Shri B Ashok Kumar vs State Of Karnataka on 10 January, 2025

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Karnataka High Court

Shri B Ashok Kumar vs State Of Karnataka on 10 January, 2025

Bench: M.Nagaprasanna

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

DATED THIS THE 10TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2025 R
BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA

CRIMINAL PETITION No.3594 OF 2022

BETWEEN:

SHRI B.ASHOK KUMAR
S/O BYRALINGE GOWDA
AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS
RESIDENT OF NO.1, VIJAYA NAGAR
2ND STAGE, B.K.ROAD
3RD CROSS, SAGARA
SHIVAMOGGA DISTRICT - 577 401.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI P.PRASANNA KUMAR, ADVOCATE A/W.,
SRI SANDESH P.NADIGER, ADVOCATE)

AND:

1 . STATE OF KARNATAKA
THROUGH SUB-INSPECTOR OF POLICE
WOMEN POLICE STATION
SHIVAMOGGA
REPRESENTED BY S.P.P
HIGH COURT
BENGALURU - 560 001.

2 . SMT. Xxxxx
W/O xxxxx
xxxxxx
Xxxxxx
... RESPONDENTS
2

(BY SRI HARISH GANAPATHI, HCGP FOR R1;
SMT. REKHA M., ADVOCATE, FOR
SRI H.C.SHIVARAMU, ADVOCATE FOR R2)

THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 OF
CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE FIR, COMPLAINT, CHARGE SHEET
AND ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS THEREON IN C.C.NO.109/2022 ON THE
FILE OF J.M.F.C.-II, SHIVAMOGGA FOR THE OFFENCES P/U/S
376(2)(n), 342, 307, 355, 323, 368, 504, 506 OF IPC REGISTERED
BEFORE WOMEN P.S., SHIVAMOGGA IN CR.NO.114/2021.

THIS CRIMINAL PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS
DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-

CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

CAV ORDER

The petitioner is before this Court calling in question

proceedings in C.C.No.109 of 2022 pending before the JMFC II

Court, Shivamogga arising out of crime in Crime No. 114 of 2021

registered for offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(n), 368,

342, 307, 355, 323, 504 and 506 of the IPC.
3

2. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows:-

The petitioner is working as a Circle Inspector in the Police

Department. The 2nd respondent is the complainant, wife of one

Sri Somashekar, a constable in the Police Department. It is the case

of the prosecution that the complainant had come in contact with

the petitioner in the year 2017 when she had been to the

Bhadravathi Rural police station with other public in relation to

some other case. The intimacy between the two turned into

physical as well. In this regard, a complaint comes to be registered

by the complainant in the month of May 2021 before the Women's

Police Station alleging physical and sexual harassment meted out to

her by the petitioner after which, the petitioner is said to be

threatening the complainant to withdraw the case that she had filed

and failure on her part to do so, he would kill her children as well.

It is then another complaint comes to be registered by the

complainant on 21-09-2021 in Crime No.341 of 2021 alleging

offences punishable under Section 504 and 506 of the IPC. The

complaints were not taken forward as the complainant did not

choose to pursue them further. On 11-11-2021, it is the case of
4

the complainant that she was picked up at 7.30 p.m. by the

petitioner, driven into a hotel and there he forcibly had sex with

her and assaulted her badly and dropped her at the Sagar Bus stop

in the morning hours of 2.45 a.m. It is then the complainant goes

to the hospital and gets treatment for the injuries sustained out of

the assault and registers the crime. This becomes a crime in Crime

No.114 of 2021 i.e., the subject crime for the offences as afore-

quoted. Police after investigation file a charge sheet. Filing of the

charge sheet is what has driven the petitioner to this Court in the

subject petition.

3. Heard Sri P. Prasanna Kumar, learned counsel appearing

for the petitioner, Sri Harish Ganapathi, learned High Court

Government Pleader appearing for the 1st respondent and

Smt. M. Rekha, learned counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that it

was a consensual act right from the year 2017 till 2022 and on

those consensual acts, the complainant has gone on registering

crimes. She had also registered proceedings under Section 138 of
5

the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 ('NI Act' for short) in which

the concerned Court has acquitted the petitioner. The husband of

the complainant is a Police Constable who has been dismissed from

service, though it has no bearing to the present issue. He would

contend that the allegations in the complaint or the summary of the

charge sheet are so vague that they cannot meet any of the

ingredients so alleged against the petitioner. He would, in all, seek

quashment of the proceedings placing reliance upon several

judgments of the Apex Court and this Court which have all held

consensual acts between the two cannot be dubbed to be a rape

under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC or the other offences so alleged.

5. Per contra, the learned counsel Smt. M.Rekha,

representing the 2nd respondent would refute the submissions by

taking this Court through the statement of objections so filed

threadbare to contend that the petitioner was a Circle Inspector in

the Police Department and the husband of the complainant was a

constable though not directly subordinate to him but in a different

Police Station in the same Department. The complainant, wife of

the said constable, was a social worker. The relationship between
6

the complainant and the accused/petitioner started in the year

2017 and intermittently broke and regained. It is the submission of

the learned counsel that consent of the complainant to have sexual

relationship by the petitioner was obtained by force, fraud and

deceit as the husband of the complainant was a constable and the

petitioner could yield dominance over the constable to get his wife

into the fold of sexual relationship. The learned counsel would

further submit that the Police after investigation have filed a charge

sheet. The charge sheet appends to it several documents which are

statements of individual witnesses. It is the statement of the other

constable who drove the car which took the complainant and threw

the complainant out of the car at the bus stop in Sagar Town at

around 2.45 a.m. The wound certificate and the statements would

clearly indicate that wounds are inflicted by the petitioner upon the

complainant. Therefore, it is a case where physical relationship

between the two has developed on promise of marriage or any

other inducements. The petitioner and the complainant both were

already married and had children. Therefore, it is a case of consent

obtained on deceit or dominance which would amount to rape is the

emphatic submission of the learned counsel.
7

6. In reply to the said submissions, the learned counsel for

the petitioner would take this Court through the statement of the

complainant under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C., vis-à-vis an earlier

crime in which she says that the petitioner and the complainant are

happy for themselves and there is no allegation that is worth the

name against the petitioner. Yet another circumstance the learned

counsel would seek to project is that, the complainant is in the

habit of registering crimes against the petitioner, as financial

transaction between the two formed the basis of these allegations.

In all, he would seek quashment of proceedings on the score that it

is an abuse of the process of law.

7. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions

made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the

material on record.

8. The afore-narrated facts though not in dispute would

require slight reiteration taking the issue to the events that have

happened anterior to the subject crime. The relationship of the

petitioner and the complainant is what is narrated both in the
8

complaint as well as in the summary of the charge sheet. The

relationship has turned sore. The first crime that emerges is on

27-03-2021 in crime No.38 of 2021 for the offences punishable

under Sections 354(A), 376(c), 417, 504 and 506 of the IPC. The

police conduct investigation and file a 'B' report in the said crime.

The complainant files her protest petition. During the subsistence of

the protest petition, a truce is arrived between the complainant and

the petitioner. Therefore, the complainant files a memo stating that

she is not interested in pursuing the matter. The learned

Magistrate, after recording the statement under Section 164 of the

Cr.P.C., closes the complaint. It becomes necessary to notice the

statement so recorded by the learned Magistrate in Crime No.38 of

2021. It reads as follows:

"2 ೇ ೆಚು ವ ಾ ಾ ೕಶರು ಮತು ಪ ಥಮ ದ ೆ ಾ ಕ ದಂ ಾ ಾ ಗಳ
ಾ ಾಲಯ, %ವ&ಗ'.
(¹.«Ä¸ï. ¸ÀASÉå: 932/2021)
ಅಪ*ಾಧ ಸಂ-ೆ : 38/2021

.ಾ/ಯ ೆಸರು: XXXX
ಗಂಡನ ೆಸರುಃ XXXX
ವಯಸು4: 38 ವಷ
ಉ8ೊ ೕಗ : ಗೃ;<
=ಾಸಸ>ಳ : ೈ @ಾAೇನಹCD
%ವ&ಗ'
9

¢£ÁAPÀ: 29.03.2021

E ಾಂಕ: 29.03.2021 ರಂದು ಮ;Fಾ GೕHೕI JಾKಾ GೕHೕಸರು ತಮL JಾKಾ M ಎI
ಐ ರವರ ಮೂಲಕ ಒಂದು ಮನ ಯನುQ ಸHR % ೕಮS XXXX ಎಂಬ ಅUಾ Aಾರದ ಆ*ೋಪದ WೕXೆ
ಮ;Fಾ GೕHೕI JಾKೆಯ ಅಪ*ಾಧ ಸಂ-ೆ : 38/2021 gÀ°è ¨sÁgÀwÃAiÀÄ zÀAqÀ ¸ÀA»vÉAiÀÄ PÀ®A
354(2) 376(2) 417, 504, 506 L¦¹ ೕUಾ ಪ ಕರಣ 8ಾಖXಾ[ದು\, ೊಂದ ಮ;Fೆ XXXX ರವರ
ೇC ೆಯನುQ 8ಾಖH ೊಳD]ೇ ೆಂದು ಮನ ಸHR ರುUಾ*ೆ. ಸದ ಮನ ಯನುQ ^ೕಕ
ಮನ ಯನುQ ಪ ಗ<ಸಲು ಪ ಕರಣವನುQ .`I.932/2021 ಎಂದು 8ಾಖH ೊಂಡು ಬರುವಂUೆ
ಕAೇ aೆ b8ೇ ಶನ bೕcರುUೇ ೆ.

E ಾಂಕ: 29.03.2021 ರಂದು ಸಂ ೆ 5.00 ಗಂdೆ ಸಮಯ ೆe M ಎI ಐ ರವರ ಮೂಲಕ
ೊಂದ ಮ;Fೆ XXXX ರವರನುQ ಾ ಾಲಯದHR ಾಜರುಪc ರುUಾ*ೆ. ೊಂದ ಮ;Fೆ XXXX
ರವರ ಅಪಹರಣ ಮತು ಅUಾ Aಾರ ಆ*ೋಪ ಇರುವ ಾರಣ ೊಂದ ಮ;Fೆ XXXX ರವರ ೇC ೆ
bೕಡು=ಾಗ ಆಗಬಹು8ಾದ ಮುಜುಗರ ಾಗೂ ೋವನುQ ತMhಸಲು ಈ ಪ ಕರಣವನQ ಇj ಾ W*ಾದHR
ನ ೆಸಲು ಪ %ೕಲ ೆ ೈaೊಂcರುUೇ ೆ. ಈ ಹಂತದHR ಾ ಾಲಯದHRದ\ ಎXಾR ವkೕಲರನುQ,
ಕ/8ಾರನುQ, ]ೆಂl ಕRm ಾಗೂ GೕHೕI ¹§âA¢AiÀÄªÀ£ÀÄß ಾ ಾಲಯEಂದ ೊರaೆ ಇರುವಂUೆ
ಸೂn ರುUೇ ೆ. ಇ8ಾದ ಬCಕ ೊಂದ ªÀÄ»¼É XXXX £ÁåAiÀiÁ¢üÃ±ÀgÀÄ ಮತು ಈ ಪ ಕರಣದ
]ೆರಳಚು @ಾಡುSರುವ % ೕಮS «ÄÃ£ÁPÀëªÀÄä @ಾತ ಇರುUಾ*ೆ. ೊಂದ ಮ;Fೆ XXXX ೇC ೆ
bೕಡುವ ಸಮಯದHR ಸದ ೊಠcಯHR ]ೇ*ೆ ಾರೂ ಇರHಲR.

ಈ ಹಂತದHR ೊಂದ ಮ;Fೆ XXXX ರವ aೆ ಾನು ಾ ಾಲಯದHRರುವ ಾ ಾ ೕpೆ
ಎಂಬ ಮನವ ೆ @ಾcರುUೇ ೆ. ಾವq8ಾದರೂ ಘಟ ೆ ನ ೆEದ\*ೆ btೕ S ಂದ ನ ೆದ
ಘಟ ೆಯನುQ ಯuಾ ರೂಪದHR ೇಳ]ೇಕು ಎಂದು ಮನವ ೆ @ಾcರುUೇ ೆ.

ಕಲಂ 164 . ಆv.M. ಅcಯHR ೊಂದ ಮ;Fೆ XXXX ರವರ ೇC ೆ
(wಾ ರಂtಸುವ ಸಮಯ ಸಂ ೆ 4.55 ಗಂdೆ)

ೊಂದ ಮ;Fೆ XXXX aೆ ಪ @ಾಣ ವಚನ xೋ ಸXಾ ತು.

ನನQ WೕXೆ ಾವq8ೇ 8ೌಜ ನ ಆ[ರುವqEಲR. ಾವq Aೆ ಾQ[ ಇರುUೇ=ೆ.

(ಈಗ ಸಮಯ ಸಂ ೆ 5.05 ಗಂdೆ ಆ[ರುತ8ೆ WೕXೆ 8ಾಖH ೊಂಡಂUೆ ೊಂದ ಮ;Fೆಯು bೕcದ
ೇC ೆಯನುQ ಆ ೆaೆ ಓE ೇC8ೆನು. bೕನು ೇCದ AಾರವನುQ ಯuಾ >SಯHR 8ಾಖHಸXಾ[8ೆ{ೕ
10

ಎಂದು ೊಂದ ಮ;Fೆ XXXX ರವರ ಬC ೇC ಆ ೆaೆ ಅuೈ 8ಾಗ ಆ ೆ ಾನು ೇCದಂUೆ ಸ ಇ8ೆ
ಎಂದು ಒMh ೊಂcರುUಾ*ೆ.)

¸À»/-
2 ೇ ೆಚು ವ ಾ ಾ ೕಶರು ಮತು ೆಎಂಎ|
%ವ&ಗ' ."

It is not that the learned Magistrate closes the proceedings on

account of Section 164 Cr.P.C., statement, but the statement leads

the police to file a 'B' report. The proceedings have not been taken

forward on the score that the complainant herself makes a

communication to the jurisdictional police that she is not interested

to pursue the complaint in Crime No.38 of 2021. The

communication reads as follows:

"UÉ,
D.Y.S.P ಯವ aೆ
%ವ&ಗ' ಉಪ xಾಗ,
%ವ&ಗ'.

ಇಂದ,
XXXX W/o XXXX
ೈ ಗಂaಾನಗರ,
ಭ8ಾ ವS, %ವ&ಗ'.

@ಾನ *ೇ,
ಷಯ: - ಾನು ೊಟ~ ದೂರು Aಾರ=ಾ[.

ಈ Wೕಲeಂಡ ಷಯ ೆe ಸಂಬಂ ದಂUೆ ಾನು ಅpೆ•ೕmಕು@ಾರ C.P.I .ಾಗರ. ಇವರ
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11

%ವ&ಗ', ಇHR ದೂರನುQ bೕcದು\, ಆ ಪ ಾರ=ಾ[ 38/21 ಸಂ-ೆ ಯ ಪ ಕರಣ 8ಾಖXಾ[ದು\, ಈ
ಪ ಕರಣವನುQ ಾನು ಮುಂದುವ ಸಲು ಇn• ರುವqEಲR. ಈ ಪ ಕರಣವನುQ ಮುPÁÛಯ @ಾಡಲು
ೇC ೊಳ€DUೇ ೆ.

¢£ÁAPÀ: - 03/04/2021 ಇಂS ತಮL pಾ^
ಸ>ಳ: - %ವ&UÀÎ. ¸À»/-"

The truce did not last for long. On the ground that the petitioner

was threatening the complainant that he would cause injury to the

complainant and her children, one more crime is registered in Crime

No.341 of 2021 alleging offences punishable under Sections 504,

506 and 34 of the IPC. This was pending investigation. In the

interregnum, the complainant also institutes proceedings under

Section 138 of the NI Act against the petitioner concerning a

cheque given by the petitioner on alleged financial transaction with

the complainant. It is besides the point that the concerned Court

has acquitted the petitioner.

9. The fulcrum of the lis in the present case is an event that

happens on 11-11-2021. It is the allegation that on 11-11-2021 the

petitioner forced the complainant to come near Bhadravathi Military

Camp at 7.30 p.m. Thereafter both of them headed to a hotel
12

Ashoka Grand in B.H.Road. It is here the two have had physical

relationship and the petitioner assaulting the complainant. It is then

in the wee hours of 12-11-2021 the petitioner takes the

complainant in the car and drops at Sagar private bus stop, at

which point in time it was 2.45 a.m. A few passersby who saw the

complainant in bad condition took her to the nearest hospital and

gets her treatment. It is after that the complaint is registered on

the next day on 12-11-2021 which becomes a crime in Crime

No.114 of 2021 for the afore-quoted offences. Since the issue has

now triggered from the complaint, I deem it appropriate to notice

the complaint. It reads as follows:

"¢£ÁAPÀ: 12/11/2011
UÉ,
GೕHೕI ಇj4wೆಕ~v
ಮ;Fಾ GೕHೕಸಗ JಾKೆ
%ವ&ಗ'

ಇಂದ,
% ೕಮS XXXX ೋಂ XXXX
30 ವಷ , Hಂaಾ ತ ಾS, ಗೃ;<
=ಾಸ: ಮಜ aೇನಹCD ‚ದgÉ Gೕಸ~
ಭ8ಾ ವS Uಾ॥ %ವ&ಗ' ƒXೆR
JA.£ÀA. 9845068696.

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13

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AಾರKೆಯನುQ ಮುಂದುವ ಸುವqEಲR ಎಂದು ಬ*ೆದು ೊಟು~ ]ಾ ಎಂದು ಗXಾdೆ @ಾcದು\ ಾನು
ಒಪh8ೇ ಇದು\ದ ೆe ನನaೆ ಕುSaೆಯನುQ ;ಸುk ೊXೆ @ಾಡಲು ಪ ಯSQ ದು\. ಾನು ‚c ೊಂcದು\
ನನQ ಕುSaೆaೆ aಾಯ=ಾ[ರುತ8ೆ. ಎರಡು ಬE @ಾಕು ಗಳ€ ಆ[ದು\ ತುಂ]ಾ ಅpೆ•ೕm ಕು@ಾv ರವರು
]ೆರಳ€ಗಳ€ ಉಗುರುಗಳ€ ಾ†ದು\ ಕುSaೆ aಾಯ=ಾ[ರುತ8ೆ. ನನaೆ ಬೂmï ಾHbಂದ ಬಂEದ\ಲR8ೆ
§Æmï ‚n ೊಂಡು ನನQ ಎಡಭುಜPÉÌ ೊ ೆದರು. ಅಲR8ೆ bೕನು ಸೂFೇ bೕನು ಸೂFೆತರ £ÀನQ ೊUೆ
ಇರ]ೇಕು ಾನು ೇCದಂUೆ ೇಳ]ೇ ೆಂದು ೇC *ಾS ಸು@ಾರು 11.30 ಗಂdೆ ಂದ ಒಂದು
ಗಂdೆಯ 1.00 UÀAmÉವ*ೆaೆ ಎರಡು ]ಾ ನ ೊQಂEaೆ ಬಲವಂತ=ಾ[ ಅUಾ Aಾರ @ಾcದರು. ನಂತರ
qÉæöÊªÀgÀ ¸ÀÄPÀÆರ ಎಂಬವ aೆ „ೕj @ಾc ಕ*ೆ ೊಂಡು ನನaೆ ಮ ೆaೆ ‚ಡುUೇ ೆ ಎಂದು ೇC
ಾ ನHR PÀÆj¹PÉÆAqÀÄ £À£ÀUÉ ªÀÄ£ÉUÉ ©qÀÄvÉÛÃ£ÉAzÀÄ ºÉÃ½ PÁj£À°è PÀÆj¹PÉÆAqÀÄ qÉæöÊªÀjUÉ
£ÉÆÃqÉÆÃ ¸ÀÄPÀÆgÀ ಈ ಾರನುQ ಎಲೂR bHRಸ]ೇಡ ೕ8ಾ .ಾಗರ ೆe ೋಗು ೇC ಾ ನHR{ೕ ನನaೆ
ಎರಡು ೈಗCಂದ ಕುSaೆಯನುQ ಅದು` ಉ ರುಗ†~ .ಾ ಸಲು ಪ ಯSQ ದಲR8ೆ ನನQ =ೇHbಂದ
14

ಕುSaೆaೆ ‚[ದು .ಾ ಸಲು ಪ ಯSQಸುUಾ*ೆ. ೈಮುŽ~ ಂದ ಮೂ[aೆ ಗುE\ದು\ ಾeಪdೆ~ ರಕ
ಮೂ[bಂದ ಬಂEರುತ8ೆ. bನ£ÀÄß .ಾಗರದ ನನQ ಮ ೆaೆ PÀgÉzÀÄPÉÆAqÀÄ ೋ[ ನನQ ೆಂಡSಯ
ಎದುರು bನaೆ ಷವನುQ ೊcಸುUೇ ೆ. ಈ Eನ bನQನುQ ƒೕವಂತ=ಾ[ ‚ಡುವqEಲR .ಾ {ೕ £Á£ÀÄ
bನQನುQ ರಕ WೕXೆ ‚.ಾc bನQ WೕXೆ ಾರನುQ ಹS ೊಂಡು ೋಗುವq8ಾ[ ೇಳ€Sದ\ರು. *ಾS
ಸು@ಾರು 2.45 ಗಂdೆaೆ ¸ÁUÀgÀzÀ wೆ•=ೇ... ಬ.ಾ~ಂŒ ಬC ಾರನುQ bHR bನQನುQ ಾವ ಾದರೂ
ಕ*ೆದು ೊಂಡು ೋಗH ಎಂದು ೇC ನನQನುQ ಾ ¤AzÀ ೆಳaೆ ಇC ದರು. ಾನು ಅHRಂದ ಾರನುQ
]ಾcaೆaೆ @ಾc ೊಂಡು %ವ&ಗ'ದ ªÉÄUÁÎ£ï ಆಸhUೆ aೆ ಬಂದು nkUೆ4 ಪ ೆದು ೊಂrರುUೇ ೆ. ನಂತರ
ಾನು ಸk ೇಂದ ೆe ೋ[ nkUೆ4ಯನುQ ಪ ೆದು ೊಂcರುUೇ ೆ.

ನನaೆ ಬಲವಂತ=ಾ[ ಅUಾ Aಾರ @ಾc ಬೂಟು ಾHbಂದ ಒzÀÄÝ. ೈ ಮುŽ~ ಂದ ಮೂ[aೆ
ಗುE\ aಾಯ@ಾc ಬೂ†bಂದ ೊ ೆದು ಕುSaೆ ;ಚುk aಾಯಪc WೕHbಂದ ಕುSaೆaೆ ‚[ದು ೊXೆ
@ಾಡಲು ಪ ಯSQ ರುವ ಅpೆ•ೕm ಕು@ಾv ಅವರ ರುದ• ಾನೂನು ಕ ಮ ೈaೊಂಡು £ÉÆAzÀ ನನaೆ
ಾ ಯ ೊcಸ]ೇ ೆಂದು ತಮLHR ]ೇc ೊಳ€DUೇ ೆ.

¢£ÁAPÀ: 12/11/2021 EAw ದು:ಖvÀ¥ÛÉ
ಸ>ಳ: %ವ&ಗ' ¸ ಸ;/-

Eನಂಕ: 12-11-2021 ರಂದು *ಾS 10:45 ಗಂdೆaೆ M ಾ ದು8ಾರರು JಾKೆaೆ ಾಜ*ಾ[
bೕcದ °'ತ ದೂರನುQ ^ಕ ೊಂಡು JಾKಾ ಗುನ ನಂ. 114/2021 PÀ®A, 376 (2)(N), 355,
307, 323, 504, 506, L¦¹ ತ ಪ ಕರಣ 8ಾಖH 8ೆ.

ಸ;/-
GೕHೕI ಸ" E£Àì¥ÉPÀÖgï
ಮ;Fಾ GHೕI JಾKೆ
%ವ&ಗ'."

What is noticed hereinabove is the narration in the complaint. The

police conduct investigation and file a charge sheet. The summary

of the charge sheet, as obtaining in column No.17, reads as follows:

"17. ೇ ನ ಸಂ/ಪ .ಾ*ಾಂಶ
15

8ೋ"ಾ*ೋಪKೆ ಪತ ಸಂ-ೆ 12 ರHR ಕಂಡ ಆ*ೋMಯು .ಾ/ 1 ರವ aೆ 4
ವಷ ಗಳ ;ಂ8ೆ ಾವq8ೋ ೇI ಸಲು=ಾ[ ಭ8ಾ ವS aಾ @ಾಂತರ ವೃತ ಕ•ೇ aೆ
ೋ8ಾಗ ಪ ಚಯ=ಾ[ದು\, ನಂತರದH, Gೕj ನHR ಸಂಪಕ ದHRದ\ರು,

2018 ರ ಜನವ 15/16-01-2018 ರಂದು ಆ*ೋMಯು .ಾ/ 1 ರವರನುQ
%ವ&ಗ', ƒXೆ, ಭ8ಾ ವS Uಾ. VISL UÉI~ ೌI £À gÀÆA £ÀA. 10 PÉÌ PÁgï £ÀA. PÉ.-J-
01-JA.eÉ-745 £ÉÃAiÀÄzÀ°è PÀgÉzÀÄPÉÆAqÀÄ ºÉÆÃV §®ªÀAvÀªÁV zÉÊ»PÀ ¸ÀA¥ÀPÀð
ªÀiÁrgÀÄvÁÛgÉ. ನಂತರದHRಯೂ ಆ*ೋMಯು .ಾ/ 01 ರವ*ೊಂEaೆ ¸ÀA¥ÀPÀð
ಇಟು~ ೊಂcದು\, 2021 ರ @ಾಚ SಂಗCನHR, .ಾಗರದ [ ೕj ಎಂಬ XಾŒ- aೆ
ಕ*ೆ ೊಂಡು ಅHRಯೂ ಬಲವಂತ=ಾ[ 8ೈ;ಕ ಸಂಪಕ @ಾcದ ನಂತರವq ಪ8ೇ ಪ8ೇ
ಕ*ೆದHRaೆ ಬರ]ೇ ೆಂದು ಒUಾಯ @ಾಡುSದ\ ಂದ .ಾ/ 1 ರವರು ಒಪh8ೇ ಇದು\ದ\ ೆe .ಾ/ 1
ಮತು ಅವರ ಮಕeCaೆ ೊXೆ ]ೆದ ೆ ಾkದ\ ಂದ .ಾ/ 1 ರವರು E:27-03-2021 ರಂದು
%ವ&ಗ', ಮ;Fಾ GHೕI JಾKೆಯHR ೇI 8ಾಖಲು @ಾcರುUಾ*ೆ, ನಂತರದHR ೇ ನ
ತb-ೆಯನುQ ಮುಂದುವ ಸದಂUೆ ೆದ , ೆಲಸ=ಾದ ನಂತರ ಮUೆ „ೕj @ಾc ƒೕವ
]ೆದ ೆ ಾkದ\ ಂದ E ಾಂಕ:21-09-2021 ರಂದು %ವ&ಗ' aಾ @ಾಂತರ GHೕI
JಾKೆಯH ೇI 8ಾಖಲು @ಾc ರುUಾ*ೆ.

Wೕಲeಂಡ ೇI ಗಳ Aಾರ=ಾ[ @ಾUಾ ಾಡ]ೇಕು ಎಂದು E ಾಂಕ: 11-11-
2021 ರಂದು ಸಂ ೆ 7.30 ಗಂdೆaೆ ಆ*ೋMಯು ತನQ ~ೕ|~ c.ೈv ಾv ನಂ. ೆ ಎ 01
ಎಂ.ƒ-745 ೇಯದರHR, ಭ8ಾ ವS Uಾ, ಕೃಷ--ಪh ಸಕ bಂದ .ಾ/ 1 ರವರನುQ
ಹS ೊಂಡು %ವ&ಗ', ನಗರದ .ಾಗರ ರ.ೆಯHRರುವ ಆpೆ•ೕಕ aಾ ಂŒ XಾŒ- ರೂಂ ನಂ.
306 ೆe ಕ*ೆದು ೊಂಡು ಬಂದು ಅಕ ಮ §AzsÀ£ÀzÀ°èlÄÖPÉÆAqÀÄ "£À£Àß «gÀÄzÀÝ PÀA¥ÉèAmï
PÉÆqÀ®Ä JµÀÄÖ zsÉÊAiÀÄð, £À£Àß£ÀÄß E£ïì¥ÉPÀÖgï CAzÀÄ PÉÆAr¢ÝÃAiÀÄ E®è ಹ ಾ@ಾ
ಎಂದು ೊಂcE\‡ೕ, ೊ†~ರುವ ೇI ಎಲRವನುQ =ಾwಾI Uೆaೆದು ೋ' ಎಂದು ಆ*ೋMಯು
.ಾ/ 1 ರವ aೆ ೇCದ\ನುQ b*ಾಕ ದ\ ೆe "ಸೂFೇ, ಸೂFೆ ತರಹ ನನQ ೊUೆ ಇರ]ೇಕು
bೕನು" ಎಂದು ಅ=ಾಚ =ಾ[ ]ೈದು .ಾ/ 1 ರವ aೆ ೈ ಂದ ಹXೆR @ಾc, ಶ•. bಂದ Wೖ
ೈaೆ ೊ ೆದು, ೈ ಂದ ಕುSaೆ ;ಸುk .ಾ ಸಲು ಪ ಯSQ ರುUಾ*ೆ ಮತು ಕೂaಾcದ*ೆ
wಾ j aೆ ೇತು ಾಕುUೇ ೆ ಎಂದು wಾ j Uೋ ೆದ , ಬಲವಂತ=ಾ[ 2 ]ಾ
ಅUಾ Aಾರ @ಾcರುUಾ*ೆ, ನಂತರದHR, ಅpೆ•ೕಕ aಾ ಂŒ XಾŒ- ರೂಂ bಂದ ೊರಟು ಮUೆ
ಭ8ಾ ವSaೆ ‚ಡುUೇ ೆ ಎಂದು ತನQ e™Š~ c.ೈv ಾv ನHR ಹS ೊಂಡು ಭ8ಾ ವSaೆ
16

‚ಡ8ೇ, ಾv bಂದ ಇCಯಲು ಅವ ಾಶ ೊಡ8ೇ ಅಕ ಮ ಬಂಧನ ೆe ಒಳಪc ,
.ಾಗರದವ*ೆಗೂ ಅವಹ ೊಂಡು ೋ[ರುUಾ*ೆ, ಆ*ೋMಯು .ಾ/ 1 ರವ aೆ ಾv ನHR,
ೈ ಂದ ಮೂ[aೆ ಗುE\ gÀPÀÛ aಾಯ ಪc .ಾ@ಾನ ಸ^ರೂಪದ aಾಯವನುQಂಟು
@ಾcರುUಾ*ೆ ಮತು ೈ ಂದ ಕುSaೆ ;ಸುk ೊXೆ @ಾಡಲು ಪ ಯSQ ರುUಾ*ೆ, ಮತು ಶ•
ಮತು ೈ ಂದ ೊ ೆದು, bನQನುQ .ಾ bನQನುQ .ಾ ಸುUೇ ೆ ಎಂದು ƒೕವ ]ೆದ ೆ
ಾಕುUಾ .ಾ/ 1 ರವರನುQ .ಾಗರ ಹFೇ ಬI bXಾ\ಣದ ಬC ಇC ೊರಟು ೋ[ರುUಾ*ೆ,
ಎಂದು ಇದುವ*ೆ[ನ ತb-ೆ ಂದ ದೃಢಪ†~ರುತ8ೆ.

DzÀÝjAzÀ DgÉÆÃ¦AiÀÄ «gÀÄzÀÞ PÀ®A 376(2) (J£ï), 368, 342, 307, 355,
323, 504, 506 L¦¹ jÃw DgÉÆÃ¥À ದೃಢಪ†~ದ\ ಂದ ಆ*ೋMಯ ರುದ• ಸHRಸXಾದ
8ೋ"ಾ*ೋಪKೆ ಪತ .

ಪ ಕರಣದHR, =ೈ›ಾbಕ ವರEಗಳ€, ಆv † ಓ ಪ ೕ%ೕಲ ಾ ವರE, cಆv/ಎI
cಆv, ಎ ಎ|, ನ 65 ‚ ಪ @ಾಣ ಪತ ]ಾk ಇದು\, ಮತು ಇನುQ ೆಲವq
8ಾಖXಾSಗಳನುQ ಪ ೆದು ಪœರಕ .ಾ/ಗಳನುQ AಾರKೆ @ಾc ೆಚು ವ 8ೋ"ಾ*ೋಪKೆ
ಪ†~"

Certain statements are recorded of the relevant witnesses whom I

deem it appropriate to notice. The vehicle which took the petitioner

and the complainant was driven by one Abdul Shukoor, a constable

in the Police Department. His statement assumes significance. It

reads as follows:

"²ªÀªÉÆUÀÎ ªÀÄ»¼Á ¥ÉÆ°Ã¸ï oÁuÉAiÀÄ ªÉÆ.¸ÀA.114/2021 gÀ 376(2) (J£ï),
355, 307, 323, 504, 506 L¦¹ ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ°è ¸ÁQëzÁgÀgÀ ºÉÃ½PÉ:
17

% ೕ ಅಬು\ ಶುಕೂv, ಎI ‚j ಅಬು\ ಇ@ಾಂ .ಾ", 33 ವಷ , .ಾಗರ dೌj GHೕI
JಾKೆ, ಾj4 dೇಬ , Wಟ ನಂ. 1361. =ಾಸ: .ಾಗರ GHೕI ಾ^ಟ I ಸ^ಂತ
ಊರು ಕುಂಚೂರು ಹರಪhನಹCD Uಾ. ಜಯನಗರ ƒXೆR. ªÉÆ.£ÀA. 8749038737.

¢: 19-11-2021

ಾನು ಜುXೈ 13-2015 ರಂದು GHೕI ಇXಾ-ೆaೆ .ೇ ೊಂcರುUೇ ೆ. .ಾಗರ
dೌj GHೕI JಾKೆಯHR ಾj4 dೇಬ ಆ[ 2016 ಂದ ಕತ ವ bವ ;ಸುS8ೆ\ೕ ೆ.
JಾKೆಯHR ೈ... ‚ೕ..., ಜನರ ಡೂ †, ಬಂ8ೋಬI ಡೂ † bವ ;ಸುUೇ ೆ. ಒ&LWL
ಇj4 wೆಕ~v ೇCದಂUೆ ƒೕŠ ನುQ ೆ•Ÿ @ಾಡುUೇ ೆ.

E ಾಂಕ: 11-11-2021 ರಂದು ಾನು .ಾಂದt ಕ ರ ೆಯನುQ ಾk8ೆ\ೕನು, ಆ Eನ
.ಾಗರ dೌj ಇj4 wೆಕ~v ರವ*ಾದ ಅpೆ•ೕm ಕು@ಾv ರವರು ನನaೆ „ೕj @ಾc ಗು‚‰
ೋ... aೆ .ಾ/ ನುcಯಲು ೋಗ]ೇ ಾ[8ೆ. ನನQ ಾv ನುQ Uೆaೆದು ೊಂಡು ೋaೋಣ
]ಾ ಎಂದು ೇCದ\ ಂದ ಾನು ]ೆCaೆ', 7.30 ಗಂdೆaೆ ಇj4 wೆಕ~v ಅpೆ•ೕm ಕು@ಾv
ರವರನುQ ಕ*ೆದು ೊಂಡು ಅವರ ¹é|~ c.ೈv ಾv ನHR ೊರ†ದು\, ಮ8ಾ ಹQ 12.30 Mಎಂ
aೆ ಗು‚‰ ೋ... aೆ ೋ8ೆವq, ಇj4 wೆಕ~v ರವರು ೋ... aೆ ೋ[ ಬಂದರು. ಮ8ಾ ಹQ
ಅHRಂದ ೊರ†ದು\, ಅವ aೆ Gೕj ಬರುSತು, ಭ8ಾ ವS ಾ ಂŠ ಬC ಬಂ8ಾಗ ಸಂ ೆ 7.30
ಗಂdೆ ಾ[ದು\, ಇj4 wೆಕ~v ರವರು ನನQ ಪ ಚಯದ XXXX ಎಂಬುವರು ಬರುUಾ*ೆ ಅವರನುQ
%ವ&ಗ' ೆe ಕ*ೆದು ೊಂಡು ೋಗ]ೇಕು. ನನQ cಇ Aಾರ=ಾ[ ಅವFೆ ಂEaೆ
@ಾUಾ ಾಡುವqದು ಇ8ೆ ಎಂದು ಾv bHRಸುವಂUೆ ೇCದ\ ಂದ bHR 8ೆನು. ಅHR ಒಬ‰ Xೇc
ಾv ನುQ ಹSದರು. ಇj4 wೆಕ~v ರವರು ೊರಡು ಎಂEದ\ ೆe ೊರ†ದು\, %ವ&ಗ'ದ aಾ ಂŒ
ೋdೇ ಬC bHRಸು ಎಂದರು. ೋdೇ ಬC bHR 8ೆ. Xೇc ೊUೆಯHR ೇI ಬaೆ'
@ಾUಾ ಾಡುವqE8ೆ. ಎಂದು ಅವರು ೋdೇ ಒಳaೆ ೋ[ ರೂಂ ಬುm @ಾc ೊಂಡರು.
ಆWೕXೆ ಅವರು ರೂಂ aೆ ೋದರು. ನಂತರ ನನaೆ „ೕj @ಾc ಗ*ೇ... ಮತು DªÉÄèÃmï
ತಂದು ೊಡುವಂUೆ SC ದರು. ಾನು ಅದನುQ Uೆaೆದು ೊಂಡು ಅವರು ೇCದ ರೂಂ ನಂ. 306
ೆe ೋ[ ೊಟು~ ಬಂ8ೆನು. ಇj4 wೆಕ~v ಮತು ಇ ೊQಬ‰ Xೇc XXXX ರವರು
ಕುCತು ೊಂcದ\ರು. ನಂತರ ಾನು ೊರaೆ ಬಂEದು\, ಎ¡ *ೈI Sಂದು ಾv ನHR
ಕುCS8ೆ\ೕನು. ತುಂ]ಾ ೊತು ಾದರೂ ಅವರು ]ಾರ8ೇ ಇದು\ದ ಂದ ಾv ನHR{ೕ
ಮಲ[8ೆನು *ಾS ಸು@ಾರು 1.45 ಗಂdೆaೆ ಇj4 wೆಕ~v ಮತು Xೇc ಬಂದರು. ಮUೆ
18

ಅವ ಬ‰ರೂ Aೆ ಾQ[{ೕ ಾv ನHR ಕುCತರು. ಇj4 wೆಕ~v ರವರು ಭ8ಾ ವSaೆ ‚ಡುವq8ಾ[
XXXX ರವ aೆ ೇCದ\ರು. ಾv .ಾL... @ಾcದ ನಂತರ Xೋ, ನನQ ಮಗ ೇ, bೕನು ನನQ
ೆಳaೆ ೆಲಸ @ಾಡುವ wೇ8ೆ, ಾನು ೇCದ ಾaೇ ೆಲಸ @ಾಡ]ೇಕು ಇಲR. ಅಂದ*ೆ bನQ
ೌಕ UೆaೆಯುUೇ ೆ ಎಂದು ೆದ ನನaೆ ªÁºÀನವನುQ .ಾಗರದ ಕ ೆaೆ ಓcಸು, ಎHRಯೂ
bHRಸ]ೇಡ ಎಂದು ೇCದ\ ಂದ ಾನು ಭಯaೊಂಡು WೕXಾ ಾ ಾದ ಅವರ @ಾತನುQ
ೇC =ಾಹನವನುQ .ಾಗರ ೆe ಓcಸುS8ೆ\ೕನು. ಈ ಮ¢ೆ ಅವರು XXXX ರವ*ೊಂEaೆ ]ಾ
@ಾತು UÀ¯ÁmÉ @ಾc ೊಂಡು ೈ ಂದ ೊ ೆEದು\, ಅವಳ ಮೂ[bಂದ ರಕ ಬರುSತು.
;ಂಬE ಕುCSದ\ XXXXರವ aೆ ಅpೆ•ೕm ಕು@ಾv ರವರು ಶ• ಾHbಂದ ೊ ೆಯುS8ಾ\ಗ
ಾನು ಏನು @ಾಡXಾಗ8ೇ ನನQ ೌಕ ಯನುQ ಉC ೊಳ€Dವ ಸಲು=ಾ[ =ಾಹನವನುQ
ಓc ೊಂಡು ೋ8ೆನು, ಇj4 wೆಕ~v ರವರು ೇCದಂUೆ XXXXರವರನುQ .ಾಗರದ ಹFೆ
ಬI bXಾ\ಣದ ಬCಯHR, ‚dೆ~ವq. ನಂತರ ಇj4 wೆಕ~v ರವರನುQ ಮ ೆaೆ ‚ಟು~. ಾನು
ಮ ೆaೆ ೋ8ೆನು. ನಂತರ ಏ ಾ ತು ಎಂಬ Aಾರ ನನaೆ aೊSಲR.

ನಂತರದHR ನಮL .ೆ~ೕಷj ನವ ಂದ XXXX ರವರು ಅpೆ•ೕm ಕು@ಾv ರವರ
WೕXೆ ದೂರು bೕc8ಾ\*ೆಂದು Aಾರ aೊUಾ ತು. ಾನು ಅpೆ•ೕಕ ಕು@ಾv ರವ aೆ
ಾನೂನು ಕ ಮ=ಾಗ]ೇ ೆಂದು ಮ;Fಾ GHೕI JಾKೆaೆ ಾಜ*ಾ[ .ಾ/ಯನುQ
bೕcರುUೇ ೆ."

Statement of the driver who dropped the complainant to the

McGann hospital assumes significance. It reads as follows:

" ಾನು WೕHನ FಾಸದHR =ಾಸ=ಾ[ದು\, ಸು@ಾರು 20 ವಷ ಗCಂದ
ೆ•ವv ಆ[ ೆಲಸ @ಾc ೊಂcರುUೇ ೆ. ಾನು ಮೂಲತ: .ಾಗರದವನು. ಾನು
&ದHbಂದಲೂ *ಾS ಸಮಯದHR{ೕ ೆ• ಂ¡ ೆಲಸವನುQ @ಾc ೊಂಡು
ಬಂEರುUೇ ೆ.

E ಾಂಕ: 12-11-2021 ರಂದು ]ೆಳ[ನ ಾವ 2.30 ಗಂdೆaೆ ಾನು .ಾಗರದ
ಹFೇ ಬI bXಾ\ಣದ ಹSರ ೋ... ಎದುರು xಾಗದHR ಎಂEನಂUೆ ಆdೋವನುQ
bHR ೊಂಡು ಇzÉÝÃನು. ಆಗ ಒಬ‰ ಮ;Fೆ ನನQ ಬC ಬಂದು %ವ&ಗ' ೆe ೋಗಲು
19

ಾv ]ಾcaೆaೆ ]ೇಕು ಎಂದು ೇCದರು. ಾನು 3500/-]ಾcaೆ ಆಗುತ8ೆ ಎಂದು
ೇC8ೆ. ಆ ೆಂಗಸು ಹಣ ಾ ಾಯು 2000/- ರೂ. ೊಡುUೆ ೆ ಎಂದು ೇCದರು.
ಆWೕXೆ 2500/- ರೂ. ೇCದು\, 2700/- ೆe ಅಂSಮ=ಾ[ ೇCದರು. ನಂತರ ಆ
ೆಂಗಸು Gೕj @ಾc @ಾUಾ ಾc ಎಂದು ನನQ ೈaೆ ಅವರ &]ೈ ನುQ ೊಟ~ರು.
ಾನು @ಾUಾ ಾc8ೆ. ಅವರು ಾನು .ಾಗರ dೌj .ೆ~ೕಷj ಇj4 wೆಕ~v
@ಾUಾ ಾಡುSರುವqದು, ಅವರನುQ %ವ&ಗ' ೆe ‚ಟು~ ಬbQ. ]ಾcaೆ ಾನು
ೊಡುUೇ ೆ, ಎಂದು ೇCದರು. ಆಗ ಾನು ನನQ .ೆQೕ;ತ =ೆಂಕdೇ¥ ನ ಮಗ ಾದ
ನ¦ ಬC ಾv ಇದು\, Etios ಾv ಇದು\, ೆ ಎ 01-ಎƒ-4270, ‚C
ಬಣ--8ಾ\[ರುತ8ೆ. ಾನು ನ¦ baೆ Gೕj @ಾc ]ಾcaೆaೆ ೋಗ]ೇಕು, ಾv
ೊc ಎಂದು ೇC8ೆ. ಆಗ ನ¦ ನು ಾv ನುQ ಆdೋ.ಾ~ಂŒ aೆ ತಂದನು, ಆಗ
ಸಮಯ ]ೆಳ[ನ ಾವ 3.00 ಗಂdೆ ಾ[ತು. ಆ ಾ ನHR ಾನು ಆ XೇcI ರವರನುQ
ಕ*ೆದು ೊಂಡು %ವ&ಗ' ೆe ಬಂ8ೆನು. ಅವರು WUÁÎ£ï ಆಸhUೆ aೆ ‚ಡು ಎಂದು
ೇCದರು. ಾನು Waಾ'j ಆಸhUೆ ಯ ತುತು nkUೆ4 xಾಗದ ಬC ‚dೆ~ನು. ಆಗ
ಸಮಯ 4.00 ಗಂdೆ ಾ[ತು. ಅHR ಆ XೇcI ರವರು ನನaೆ @ಾIe ನುQ Uೆaೆದು
ಮೂ[ನHR ರಕ ಬರುS8ೆ ಎಂದು Uೋ ದರು. =ೇ WೕXೆ ರಕ ‚E\ದು\ ಕಂಡು
ಬರುSತು. ಇದು ೇaಾಯು ಎಂದು ೇC8ೆ. ಆಗ ಅವರು ಾv ಹತು=ಾಗ ಏನನುQ
ೇಳHಲR. ಏ ೆ ಎಂದು ೇC8ೆ. ಈ ೕS ಾಗಲು .ಾಗರ ಇj4 wೆಕ~v ರವರು ಾರಣ,
%ವ&ಗ'Eಂದ ನನQನುQ ಾv ನHR, ಅpೆ•ೕಕ ಕು@ಾv ರವರು ಕ*ೆದು ೊಂಡು
ೋಗು=ಾಗ ೈ ಂದ, ಾHbಂದ ೊ ೆEರುUಾ*ೆ, ಾv bಂದ ದ§âಲು ಪ ಯತQ
@ಾcರುUಾ*ೆ. ಾನು ಸತು ಬದುk8ೆ\ೕ ೆ ಎಂದು ೇCದರು. ನಂತರ ]ಾcaೆ ಹಣ
2700/- ರೂ. ಹಣವನುQ ೊಟ~ರು. ಾನು ಅವರನುQ ಆಸhUೆ ಬC ‚ಟು~ .ಾಗರ ೆe ೋ8ೆ.
@ಾರ ೇ Eನ ಅಂದ*ೆ E:12-11-2021 ರಂದು ]ೆCaೆ' ಾನು ಇj4 wೆಕ~v ರವರ ಬC
3000/- ರೂ. ಹಣವನುQ ಪ ೆದು ೊಂcರುUೇ ೆ. ಆ ನಂತರದHR ಆ XೇcI ೆಸರು
XXXX, ಭ8ಾ ವSಯವರು ಎಂದು aೊUಾ ತು,

ಓ, ೇ. ೆ ಸ 8ೆ."
20

What is discernible from the afore-quoted statements is link in the

chain of events. The petitioner and the complainant enter into

Ashoka Grand hotel in the official car. At 1.45 a.m. it is the

statement of the driver/constable who drove them that both of

them came back to the car, sat and nothing untoward incident

happened till that time, but suddenly squabble erupted between the

two and the petitioner assaulted the complainant. The aftermath of

dropping is captured by one Ramesh, the driver who took the

complainant to the hospital. It is his statement that the complainant

was bleeding and when he asked as to how this happened, she has

narrated the story that is narrated in the statement. All this

corroborate with the wound certificate. The wound certificate is

appended to the charge sheet. The wounds inflicted are as follows:

" Pt c/o pain in the neck
bleeding from nose
Pain over nose lower
Pain over (L) side abdomen
O/e Tenderness and mild swelling over
nose -B/L nasal bones
Tenderness over (L) Iliac & lumbar
region

I am of opinion that the above mentioned injuries are
simple in nature.

Station:SHIVAMOGGA. Name:Dr.flama Shetty
Date:6/1/2022 Rank: CMO
21

Sd/-
Casualty Medical Officer
Mc.Gann.Teaching Hospital
SIMS, SHIVAMOGGA.

Recd on 6/1/22
Sd/-
Police Inspector
Women Police Station
SHIVAMOGGA."

The treatment is on 12-11-2021 at 4.20 a.m. at McGann Hospital,

Shimoga. Therefore, the link in the chain of events would

undoubtedly pin the petitioner down for the allegations that are

made in the complaint and summarized in the charge sheet. Not for

nothing statements are recorded and culminated into the summary

of the charge sheet.

10. The learned counsel for the petitioner would seek to

take recourse to one statement made by the complainant when she

was taken to the hospital. He would take this Court through the

recording of the doctor with regard to the assault. It is the

complainant's statement that assault is by a Police Officer and does

not reveal the name of the petitioner. Taking cue from this

statement, the learned counsel for the petitioner seeks to project
22

that it was not him who has assaulted. This submission is noted

only to be rejected, as copious evidence by way of statements are

recorded during the investigation which would prima facie belie

whatever defence that the petitioner seeks to project.

11. The issue now would be, whether acts of the petitioner

with the complainant throughout between 2017 to the date of

registration of complaint in 2021 amount to the ingredients of

Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC - the offence of repeated rape.

Section 376 (2)(n) reads as follows:

"376. Punishment for rape.--(1) Whoever, except in
the cases provided for in sub-section (2), commits rape, shall
be punished with rigorous imprisonment of either description
for a term which shall not be less than ten years, but which
may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable
to fine.

(2) Whoever,--
... ... ...

(n) commits rape repeatedly on the same woman,

shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term
which shall not be less than ten years, but which may extend
to imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for
the remainder of that person's natural life, and shall also be
liable to fine. ... ..."
23

If the narration in the complaint or the averments in the statement

of objections or even the summary of charge sheet is taken note of,

the complainant visits the petitioner for the first time in the year

2017 in connection with the affairs of the Karnataka Rakshana

Vedhike of Shivamogga District of which the complainant was the

President. It is from the said meeting blossoms friendship, and

friendship into relationship. The relationship even physical between

the complainant and the petitioner, as found in the material placed

before the Court, would clearly indicate that they were at times

peaceful and they were at times marred with violent acts on the

part of the petitioner. But, insofar as the offence of rape is

concerned, the acts between the complainant and the petitioner

were not out of fraud, force or deceit as is alleged. They were all

consensual acts. These consensual acts can be gathered from the

statement of the complainant herself in the earlier crime in Crime

No.38 of 2021 which was registered for the same offence.

Therefore, such consensual acts between the petitioner and the

complainant, for four long years, cannot be termed as offence of

repeated rape, though the projection, is that consent was obtained

by fraud, dominance or otherwise. The consent cannot be obtained
24

by these methods for four long years. Therefore, I decline to accept

the submission of the learned counsel for the complainant that the

acts amount to rape, and accept the submission of the learned

counsel for the petitioner that they were all consensual, as the facts

obtaining in the case at hand are akin to what is considered by the

Apex Court in the case of DR. DHRUVARAM MURLIDHAR SONAR

v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA1, wherein the Apex Court holds as

follows:

".... .... ....

14. In the instant case, FIR was registered against the
appellant and the co-accused under Sections 376(2)(b), 420
read with Section 34 IPC and under Section 3(1)(x) of the
SC/ST Act. Section 376(2)(b) prescribes punishment for the
offence of rape committed by a public servant taking advantage
of his official position on a woman in his custody as such public
servant or in the custody of a public servant subordinate to him.
The said provision during the relevant point of time was as
under:

"376. Punishment for rape.--
(1) * * *
(2) Whoever,--
(a)***

(b) being a public servant, takes advantage of his
official position and commits rape on a woman
in his custody as such public servant or in the
custody of a public servant subordinate to
him; or

1
(2019) 18 SCC 191
25

(c)-(g)***

shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a
term which shall not be less than ten years but which
may be for life and shall also be liable to fine."

15. Section 375 defines the offence of rape and
enumerates six descriptions of the offence. The first
clause operates where the woman is in possession of her
senses and, therefore, capable of consenting but the act
is done against her will and the second where it is done
without her consent; the third, fourth and fifth when
there is consent but it is not such a consent as excuses
the offender, because it is obtained by putting her, or any
person in whom she is interested, in fear of death or of
hurt. The expression "against her 'will' " means that the
act must have been done in spite of the opposition of the
woman. An inference as to consent can be drawn if only
based on evidence or probabilities of the case. "Consent"
is also stated to be an act of reason coupled with
deliberation. It denotes an active will in mind of a person
to permit the doing of the act complained of.

16. Section 90 IPC defines "consent" known to be given
under fear or misconception:

"90. Consent known to be given under fear or
misconception.--A consent is not such a consent as is
intended by any section of this Code, if the consent is given
by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception
of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason
to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of
such fear or misconception;"

17. Thus, Section 90 though does not define
"consent", but describes what is not "consent". Consent
may be express or implied, coerced or misguided,
obtained willingly or through deceit. If the consent is
given by the complainant under misconception of fact, it
is vitiated. Consent for the purpose of Section 375
requires voluntary participation not only after the
exercise of intelligence based on the knowledge of the
26

significance and moral quality of the act, but also after
having fully exercised the choice between resistance and
assent. Whether there was any consent or not is to be
ascertained only on a careful study of all relevant
circumstances.

18. In Uday v. State of Karnataka [Uday v. State of
Karnataka, (2003) 4 SCC 46: 2003 SCC (Cri) 775] , this Court
was considering a case where the prosecutrix, aged about 19
years, had given consent to sexual intercourse with the accused
with whom she was deeply in love, on a promise that he would
marry her on a later date. The prosecutrix continued to meet
the accused and often had sexual intercourse and became
pregnant. A complaint was lodged on failure of the accused to
marry her. It was held that consent cannot be said to be given
under a misconception of fact. It was held thus: (SCC pp. 56-
57, paras 21 & 23)

"21. It therefore appears that the consensus of
judicial opinion is in favour of the view that the consent
given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse with a person
with whom she is deeply in love on a promise that he would
marry her on a later date, cannot be said to be given under
a misconception of fact. A false promise is not a fact within
the meaning of the Code. We are inclined to agree with this
view, but we must add that there is no straitjacket formula
for determining whether consent given by the prosecutrix to
sexual intercourse is voluntary, or whether it is given under
a misconception of fact. In the ultimate analysis, the tests
laid down by the courts provide at best guidance to the
judicial mind while considering a question of consent, but
the court must, in each case, consider the evidence before it
and the surrounding circumstances, before reaching a
conclusion, because each case has its own peculiar facts
which may have a bearing on the question whether the
consent was voluntary, or was given under a misconception
of fact. It must also weigh the evidence keeping in view the
fact that the burden is on the prosecution to prove each and
every ingredient of the offence, absence of consent being
one of them.
* * *
23. Keeping in view the approach that the court
must adopt in such cases, we shall now proceed to consider
the evidence on record. In the instant case, the prosecutrix
was a grown-up girl studying in a college. She was deeply in
27

love with the appellant. She was, however, aware of the
fact that since they belonged to different castes, marriage
was not possible. In any event the proposal for their
marriage was bound to be seriously opposed by their family
members. She admits having told so to the appellant when
he proposed to her the first time. She had sufficient
intelligence to understand the significance and moral quality
of the act she was consenting to. That is why she kept it a
secret as long as she could. Despite this, she did not resist
the overtures of the appellant, and in fact succumbed to
them. She thus freely exercised a choice between resistance
and assent. She must have known the consequences of the
act, particularly when she was conscious of the fact that
their marriage may not take place at all on account of caste
considerations. All these circumstances lead us to the
conclusion that she freely, voluntarily and consciously
consented to having sexual intercourse with the appellant,
and her consent was not in consequence of any
misconception of fact."

19. In Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar [Deelip
Singh v. State of Bihar, (2005) 1 SCC 88: 2005 SCC (Cri) 253],
the Court framed the following two questions relating to
consent: (SCC p. 104, para 30)

(1) Is it a case of passive submission in the face of
psychological pressure exerted or allurements made by the
accused or was it a conscious decision on the part of the
prosecutrix knowing fully the nature and consequences of
the act she was asked to indulge in?

(2) Whether the tacit consent given by the
prosecutrix was the result of a misconception created in her
mind as to the intention of the accused to marry her?

In this case, the girl lodged a complaint with the police
stating that she and the accused were neighbours and
they fell in love with each other. One day in February
1988, the accused forcibly raped her and later consoled
her by saying that he would marry her. She succumbed to
the entreaties of the accused to have sexual relations
with him, on account of the promise made by him to
marry her, and therefore continued to have sex on
several occasions. After she became pregnant, she
revealed the matter to her parents. Even thereafter, the
28

intimacy continued to the knowledge of the parents and
other relations who were under the impression that the
accused would marry the girl, but the accused avoided
marrying her and his father took him out of the village to
thwart the bid to marry. The efforts made by the father of
the girl to establish the marital tie failed. Therefore, she
was constrained to file the complaint after waiting for
some time.

20. With this factual background, the Court held that the
girl had taken a conscious decision, after active application of
mind to the events that had transpired. It was further held that
at best, it is a case of breach of promise to marry rather than a
case of false promise to marry, for which the accused is prima
facie accountable for damages under civil law. It was held thus :
(Deelip Singh [Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar, (2005) 1 SCC 88 :
2005 SCC (Cri) 253] , SCC p. 106, para 35)

"35. The remaining question is whether on the basis
of the evidence on record, it is reasonably possible to hold
that the accused with the fraudulent intention of inducing
her to sexual intercourse, made a false promise to marry.
We have no doubt that the accused did hold out the promise
to marry her and that was the predominant reason for the
victim girl to agree to the sexual intimacy with him. PW 12
was also too keen to marry him as she said so specifically.
But we find no evidence which gives rise to an inference
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had no intention
to marry her at all from the inception and that the promise
he made was false to his knowledge. No circumstances
emerging from the prosecution evidence establish this fact.
On the other hand, the statement of PW 12 that "later on",
the accused became ready to marry her but his father and
others took him away from the village would indicate that
the accused might have been prompted by a genuine
intention to marry which did not materialise on account of
the pressure exerted by his family elders. It seems to be a
case of breach of promise to marry rather than a case of
false promise to marry. On this aspect also, the
observations of this Court in Uday case [Uday v. State of
Karnataka, (2003) 4 SCC 46 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 775] at para
24 come to the aid of the appellant."

21. In Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana [Deepak
Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 : (2013) 3
29

SCC (Cri) 660] , the Court has drawn a distinction
between rape and consensual sex. This is a case of a
prosecutrix aged 19 years at the time of the incident. She
had an inclination towards the accused. The accused had
been giving her assurances of the fact that he would get
married to her. The prosecutrix, therefore, left her home
voluntarily and of her own free will to go with the
accused to get married to him. She called the accused on
a phone number given to her by him, to ask him why he
had not met her at the place that had been pre-decided
by them. She also waited for him for a long time, and
when he finally arrived, she went with him to a place
called Karna Lake where they indulged in sexual
intercourse. She did not raise any objection at that stage
and made no complaints to anyone. Thereafter, she went
to Kurukshetra with the accused, where she lived with his
relatives. Here too, the prosecutrix voluntarily became
intimate with the accused. She then, for some reason,
went to live in the hostel at Kurukshetra University
illegally, and once again came into contact with the
accused at Birla Mandir there. Thereafter, she even
proceeded with the accused to the old bus-stand in
Kurukshetra, to leave for Ambala so that the two of them
could get married at the court in Ambala. At the bus
station, the accused was arrested by the police. The Court
held that the physical relationship between the parties
had clearly developed with the consent of the prosecutrix
as there was neither a case of any resistance nor had she
raised any complaint anywhere at any time, despite the
fact that she had been living with the accused for several
days and had travelled with him from one place to
another. The Court further held that it is not possible to
apprehend the circumstances in which a charge of
deceit/rape can be levelled against the accused.

22. Recently, this Court, in Shivashankar v. State of
Karnataka [Shivashankar v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 18 SCC
204] , disposed of on 6-4-2018, has observed that it is difficult
to hold that sexual intercourse in the course of a relationship
which has continued for eight years is "rape", especially in the
face of the complainant's own allegation that they lived together
as man and wife. It was held as under : (Shivashankar
30

case [Shivashankar v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 18 SCC 204] ,
SCC p. 205, para 4)

"4. In the facts and circumstances of the present
case, it is difficult to sustain the charges levelled against the
appellant who may have possibly, made a false promise of
marriage to the complainant. It is, however, difficult to hold
sexual intercourse in the course of a relationship which has
continued for eight years, as "rape" especially in the face of
the complainant's own allegation that they lived together as
man and wife."

23. Thus, there is a clear distinction between rape
and consensual sex. The court, in such cases, must very
carefully examine whether the complainant had actually
wanted to marry the victim or had mala fide motives and
had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his
lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or
deception. There is also a distinction between mere
breach of a promise and not fulfilling a false promise. If
the accused has not made the promise with the sole
intention to seduce the prosecutrix to indulge in sexual
acts, such an act would not amount to rape. There may be
a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual
intercourse on account of her love and passion for the
accused and not solely on account of the misconception
created by accused, or where an accused, on account of
circumstances which he could not have foreseen or which
were beyond his control, was unable to marry her despite
having every intention to do. Such cases must be treated
differently. If the complainant had any mala fide
intention and if he had clandestine motives, it is a clear
case of rape. The acknowledged consensual physical
relationship between the parties would not constitute an
offence under Section 376 IPC.

24. In the instant case, it is an admitted position
that the appellant was serving as a Medical Officer in the
Primary Health Centre and the complainant was working
as an Assistant Nurse in the same health centre and that
she is a widow. It was alleged by her that the appellant
informed her that he is a married man and that he has
differences with his wife. Admittedly, they belong to
31

different communities. It is also alleged that the
accused/appellant needed a month's time to get their
marriage registered. The complainant further states that
she had fallen in love with the appellant and that she
needed a companion as she was a widow. She has
specifically stated that "as I was also a widow and I was
also in need of a companion, I agreed to his proposal and
since then we were having love affair and accordingly we
started residing together. We used to reside sometimes
at my home whereas sometimes at his home". Thus, they
were living together, sometimes at her house and
sometimes at the residence of the appellant. They were in
a relationship with each other for quite some time and
enjoyed each other's company. It is also clear that they
had been living as such for quite some time together.
When she came to know that the appellant had married
some other woman, she lodged the complaint. It is not
her case that the complainant has forcibly raped her. She
had taken a conscious decision after active application of
mind to the things that had happened. It is not a case of
a passive submission in the face of any psychological
pressure exerted and there was a tacit consent and the
tacit consent given by her was not the result of a
misconception created in her mind. We are of the view
that, even if the allegations made in the complaint are
taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety,
they do not make out a case against the appellant. We
are also of the view that since the complainant has failed
to prima facie show the commission of rape, the
complaint registered under Section 376(2)(b) cannot be
sustained."

(Emphasis supplied)

The Apex Court again in the case of LALU YADAV v. STATE OF

UTTAR PRADESH2, has held as follows:

2
2024 SCC OnLine SC 2876
32

".... .... ....

8. We have already taken note of the facts revealed
from the subject FIR itself that the time of occurrence of
offence is allegedly, from 05.01.2013 to 05.01.2018 and
that it was registered only at 21.34 hrs. on 21.02.2018.
That apart, it is evident that even going by respondent
No. 4, the complainant herself and the appellant were
living as husband and wife. The complaint of respondent
no. 4, as is revealed therefrom, is that the appellant had
deceived her by promising to marry and then by
establishing physical relationship. At the risk of
repetition, we will have to refer to the FIR, carrying the
following recitals from her complaint:

"... Lalu Yadav S/o Seshnath Yadav R/o Atarsuya P.S.
Nandganj District-Ghazipur, used to come to my house
along with the brother-in-law Ravindra Yadav of my elder
sister, at that time about five years back I was a student of
High School, then the said Lalu Yadav by way of deceiving
myself promise that he will marry me and established
physical relationship with me without my consent and
started living with me as the husband."

(underline supplied)

9. At the very outset, it is to be noted that there is a
huge irregularity between the statements "established physical
relationship with me without my consent" and "started living
with me as the husband". Be that as it may, bearing in mind the
allegations raised by respondent No. 4 reflected in the subject
FIR, we will refer to the relevant decisions of this Court.

10. While dismissing the writ petition under the impugned
order, presumably taking note of the contentions based on time
lag of five years, the High Court relied on its Full Bench
decisions in Ajit Singh @ Muraha v. State of U.P.2, and in Satya
Pal v. State of U.P.3. as well as the decision of this Court
in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal4. It observed and held that
there could be no interference with the investigation or order
staying arrest unless cognizable offence is not ex-facie
discernible from the allegations contained in the FIR or there
exists any statutory restriction operating against the power of
33

the Police to investigate a case. There can be no two views on
the exposition of law thus made relying on the said decisions. In
the same breath we will have to say that those decisions can be
no bar for the exercise of power under Section 482, Cr. P.C., in
various other situations dealt with, in detail, by this Court,
including in the decision in Bhajan Lal's case (supra).

11. To determine whether the case in hand
deserves to be quashed at the present stage we will refer
to some of the decisions. We have already taken note of
the fact that though there was an allegation in the FIR
regarding commission of offence under Section 313, IPC,
on completion of the investigation, the investigating
agency itself omitted the offence under
Section 313, IPC against the appellant-accused. In
paragraph 102 of the decision in Bhajan Lal's case (supra) this
Court held thus:--

"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV
and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a
series of decisions relating to the exercise of the
extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent
powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have
extracted and reproduced above, we give the following
categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such
power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the
process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any
precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and
inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an
exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power
should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they are taken
at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not
prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case
against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do
not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except
34

under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section
155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in
the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support
of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence
and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police
officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated
under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the
basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just
conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act
(under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where
there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned
Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the
aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking
vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due
to private and personal grudge."

12. In the decision in Shivashankar alias Shiva v. State of
Karnataka5, this Court held thus:--

13. The decision in "XXXX" v. State of Madhya
Pradesh6, also assumes relevance in the contextual
situation. This court took into consideration an earlier
decision of this Court in Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of
Delhi)7, where the allegation was one of alleged rape on
false promise of marriage, made five years after the
complainant and the accused started having relations and
even got pregnant from the accused, of course when she
was having a subsisting marriage, the Court found that
there cannot be any stretch of imagination that the
prosecutrix had given her consent for sexual relationship
under misconception. Having considered the said decision
and finding identity in facts, this court in the decision
reported in (2024) 3 SCC 496 reversed the order
impugned therein dismissing the petition filed under
Section 482, Cr. P.C. for quashment of FIR and allowed
the appeal by setting aside the impugned order and
quashing the subject FIR.

14. Now, having bestowed our anxious
consideration to the decisions referred supra with
reference to the factual situations obtained in the case at
hand, we are of the considered view that the High Court
has palpably gone wrong in not considering the question
whether the allegations in the complaint reveals prima
facie case that the complainant had given her consent for
the sexual relationship with the appellant under
misconception of fact, as alleged, or whether it reveals a
case of consensual sex. Firstly, it is to be noted that the
subject FIR itself would reveal that there occurred a
delay of more than 5 years for registering the FIR;
secondly, the very case of the complainant, as revealed
from the FIR, would go to show that they lived for a long
period as man and wife and thirdly, the facts and
circumstances obtained from the subject FIR and other
materials on record would reveal absence of a prima
facie case that the complainant viz., respondent No. 4 had
given her consent for sexual relationship with the
appellant under misconception of fact. At any rate, the
allegations in the FIR would not constitute a prima
36

facie case of false promise to marry from the inception
with a view to establish sexual relationship and instead
they would reveal a prima facie case of long consensual
physical relationship, during which the complainant
addressed the appellant as her husband. Moreover, it is
also the case of the complainant, revealed from the
subject FIR and the other materials on record that she
went along with the appellant to Varanasi with the
knowledge of her family and stayed with him in hotels
during such visits. The subsequent refusal to marry the
complainant would not be sufficient, in view of the facts
and circumstances obtained in the case at hand, by any
stretch of imagination to draw existence of a prima
facie case that the complainant had given consent for the
sexual relationship with the appellant under
misconception of fact, so as to accuse the appellant guilty
of having committed rape within the meaning of
Section 375, IPC."

(Emphasis supplied)

In the light of afore-quoted judgments of the Apex Court, the

offence of repeated rape laid against the petitioner cannot be

sustained. Therefore, said offence requires to be obliterated.

12. The other offences alleged are the ones punishable under

Sections 368, 342, 307, 355, 323, 504 and 506 of the IPC. What

has happened on 11-11-2021 which forms the fulcrum of the lis, as

observed hereinabove and the statements recorded thereon would

clearly indicate violent behaviour of the petitioner upon the

complainant, be it for offence of attempt to murder under Section
37

307 of the IPC or assault as obtaining under the provisions as noted

hereinabove. They are all met albeit, prima facie, in the case at

hand. The statement of the complainant in Crime No.38 of 2021

which lead to filing of 'B' report and closure of proceedings does not

in any way overlap the crime impugned in the proceedings, as long

after the statement so rendered in Crime No.38 of 2021 the acts of

the petitioner are found.

13. I deem it appropriate to hold that consensual acts

between the accused and the victim for having sexual

relationship, can never become a licence to the man to

assault the lady. The case at hand projects gross misogynist

brutality upon the complainant. In the light of the preceding

analysis, the unmistakable inference would be obliteration of

offence of rape alleged against the petitioner as obtaining under

Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC as, consensual acts between the two

cannot become a rape. The other offences are all to be sustained,

as any amount of consensus cannot handover a man with, the

licence to assault a woman. Therefore, all the offences other than
38

the one of repeated rape, are sustained and the petitioner has to be

tried, and trial is a must.

14. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:

ORDER

(i) Criminal Petition is partly allowed.

(ii) The offence of rape under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC alleged against the petitioner is obliterated.

(iii) All other offences alleged in C.C.No.109 of 2022 stand sustained.

(iv) It is made clear that the observations made in the course of the order are only for the purpose of consideration of the case of petitioner under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and the same shall not bind or influence the proceedings that are pending against the accused/petitioner.

Consequently, I.A.No.1 of 2024 filed for vacating stay also stands disposed.

Sd/-

(M. NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE Bkp CT:SS

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