Gujarat High Court
Sureshbhai Suvalal Jayswal & vs State Of Gujarat & 12 on 28 August, 2015
Author: C.L.Soni
Bench: C.L. Soni
C/CA/6953/2014 JUDGMENT
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY) NO. 6953 of 2014
In
CIVIL APPLICATION (STAMP NUMBER) NO. 3769 of 2014
In
SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1691 of 2013
With
CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1525 of 2015
In
CIVIL APPLICATION (STAMP NUMBER) NO. 574 of 2015
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.L. SONI Sd/-
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1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed No
to see the judgment ?
2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ? Yes
3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of No
the judgment ?
4 Whether this case involves a substantial question of No
law as to the interpretation of the Constitution of
India or any order made thereunder ?
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SURESHBHAI SUVALAL JAYSWAL & 1....Applicant(s)
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & 12....Respondent(s)
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Appearance in Civil Application 6953 of 2014:
MR DHIRAJ M PATEL, ADVOCATE for the Applicant(s) No. 1 - 2
MR JAIMIN GANDHI, ASSTT GOVT PLEADER for Respondent(s) No. 1
MR MAULIK R SHAH, ADVOCATE for the Respondent(s) No. 5 - 13
Appearance in Civil Application 1525 of 2015:
MR SALIL M THAKORE, ADVOCATE for the Applicant
MS NISHA M THAKORE, ASSTT GOVT PLEADER for Respondent(s) No. 1
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CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.L. SONI
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C/CA/6953/2014 JUDGMENT
Date : 28/08/2015
COMMON ORAL JUDGMENT
1. In these two applications, though filed in different petitions by different learned advocates, learned advocates appearing in both the applications have made common grievance as regards insistence of the office to file separate applications- present applications for condonation of delay occurred in bringing heirs of the deceased parties in both the petitions.
2. Learned advocates Mr. Salil Thakore and Mr. Dhiraj Patel for the applicants submitted that pending the petition filed under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India, either arising from the orders made by the Civil Court in the civil suit or from orders made by any authority or Court in the proceedings under any other Statute, if any of the parties to the petition dies, though action required to bring heirs of such deceased party on record of the petition is to be taken within reasonable time, however, such action is not governed by Order-22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ('the Code'). They drew the attention of the Court to Section 141 of the Code so as to submit that proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are not governed by the provisions of the Code and therefore, procedure contemplated under Order-22 of the Code will have no application to the proceedings filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. They submitted that equally such procedure under Order-22 of the Code shall not apply to the proceedings filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. They submitted that provisions of limitation under Article 120 of the Limitation Act also do not apply to the proceedings filed under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India before this Court as no limitation is prescribed for filing such Page 2 of 12 HC-NIC Page 2 of 12 Created On Mon Sep 07 02:41:24 IST 2015 C/CA/6953/2014 JUDGMENT proceedings before this Court. They have relied on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sudama Devi Vs. The Commissioner and others reported in AIR 1983 SC 653 and in the case of Puran Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab and others reported in AIR 1996 SC 1092. It is their submission that the applicants are required to explain the delay occurred in making application for bringing heirs of deceased party in the proceeding filed under Article 226/ 227 of the Constitution of India in such application itself. However, no separate application is required for such purpose so as to seek condonation of delay.
3. The Court having heard learned advocates for the applicants and having considered the provisions of Section 141 of the Code with Article 120 of the Limitation Act and having gone through the judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above-referred cases finds that Order-22 of the Code will not strictly apply to the proceedings filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is required to note that for filing proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, no period of limitation is prescribed though such proceedings are required to be filed within reasonable time period. Therefore, provisions for limitation under Article 120 of the Limitation Act to the proceedings filed under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India will have no application. Similarly, if any application is filed in proceedings filed under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, especially the application for bringing heirs of the deceased party on record of such proceedings, neither provisions for Order-22 of the Code nor Article 120 of the Limitation Act will apply. It will, therefore, not be required to seek condonation of delay occurred in late filing of the application for bringing heirs of the deceased party on record of the proceedings filed under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India.
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C/CA/6953/2014 JUDGMENT
4. In the case of Smt. Sudama Devi Vs. Commissioner and others reported in (1983)2 SCC 1 [ AIR 1983 SC 653], Hon'ble Supreme Court has held and observed as under:-
We are of the view that so far as writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is concerned, there can be no hard and fast rule of 90 days by way of period of limitation but the general rule of laches alone can be applied and this must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The High Court has said in its order that "the writ petition was beyond time by 136 days. Neither the explanation of 136 days nor the explanation for filing it today, was given." This view does not appear to be correct because the High Court has proceeded on the assumption that there is a period of limitation of 90 days and unless sufficient cause is shown as contemplated under Section
5 of the Limitation Act, a writ petition filed after the expiration of 90 days is liable to be rejected. This assumption is wholly unjustified. There is no period of limitation prescribed by any law for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is in fact doubtful whether any such period of limitation can be prescribed by law. In any event, one thing is clear and beyond doubt, that no such period of limitation can be laid down either under rules made by the High Court or by practice. In every case it would have to be decided on the facts and circumstances, whether the petitioner is guilty of laches and that would have to be done without taking into account any specific period as a period of limitation. There may be cases where even short delay may be fatal while there may be cases where even a long delay may not be evidence of laches on the part of the petitioner. We would, therefore, set aside the order of the High Court and remand the writ petition to the High Court so that the High Court may dispose it of on merits in accordance with law. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and order of the High Court and direct that the writ petition may be disposed of by the High Court on merits in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs.
5. In the case of Puran Singh (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court has held and observed in para 4 to 10 as under:-
4. A personal action dies with the death of the person on the maxim "actio personalis moritur cum persona". But this operates only in a limited class of actionsex delicto, such as action for damages for defamation, assault or other personal injuries not causing the death of the party, and in other actions where after the death of the party the granting of the relief would be nugatory, (Girja Nandini v. Bijendra Narain, (1967) 1 SCR 93 : (AIR 1967 SC 1124). But there are other cases where the right to sue survives in spite of the death of the person against whom the proceeding had been initiated Page 4 of 12 HC-NIC Page 4 of 12 Created On Mon Sep 07 02:41:24 IST 2015 C/CA/6953/2014 JUDGMENT and such right continues to exist against the legal representative of the deceased who was a party to the proceeding. Order 22 of the Code deals with this aspect of the matter. Rule 1 and Order 22 says that the death of a plaintiff or defendant shall not cause the suit to abate if the right to sue survives. That is why whenever a party to a suit dies, the first question which is to be decided is as to whether the right to sue survives or not. If the right is held to be a personal right which is extinguished with the death of the person concerned and does not devolve on the legal representatives or successors, then it is an end of the suit. Such suit, therefore, cannot be continued. But if the right to sue survives against the legal representative of the original defendant, then procedures have been prescribed in Order 22 to bring the legal representative on record within the time prescribed. In view of Rule 4 of Order 22 where one of two or more defendants dies and the right to sue does not survive against the surviving defendant or defendants alone, or a sole defendant dies and the right to sue survives, the Court on an application being made in that behalf, shall cause the legal representatives of the deceased defendant to be made a party and shall proceed with the suit. If within the time prescribed by Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1963 no application is made under sub-rule (1) of Rule 4, the suit shall abate as against the deceased defendant. This Rule is based not only on the sound principle that a suit cannot proceed against a dead person, but also on the principle of natural justice that if the original defendant is dead, then no decree can be passed against him so as to bind his legal representative without affording an opportunity to them to contest the claim of the plaintiff. Rule 9 of Order 22 of the Code prescribes the procedure for setting aside abatement.
5. The question with which we are concerned is as to whether the aforesaid provisions made under Order 22 of the Code are applicable to proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. Prior to the introduction of an explanation by Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act 1976, Section 141 of the Code was as follows :
"141. Miscellaneous proceedings - The procedure provided in this Code in regard to suits shall be followed as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of Civil Jurisdiction". The explanation which was added by the aforesaid Amending Act said:
"Explanation - In this section, the expression "proceedings"
includes proceedings under Order IX, but does not include any proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution".
There was controversy between different Courts as to whether the different provisions of the Code shall be applicable even to writ proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. Some High Courts held that writ proceedings Page 5 of 12 HC-NIC Page 5 of 12 Created On Mon Sep 07 02:41:24 IST 2015 C/CA/6953/2014 JUDGMENT before the High Court shall be deemed to be proceedings "in any Court of Civil Jurisdiction" within the meaning of Section 141 of the Code. (Ibrahimbhai v. State, AIR 1968 Gujarat 202; Panchayat Officer v. Jai Narain, AIR 1967 All 334 : Krishanlal Sadhu v. State, AIR 1967 Cal 275; Sona Ram Ranga Ram v. Central Government, AIR 1963 Punjab 510; A. Adinarayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1958 Andh Pra 16. However, in another set of cases, it was held that writ proceeding being a proceeding of a special nature and not one being in a Court of civil jurisdiction Section 141 of the Code was not applicable. (Bhagwan Singh v. Additional Director Consolidation, AIR 1968 Punjab 360; Chandmal v. State, AIR 1968 Rajasthan 20; K. B. Mfg. Co. v. Sales Tax Commissioner, AIR 1965 All 517; Ramchand v. Anandlal, AIR 1962 Gujarat 21; Bharat Board Mills v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, AIR 1957 Cal
702).
Even before the introduction of the explanation to Section 141 of the Code, this Court had occasion to examine the scope of the said section in the case of Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal Khodidas Barot, AIR 1974 SC 2105 : (1975) 2 SCR 71. It was said :
"It is not necessary for this case to express an opinion on the point as to whether the various provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution. Section 141 of the Code, to which reference has been made, makes it clear that the provisions of the Code in regard to suits shall be followed in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction as far as it can be made applicable. The words "as far as it can be made applicable" make it clear that, in applying the various provisions of the Code to proceedings other than those of a suit, the Court must take into account the nature of those proceedings and the relief sought. The object of Article 226 is to provide a quick and inexpensive remedy to aggrieved parties. Power has consequently been vested in the High Courts to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any government, within the jurisdiction of the High Court, orders of writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari . It is plain that if the procedure of a suit had also to be adhered to in the case of writ petition, the entire purpose of having a quick and inexpensive remedy would be defeated. A writ petition under Article 226, it needs to be emphasised, is essentially different from a suit and it would be incorrect to assimilate and incorporate the procedure of a suit into the proceedings of a petition under Article 226".
It can be said that in the judgment aforesaid, this Court expressed the view that merely on basis of Section 141 of the Code it was not necessary to adhere to the procedure of a suit in writ petitions, because in many cases the sole object of writ jurisdiction to provide quick and inexpensive remedy to the Page 6 of 12 HC-NIC Page 6 of 12 Created On Mon Sep 07 02:41:24 IST 2015 C/CA/6953/2014 JUDGMENT person who invokes such jurisdiction is likely to be defeated. A Constitution Bench of this Court in the case ofState of U.P. v. Vijay Anand, AIR 1963 SC 946said as follows :- (Para 9) "It is, therefore, clear from the nature of the power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution and the decisions on the subject that the High Court in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution exercises original jurisdiction, though the said jurisdiction shall not be confused with the ordinary civil jurisdiction of the High Court. This jurisdiction, though original in character as contrasted with its appellate and revisional jurisdictions, is exercisable throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction and may for convenience, be described as extraordinary original jurisdiction".
When the High Court exercises extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, it aims at securing a very speedy and efficacious remedy to a person, whose legal or constitutional right has been infringed. If all the elaborate and technical rules laid down in the Code are to be applied to writ proceedings the very object and purpose is likely to be defeated. According to us, in view of the conflicting opinions expressed by the different Courts, the Parliament by the aforesaid amending Act introduced the explanation saying that in Section 141 of the Code the expression "proceedings" does not include "any proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution" and statutorily recognised the views expressed by some of the Courts that writ proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution shall not be deemed to be proceedings within the meaning of Section 141 of the Code. After the introduction of the explanation to Section 141 of the Code, it can be said that when Section 141 provides that the procedure prescribed in the Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable "in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction" it shall not include a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. In this background, according to us, it cannot be held that the provisions contained in Order 22 of the Code are applicable per se to writ proceedings.If even before the introduction of the explanation to Section 141, this Court in the case of Babubhai v. Nandlal, (AIR 1974 SC 2105) (supra) had said that the words "as far as it can be made applicable occurring in Section 141 of the Code made it clear that in applying the various provisions of the Code to the proceedings other than those of a suit, the Court has to take into consideration the nature of those proceedings and the reliefs sought for" after introduction of the explanation the writ proceedings have to be excluded from the expression "proceedings" occurring in Section 141 of the Code. If because of the explanation, proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution has been excluded, there is no question of making applicable the procedure of Code' as far as it can be made applicable' to such proceeding. The procedures prescribed in respect of suit in the Page 7 of 12 HC-NIC Page 7 of 12 Created On Mon Sep 07 02:41:24 IST 2015 C/CA/6953/2014 JUDGMENT Code if are made applicable to the writ proceedings then in many cases it may frustrate the exercise of extra-ordinary powers by the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.
6. But then can it be said that as the provisions of Order 22 of the Code are not applicable to writ petitions,the party who has invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court by filing such writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is at liberty to proceed with such writ petitions against a dead respondent ? Can the High Court pass an order without hearing the legal representative of such deceased respondent even in cases where right to sue survives against the legal representative of such deceased respondent? If such legal representative is not brought on the record, any order passed against the original respondent after his death shall not be binding on them because they have not been heard. The order of the High Court shall be deemed to have been passed against a dead person. If the right of the petitioner to pursue the remedy survives even after the death of the original respondent to the writ petition, then on the same principle even the right to context that claim survives on the part of the legal representative of the deceased respondent. In such a situation, after the death of the respondent if the right to sue survives against the legal representative of such respondent, then the petitioner has to substitute the legal representative of such respondent before the writ petition can proceed and can be heard and disposed of. The petitioner has to take steps for substitution of legal representative within a reasonable time. It need not be impressed that it will be unreasonable on the part of the Court to implead the legal representative of the deceased respondent after lapse of several months or years and then to direct them to contest the claim of the petitioner merely on the ground that after the death of the original respondent the right, title or the interest of such respondent has devolved on them.
7. In the case of Ram Kala v. Assistant Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, Rohtak, AIR 1977 Punjab and Har 87, a Full Bench of three Judges held that Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act does not apply to an application for adding or substituting a party to a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was also held that Section 141 of the Code cannot be pressed into service for applying the provisions including Order 22 of the Code in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. Later a Full Bench of five Judges of the same Court, in the case of Teja Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh, (AIR 1982 Punj and Har 169) (supra) held that in view of Rule 32 of the Writ Rules framed by the High Court under Article 225 of the Constitution which provided that in all matters in which no provision had been made by those Rules, the provisions of Civil Procedure Code shall apply mutatis mutandis in so far as they were not inconsistent with those Rules. It was held that the explanation which had been added Page 8 of 12 HC-NIC Page 8 of 12 Created On Mon Sep 07 02:41:24 IST 2015 C/CA/6953/2014 JUDGMENT to Section 141 of the Code by the aforesaid Amending Act, did not in any way nullified the effect of Rule 32 of the Writ Rules. Rule 32 of the Writ Rules is as follows :-
"32. In all matters for which no provision is made in these rules, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall apply mutatis mutandis insofar as they are not inconsistent with these rules".
8. On a plain reading, Section 141 of the Code provides that the procedure provided in the said Code in regard to suits shall be followed "as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings". In other words, it is open to make the procedure provided in the said Code in regard to suits applicable to any other proceeding in any Court of civil jurisdiction. The explanation which was added is more or less in the nature of proviso, saying that the expression "proceedings" shall not include any proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. The necessary corollary thereof shall be that it shall be open to make applicable the procedure provided in the Code to any proceeding in any Court of Civil jurisdiction except to proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. Once the proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution has been excluded from the expression "proceedings" occurring in Section 141 of the Code by the explanation, how on basis of Section 141 of the Code any procedure provided in the Code can be made applicable to a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution ? In this background, how merely on basis of Writ Rule 32 the provisions of the Code shall be applicable to writ proceedings ? Apart from that, Section 141 of the Code even in respect of other proceedings contemplates that the procedure provided in the Code in regard to suits shall be followed "as far as it can be made applicable". Rule 32 of Writ Rules does not specifically make provisions of Code applicable to petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. It simply says that in matters for which no provision has been made by those rules, the provisions of the Code shall apply mutatis mutandis in so far as they are not inconsistent with those rules. In the case ofRokyaybi v. Ismail Khan, AIR 1984 Karnataka 234, in view of Rule 39 of the Writ Proceedings Rules as framed by the Karnataka High Court making the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure applicable to writ proceedings and writ appeals, it was held that the provisions of the Code were applicable to writ proceedings and writ appeals.
9. We have not been able to appreciate the anxiety on the part of the different Courts in judgments referred to above to apply the provisions of the Code to Writ Proceedings on the basis of Section 141 of the Code. When the Constitution has vested extraordinary power in the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 to issue any order, writ or direction and the power of superintendence over all Courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which such High Court is exercising Page 9 of 12 HC-NIC Page 9 of 12 Created On Mon Sep 07 02:41:24 IST 2015 C/CA/6953/2014 JUDGMENT jurisdiction, the procedure for exercising such power and jurisdiction, have to be traced and found in Articles 226 and 227 itself. No useful purpose will be served by limiting the power of the High Court by procedural provisions prescribed in the Code. Of course, on many questions, the provisions and procedures prescribed under the Code can be taken up as guide while exercising the power, for granting relief to persons, who have invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court. It need not be impressed that different provisions and procedures under the Code are based on well recognised principles for exercise of discretionary power and they are reasonable and rational. But at the same time, it cannot be disputed that many procedures prescribed in the said Code are responsible for delaying the delivery of justice and causing delay in securing the remedy available to a person who pursues such remedies. The High Court should be left to adopt its own procedure for granting relief to the persons concerned. The High Court is expected to adopt a procedure which can be held to be not only reasonable but also expeditious.
10. As such even if it is held that Order 22 of the Code is not applicable to writ proceedings or writ appeals, it does not mean that the petitioner or the appellant in such writ petition or writ appeal can ignore the death of the respondent if the right to pursue remedy even after death of the respondent survives. After the death of the respondent it is incumbent on the part of the petitioner or the appellant to substitute the heris of such respondent within a reasonable time. For purpose of holding as to what shall be a reasonable time, the High Court may take note of the period prescribed under Article 120 of the Limitation Act for substituting the heirs of the deceased defendant or the respondent. However, there is no question of automatic abatement of the writ proceedings. Even if an application is filed beyond 90 days of the death of such respondent, the Court can take into consideration the facts and circumstances of a particular case for purpose of condoning the delay in filing the application for substitution of the legal representative. This power has to be exercised as well known and settled principles in respect of exercise of discretionary power by the High Court. If the High Court is satisfied that delay, if any in substituting the heirs of the deceased respondent was not intentional, and sufficient cause has been shown for not taking the steps earlier, the High Court can substitute the legal representative and proceed with the hearing of the writ petition or the writ appeals, as the case may be. At the same time the High Court has to be conscious that after lapse of time a valuable right accrues to the legal representative of the deceased respondent and he should not be compelled to contest a claim which due to the inaction of the petitioner or the appellant has become final.
6. Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court has also taken similar view Page 10 of 12 HC-NIC Page 10 of 12 Created On Mon Sep 07 02:41:24 IST 2015 C/CA/6953/2014 JUDGMENT vide order dated 4.3.2010 passed in Letters Patent Appeal No.937 of 2009. Following are the observations made in the said order:-
It is settled law that the provision of Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable in the proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in view of the Explanation below Section 141 of Code of Civil Procedure. In the case of Smt.Sudama Devi v. Commissioner and Others, reported in (1983) 2 SCC 1, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that provisions of Limitation Act are not applicable to the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India though the general rule of delay and laches may be considered on the basis of circumstances of the case. Similar is the view of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. And others v. Raj Bahadur Singh and another reported in (1998) 8 SCC 685.
In view of the aforesaid finding of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we are of the view that for filing the petition for substitution of the heirs, neither provision of Code of Civil Procedure was maintainable nor provision of Limitation Act is applicable for condoning the delay though it was open to the Court to find out whether there was delay and laches on the part of the applicant. In such circumstances, neither the Registry should have objected the application for restoration i.e. Civil Application (Stamp) No.3743 of 2003 on the ground that it was beyond time and not accompanied with separate application for condonation of delay, nor the learned Single Judge should have accepted such objection raised by the Registry.
For the reasons aforesaid, we allow Misc. Civil Application No.2689 of 2005 for restoration of Civil Application (Stamp) No.3743 of 2003 to its original file and order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 26th March 2009 is set aside. Office is directed to register Civil Application (Stamp) No.3743 of 2003 in Special Civil Application No.341 of 1999 and list it on an earlier date preferably in first week of April 2010.
7. It was however, brought to the notice of the Court that Rule 67 of the Gujarat High Court Rules provides for making of separate application seeking condonation of delay if occurred in filing the application for bringing heirs of deceased party on record. The Court, however, finds that Rule 67 of the said Rules cannot be applied to the proceedings filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.
8. In view of above, it was not required of the applicants to prefer Page 11 of 12 HC-NIC Page 11 of 12 Created On Mon Sep 07 02:41:24 IST 2015 C/CA/6953/2014 JUDGMENT separate application to seek condonation of delay occurred in filing the application to bring heirs of the deceased party on record of the proceedings of the main petition filed under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. It is always open for the applicants to explain delay or laches occurred in filing the application for bringing heirs of the deceased party on record of the petition.
9. In above such view of the matter, the Registry henceforth shall not insist for filing of separate application in any proceedings filed under Article 226/ 227 of the Constitution of India. It will be open to the applicants of the present the applications to seek amendment in the application preferred by them to bring on record of the main petition the heirs of deceased parties to explain delay and laches occurred in filing such application. Office may, therefore, now circulate such application for bringing heirs of the deceased party on the record of the petition without insisting for filing separate application to seek condonation of delay. The applications stand disposed of accordingly.
Sd/-
(C.L.SONI, J.) Omkar Page 12 of 12 HC-NIC Page 12 of 12 Created On Mon Sep 07 02:41:24 IST 2015