trinity of conditions must be satisfied, namely: (i) existence of a prima facie case, (ii) where the balance of convenience lies in favour of the appellant/plaintiff, and (iii) the likelihood that refusal of the injunction would cause irreparable loss/injury to the parties. Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC and Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act (in short 'T.P. Act') were considered before a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in K. Ravi Prasad Reddy v. G. Giridhar12, where, in lucid terms, one of us (Hon'ble RNT,J) explained in para No.25 that:-
".......25. The distinction between Section 52 of T.P. Act and Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC, is that an order of temporary injunction is of preemptive nature restraining the act of alienation 12 2022 SCC OnLine AP 135 35 RNTJ & MRKJ CMA_714_686_2025 by party to the suit where there is such a danger, whereas Section 52 of T.P. Act comes into play after the alienation takes place during pendency of the suit. Section 52 of T.P. Act provides for the consequences of a transfer taking place pending litigation, i.e., that the pendent lite purchaser would be entitied to or suffer the same legal rights and obligations of his vendor that may be finally determined by the court. Section 52 of T.P. Act does not come in the way of applicability of Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 CPC. In other words, notwithstanding Section 52 of T.P. Act making the transfers during pendency of the suit subject to the ultimate decree that may be passed in the suit, the court may, pass an order of temporary injunction, if all the requisite pre-conditions for such grant are satisfied. If an order is passed and transfer is restrained, the question of applicability of Section 52 of T.P. Act will not arise as then there will be no transfer pending litigation. On the other hand, if the party does not apply for temporary injunction or if the application is rejected and the suit property is transferred pending litigation, Section 52 of T.P. Act shall come into play and those transfers would abide by the ultimate result of the suit......."
67. Therefore, merely relying on Section 52 of T.P. Act cannot cover all transfers, but only governs transfers subject to the result of the civil suit. In fact, the pendency of the lis, as envisaged under Section 52, regulates all pendente lite transfers. However, this provision alone may not adequately shield enough to take widest care of the appellant/plaintiff's interest in respect of such transfers. Conclusion:
68. In the backdrop of the facts and circumstances of the present case, the appellant/plaintiff has established a prima facie case warranting protection of the subject land. The balance of convenience clearly lies in favour of appellant/plaintiff, warranting an order restraining 36 RNTJ & MRKJ CMA_714_686_2025 any further alienation, and failure to do so would likely cause irreparable loss/injury that cannot be adequately compensated in monetary terms. Therefore, the preservation of the subject land is essential to safeguard the subject matter of the litigation pending its final adjudication.
69. Having considered the matter in totality, this Court is of the view that the Trial Court failed to properly appreciate the settled principles governing the grant of temporary injunction. The Trial Court proceeded on a narrow reading of the documents and ignored the undisputed fact that the documents presented by the respondents suffer from ambiguity and the Trial Court ought not to have rejected the application on speculative grounds. The finding of the Trial Court, therefore, warrants interference under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 C.P.C.
70. In the result, C.M.A. Nos.714 and 686 of 2025 are allowed, setting aside the orders dated 20.08.2025 passed in I.A. No.1634 of 2025 and I.A. No.1635 of 2025 in O.S. No.27 of 2025 on the file of the Court of III Addl. District Judge, Kurnool at Nandyal. There shall be interim injunction restraining the respondents from making alienation of the subject land and the respondents are directed not to proceed with constructions in respect of the subject land, until disposal of the main suit.
37
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71. The Trial Court shall make endeavour to expeditiously decide the suit matter with the cooperation of the parties. Needless to say, that any observation made herein is only to assess the validity of the orders under challenge and shall have no effect on the adjudication of the merits of the case by the Trial Court.
No costs. As a sequel, all pending applications shall stand closed.
___________________ RAVI NATH TILHARI, J _____________________________ MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM, J Dated 17.12.2025 GVK 38 RNTJ & MRKJ CMA_714_686_2025 99 THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI AND THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL Nos.714 and 686 of 2025 Dt. 17.12.2025 GVK