Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Andhra Cotton Mills Ltd. Rep. By Its ... vs Sri Lakshmi Ganesh Cotton Ginning Mill, ... on 5 September, 1995
Equivalent citations: 1996(1)ALT537
JUDGMENT Krishna Saran Shrivastav, J.
1. This appeal is against the judgment and decree passed by the Subordinate Judge, Gunturin O.S. No. 309/1980 dt 30-6-1982.Thedefendantistheappellant.
2. The facts which are no longer in controversy before me, in short are that on 9-8-1977 the appellant-defendant had purchased 50 bales of cotton, the net weight of which is 84 quintals 79 kgs. 500 grams, at the rate of Rs. l,251-62ps. per quintal for a total sum of Rs. 1,06,131-12 ps. through invoice No. 2/19. On the same day, the appellant-defendant also purchased 28 borems of cotton, the net weight of which is 38 quintals 57 kgs. and 500 grams, at the rate of Rs. 1,406-28 ps. per qunital for a total sum of Rs. 54,247-25 ps. through invoice No. 2 /18. The invoices were prepared on 9-8-1977. The sold bales of cotton were delivered to the appellant-defendant on the same day. He had purchased the cotton on credit. The payment was agreed upon to be made after one week therefrom. But the appellant-defendant paid Rs. 1,60,000/- in instalments after two years, leaving a balance of Rs. 378-37 ps. towards the unpaid price of the cotton sold.
3. The respondent-plaintiff brought a suit for recovery of Rs. 373-37ps. towards principal and interest at the rate of 18% per annum on the total price of cotton sold on credit and thus he claim for a decree of Rs. 49,010-05 ps. from the defendant-appellant, alleging that he did not pay the agreed interest as also the price of the cotton sold within the stipulated time.
4. The appellant-defendant denied the allegations made in the plaint and pleaded that no agreement for payment of interest was ever made between the parties to the suit. In fact, the market position of cotton in the year 1977 was dull and therefore, the respondent-plaintiff had pursuaded the defendant-appellant to purchase the cotton under an oral agreement, in which it was agreed that payment would be made in instalments as per the convenience of the appellant-defendant. The respondent-plaintiff did not claim interest before 19-12-1979 because it was agreed upon the parties to the suit that no interest should be paid till then by the appellant-defendant. He had sent a cheque for Rs. 378-37 ps. on 6-2-1980 in full and final satisfaction of the claim of the respondent-plaintiff. Therefore, no cause of action for the suit has arisen.
5. The learned lower Court, on assessment of the evidence adduced by the parties to the suit, reached the conclusion that the respondent-plaintiff has failed to prove that the defendant-appellant had an agreement for payment of interest. It is further concluded that the respondent-plaintiff has also failed to prove that there was trade usage and custom for the payment of interest. It is further concluded that the respondent-plaintiff has failed to prove the agreement for payment of interest on the price of the cotton sold by him. The . learned lower court, however, granted interest at the rate of 12% per annum under Section 61 (2) of the Sale of Goods. Act, 1930 (for short 'the Act') amounting to Rs. 24,064-28 ps. It has also passed a decree for the balance amount of Rs. 378-37 ps. Thus, a decree for Rs. 24,442-65 ps. has been passed against the appellant-defendant.
6. Feeling aggrieved by the impugned judgment and decree, the defendant has preferred this appeal. It has been urged on behalf of the appellant that interest under Section 61 (2) of the Act can be awarded by the court, only when it is a suit by the seller for the amount of price of the goods sold. If defendant (sic. plaintiff) has not instituted the suit regarding the price of goods sold, he is precluded from suing the purchaser only for the amount of interest on unpaid price of goods sold.
7. The plaintiff-respondent in para 4 of the plaint has pleaded that the appellant-defendant has paid Rs. 1,60,000/- in instalments leaving a balance of Rs. 378-37 ps. towards principal amount. It is not disputed before me that though this amount of Rs. 378-37 ps. was sent through a cheque by the appellant-defendant, it remained uncashed because he had sent this amount in full and final satisfaction of the claim of the respondent-plaintiff. Thus, it is clear that a sum of Rs. 378-37 ps. was not duly paid by the appellant-defendant to the respondent-plaintiff. The learned lower court has also passed a decree for the amount of Rs. 378-37 ps. against the appellant-defendant and, therefore, it cannot be said that the suit has not been filed for recovery of the balance amount of the price of the goods sold on credit. And it is simply a suit for recovery of interest. Though the respondent-plaintiff has shown the balance of the amount of Rs. 49,010-05 ps. in the relief clause, yet it remains a fact that he has not abandoned the claim of Rs. 378-37 ps. being the outstanding balance of the unpaid price of the goods sold.
8. The short but interesting question of law which arises in this appeal is whether the interest claimed by the respondent in a suit filed by him, even assuming that he has not claimed unpaid price of goods sold, can be awarded under Section 61 (2) of the Act?
9. A look at Sub-clause (a) of Sub-section (2) of Section 61 of the Act, 1930 shows that the court may award interest at such rate as it thinks fit and the amount of the price to the seller in a suit by him for the amount of the price-from the date of the tender of the goods or from the date on which the price was payable; and this clause does not speak about the suit for the recovery of interest only on the unpaid price of goods.
10. In Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Ex-Justice Guru Prasanna Singh, Third Edition at page 58 it has been observed that:
"It is not allowable to read words in a statute which are not there, but "where the alternative lies between either supplying by implication, words which appear to have been accidentally omitted, or adopting a construction which deprives certain existing words of all meaning, it is permissible to supply the words." Even a departure from the rule of literal construction may be legitimate so as to avoid any part of the statute becoming meaningless."
11. In the case of Siraj-Ul-Haq v. Sunni Central Board of Waqf, , it is held that: "In construing Section 5 (2) of the U.P. Muslims Waqfs Act, 1936 which provides Mutawalli of a WAQF or any person interest in a WAQF or a Central Board may bring a suit in a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction for a declaration that any transaction held by the Commissioner of Waqfs to be a WAQF is not a WAQF the...............words 'any person interested in a waqf' as meaning 'any person interested in what is held to be a Waqf. Gajendragadkar, J. speaking for the court observed: "It is well settled that in construing the provisions of a statute courts should be slow to adopt a construction which tends to make any part of the statute meaningless or ineffective", and "where literal meaning of the words used in a statutory provision would manifestly defeat its object by making a part of it meaningless and ineffective, it is legitimate and even necessary to adopt the rule of liberal construction so as to give meaning to all parts of the provision and to make the whole of it effective and operative."
12. In State Bank of Travancore v. Mohd. Khan, AIR 1981SC1750, it has been held by the apex Court that:
"Similarly the words " any debt due before the commencement of this Act to any banking company" as occurring in Section 2 (4) (1) of the Kerala Agriculturists Debt Relief Act, 1970, were construed to............mean "any debt due at and before the commencement of this Act." Chandrachud, C.J., delivering the judgment of the court said: "We would have normally hesitated to fashion the clause by so restructuring it but we see no escape from that course since that is the only rational manner by which we can give meaning and content to it, so as to further the object of the Act"
13. This position of law which emerges after the afore-mentioned judgments of the Apex Court, in short, is that ordinarily it is not permissible to read the words in a statute which are not there, but where the alternative lies between either supplying by implication, words which appear to have been accidentally omitted, it is permissible to supply the words.
14. The intention of the legislature in enacting Sub-section (2) of Section 61 of the Act, appears to be that if there is no contract between the parties to pay interest on the unpaid price of the goods sold, the seller should not be put to loss by the default in payment by the purchaser. For example, a purchaser who does not pay the price of goods purchased on credit for a long time but when noticed pays only the principal amount immediately and before the institution of the suit against him, the provision made for payment of interest would be frustrated if he is precluded to sue the purchaser and the seller will be put to loss of interest without his fault. Under these circumstances, reading of the additional word "inter alia" immediately, after the words "in a suit for the amount of the price" is more in consonance with reason and justice in reading Sub-clause (a) of Sub-section (2) of Section 61 of the Act, and it would frustrate the desire of the shrewd purchaser to be benefitted for his default, particularly because contrary result would frustrate the beneficient provisions of the Act.
15. It would be unjust to deny the relief sought by the respondent-plaintiff because to put impediment by raising legal and technical defence as has been taken by the learned counsel for the appellant-defendant, would amount to re-enacting Merchant of Venice of Shakespere where Portia put the classical defence "NOT A DROP OF BLOOD".
16. For the foregoing reasons, in my opinion, that in a suit by the seller for the amount of the price as occurring in Sub-clause (a) of Sub-section (2) of Section 61 of the Act should be construed as a suit by him "Inter alia" for the amount of the price would meet the ends of justice because it is more in consonance with reason and justice.
17. The upshot of the above mentioned discussion is that even assuming that the suit has been filed for the recovery of interest only, the Court is competent to grant the same.
18. In the result the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case I leave the parties to bear their own costs.