Madras High Court
Management Of Rain Bow Dyeing Factory ... vs Industrial Tribunal, High Court ... on 11 August, 1958
Equivalent citations: AIR1959MAD137, (1958)2MLJ74, AIR 1959 MADRAS 137, (1959) 1 MADLJ53, ILR (1959) MAD 75, 1959 MADLJ(CRI) 39, 1971 MADLW 835
JUDGMENT Balakrishna Ayyar, J.
1. By an order, G. O. Ms. No. 3961, Industries, Labour and Co-operation, dated 2-12-1957, the Government of Madras referred to the Industrial Tribunal, Madras, for adjudication, various issues relating to the wages, dearness allowance, bonus, and holidays with pay, arising between thirty industrial establishments or concerns in Salem, which are engaged in dyeing yarn or cloth, and the persons working in those establishments.
2. The managements took the preliminary objection that the reference was incompetent "as there was no industrial dispute at all since there was no relationship of employer and employee or master and servant between the parties." Two of the managements concerned took the special plea that there was no dispute whatever between them and their employees.
3. The Tribunal overruled the objections and passed an award on 9-5-1958, In respect of dear-ness allowance the Tribunal held that only three factories were in a position to pay any special clearness allowance, and these were directed to pay dearness allowance at the rate of Rs. 10 per month for every worker. The question of bonus was also considered unit by unit, In some cases the Tribunal found that there was no surplus out of which bonus could be paid. In other cases the Tribunal directed payment of bonus at varying rates.
4. This award was published by the Government of Madras in the Fort St. George Gazette on 2-7-1958.
5. The managements of all the thirty concerns affected by the order of the Tribunal have now come up to this Court, for the issue of a writ of certiorari or other appropriate writ to quash the order of the Tribunal.
6. The petition now sought to be filed is a single one by all the managements together. The office took the objection, that each management should file a separate petition which meant in effect that a separate court-fee should be paid by the management of each of the concerns. The advocates concerned demurred to this and asked that the matter be posted before Court.
7. In view of the apparent conflict of decisions on this point the matter has been posted before a Bench.
8. Section 4 of the Madras Court-fees Act, which is the charging section, gives no guidance on this matter, nor the rules framed by this court under Article 225 of the Constitution. The investigation has therefore to go further back.
9. The position is thus summarised in para graph 155 at page 83 of volume 11 of Halsbury's Laws of England:
"Enforcement of separate claims. Two persons cannot join in a single application for an order of mandamus to enforce separate claims. There must be separate applications for separate orders, and that although the several applicants are successors in the office in respect of which the claims arise (Ex parte, Scott and Morgan, 1840-8 Dowl. 328)."
We have not been able to see the case cited in the foot note as an authority for this proposition.
10. The case of R. v. City of Chester, (1694) 87 ER 487, is even older. That was a case of mandamus to restore nine persons to their places of common councilmen in Chester." In dismissing the application Holt, Chief Justice, observed as follows:
"And here you ought to have brought several mandamuses; for nine persons cannot join in a mandamus as here; perhaps you were chosen at nine several times. You cannot all join in one writ, for the election of one is not the election of another. This is an innovation to join nine men in one writ of mandamus; can we grant a joint restitution to them? It is a several interest. Tenants in common cannot join in one action, though they come in by one feoffment; the emotion of the one is not the emotion of the other; and it may be for several faults, one for forfeiture, the others for other reasons. I think the writ ought to be quashed."
11. Adopting the language of the learned Chief Justice, one may say in the present case that the direction of the Tribunal that wages, bonus arid clearness allowance should be paid at certain rates was a direction to each of the concerns, and the direction to one is not a direction to the other. The interests of the petitioners, though similar, are several and distinct.
12. The position in America is thus stated in Article 333 on page 81 of Vol. 35 of American Jurisprudence:
"Generally-- Persons having a common and joint interest in the subject-matter in controversy may be joined as relators in mandamus, and in a number of cases it has been held, apart from any express statutory authority, that several rclators may properly join in an application for the writ, even though they have no strictly joint interest in the right sought to be enforced, where the right of each relator is the same as that of all the others. Generally however, persons having similar but wholly separate and distinct interests in the subject-matter of the controversy are not entitled to join as relators in mandamus. Statutory provisions relating to the joinder of plaintiffs in actions are in general applicable to mandamus proceedings."
13. On this summary of the law one may make certain observations. The statement here that "persons having a common and joint interest in the subject-matter in controversy may be joined as relators in mandamus" and the further statement that "persons having similar but wholly separate and distinct interest in the subject-matter of the controversy" may not do so, appears to be a correct summary of also English practice.
We have not been able to examine any of the cases cited as authority for the statement that in a number of cases it has been held "Apart from any express statutory authority, that several relators may properly join in an application for the writ, even though they have no strictly joint interest in the right sought to be enforced, where the right of each relator is the same as that of all the others."
Reading the summary as a whole, we get the impression that all these cases are exceptions to the general rule, the general rule itself being that persons having similar but separate interests must file separate applications. As for the last statement in the summary that "statutory provisions relating to the joinder of plaintiffs in actions are in general applicable to mandamus proceedings" it is sufficient to say that it would not be a correct statement of the law in India.
14. United Motors (India) Ltd. v. State of Bombay, 55 Bom LR 246, was a case in which seven persons joined in a single petition challenging the validity of the Bombay Sales Tax Act. The learned Advocate-General took the preliminary point that a single petition by all of them was incompetent. He contended that a petition can be maintained only by one petitioner when he complains of either a breach of statutory duty on the part of an officer of Government or a contravention of fundamental rights and that relief can be given only to one petitioner in a petition. The court overruled the objection and remarked:
"The claim made by all the petitioners is the same viz., that the Sales-tax Act is invalid and it should not be enforced against them. Here there are not several claims made by several petitioners. Even assuming that the Advocate-General was right, at the highest the joining of more than one petitioner would be a surplusage and that surplusage could be cured by six of the petitioners being struck off the record. The petition could easily be maintained by one out of the seven petitioners." It will be noticed that between the Bombay case and the instant case there is one important difference. In the Bombay case if the court had held that the Act was ultra vires the State legislature every body affected by the enactment would have got the benefit of it. In the instant case, if only one of the petitioners had come up, it is quite possible -- we are of course not expressing any opinion on the merits or a substance of the matter at this stage -- that any relief which he might obtain would not enure to the benefit of the other managements.
It will also be noticed that the decision in the Bombay case proceeded on the footing that the claim marie by all the petitioners was the same. But, in the present case, we find it difficult to say that in respect of all the petitioners. Their claims are no doubt similar in several respects but they are not the same.
15. The Bombay High Court held that the enactment was ultra vires, the State legislature and the State of Bombay appealed to the Supremo Court. In the Supreme Court the point was not taken that the petition was incompetent because seven persons had joined in it. It was suggested that if this objection had been a good one it would certainly have been taken on behalf of the Government, and the omission to do so indicates that the petition was properly presented.
16. We do not by any means feel sure of that, because it may very well be that the Government were anxious to get a decision on the merits of the case from the Supreme Court. By defeating the petition on a technical plea they would merely have delayed the final adjudication of the crucial question whether the Act complained of was ultra vires and, the delay would have been extremely inconvenient all round.
17. In re A. Gopalakrishnarao, (S) AIR 1957 Andli Pra 88, is the next case in point. The facts there were as follows. From 1951 the owners of certain rice mills in Krishna district had been taking out separate licences on payment of a fixed licence fee of Rs. 24. Each of them had also deposited Rs. 200 as security for the due performance of various conditions imposed by the licence.
When the petitioners applied for renewal of their licences for the year 1956-57, the Collector of Krishna demanded a further deposit of Rs. 300 from each of the petitioners. The petitioners challenged the legality of this demand and all of them joined in a single petition before the High Court. The Court held that they could not.
"The learned counsel for the petitioners argues that the petitioners have invoked civil jurisdiction of this court for the issue of a writ, that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code therefore apply and that as Order 1, Rule 1 permits such joinder of petitioners a common petition is tenable in law. It is correct to state that such a writ petition is a civil proceeding ant! the jurisdiction of this court in this behalf is original as distinguished from the appellate or revisional jurisdiction and it is summary in nature. Provisions of Civil Procedure Code arc no doubt available to such proceedings, but only so far as they are consistent with the nature and scope of the proceedings and general principles guiding such writs.
I am therefore not prepared to hold that principles of Order 1, Rule 1, C. P. C., or Order 1, Rule 8, C. P. C., must be extended to such petitions ..... The right of a person to apply for an appropriate writ flows from the order that affects him. A person desirous of questioning the validity or legality of such order is entitled, subject to other conditions, to apply for such writ. It is not open to him to join in this petition other person or persons affected by similar orders, for they too have a remedy open to them and the quashing of one order does not necessarily render the other order null and void."
18. In a later case of the same court reported in Annam Adinarayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh, different view was expressed. The petitioners in that case were two supervisors of the Market Committee, Guntur. In pursuance of orders issued by the Government of Andhra, the Collector; who was the ex-officio Chairman of the Guntur Market Committee, terminated their services. Thereupon both of them jointly filed a single petition for quashing the order terminating their services, and the question was whether a joint petition would lie. The court held, "The legal position may now be summarised. An application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is a proceeding in a court of civil jurisdiction. The provisions of Order 1 and 2 can be invoked as far as they can be made applicable to the proceedings in a writ application under Article 226. Ordinarily, two or more persons cannot join in a single petition to enforce separate claims. But where the right to relief arises from the same act nr transaction and there is a common question of law or fact or where though the right to relief claimed does not arise, from the same cause or, act or transaction, the petitioners are jointly interested in the causes of action, one petition is maintainable at their instance. In the present case, the petitioners are aggrieved by a single act of the Collector, and a common question of law and fact arises, and, therefore, a single application is maintainable."
With all respect to the learned Judges it is by no means clear to us how in that case it can be said that the two petitioners were jointly interested in the matter. The circumstances that the services of both were terminated by the same order would not make their interests joint since by a single order properly made the services of a large number of persons who have no connection with one another can be terminated. We have also difficulty in reconciling the observation, "The provisions of Orders 1 and 2 can be invoked as far as they can be made applicable to the proceedings in a writ application under Art, 226."
With the earlier observations in the judgment which run as follows:
This judgment is authority for the position that the provisions of Order 1 Rule 8 C. P. Code, cannot be applied to a writ petition. It is not necessary to express our opinion in this case but the conclusion may be justified on the ground that the said procedure is inappropriate to writ petitions. There is no scope for invoking Order 1 Rule 1 or Order 2 Rule 3 C. P. Code, as in that case the right fo relief of the various petitioners did not arise from the same acts of transactions or the petitioners were not jointly interested in the cause of action."
19. None of the cases cited before us furnish any support for the observation that where the right to relief arises from the same act or transaction and there is a common question of law or fact, the persons concerned may join in the same petition. The circumstance that a common question of law or fact arises would no doubt often induce the court to hear the petitions together, but that does not mean that the persons are jointly interested in the matter.
20. We now come to the decisions of this court: Muhammad Ibrahim v. Dy. C. T. Officer, Pudukottai, 1956-2 Mad LJ 23 : (AIR 1956 Mad 628), was a case in which eleven tobacco merchants sought to file a single petition questioning the legality of Madras Act XIII of 1955, which authorised the State Government to levy sales-tax on tobacco at certain rates. The court held that a single petition would not lie.
"Where a petitioner desires to question the validity or legality of an order, he is entitled to apply for an appropriate writ, but this right of his flows from the order affecting him. The fact that similar orders are passed in the case of other individuals also be it by the same officer or authority, does not mean that the injury caused is a common or class injury so as to justify a single petition with all the individuals similarly affected joining in it as petitioners. The provision in Order 1 Rule 8 C. P. C. seeks to obviate the inconveniences arising out of a multiplicity of parties -- but neither the rule nor its principle can be extended to writ petitions. Again the fact that the relief prayed for by the several petitioners each of whose individual right is alleged to have been invaded improperly by the impugned order is grounded on a common objection, the invalidity of the legislation or the rule or some order interpreting or enforcing the statute or the rule does not also afford any basis for a joint writ petition by several petitioners aggrieved by similar orders. Each of them has to file independent petitions, paying separate court-fee on each, with separate vakalat, etc."
See also Sambandam v. Sirkali Panchayat, 1957-1 Mad LI (S. N.) 8 :
"Where a petitioner seeks distinct and separate reliefs for issue of writs of certiorari in respect of distinct orders, he has to pay separate court-fee, file separate vaikalats and other enclosures in respect of each of the reliefs."
and Subramania v. Courtallam Township Committee, 1957-1 Mad LJ (SN) 20.
21. Ganapathi Nadar v. State of Madras, was a case in which the managements of a number of handloom factories attempted to take out a single petition for the issue of a writ prohibiting the Industrial Tribunal from proceeding with an enquiry in an industrial dispute in pursuance of a notification made by the Government. The court held that separate petitions should be filed.
"I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners who urged that as the reference by the Government, which was impugned in the petition, was a single one the petitioners were entitled to file a single writ petition but I am not persuaded that this contention is correct. Notwithstanding that the reference was one, what is sought to be ventilated in the petition is the right of each petitioner to carry on its business without the interference by the State Government or the Tribunal acting under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. That the right whose violation is alleged is an individual right which inheres in each petitioner cannot be disputed and merely because similar rights possessed by the other persons are also violated it does not follow that their grievances have a unity.
22. To the same effect is the decision in Shanmuga Rajeswara Sethupathi v. State of Madras, .
23. Mr. M. K. Nambiar, the learned advocate for the petitioners contended that in the present case we may properly postulate that all the petitioners have a joint interest because as he explained: (1) All persons employed or working in all the factories were ranged on one side and the managements of all the establishments were ranged on the other;
(2) All the employees in all the factories belong to the same trade union;
(3) The reference for adjudication was made by a single order.
(4) The dispute was an "integrated" dispute.
(5) If any of the petitioners had come to this court at an earlier stage and asked for a writ of prohibition and had succeeded in getting it that would have enured to the benefit of all.
(6) Finally, there was a single award. He also drew certain analogies from the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code relating to the joinder of charges.
24. So far as the analogy based on the Criminal Procedure Code is concerned, it ought to be sufficient to say that we sec no justification for extending the rules relating to the joinder of charges and the trial of criminal offences to the hearing of writ petitions. It has been held in this court that proceedings relating to writs, where the civil rights of a party are affected by an order of the Government or any tribunal, are civil proceedings. Vide Dhanalakshmi Ammal v. I. T. Officer, Madras, 1957-2 Mad LJ 567 : (AIR 1958 Mad 157). At page 569 (of Mad LJ): (at p. 152 of AIR), the learned Chief Justice observed:
"We fail to see why a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution for the enforcement of a right to property, for instance, cannot be deemed to be a civil proceeding. We realise that every application under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be deemed to be a civil proceeding. To give an obvious example an application for a writ of habeas corpus or a writ of prohibition to prevent prosecution of criminal proceedings may not he properly described as civil proceedings, hut if the civil rights of a party are affected by an order of the executive Government or a party feels aggrieved by the adjudication of a special Administrative Tribunal relating to his rights in a property or other civil rights we see no reason why an application by such an aggrieved party should not be deemed to be a civil proceeding."
25. We are reluctant to extend to civil proceedings which are governed by a separate Code analogies drawn from the Criminal Procedure Code.
26. On the other contention of Mr. Namhiar that all the petitioners here have a joint interest in the matter, we would observe that neither severally nor cumulatively are the various circumstances he referred to sufficient to establish that the interest of the petitioners is a joint one. That all the employees in all the establishments are ranged on one side does not show more than this, that in this particular matter they are all working together.
They seek to draw strength as they are entitled to by standing together; they all belong to the same trade union, and, the union would naturally try to present a consolidated front. That the Government made a single reference does not make any difference at all, because under Section 10(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, when a dispute concerning any establishment is referred for adjudication and the appropriate Government is of opinion that any other establishment of a similar nature is likely to be interested in, or affected by the dispute, the Government may include in the reference the cases of such establishments also.
27. On the argument that if any one of the petitioners had come earlier and succeeded in getting a writ of prohibition all the petitioners would have benefited it is sufficient to say that it only shows that the interests of all the petitioners are similar and not that they are joint.
If for example as in the Bombay case, the State Legislature passes an Act authorising the levy of a particular tar and one of the numerous persons affected thereby applies to the court for an appropriate writ and succeeds in convincing the court that the State legislature had no power under the Constitution to levy such a tax and that in the result the Act is ultra vires, naturally all the persons who might otherwise have had to pay the tax would be benefited by the decision of the court. That was only to show that the interests of all the persons affected are similar; and not that their interests are joint.
28. The statement of Mr. Nambiar that the dispute was an "integrated" one is only another way of saying that the disputes were all heard together.
29. In our judgment, the interests of all the petitioners here though similar were certainly not joint.
30. Mr. Nambiar next said: here we are asking for a writ of certiorari. The object of the petition is to destroy or kill the order complained of, and, if the writ is issued the order complained of will be killed and that would enure to the benefit of all.
31. That any one of the persons affected can come and apply for a writ does not support the contention that all of them can come together on a single petition. The action of one may benefit many; but, it does not follow that all the many can file a single petition. Nor are we willing to subscribe generally and without qualification to the statement that a writ of certiorari must destroy the order as a whole or not at all.
We consider that in appropriate cases and where the circumstances require it, the order can be so moulded as to give relief only to the persons who are before the court, or other limited class of persons. The destruction of the order complained of may in such cases be a partial destruction. It will have been noticed that even in the present case two of the managements complained of took special pleas before the Tribunal. They contended that there was no dispute between them and the members of their establishments.
It has also been mentioned that in its award the Tribunal directed payment of bonus and dearness allowance at different rates for different establishments. It may be that when this court is called upon finally to decide the matter on the merits it would take into account all these circumstances. We are not willing at this stage to say that a petition for the issue of a writ of certiorari must either be allowed as a whole or dismissed as a whole. That, it seems to us, must to a large extent depend upon the circumstances of each case.
32. Section 141 C. P. Code provides that the procedure laid down in the Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any court of civil jurisdiction. On the strength of this rule it was suggested that the provisions of Order 1 C. P. C. can be applied to writ proceedings. In respect of this suggestion it is sufficient to refer to Thakur Prasad v. Fakir Ullab, ILR 17 All 106 (PC), where when dealing with Section 647 of the old Civil procedure Code, which corresponds to Section 141 of the present Code, the Privy Council observed, "Their Lordships think that the proceedings spoken of in Section 647 include original matters in the nature of suits such as proceedings in probates, guardianships, and so forth, and do not include executions."
So far as we are aware, a writ proceeding has never been held to be in the nature of a suit.
33. The view has been consistently held in this court that in matters of this kind each person aggrieved must file a separate petition and of course pay the requisite court-fee. That view ap-pears to us to be the correct one, and we, therefore, adopt it.