Delhi District Court
Shri Subhash Mehra vs Smt. Suchitra Jain on 2 July, 2013
IN THE COURT OF SHRI SANJEEV KUMAR SINGH :
ADMINISTRATIVE CIVIL JUDGE CUM ADDITIONAL RENT
CONTROLLER (CENTRAL) : DELHI
E36/2012
Unique ID No : 02401C0154792012
In the matter of:
Shri Subhash Mehra,
S/o Late Shri Puran Chand Mehra,
R/o 4787/23, Ansari Road, Darya Ganj,
New Delhi110002.
....Petitioner
Versus
Smt. Suchitra Jain,
Widow of Late Shri Raj Kumar,
R/o 13, Shivalis, Sector61,
Noida (U.P.)
Also At:
4222/1, Laxmi Kunj, Third Floor,
Ansari Road, Darya Ganj,
New Delhi110002.
.....Respondent
O R D E R:
Vide this order, I shall decide an application for leave to defend filed on behalf of the respondent under Section 25B (4) of The Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as DRC Act, 1958) seeking leave to contest the present eviction petition.
2. The present eviction petition has been filed by the petitioner Sh. E36/2012 Page 1/20 Subhash Mehra against the respondent Smt. Suchitra Jain under Section 14 (1)
(e) read with Section 25B of the DRC Act, 1958.
3. The stand of the petitioner is that Late Laxmi Devi (mother of the petitioner) was the owner of the property in dispute. She let out two rooms marked 'A' & 'B', in the site plan attached with the petition, one small pooja room, one kitchen, one bathroom, a balcony and one latrine situated on the third floor of the property no. 4222/1, Laxmi Kunj, Ansari Road, Darya Ganj, New Delhi to the respondent at a monthly rent of Rs. 350/ besides electricity and water charges. In or about in the year 1986 an additional room marked 'C' in the site plan was constructed on the third floor of the said property by Smt. Laxmi Devi and it was let out to the respondent. Thereafter, monthly rent of the aforesaid premises was increased from Rs. 350/ to Rs. 1,050/ p.m. besides electricity and water charges. The respondent started making the payment of the said rent by means of cheques. Accordingly, the respondent has paid rent for the period upto 31.03.2012.
4. It is further the version of the petitioner that his mother expired on 03.05.2013. Thereafter, the petitioner inherited the said property. The respondent attorned the petitioner as onwer/landlord of the premises and started making payment of rent to the petitioner by means of cheques. The petitioner has also made payment of house tax to the MCD, vide House Tax Receipt No. 0879298 dated 31.10.2004. For the last 1011 years, the respondent has not been residing or using the tenanted premises but the same are lying under the locks and keys of the respondent. The respondent alongwith her family E36/2012 Page 2/20 member is residing in House No. 13, Shivalis, Sector61, Noida (U.P.). The said house was constructed by the husband of the respondent.
5. It is further the version of the petitioner that the tenanted premises are required bonafidely by the petitioner for his residence as well as for the residence of his dependent family members. The petitioner is the owner of the third floor of property No. 4787/23, Ansari Road, Darya Ganj, New Delhi and he is residing in the said house alongwith his wife, his married son Shri Praveen Mehra, wife of his son besides his one granddaughter and one grandson. The grandchildren of the petitioner are aged about 16 and 10 years respectively. The granddaughter of the petitioner is studying in 10th standard and his grandson is studying in 6th standard. The said accommodation consists of two bedrooms, a drawingcumdining room, a small lobby, kitchen, toilet and W.C. besides open terrace with two small stores. The said accommodation is most insufficient and is not a reasonably suitable residential accommodation required by the petitioner and his family members.
6. It is further the version of the petitioner that there is no independent accommodation for the granddaughter of the petitioner in property no. 4787/23, Ansari Road, Darya Ganj. The petitioner wants to shift his granddaughter from the said house to live with him in the tenanted premises. The petitioner shall use one room for himself and his wife, one room shall be used as drawingcum dining room, the third floor shall be used by the granddaughter for her residence and study. The said room shall also be used by the married daughter of the petitioner as and when she visits the petitioner. The petitioner and his E36/2012 Page 3/20 abovementioned family members have no other reasonably suitable accommodation with them. It is further prayed that an eviction order may be passed in respect of the tenanted premises as shown in red colour in the site plan.
7. Summons in the prescribed form under Schedule III of DRC Act, 1958 were served upon the respondent. Thereafter, an application for leave to defend along with affidavit has been filed by the respondent within the stipulated period.
8. It is the version of the respondent that the present petition is malafide, misconceived, vexatious, speculative, harrasive, humilative and an abuse of the process of law. The petitioner has no right to evict the tenant. In the year 1980, there was no roof on the third floor (infact it is 4th floor) and no structures were built on the said floor. The respondent was given vacant space without structure with power to the respondent to make construction at the third floor (4th floor) at the cost of the respondent. At the time when possession of the area was given to the respondent, pugree in the sum of Rs. 25,000/ was also paid to the petitioner. The structure covering two bed rooms, one drawingcum dining room, one small pooja room, one kitchen, one bathroom, a balcony and one latrine on the third floor was constructed by the respondent out of her own money.
9. The respondent has denied that mother of the petitioner let out the tenanted premises, rate of rent, construction of additional room as averred in E36/2012 Page 4/20 para 18 (a) (i) of the eviction petition.
10. It is further the version of the respondent that upon enquiry, the respondent has come to know that one of the sister of petitioner is also one of the owner of the property in dispute. The petitioner has not disclosed as to why the premises in the possession of the respondent would only be required by the petitioner. The petitioner is also owner of property no. 4787/23, Ansari Road, Darya Ganj, New Delhi wherein also the petitioner has various space to accommodate his family members if at all, there is any requirement as alleged. The accommodation with the petitioner at property no. 4787/23, Ansari Road, Darya Ganj, New Delhi is sufficient. The petitioner and his family members are living jointly. The son and his family are owner of various properties.
11. The respondent has denied that for the last 1011 years, she has not been residing or using the tenanted premises. The respondent has also denied that she alongwith family members is residing at H.No. 13, Shivalis, Sector61, Noida (U.P.). The bonafide requirement as shown by the petitioner is exaggerated. It is further prayed that the respondent's application for leave to contest may be allowed.
12. The petitioner has filed reply alongwith affidavit to the application for leave to defend and has denied the allegations leveled by the respondent and has reaffirmed his stand as averred in the petition. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the respondent has not denied the specific statement of facts mentioned in para 18 (III) and (IV) of the petition, hence the same shall be E36/2012 Page 5/20 deemed to have been admitted.
13. The respondent has filed rejoinder along with affidavit and the averments made in the application for leave to defend have been reiterated and reaffirmed. It is submitted that the alleged requirement of granddaughter of the petitioner is not the requirement as per law.
14. I have heard the ld. counsel for the parties and perused the record carefully.
15. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon 2012 Rajdhani Law Reporter (Note) 3, titled as "Abdul Malik Vs. Shashi Bhalla", 172 (2010) Delhi Law Times 551 Delhi High Court, titled as "Kharati Ram Khanna & Sons Vs. Krishna Luthra", 169 (2010) Delhi Law Times 769 Delhi High Court, titled as "Krishan Lal Vs. R.N. Bakshi", 173 (2010) Delhi Law Times 318 Delhi High Court, titled as "Labhu Lal Vs. Sandhya Gupta" and 135 (2006) Delhi Law Times 453 Delhi High Court, titled as "Mahabir Prasad & Anr. Vs. Ved Wati Pathak & Ors.".
16. Ld. Counsel for the respondent has relied upon 1982 (3) SCC 270, titled as "Precision Metal & Engg. Works Vs. Prema Deva, Niranjan Deva Tayal", 2001 (1) SCC 706, titled as "Inderjeet Kaur Vs. Nirpal Singh", R.C. REV. 382/2012 decided on 14.12.2012 by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi, titled as "Ram Devi Vs. Raj Rani & Anr." and R.C. REV. 102/2012 decided on E36/2012 Page 6/20 21.12.2012 by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi, titled as "Prahlad Rai Mittal Vs. Smt. Rita Devi".
17. While deciding the question whether leave to defend should be granted or refused, the Court is to address itself on following issues :
(a) That the petitioner is owner of the suit premises;
(b) Purpose of letting;
(c) That the premises is required bonafide by the petitioner; and
(d) That the petitioner has no other alternative suitable accommodation in Delhi.
18. In Precision Metal & Engg. Works Vs. Prema Deva, Niranjan Deva Tayal, AIR 1982 SC 1518, it has been held that "while deciding the application for leave to contest, the controller has to confine himself to the affidavit filed by the tenant under Sub Section (4) and the reply if any. On perusing the affidavit filed by the tenant and the reply if any filed by the landlord, the controller has to pose to himself the only question, "Does the affidavit disclose, not prove, facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession on the ground specified in clause of the proviso to Section 14 (1)?". The controller is not to record a finding on disputed questions of facts or his preference of one set of affidavits against the other set of affidavits."
The gist of the various decisions is that if any triable issue is raised in the application which can not be decided unless the parties lead evidence, leave to contest should be granted. In all other cases, the leave has to be E36/2012 Page 7/20 refused.
19. In (2002) 7 SCC 614 titled as Rita Lal Vs. Raj Kumar Singh, Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under : "If the Court is satisfied that though in the pleadings an issue is raised but that is not a triable issue then the Court is justified in refusing the leave to defend. A defence, which is practically moonshine, sham or illusory can not be held to be raising a triable issue. Else the whole purpose behind enacting a provision for granting leave to defend, and not permitting a contest unless leave was granted, would stand defeated."
Ownership
20. The petitioner claims himself as owner and landlord of the tenanted premises on the ground that previously his mother was owner/landlord of the tenanted premises and after her death, he had inherited the said property. The respondent has contended that the petitioner cannot claim himself to be the sole owner of the premises as she has come to know that one of the sister of the petitioner is also the owner of the premises in dispute.
21. In Shanti Sharma Vs. Ved Prabha AJR 1987 SC 2028, it has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court that for the purpose of Section 14 (1) (e) of DRC Act, "Ownership is not to be understood as absolute ownership but only as a title better than the tenant".
In Rajender Kumar Sharma & Ors. Vs. Leelawati & Ors. 155 (2008) DLT 383, it has been held by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi that E36/2012 Page 8/20 "landlord is not supposed to prove absolute ownership as required under Transfer of Property Act. He is required to show only that he is more than tenant."
In 157 (2009) DLT 450, Delhi High Court titled as Ramesh Chand Vs. Uganti Devi, it has been observed by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi vide para No. 7 that "It is settled proposition of law that in order to consider the concept of ownership under Delhi Rent Control Act, the Court has to see the title and right of the landlord qua the tenant. The only thing to be seen by the court is that the landlord had been receiving rent for his own benefit and not for and on behalf of someone else. If the landlord was receiving rent for himself and not on behalf of someone else, he is to be considered as the owner, howsoever, imperfect his title over the premises may be. The imperfectness of the title of the premises can not stand in the way of an eviction petition under Section 14 (1) (e) of the DRC Act, neither the tenant can be allowed to raise the plea of imperfect title or title not vesting in the landlord and that too when the tenant has been paying rent to the landlord. Section 116 of the Evidence Act creates a estoppels against such a tenant. A tenant can challenge the title of landlord only after vacating the premises and not when he is occupying the premises. In fact, such a tenant who denies the title of the landlord, qua the tenanted premises, to whom he is paying rent, acts dishonestly."
22. In the present case the petitioner has filed copy of properties tax receipt regarding tenanted premises. The petitioner has also filed copy of rent receipt dated 07.05.1982 to show that the mother of the petitioner was landlord E36/2012 Page 9/20 of the tenanted premises and the respondent was tenant (annexure A1). The petitioner has also filed copy of cheque (annexure B) issued by respondent to the petitioner to show last payment of rent by the respondent with effect from July 2010 to March 2012 in the sum of Rs. 24,150/ and as such, the petitioner has established the relationship of landlord and tenant between him and the respondent. The contention of the respondent that one of the sister of the petitioner is also the owner of the tenanted premises is not of much relevance as it is settled position of law that an eviction petition U/S 14 (1) (e) of DRC Act, 1958 can be filed even by one coowner. Therefore, keeping in view aforesaid authorities, the aspect of ownership goes in favour of the petitioner.
23. The purpose of letting has become redundant as in Satyawati Sharma Vs. Union of India 148 (2008) DLT 705 Supreme Court, it has been held that the premises let out either for residential or for commercial purposes can be got vacated by the landlord for bonafide requirements. Nonavailability of reasonably suitable alternative accommodation in Delhi.
24. Let us examine the aspect of availability or nonavailability of any other reasonably suitable alternative accommodation with the petitioner in Delhi. The stand of the petitioner is that he has no other reasonably suitable alternative accommodation in Delhi except the tenanted premises. The requirement of the petitioner is based on paucity of accommodation on the ground that accommodation in H.No. 4787/23, Ansari Road, Darya Ganj, New Delhi, where presently he is residing alongwith his family is insufficient. On E36/2012 Page 10/20 this aspect it is the contention of the respondent that the son of the petitioner and his family member are owner of various properties.
25. In 157 (2009) DLT 450 titled as Ramesh Chand Vs. Uganti Devi, Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has observed vide para (9) that "A tenant who alleges that the landlord has at his disposal other accommodation has to place before Ld. ARC some material to show that the landlord has a specific alternative accommodation at his disposal. Mere assertion that the landlady/landlord was the owner of various properties without placing on record even a single piece of document of the fact that such property was available to the landlord or landlady, no triable issue is raised. If these kinds of bald assertions are entertained by the Ld. ARC, then every tenant would assert about the ownership by the landlord of any property owned by a stranger and would go away with leave to defend. That is not the intent of Legislature. Only in those cases leave to defend can be granted where Ld. ARC finds some substance in the issues raised by the tenant, so find out if there was substance into the assertions made by the tenant, Ld. ARC has to scrutinize the material placed before him by both the parties and come to a conclusion."
26. In the present case, the respondent has not filed any document on record to show that son or the family members of the petitioner are owners of various properties. Even the respondent has not given any specific number of alleged various properties. Therefore, placing reliance upon "Ramesh Chand Vs. Uganti Devi (Supra)", I am of the considered opinion that the petitioner has been able to establish that he does not have any other suitable alternative E36/2012 Page 11/20 accommodation in Delhi except the tenanted premises. Bonafide Requirement
27. Let us turn towards the aspect of bonafide requirement of the petitioner. As per petitioner, his family consists of his wife, married son, son's wife, one granddaughter (aged about 16 years, studying in 10th standard) and one grandson (aged about 10 years, studying in 6th standard). Presently, the petitioner is residing alongwith his aforesaid family members at 4787/23, Ansari Road, Darya Ganj, New Delhi. This house consists of two bed rooms (10' X 17'2'', 11' X 17'1''), a drawingcumdining room (10' X 23'), a small lobby (8'6'' X 9'10'') and W.C. besides open terrace with two small stores as per site plan annexure K. Due to shortage of accommodation in aforesaid property, the petitioner requires the tenanted premises for his residence, residence of his wife and for the residence of his granddaughter who is studying in 10th standard. There is no independent accommodation for his granddaughter. He wants to shift his granddaughter from the said house to live with him in the tenanted premises.
28. The respondent's stand is that presently where petitioner is residing is sufficient for the petitioner and for his family members. Ld. Counsel for the respondent argued that in the eviction petition, the reasons/changed circumstances due to which all of sudden present eviction petition has been filed when petitioner alongwith his family members is happily residing in property no. 4787/23, Ansari Road, Darya Ganj, New Delhi and how his granddaughter who is 16 years of age is dependent upon him when her parents E36/2012 Page 12/20 are alive.
29. In Shiv Sarup Gupta Vs. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta VI (1999) SLT 163 = (1999) 6 SCC 222 wherein, it was observed by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India that : "12. A perusal of Section 14 of the Act shows that the law has imposed restrictions on the recovery of possession, of any premises by landlord from a tenant notwithstanding any law or contract to the contrary. However, an order for recovery of possession is permissible on one or more of the specified ground. One such ground is the premises let for residential purposes being required bonafide by the landlord for occupation as residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him. What is a bonafide requirement is not defined in the Act. The words 'need' and 'require' both denote a certain degree of want with a thrust within demanding fulfilment. 'Need' or 'requirement' qualified by word 'bonafide' or 'genuine' preceding as an adjectiveis an expression often used in Rent Control Laws. 'Bonafide or genuine need' of the landlord or that the landlord 'genuinely requires' or "requires bonafide" an accommodation for occupation by or use for himself is an accepted ground for eviction and such expression is often employed by Rent Control legislation draftsman. The two expressions are interchangeable in practice and carry the same meaning."
13. Chambers 20th Century Dictionary defines bonafide to E36/2012 Page 13/20 mean "in good faith: genuine". The word 'genuine' means 'natural; not spurious; real" pure: sincere'. In Law Dictionary, Mozley and Whitley defines bonafide to mean 'good faith, without fraud or deceit'. Thus the term bonafide or genuinely refers to a state of mind. Requirement is not a mere desire. The degree of intensity contemplated by 'requires' is much more higher than in mere desire. The phrase 'required bonafide' is suggestive of legislative intent that a mere desire which is outcome of whim or fancy is not taken note of by the Rent Control Legislation. A requirement in the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, honest desire, in contradistinction with a mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant, on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family would entitle him to seek ejectment of the tenant."
30. In R.K. Bhatnagar Vs. Sushila Bhargav, 1986 RLR 232, Hon'ble High Court of Delhi had observed vide para no. 9 & 10 as under :
9. The converse of the foregoing legal position would equally hold good inasmuch as an increase in the family of the landlord may justify need for additional accommodation even though the landlord has acquired some more accommodation during the pendency of eviction proceedings or appeal. As would be seen from the affidavit of the respondent, adverted to above, at least two rooms will be required by her eldest son Vijay Kumar and his children, both of whom are school going. Likewise, two rooms will be required by her son Kapil Bhargava. No doubt, both his children are very young at E36/2012 Page 14/20 present but even then they will need a separate room for their studies etc. as they grow in age. But even assuming that they can sleep in the room of their parents for the present, the need of the respondentlandlady for additional accommodation, as shall be presently seen is still there. One room each will be required by the respondent for herself and her two married daughters who, as stated above, are at present living with her. It is true that in Hindu society married daughters are not normally considered to be members of the family of their parents and strictly speaking they cannot be said to be dependent on their parents for residence. However, the concept of family is not that rigid as to always exclude the married daughters from the family of their parents inasmuch as there can be genuine cases where married daughters are in fact living with their parents for one reason or the other and they may be said to be dependent on their parents for residential accommodation. It is now well settled that the expression "family" has to be interpreted reasonably and fairly giving the due regard to the social, religious and economic conditions of life in our country as also peculiar circumstances of each case. As held by a Division Bench of this Court in Gobind Dass v. Kuldip Singh, 1970 R.C.R. 511, an extended meaning is to be given to the word "family". Observed the Division Bench :
"The word "family" has not been defined in the Act and we feel advisedly so. Te concept of what constitutes a family when a number of persons are related or are living together is not something static or capable of concise definition. What constitutes a family in a given set of circumstances or in a particular society depends upon the habits and ideas of persons constituting that society and the religious and socio religious customs of the community to which such persons may belong."
10. Their Lordships further said that, "A remote relation may, in a given set of circumstances, be treated as a member of the family, whereas in another set of circumstances the same relation may not be legitimately called as a member of the E36/2012 Page 15/20 family." In Lala Ram v. Kalawati, 1975 R.L.R. (Note) 112, the landlady was living in the house with her married daughter and her husband as a family. It was held by Yogeshwar Dayal, J. that "the requirement of the daughter and her husband will be treated as the requirement of the landlady". I am in respectful agreement with this observation of his Lordship. So, having regard to the fact that both the married daughters who have been living continuously with the respondent because they could not live with their husbands for some reason or the other will be deemed to be members of her family. On a parity of reasoning they will also be considered to be dependent on her for residential accommodation even though both of them are earning hands. It is now well settled that the word "dependent" cannot be construed as wholly dependent in the sense of earning nothing at all and being entirely dependent on parents for board, lodging or maintenance but in the context in which that term appears in S14(1) (e) it connotes a wider concept and covers a larger field. So, it takes in a person who is not financially dependent upon the landlord but who would in the normal course look up to the landlord to provide him with the facility of a house possessed by the landlord; though in strict legal parlance dependent may mean looking up for support or finance. So looked at the matter from this angle, both the married daughters of the respondent can well be said to be members of her family. Even though both of them are earning hands they have to look to their parents for residential accommodation because they are not living with their husbands and for reasons of security etc. they would be finding it difficult to live all alone at Delhi and set up an independent establishment of their own.
31. In 167 (2010) DLT 678, it was observed by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi that "only a room which measured 100 square feet or more is considered E36/2012 Page 16/20 habitable living room - room is a place where person can live in privacy."
In 49 (1993) Delhi Law Times 543, it was observed by Hon'ble High Court that "room having area less than 100 square feet is not a living room. Bonafide requirement - whether grown up child needs one separate room? (Yes). It was further held that "One single room means that grown up child should be free to live in that room in a manner he likes. He should also be free to devote his time to study without disturbance. It will amount to snatching away such a right from a child if we draw an imaginary line of partition in a room."
In 25 (1984) Delhi Law Times (SN) CR No. 253 (1980) decided on 17.03.1980, it was observed by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi that "Requirement for separate room for grown up children not to be considered fanciful or dishonest."
In 61 (1996) DLT 426 (DB), it was observed by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi that "Social customs, conventions, habits and usages and practices of the society and similar other considerations cannot be completely ignored as irrelevant while considering the question of the requirement of the landlord. In our view it would not be proper to say that as a broad proposition of law that the requirements of the family guests visiting the landlord off and on cannot at all be taken into consideration while assessing the need of the landlord. The requirement of the landlord for guests and relations who visit and stay with him off and on, in our view, is also entitled to be considered keeping in view the facts and circumstances of each case as has also been observed by M.L. Jain, J. in Kanwal Narain v. L.F. Tellis."
In 82 (1999) DLT 203, it was held by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi E36/2012 Page 17/20 that "All 4 children require separate rooms for their residence besides one room for petitioner and his wife - Requirement of guest room - cannot be termed unreasonable."
In 82 (1999) DLT 948, it was held by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi that "Even holding that total rooms available with the appellant were only two, the Tribunal committed grave error in not considering the demand as bonafide the requirement for the purposes of drawingcumdining room."
In Krishan Kumar Vs. Vimla Sehgal (Delhi) 1976 RCR 249, it has been held that "no one can say that when the landlord requires one separate room for each member of his family including himself and his wife, his requirement is unreasonable. The law does not expect the landlord to sacrifice his comforts and live a crowded life in his own house when he can have better comfort. The view that son and daughter can be huddled together in one room is unreasonable. The landlord can not be asked that he must somehow put up with the limited accommodation in his possession."
In 135 (2006) DLT 453 titled as Mahabir Parshad & Anr. Vs. Vedwati Pathak & Ors., it was observed by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi that "It can not be said that the landlord is not entitled to a room or each of his sons alongwith daughtersinlaw are not entitled to a room each for the couple. Similar is the requirement of the grownup granddaughters and three granddaughters can not be thrust into one room ." It was further observed that "law does not compel a landlord to squeeze his requirement tightly into lesser premises protecting tenants occupation." E36/2012 Page 18/20
32. Now, I shall examine whether additional requirement of the petitioner qua the tenanted premises is bonafide or not. The respondent has not disputed the family size of the petitioner. As per site plan of the property no. 4787/23, Ansari Road, Darya Ganj, New Delhi, there are two bed rooms (10' X 17'2''), one drawingcumdining room (10' X 23') for the purposes of residence i.e. habitable living room, a small lobby, kitchen, toilet, open terrace with two small stores. If the test of reasonable and bonafide requirement of the landlord is applied to the aforesaid accommodation as compared even the basic requirement of the landlord for himself and for his family members, there is no doubt in my mind that the landlord suffers from paucity of accommodation. Being guided by the aforesaid authorities, the requirement of one room for the petitioner and his wife, one room for his son and his wife, one room for granddaughter of the petitioner, one room for grandson of the petitioner, one drawingcumdining room cannot be said a mere wish or desire. At present, the petitioner is having only two bedrooms and one drawingcumdining room and as such the additional requirement of the petitioner is bonafide and genuine requirement keeping in view the size of rooms available with the petitioner as depicted in the site plan filed by the petitioner. I also reject the contention of the respondent that granddaughter is not dependent upon him for residence purposes placing reliance upon R.K. Bhatnagar V. Sushila Bhargav (Supra). The authority relied upon by Ld. Counsel for the respondent i.e. Ram Devi Vs. Raj Rani & Anr. (Supra) is not applicable to the facts of the present case as in the aforesaid authority the ownership of the landlord was under dispute as the suit filed by the landlord in which issue regarding the ownership was framed was dismissed. The authority relied upon by Ld. Counsel for the respondent i.e. E36/2012 Page 19/20 Prahlad Rai Mittal Vs. Smt. Rita Devi (Supra) is also not applicable to the facts of the present case as in that authority the tenant had given a detailed list of properties with specific numbers held by the owner/landlord and in the present case the respondent has not given even the property number of the various properties owned by the son of the petitioner or his family members.
33. In the light of the above discussion, this Court is of the view that the respondent has failed to put forth any triable issue which requires investigation or requires recording of evidence. In other words, primafacie there is nothing on record which would disentitle the petitioner of the right of immediate possession of the tenanted premises.
34. With these observations, application of the respondent under Section 25B (4) of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 is hereby dismissed. Accordingly, eviction order is passed in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent qua the tenanted premises bearing no. 4222/1, Laxmi Kunj, Ansari Road, Darya Ganj, New Delhi as shown in red colour in the siteplan (annexure A) attached with the petition. This order shall not be executable before expiry of six months from the date of this order. Parties to bear their own costs.
File be consigned to Record Room.
Announced in the open court (SANJEEV KUMAR SINGH )
on 02/07/2013 Administrative Civil JudgeCum
Additional Rent Controller (Central)
Delhi
E36/2012 Page 20/20
E36/2012
02.07.2013
Pr: Petitioner in person.
None for the respondent.
Vide separate order, application of the respondent for leave to defend is dismissed. Accordingly, eviction order is passed in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent qua the tenanted premises bearing no. 4222/1, Laxmi Kunj, Ansari Road, Darya Ganj, New Delhi as shown in red colour in the siteplan (annexure A) attached with the petition. This order shall not be executable before expiry of six months from the date of this order. Parties to bear their own costs.
File be consigned to Record Room.
(Sanjeev Kumar Singh) ACJ/ARC (Central)/Delhi 02.07.2013 E36/2012 Page 21/20