Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Manepalli Ammalu Anr vs Kada Hareesh Kumar 3 Ors on 20 June, 2025
APHC010416492017
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADJ
AT AMARAVATI
FRIDAY, THE TWENTIETH DAY OF JUNE
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA
MOTOR ACCIDENT CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS flppEAL NO- 537 OF 2017
Between:
1. Manepalli Ammalu, W/o.Late Annajirao, aged about 54 years
R/o.Alluveedhi, Salur, Vizianagaram District.
2. Manepalli Santhosh Kumar, S/o.Late Annajirao aged about 27 years,
R/o.Alluveedhi, Salur. Vizianagaram District.
-appellants (PETITIONERS)
AND
1. Kada Hareesh Kumar. S/o.Ramakrishna, aged about 24 years. Driver of
APSRTC Bus Bearing No.AP 10 Z 6354, R/o.Venkateswara Colony,
Salur, Vizianagaram District.
2. Nalli Adinarayana, S/o.Late Appalaswamy, aged about 53 years, Shift
Supervisor, RTC Depot Salur, R/o.Srirama Colony Salur,
Vizianagaram District.
3. APSRTC, Salur Depot, rep by its Depot Manager.
4. APSRTC, Hyderabad
rep by its Managing Director, Bus Bhavan,
Hyderabad.
...RESPONDENTS(RESPONDENTS)
Appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, against the Order
and Decree dated 15.12.2016 passed in MVOP No.276 of 2015 on the file of
the .Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (II Additional District Judge),
Parvathipiifam, Vizianagaram District.
This appeal coming on for hearing and upon perusing the grounds of
appeal, the Order and Decree of the Trial Court and material papers in the
petition and upon hearing arguments of Sri G.Sai Narayana Rao, Advocate
for Appellants, and of Sri Vinod Kumar Tarlada, Standing Counsel for
Respondent Nos.3 & 4, and none appeared for Respondent Nos.1 & 2.
THIS COURT DOTH ORDER AND DECREE:
1.
That the appeal be and the same is hereby allowed;
2.
That the Order and Decree, dated 15-12-2016 passed by the Motor
Accidents Claims Tribunal be and are hereby set-aside;
3. That the M.V.O.P.No.276 of 2015 be and the same is hereby allowed
as follows:
a) That the claimants be and are hereby entitled for a compensation
of Rs.4,39,000/- with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the
date of petition till the date of realization;
b) That all the respondents be and are hereby liable to pay the
compensation jointly and severally;
c) That the Claimant No.1 be and is hereby entitled for Rs.3,00,000/-
with proportionate interest and total costs;
d) That the Claimant No.2 be and is hereby entitled for Rs.1,39,000/-
with proportionate interest and costs;
e) That on deposit both the claimants be and are hereby permitted to
withdraw the entire amount at once; and
4. That there be no order as to costs in this appeal.
SD/- N.NAGAMMA
ASSISTANT REGISTRAR
//TRUE COPY//
SECTION OFFICER
To
1. The Chairman, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-ll Additional
District Judge, Parvathipuram, Vizianagaram District.
2. THREE CD COPIES
TAC
HIGH COURT
DATED;20/06/2025
DECREE
MACMA N0.537 OF 2017
0 JUL 2025
X'vGiiTwit s«tigp^*^x
'''SggPiisS^^
ALLOWING THE MACMA WITHOUT COSTS
APHC010416492017
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI
FRIDAY, THE TWENTIETH DAY OF JUNE
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA
MOTOR ACCIDENT CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL NO: 537 OF 2017
Appeal filed under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, against the
Order and Decree dated 15.12.2016 passed in MVOP No.276 of 2015 on the
file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (II Additional District Judge),
Parvathipuram, Vizianagaram District.
Between:
1. Manepalli Ammalu, W/o.Late Annajirao, aged about 54 years.
R/o.Alluveedhi, Salur, Vizianagaram District.
2. Manepalli Santhosh Kumar, S/o.Late Annajirao, aged about 27 years.
R/o.Alluveedhi, Salur, Vizianagaram District.
...APPELLANTS (PETITIONERS)
AND
1. Kada Hareesh Kumar, S/o.Ramakrishna, aged about 24 years. Driver of
APSRTC Bus Bearing No.AP 10 Z 6354, R/o.Venkateswara Colony,
Salur, Vizianagaram District.
2. Nalli Adinarayana, S/o.Late Appalaswamy, aged about 53 years. Shift
Supervisor, RTC Depot Salur, R/o.Srirama Colony, Salur,
Vizianagaram District.
3. APSRTC, Salur Depot, rep by its Depot Manager.
4. APSRTC, Hyderabad, rep by its Managing Director, Bus Bhavan,
Hyderabad.
...RESPONDENTS (RESPONDENTS)
• -4
for the Petitioners : SRI G.SAI NARAYANA RAO
Counsel for the Respondent Nos.1 & 2 : NONE APPEARED
Counsel for the Respondent Nos.3 & 4 : SRI VINOD KUMAR TARLADA
(SC FOR APSRTC)
The Court made the following JUDGMENT :
1
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA
M.A.C.M.A.No.537 of 2017
JUDGMENT:
1. Claimants in M.V.O.P.No.276 of 2015 on the file of Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-ll Additional District Judge, Parvatipuram (for short "the learned MACT"), questioning the dismissal of their claim petition filed the present appeal.
2. The claim was arising out of the death of Manepalli Annaji Rao (hereinafter referred to as "the deceased") in a Motor Vehicle accident that occurred at A.P.S.R.T.C. complex, Salur, due to the involvement of A.P.S.R.T.C. Bus bearing No.AP 10 Z 6354 (hereinafter referred to as "the offending vehicle") driven by Respondent No.1.
3. Claimants are the wife and the son of the deceased. Respondent Nos.1 and 2 i.e. the driver of the offending vehicle and the Shift Supervisor of the R.T.C. Depot, Salur remained ex parte.
4. Respondent Nos.3 and 4 / Depot Manager and Managing Director contested the case.
5. For the sake of convenience, the parties will be hereinafter referred to as the claimants and the Respondents as and how they are arrayed in the impugned proceedings.
sn* 2 Case of the claimants:
6. Deceased worked as driver in A.P S.R T,C. became unfit due to medical reasons and out of service from A.P.S.R.T.C. On 03.12.2013 at about 08;00 p.m., the deceased went to Salur R.T.C. depot to enquire about the retirement benefits payable to him. When he was proceeding towards office / garage, Respondent No. 1-the driver of the offending vehicle drove the offending vehicle and dashed the deceased causing severe injuries. Immediately the deceased was shifted to the Government Hospital. But, while undergoing treatment, the deceased succumbed to injuries. Deceased was aged about '58' years; hale and healthy; earning Rs.400/- per day on daily wage basis and also Rs.6,000/- as pension. Due to the death of the deceased, the claimants become orphans.
7. Case in Cr.No.119 of 2013 was registered at Salur Town Police Station against the driver of the offending vehicle viz. Respondent No.1 and subsequently charge sheet was laid. Since the accident has occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of Respondent No.1 and Respondent Nos.2 and 3, the officials / in charge of the employment of Respondent No.1 and Respondent No.4 owning the offending vehicle, all the Respondents are liable to pay the compensation.
Case of Respondent Nos.3 and 4:
8. The petitioner(s) allegations are incorrect. There was no negligence on the part of Respondent No.1. Age, occupation, income of the deceased claimed w ' ^ 3 are incorrect and the claimant is put to strict proof of all the allegations, Negligence of the deceased is the cause for the accident. Garage is a private, restricted and prohibited. There cannot be free place, the movements are access to others. The entry into garage of the R.T.C. is unauthorized--Ihe claimant, being a retired employee, should know the rules and also the tune hfting dangerous. He is a trespasser. Therefore, not entitled for compensatiorL Q Further, Respondent No.1. who was serving as an outsourcing Shramlk (amnlovee^ at the time of accident. The bus / offending vehicle was handed oyer to the private contractor/ agency (KLFM) for service and maintenance. The nneration of the bus / offending vehicle bv Respondent No.1 is without ...the instructions of Management. The liability, if any, is that of the Management of KLFM. The petition is bad for non-joinder.
10. The outsourcing Shramiks are not entitled to drive the buses and they have to assist the mechanics. Therefore, there is violation of the conditions. The contractor is fully acquainted with the conditions in terms of the agreement with A.P.S.R.T.C. As per contract conditions, the workers are not allowed to drive inside/outside the premises. The contractor is liable to pay compensation for any damage to the property caused by him or his workers. Therefore, A.P.S.R.T.C. is not liable.
11. On the strength of pleadings, the following issues were settled for trial by the learned MACT;
»« 4 ^#5 *
1.) Whether the respondent drove the offending vehicle (RTC bus) bearing No.AP 10 Z 6354 in a rash and negligent manner and responsible for the death of the deceased In the accident?
2) Whether the petitioners are entitled to any compensation and if so, at what quantum and from whom?
3) To what relief?
12. Evidence before the learned MACT:
Description Remarks
Oral evidence P.W.1: Manepalli Ammulu Claimant No.1.
P.W.2: Rajanala Chandrasekhar Eye witness to the
accident.
R.W.1; Penta Siva Kumar Depot Manager,
Salur Depot.
Documentary Ex.A1: Attested true copy of FIR On behalf of the
evidence in Cr.No.119/2015 of Salur Town petitioner(s).
Police Station,
Ex.A2: Attested true copy of post
mortem certificate.
Ex.AS: Attested true copy of
charge sheet.
Ex.A4: Attested true copy of
M.V.I. report
Ex.AS: Pass book
Ex.BI: copy of agreement On behalf of the
Respondent(s)
Findings of learned MACT:
On negligence and death of the deceased due to accident:
13. In view of evidence of PW.1 and PW.2-another driver of the R.T.C. bus and the crime record, particularly charge sheet laid against the driver of \ H 5 Respondent No.1 and MVI report, the negligence, accident, and death of deceased due to accident stands proved. Accordingly, the issue regarding negligence is answered in favour of the claimants.
With regard to compensation:
14. Deceased was aged about '58 years, multiplier '9' is applicable. His income can be notionally taken at Rs.4,500/-. After deducting 1/3rd towards the personal expenditure and upon application of multiplier '9', the loss of dependency to claimants comes to Rs.3,24,000/- and the claimants are entitled for Rs.5,000/- towards transport expenditure, Rs.25,000/- towards funeral expenditure, Rs. 10,000/- towards loss of estate and Rs.30,000/- towards loss of consortium. In all, the claimants are entitled for Rs.3,94.000/- as compensation.
With regard to liability:
15. The petitioners did not implead M/s. K.L.F. Management Services, who provided the services of Respondent No.1 driver. Evidence of RW.1 is that the Ex.BI agreement with M/s. K.L.F. Management Services were in force and Respondent No.1 is not the employee of the R.T.C. but outsourced by Shramic agency and the agency as to provide only services and maintenance to the buses. The workers of agency shall not drive the vehicle and as Respondent No.1 is not the employee of R.T.C and the K.L.F.M. service agency is not impleaded. Hence, the petition is liable to be dismissed.
6Arguments in the appeal:
For the claimants:
16. Dismissal of the claim petition on the ground of not adding the agency, which provided the services of Respondent No.1 is an incorrect approach.
17. Learned MACT erred in appreciating the evidence particularly Ex.B1 and its contents.
18. Learned MACT erred in quantifying the compensation also and ought to have awarded more compensation than what claimed.
On behalf of the Respondent-A.P.S.R.T.C:
19. Dismissal of claim petition is justified and the contents of Ex.B1 and evidence of RW.1 are properly appreciated. The learned MACT ought to have appreciated the defense that the premises of the A.P.S.R.T.C depot and garage is not a public place, in addition to the absence of a proper party. No liability can be imposed on A.P.S.R.T.C under any circumstances and the quantification of compensation done is also without any basis. There are no grounds to interfere in this appeal and the appeal is liable to be dismissed with costs.
20. Perused the pleadings. Thoughtful consideration given to the arguments advanced by the both sides.
21. The points that arise for determination in this appeal are:
1) Whether the pleaded accident dated 03.12.2013 has occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle by Respondent No.1?7
2) Whether the accident place viz. the RTC depot premises and garage, i~ not a public place and whether on the ground of deceased presence is not proper at the time of the accident and no liability can be imposed on the APSRTC?
3) When outsourcing employees are sponsored by an agency and when such an outsourced functionary drives a vehicle? Whether the owner of the offending vehicle like A.P.S.R.T.C, an organization, who has engaged the services of an outsourcing agency can disown the liability?
4) Whether the petition is bad and liable to be dismissed for non-joinder of the agency-M/s.K.L.Facility Management Services, which provided the outsourcing functionaries for maintenance etc. of the vehicles of the A.P.S.R.T.C. viz. the Respondents?
5) Whether the claimants are entitled to compensation, if so, to what quantum?
6) What is the liability of the Respondents?
7) What is the result of the appeal?
Point No.1:
Negligence:
22. Accident and death of deceased due to accident are not in dispute.
Registration of FIR and filing of charge sheet against the Respondent No.1 who drove the offending vehicle at relevant time is also out of dispute.
823. There is evidence of eye witness-PW.2 in categorical terms indicating the occurrence of accident and negligence of Respondent No.1. PW.2 is also a driver, working for A.P.S.R.T.C. The presence of PW.2 at relevant time near accident spot is natural. Respondent No.1, who drove the offending vehicle and against whom the FIR and charge sheet were laid remained ex parte and he was not examined.
24. This material available on record is sufficient to believe the occurrence of accident and negligence of Respondent No.1, who drove the offending vehicle at the relevant time.
25. There is no iota of evidence contradicting this material from the end of Respondents. Therefore, without any hesitation the point touching the negligence is answered in favor of the claimants and against the Respondents Concluding that the negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle is the cause for the accident. Point No.1 is answered accordingly. Point No.2:
26. Section 2 (34) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 defines the public place as follows:
Public place means a road, street, way or other place, whether a thoroughfare or not, to which the public have a right of access, and includes any place or stand at which passengers are picked up or set down by a stage carrier;9
27. Access to the public cannot be equated to access to an employee or a retired employee who approaches an office like RTC depot or garage where office is also located.
28. It is the case of the claimants that the office is located in the depot/garage.
It is natural for an employee either serving or retire for certain office and administrative purposes to visit the office. There is no denial that the office is situated within the depot or garage. Therefore, the contention that the entry of the deceased into the premises is unauthorized and that he is a trespasser is found not acceptable ex-facie.
29. In a case between The New India Assurance Company Limited vs. Devchandbhai Khumansinh Ajanar\ the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat found that if a place is accessible to the public even if privately owned, the claim can be entertained by the tribunal. Observations in para Nos.8 and 9 of the judgment with reference to Section 2(34) of the Motor Vehicles Act and also another judgment of the Gujarat High Court in a case between United India Insurance Company Limited vs. Gujarat Ship Trade Corporation and others^ found relevant. They are as follows:
8. At the outset, the definition of 'public place' given in Section 2 (34) of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 is required to be read, which is as follows:
^ 2024 Supreme {Online)(GUJ)23740 =First Appeal No.l225 of 2020 1997 (3) GLR 2560 10 "public place means a road, street, way or other place, whether a thoroughfare or not, to which the public have a right of access, and includes any place or stand at which passengers are picked up or set down by a stage carriage;"
9. The simple reading of Section 2(34) of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 would Imply that if public have a right of access though on private land, it could be public place within the meaning of Section 2 (34) of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. The issue is no more res Integra as this Court in case of United India Insurance Company Limited vs. Gujarat Ship Trade Corporation and others - 1997 (3) GLR 2560, addressed this issue. Relevant paras thereof are as under:
"12. It would be interesting to consider as to whether in the light of the special circumstances obtainable from the evidence on record could the accident be said to have occurred In a 'public place' or not. Before factual scenario put again into focus it would be advisable to refer the statutory provisions of Section 2(34) of the new Act which prescribes and provides as to what Is a 'public place'. Its corresponding section of old Act is Section 2(24), which reads as under 'Public place' means a road, street, way or other place, whether a thorough-fare or not, to which the public have a right of access, and includes any place or stand at which passengers are picked up or set down by a stage carriage.
13. It would be very well seen from the aforesaid provisions that even user of the private place where public have access Is also included in the definition of the 'public place'. It, therefore, need not necessarily be a public property. Even in case of private place where public have access without restrictions or even limited with pass, etc., it could be characterised as a public place in view of the clear definition supplied In Section 2(34) of the new Act.
14.
15. It would be very well visualised from the aforesaid provisions that in order to hold the insurer liable for 11 compensation one of the requirements and conditions is vehicular accident must have occurred in a 'public place'. Broadly speaking, when bodily injury to any passenger of public service vehicle or when damage is caused to a third party arising out of use of the vehicle in the 'public place' governs the field arising out of the use of the vehicle in a 'public place'. That means there must be involvement of the vehicle which is defined under the new Act.
16. Therefore, it can safely be concluded that there must be user of the vehicle because of which injury to a person or damage to the goods has been caused in a 'public place'. The expression 'public place' provided under Section 2(34) of the new Act Is of vital importance and wide amplitude. It is an inclusive definition. Therefore, definition of a 'public place' under the new Act would include any place which members of public use and to which they have a right of access. The right of access may be permissive, limited, restricted or regulated by oral or written permission, by tickets, passes or badges or on payment of fee. This Is a settled principle of law. The use may be restricted generally or to particular purpose or purposes. What is paramountly significant is the place ought to have access to take members of public and be available for their use, enjoyment, avocation or any other purpose. "
30. The New India Assurance Company Limited vs. Devchandbhai Khumansinh Ajanar (1 supra) was a case of a minor son of the claimants was sleeping by covering a plastic cover in an open place of the factory and while reversing a tractor in the premises the accident has occurred and minor son of the claimants died. The defense was similar to that of the present case that the place is not a public place and within the four corners of the compound of the 12 V factory which is the private place. In the said context, the above observations are made by the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat.
31. Similarly in a case between K. Hanumantha Rao vs. National Aeronautical Laboratory^, the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka held that a tribunal in terms of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 had jurisdiction to adjudicate claims for compensation in respect of accidents, regardless whether they are occurred in public or private places as long as the tribunals jurisdiction extends to the area where the accident takes place.
32. It was the case where this accident took place within the private premises of National Aeronautic Laboratory, Kodihalli, Bangalore and it is not a public place. Addressing the said situation, Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka found that the observations of the learned MACT that it had no jurisdiction as the place of accident is not a public place cannot be upheld vide para No.3 observed as under:
(3) THE incident in question happened on 5-8-1968. The accidents claims Tribunals are constituted by virtue of the provisions of S. 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. S. 110 (1) as i,t stood prior to its amendment by 2-3-1970 reads as follows :
" A State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one or more Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals (hereinafter referred to as claims Tribunal) for such area as may be specified in ^ 1973 0 Supreme (Kar) 4 =1973 0 ACJ 78; 1973 I KarU 152 13 the notification for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily Injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles. "
a reading of the above provision makes it plain that it empowers the State government to constitute one or more Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals by issuing a notification in the Official Gazette and prescribing the area or areas over which the Tribunals would have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily Injuries to persons arising out of the use of Motor Vehicles. It is also plain that the said section by itself does not place any restrictions in regard to places by characterising places either as public or as private places. Hence It is necessary to make a reference to the notification issued by the State Government while constituting the Motor Accidents Claims tribunal at Bangalore. The First Additional District Judge, Bangalore, was appointed as Member cf the said Tribunal by such a notification issued on 24-2-1968. A reference to this notification shows that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal extended over the whole of Bangalore District. The notification has not made any distinction between private places and public places in Bangalore District. A result of reading of the provisions of this notification and S. 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, would clearly be that the State Government by exercising its powers under S. 110 of the act, constituted a Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and appointed the First additional District Judge as Member and fixed Bangalore District as the area over which the Tribunal had jurisdiction to adjudicte upon for claims of compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles. We have therefore 14 no hesitation in hoiding that the conciusion of the Tribunai that it had no jurisdiction in vi view of the fact that the accident in question had taken piece not in a public place but in the National Aeronautic Laboratory, kodihalli. Bangalore, cannot be upheid. The teamed Member has nowhere a the order passed by him made it dear as to in why he M/as under the h impression that the Tribunai had jurisdiction only in regard to claims arising out of accidents in public places.
33. Further, the Hon'ble High Court of Rajasthan in a case between United India Insurance Company Limited vs. Smt. Roop Kanwar"^, while answering whether a motor garage is a public place answered the same affirmatively that it is also a public place. While referring to the definition of public place in terms of Section 2(24) of the Act of 1939 in para No. 15, the High Court of Rajasthan made the following observations:
15. There is yet another aspect of the matter. Admittedly the accident took place in the workshop of Kasim Khan, PW-3. It was public place Within the meaning of section 2(24) of the Act of 1939 as public had a right of access in it. Any person could go inside it. His brother Kalu Khan has categorically stated in his cross-examination that any person could come in the Workshop for repairs of his vehicle. No suggestions M/as put in the cross-examination of Kasim Khan that it was a private place and not a public place. It has been observed in Pandarang vs. New India Life Insurance Company Ltd. (supras) paras 8, 10 and 11 as under:
"Para 8 1990 0 Supreme (Raj) 217; 1991 0 ACJ 74; 1991 1 RLWjRaj) 242: 1991 1 TAG 289 15 It is in the light of the object of the statute, its aforesaid relevant provisions and the schema, that we have to appreciate the true import of the expression "public place" for the purposes of Chapter VIII of the Act. It has further to be remembered that the expression "public place" is a term of art, the same having been defined specifically by sub-cl. (24), of S. 2 of the Act. Such definition reads as follows:
"(24) public place means a road, street, way or other place, whether a thorough fare or not, to which the public have a right of access and includes any place or stand at which passengers are picked up or set down by a stage carriage;"
"The first thing to remember with regard to the definition is that it is an inclusive one. Secondly it in terms makes it clear that any road, street way or other place, whether a thorough fare or not, Is a public place for the purposes of the Act, the only condition being that the public should have a right of access to it. Thirdly, the expression used in the definition is "a right of access" and not "access as of right".
Lastly, when it states that anyplace or stand at which passengers are picked up or set down by a stage carriage, is a public place, it shows that it is not so much concerned with the ownership of the place as with its user. Stage carriage Is defined in sub-cl. (29) of S. 2 and it means a motor vehicle which Is used to carry or adapted to carry more than six persons excluding the driver and which carries passengers for hire or reward at separate fares paid by or for individual passangers, either for the whole journey or for stages of the journey. In short, it means a public passenger-carrier. In other words, by virtue of the last part of the definition, the expression would 16 include any place, Including private, where public passenger-carrier picks up or sets down passengers.
The definition of "public place" under the Act is, therefore, wide enough to include any place which members of public use and to which they have a right of access. The right of access may be permissive, limited, restricted or regulated by oral or written permission, by tickets, passes or badges or on payment of fee. The use may be restricted generally or to particular purpose or purposes. What is necessary is that the place must be accessible to the members of public and be available for their use, enjoyment, avocation other purpose.
Para 10:
If we further bear in mind the overall object of the provisions of Chapter VIII which deals with compulsory insurance of the vehicle to cover risks to third parties and their property, with claims to be filed for recovering compensation, no fault liabilities and liabilities arising out of hit and run accidents, etc. the intention of the legislature is clear. It is to secure compensation to the persons and property which are exposed to the accidents caused by the vehicles. The very nature of the motor vehicle and its use, mandate these provisions. The motor vehicle in this respect can be likened to a wild animal.
Whoever keeps it does so at his risk. As pointed out earlier, some of the restrictions on the use of the vehicle contained in the Act are irrespective of the nature of the place where it is used and irrespective of whether it is plied or kept stationary. The legislature was concerned not so much with the nature of the place where the vehicle causes the accident as where it was likely to do so. Hence all places where the members of public and/or their property are likely to 'V ' m 17 r come in contact with the vehicles can legitimately be said to be in its view when the legislature made the relevant provisions for compulsory insurance. It will have, therefore, to be held that all places, where the members of public have an access, for whatever reasons, whether as of right or controlled in any manner whatsoever, would be covered by the definition of "public place" in S. 2 (24) of the Act. To hold otherwise would frustrate the very object of the said Chapter and the Act.
Para 11:
Although dictionary meaning of the expression is hardly of any use to us, it will be instructive to refer to It. In Strouds Judicial Dictionary, Fifth Edition, page 2094,public place has been defined as follows: "A public place is a place to which the public can and do have access; it doesnt matter whether they come at the invitation of the occupier or merely with his permission, or whether some payment or the performance of some formality is required before access can be had..."
This definition is taken from the decision in R. V. Kane, (1965) 1 ALL ER 705, and is a reproduction of only a part of it given there. The other part reads as follows:-
"but a place such as the club In the present case, would be a private place, if there was a real restriction of access to members and their guests and that any other members of the public who got in was In reality a trespasser."
In this case what fell for consideration was whether for the purposes of common law offeace of affray in a public place, the Stage and Press Club where the offence took place was a public place. The other definitions of public place given in the dictionary are with reference to the provisions of the Vagrancy Act of 1824. They are hardly of any relevance to us.18
In Blacks Law Dictionary; Fifth Edition, page 1107, public place has been defined as follows:
"A place to which the general public has a right to resort; not necessarily a place devoted solely to the uses of the public, but a place which Is in point of fact public rather than private, a place visited by many persons and usually accessible to the neighbouring public (e.g. a park or public bench). Also, a place In which the public has an interest as affecting the safety, health, morals, and welfare of the community. A place exposed to the public, and where the public gather together or pass to and fro."
Neither the Act of 1923 nor the above-quoted endorsement No. 16 of the Policy Ex.A-19 requires that the accident should have taken place In a public place. Thus the said contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is also devoid of force.
34. It is also relevant to note the observations of the High Court of Orissa in a case between Nakula Swain vs. Ravi Suresh Ku. Gupta^, wherein it is found that the public place under Motor Vehicles Act should not be narrowly considered and it includes the places which is the vehicle have access and it was a case of deceased working as a coolie under the respondent while sitting on road inside the factory premises, a vehicle suddenly moved backward and dashed the deceased.
It was a case of accident occurring inside the factory premises. Relevant observations are made in para No.6 which are as follows:
6. This Court in the case of M.K. Bhaumik (supra) referring to various decisions of different High Courts has come to hold that the ^ 2013 0 Supreme (Ori) 450 19 definition of 'public place' u/s 2(34) of the M.V. Act Is very wide and the private place used with permission or without permission would amount to a public place. This Court further observed that the term 'public place' cannot be given a restricted meaning, inasmuch as, it Is not to be taken as a place where public have uncontrolled access at all times, 'public place' for the purpose of M. V. Act has to be understood with reference to the places to which a vehicle has access.
35. In view of the consistent judicial approach of various high courts and in view of the facts and circumstances of the present case as the deceased was an ex -employee of the A.P.S.R.T.C and who said to have back to the depot for enquiring about his retirement benefits etc. His presence at the accident spot within the RTC premises cannot be considered as unauthorized and the objection of the A.P.S.R.T.C found not tenable. Hence, the point is answered against the A.P.S.R.T.C. and in favour of the claimants.
Point No.3:
36. As per the evidence of RW.1, there was agreement between the APSRTC and M/s.K.L. Facility Management Services, Secunderabad for providing certain workers. Admittedly, Respondent No.1 was provided by the contracting agency. RW.1 is not a party to the Ex.BI agreement. Contracting party M/s. K.L. Facility Management has nothing to do with the buses is the admission of RW.1.
2037. Rw.1 did not file any counter though arrayed as independent party. Fictionally, the counter filed by Respondent No.4 would cover the defense of RW.1, but it is relevant to note that Ex.BI is binding on all the Respondents. The deceased and the claimants are third parties to the Ex.BI agreement. R.T.C. is relying on the violation of contractual terms of Ex.BI which are between the R.T.C. and another agency. It is a private arrangement made by R.T.C. to have certain outsourcing functionaries provided to the R.T.C. for the management of its business or services.
38. Entrustment of the vehicle to proper driver is the obligation of any and every owner of a motor vehicle in terms of the Motor Vehicles Act.
39. Itjs not the case of the A.P.S.R.T.C./ Respondents. Respondent No.1 was not driving the offending vehicle at the relevant time A.P.S.R.T.C is a monopolized organization, being a statutory establishment. Having special exemptions in terms of the Motor Vehicles Act issued bv the State Government Therefore, the defense cannot be very light like the ordinary owner of anv vehicle.A.P.S.R.T.C cannot simply sav that somebody has entered into the premises without its knowledge, somebody has driven the bus without its permission or knowledge and that some unauthorized person has driven the vehicle. Such kind of loose and irresponsible pleas from a responsible institution like a A.P.S.R.T.C. cannot be appreciated. On the contrary, it is a lamentable state of affair. Taking a defense for the sake of defense is different from parties 21 with certain reasonable backdrop taking acceptable defenses. The clauses in agreement, if provide for the liability inter se the contracting agency and the A.P.S.R.T.C. A.P.S.R.T.C. is at liberty to take appropriate legal proceedings for any loss or damage in terms of its private agreement between the R.T.C. and the agency with which has entered an agreement.
40. For all above reasons, the organization like APSRTC cannot disown its liability and point No.3 is answered accordingly concluding that even if an outsourced functionary drives the vehicle with a knowledge and permission of the owner of the offending vehicle who engaged the services of outsourcing agency, the owner and all other persons connected there with are responsible for any tortious act of such outsourcing employee and the owner including an organization like A.P.S.R.T.C. cannot disown its liability.
Point No.4:
41. Non-joinder of the necessary party appears to be the defense but the defense is not taken in clear terms by A.P.S.R.T.C. in its pleadings, even after long travel and facing trial also no steps were taken for getting such an issue framed is answered. Even otherwise for any reason that the contentions are sufficient to address such issue, it can be safely inferred and answered that a contract between the agencies that provided functionaries including drivers to the 22 a nrivata SQ^^P^-^aesnot^d the claiman).
^^^^^^^^-^^-telead^ourcina Agpnny
42. Liability fn J-^mant cannnt disowned ^LLjTe_ground_oL£riyate contract__betweerLth e __owner of the vehicle and ^ third-part' Jflencv. ThP claimants hau» no ^nyiti/L^ contract with the third p art' aqenc VIZ.
M/a. K.L. Facility Mana
^g^gQtSeryices with whom th^. p o J^ T.C is having a
contract to
IQVide outsourr^in functionaries for attendin
some work in
A.P.S.R.T.C. depot, that
^PPteLmaUjave^clause ot m.i.. aood the Insc gMaaredbi^,P.S.R.TC Wth.
-^ggds_OfsUCh OUtsOlirrin, personnel sponsored Such contract is ^^^^-^Q^gggQdentcontract. Suoh thirH ^rty is accountable tn nni A.P.S.R.T.C. but nnt tn ^teiants_fectlv. The liehiiit, jf any of the third 'arty agency is towards A.P.S RTn alone. Therefore, la ge on the part of th^ claimants to inrindo or implead the outsourcinri ^ggOaLyiAJVI/s. K.L. Ferility Management Servirtag ^^nnmejgund^ defect: dismis.. th^ claim.
43. Order I Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) reads as follows:
9. Misjoinder and non-joinder:- No suit shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or non-joinder ofparties, and the Court may in every su„ deal With the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the parties actually before it:23
44. The rigor of Order 1 Rule 9 of the CPC applies to non-joinder of necessary parties, even if any reason, the A.P.S.R.T.C feels that M/s. K.L.Facility Management Services should have been added. Such parties only a proper The remedies of party but not a necessary party to non-suit the claimants. A.P.S.R.T.C. are independent.
45. Here in this context it is relevant to note the conditions in Ex.B1 agreement vide Condition Nos.28, 29 and 42, which read as follows:
28. The Contractor Is liable to pay the Damages, if any, or movable or immovable property of the Corporation, by him or by his agents The Licensor or representatives, as determined by the Licensor.
shall have the right to recover such amounts towards the damages caused, from the monthly remuneration or Security Deposit of the Contractor.
29. Any violation or breach of terms and conditions of the contract including unsatisfactory performance shall render the contract liable to be terminated duly forfeiting the Security Deposit.
42. In the event of any statutory authority imposing any punishment like fines etc., and if the corporation is made a party in such panel action, the corporation has got the authority to keep and recover such amount due to the contractor like remuneration / Security deposit etc., with It until It is proved to the satisfaction of the corporation that such penal actions are ceased. Such action may also be reason for termination of contract.
2446. Upon considering the factual and legal scenario, unhesitantly it is found that there is no necessity of presence of M/s. K.L. Facility Management Services in the present proceedings and the observations contra by the learned MACT and the defense of the A.P.S.R.T.C. are not tenable and point No.4 is answered accordingly against the A.P.S.R.T.C. and in favour of the claimants / appellants. Point No.5:
Quantum of Compensation:
A. Precedential guidance for quantifying the compensation in case of claims arising out of Motor Vehicles Accidents causing death:-
3) Adoption of Multiplier. Multiplicand and Calculation:
47.(i). Hon'ble Apex Court to have uniformity of practice and consistency in awarding just compensation provided certain guidelines in Sarla Verma (Smt.) and Ors. Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Anr.^ vide paragraph Nos. 18 and 19, while prescribing a table directed adoption of suitable multiplier mentioned in column No.4 of the table. As per the observations in the judgment the claimants have to establish the following:
1. Age of the deceased.
2. Income of the deceased.
3. Number of dependents.
® 2009 (6) see 121 25
47.(ii). Hon'ble Apex Court directed certain steps while determining the compensation, they are;
Step No.1:
Ascertain the multiplicand, which shall be the income of the deceased he / she should have contributed to the dependents and the same can be arrived after deducting certain part of personal living expenses of the deceased.
Step No.2:
Ascertaining Multiplier. This shall be with reference to the table provided and table is provided in judgment itself.
Step No.3:
Calculation of the compensation.
Final Step:
After calculation adding of certain amount towards conventional heads towards loss of estate, loss of consortium, funeral expenditure, cost of transport.
cost of medical expenses for treatment of the deceased before the death etc. are advised.
b) Adding of future prospects:
48(i). Enhancing the scope for awarding just compensation, the Hon'ble Apex Court in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi and Others^case guided for adding of future prospect. In respect of permanent employment, 50% ' 2017(16) see 680 26 where the deceased is below 40 years, 30% where the deceased is 40-50 years and 15% where the deceased is 50-60 years.
48(ii). The actual salary to be taken shall be after deducting taxes, Further, in respect of self employed on fixed salary addition is recommended, at 40% for the deceased below 40 years, at 25% where the deceased is between 40-50 years, at 10% where the deceased is between 50-60 years, Further, adding of compensation for loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses at Rs. 15,000/- and Rs.40,000/- and Rs. 15,000/- respectively is recommended by Hon'ble Apex court with an addition of 10% for every three years in Pranay Sethi's case.
c]Loss of Consortium under the heads of parental and filial consortium:
49.
Further enlarging the scope for awarding just and reasonable compensation in Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Nanu Ram and Others , Hon ble Apex Court observed that compensation can be awarded under the heads of loss of consortium not only to the spouse but also to the children and parents under the heads of parental and filial consortium.
(2018) 18 see 130 27
d) Just Compensation:
50. In Rajesh and others vs. Rajbir Singh and others^, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para Nos. 10 and 11 made relevant observations, they are as follows:
10. Whether the Tribunal is competent to award compensation in excess of what is claimed in the application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, is another issue arising for consideration in this case. At para 10 ofNagappa case [Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh, (2003) 2 see 274 : 2003 SCC (eri) 523 : AIR 2003 SC 674] , It was held as follows: (See p. 280) "10. Thereafter, Section 168 empowers the eiaims Tribunal to 'make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it the to be just'. Therefore, the only requirement for determining compensation Is that It must be 'just'. There is no other limitation or restriction on its power for awarding just compensation.
'' The principle was followed in the later decisions in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Mohd. Nasir [(2009) 6 SCC 280 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 877 :
(2009) 2 SCC (CrI) 987] and in Ningamma v. United India Insurance Co.
Ltd. [(2009) 13 SCC 710 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 241 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1213]
11. Underlying principle discussed in the above decisions Is with regard to the duty of the court to fix a just compensation and It has now become settled law that the court should not succumb to niceties or technicalities, in such matters. Attempt of the court should be to equate, as far as possible, the misery on account of the accident with the compensation so that the injured/the dependants should not face the vagaries of life on account of the discontinuance of the income earned by the victim.
Granting of more compensation than what claimed, if the claimants are otherwise entitied:-
51. The legal position with regard to awarding more compensation than what claimed has been considered and settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court holding that there is no bar for awarding more compensation than what is claimed. For ® (2013) 9 SCC 54 28 the said preposition of law, this Court finds it proper to refer the following observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court made in:
(1) Nagappa Vs. Gurudayal Singh and Others^®, at para 21 of the judgment, that-
there is no restriction that the Tribunal/Court cannot award compensation amount exceeding the claimed amount. The function of the Tribunal/Court is to award "just" compensation, which is reasonable on the basis of evidence produced on record."
(2) Kajal Vs. Jagadish Chand and Ors ^^ at para 33 of the judgment, as follows:-
"33. We are aware that the amount awarded by us is more than the amount claimed. However, it Is well settled law that in the motor accident claim petitions, the Court must award the just compensation and, in case, the just compensation is more than the amount claimed, that must be awarded especially where the claimant is a minor."
(3) Ramla and Others Vs. National Insurance Company Limited and Others^^ at para 5 of the judgment, as follows:-
"5. Though the claimants had claimed a total compensation of Rs.25,00,000 in their claim petition filed before the Tribunal, we feel that the compensation which the claimants are entitled to is higher than the same as mentioned supra. There is no restriction that the Court cannot award compensation exceeding the claimed amount, since the function of the Tribunal or Court under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 Is to award "just compensation". The Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial and welfare legislation. A "just compensation" is one which is reasonable on the basis of evidence produced on record. It cannot be said to have become time-barred. Further, there is no need for a new cause of action to claim an enhanced amount. The courts are duty-bound to award just compensation. "10
(2003) 2 see 274 11 2020(04) see 413 12 (2019) 2 sec 192 R Analysis nf Eviden^ft and Finding^ driver. It is claimed
52. There is evidence that the deceased was served as a breath, the claimants said that deceased was earning Rs.400/- per day. In one the other breath it is said that he that the deceased was medically invalidated, on It is clear that his an ex-employee of was working as on daily wage basis.
A.P.S.R.T.C. Even according to the claim petition and other material, he went to ire about the amounts payable to him, after A.P.S.R.T.C. office / depot to enquire retirement. Therefore, the age of the deceased is '58' adding of future prospects . Therefore, the at that age also may not be possible in the context of the case income taken nationally at Rs.4,500/- by the learned MACT and deducting 1/3 towards personal expenditure found proper.
53. However, the compensation awarded under the heads of loss of not in tune with the consortium, loss of estate, funeral expenditure etc. are Therefore, directives of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Pranay Sethi's case, The entitlement of the claimants for revisiting and revamp is necessary, loss of compensation under the head of loss of dependency is at Rs.3,24,000/-, estate is at Rs.15,000/-, funeral expenditure isis at Rs.15,000/-, loss of consortium at Rs.40,000/-, parental consortium i.e. spousal consortium for claimant No.1 is and other incidental for Claimant No.2 is at Rs.40,000/-, Transportation expenditure at Rs.5,000/-.
3054. In the light of precedential guidance and in view of the reasons and evidence referred above, the entitlement of the claimants for reasonable compensation in comparison to compensation awarded by the learned MACT is as follows:
SI. Head Arrived by the Fixed by this
No. learned MACT Appellate
Court
1. Loss of dependency Rs.3,24,000/- Rs.3,24,000/-
2. Transport Rs.5,000/- Rs.5,000/-
expenditure and
other incidental
expenditure
3. Funeral Expenditure Rs.25,000/- Rs.15,000/-
4. Loss of estate Rs.10,000/- Rs.15,000/-
5. Loss of consortium Rs.30,000/- Rs.80,000/-
(Spousal and
parental
consortium to
Claimant Nos.1
and 2 @
Rs.40,000/-
each)
Total: Rs.3,94,000 /- Rs.4,39,000/-
55. For the aforesaid reasons, point No.5 is answered in favour of the
claimants concluding that they are entitled for compensation of Rs.4,39,000/-.
31Point No.6:
56. For the reasons stated and conclusions drawn under Point Nos.1 to 5 and in the result it is found that all the respondents are liable to pay the compensation jointly and severally and Point No.6 is answered accordingly.
Summary of findings:
Point Point Held in favour of
No.
1. Whether the pleaded The point touching the negligence is
accident dated 03.12.2013
answered in favor of the claimants and
has occurred due to rash
and negligent driving of the against the Respondents.
offending vehicle by
Respondent No.1?
2.
Whether the accident place The deceased was an ex-employee of viz. the RTC depot premises the A.P.S.R.T.C and who went to the and garage, is not a public place and whether on the depot for enquiring about his ground of deceased presence is not proper at the retirement benefits etc. His presence time of the accident and no at the accident spot within the RTC liability can be imposed on the APSRTC? premises cannot be considered as unauthorized and the garage or the depot of A.P.S.R.T.C. cannot be considered as privileged place as against its serving on retired employees visiting for some administrative and reasonable purposes.
323. When outsourcing Even if employees are sponsored an outsourced functionary by an agency and when such vehicle with a knowledge and , ..
an outsourced permission of the owner of the functionary drives a vehicle?
Whether the owner of the °^®f^bing vehicle who engaged the offending vehicle like APSRTC, an organization, services of outsourcing agency, the who has engaged the owner and all other persons ag^cr liability? for any tortious act for such outsourcing employee and the owner including an organization like A.P.S.R.T.C. cannot disown its liability.
4. Whether the petition is bad | There IS no necessity of presence of and liable to be dismissed for non-joinder of the M/s. K.L. Facility Management agency. M/s. K.L. Facility Services to Management the accident claim Services, which provided the proceedings and the defense of outsourcing functionaries for A.P.S.R.T.C is not tenable.
Point is maintenance etc. of the vehicles of the A.P.S.R.T.C. answered against the A.P.S.R.T.C viz. the Respondents? and in favour of the claimants.
5. Whether the claimants are They are entitled for compensation of entitled to compensation, if so, to what quantum? Rs.4,39,000/-.
6.
What is the liability of the' All the
respondents are liable to
Respondents?
pay the compensation jointly and
severally.
33
m
Point No.7:
57. For the aforesaid reasons and in view of the findings of point Nos. 1,to 6, Point No.7 is answered as follows:
In the result,
(i) The appeal is allowed,
(ii) The order and decree dated 15.12.2016 passed by the learned MACT are set-aside,
(iii) M.V.O.P.No.276 of 2015 is allowed as follows:
(a) Claimants are entitled for a compensation of Rs.4,39,000/- with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of petition till the date of realization.
(b)AII the Respondents are liable to pay the compensation jointly and severally,
(c) Claimant No.1 is entitled for Rs.3,00,000/- with proportionate interest and total costs,
(d) Claimant No.2 is entitled for Rs.1,39,000/- with proportionate interest and costs.
(e)Both the claimants are permitted to withdraw the entire amount at once on deposit,
(iv) There shall be no order as to costs, in this appeal.
As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the appeal shall stand closed.
SDI- N.NAGAMMA ASSISTANT REGISTRAR //TRUE COPY// Y ' SECTION OFFICER One Fair Copy to the Hon'ble SRI JUSTICE A.HARI HARANADHA SARMA (For his Lordship's kind perusal) To,
1. The Chairman, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-ll Additional District Judge, Parvathipuram, Vizianagaram District. (With records) j'V:
2. One CC to Sri G.Sai Narayana Rao, Advocate [OPUC]
3. One CC to Sri Vinod Kumar Tarlada (SC for APSRTC), Advocate {OPUC]
4. The Section Officer, V.R.Section. High Court of A.P at Amaravati.
5. Nine (09) L.R. Copies.
6. The Under Secretary, Union of India, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, New Delhi.
7. The Secretary, Andhra Pradesh High Court Advocates' Association Library, High Court Buildings, Amaravathi.
8. THREE CD COPIES BSV TAC HIGH COURT DATED:20/06/2025 JUDGMENT AND DECREE MACMA N0.537 OF 2017 2025 Co ALLOWING THE MACMA WITHOUT COSTS