Allahabad High Court
Kahkashan Bano vs Abdul Moiz Ansari on 23 November, 1989
Equivalent citations: I(1990)DMC495
JUDGMENT A.N. Dikshita, J.
1. Smt. Kahkashan Bano being aggrieved against the judgment and order dated 8-9-1988 of learned District Judge, Basti, allowing the application in Misc. Case No. 60 of 1987 Abdul Moiz Ansari v. Smt. Kahkashan Bano filed by the respondent under Sections 25 and 12 of the Guardian and Wards Act read with the Personal Muslim Law for the custody of a minor and directing that the child shall be given to the custody of the respondent within fifteen days has preferred this appeal.
2. Facts as revealing from the petition are that the respondent filed a petition under Sections 12 and 25 of the Guardian and Wards Act (hereinafter called "The Act") against the appellant, Smt. Kahkashan Bano on 4-12-87 for being given the custody of the child, Mohd. Shoaib, to him. It was stated in the petition that the respondent married the appellant on 18-11-79 ond his son (Mohd. Shoab Ansari) was born out of this wedlock. The respondent divorced the appellant on 27-12-81 and consequent to this divorce parties started living separately. It was, further, mentioned in the petition that at the time of divorce Mohd. Shoab Ansari was aged about one year and as per the understanding arrived at it was decided that the child would continue to live with his mother till he attained the age of 5 years whereafter the respondent would keep the son in his custody. Mohd. Shoab has attained the age of seven and a half years and the respondent is thus entitled to his custody which may be given.
3. Appellant, Kahkashan Bano filed written statement that after the marriage respondent started harassing and ill-treating her. The respondent orally divorced the appellant on 27-12-81 though no document or Talaqnama was executed to witness the divorce. The appellant also alleged that no agreement (Iqrarnama) was executed and the one on which reliance has been placed by the respondent is a forged one. The appellant is maintaining her son, Mohd. Shoab Ansari with great love and affection and is imparting education to him in St. Joseph's Convent School. The appellant who is living with his mother and brother and other family members are also keeping and showing the body great love and affection. It has also been alleged that the respondent never took care of the child, Mohd. Shoab Ansari during all this period. In support of her objection the appellant also filed an affidavit on 29-8-88.
4. After considering the respective contentions of the parties learned District Judge allowed the application filed by the respondent under Sections 12 and 25 of the Act and directed the appellant to give the custody of the child within fifteen days.
5. Hence, this appeal.
6. A detailed counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondent repudiating the averments as contained in the affidavit. It has been alleged by the respondent that on the refusal of the appellant to give the custody of the child after his attaining the age of five years the respondent was compelled to file the application in the Court for being given the custody of the child. Allegations of torture and mal-treatment of the appellant were denied by the respondent. The respondent had been paying Rs. 200/- per month since 1981 for the maintenance and proper education of the child. Respondent has stated that he is very much attached to the child.
7. A rejoinder affidavit reiterating the averments in the, affidavit filed earlier and repudiating the allegations of the counter affidavit has been filed.
8. Learned counsel for the parties submitted that instead of disposing of the interim matter the appeal be disposed of on merits by this Court. Accordingly learned counsel for the parties have been heard.
9. During the hearing of the appeal on merits it was found expedient that the appellant produces the child in Court when the respondent shall also be present. Accordingly 28-2-89 was fixed for such production of the child and presence of the parties. On 28-2-1989 the child was produced by the appellant. Respondent was also present. In the presence of the appellant and the respondent the following statement of the child, Mohd. Sohab Ansari was recorded.
"My name is Mohd. Shoab Ansari. I am residing with my mother Scat. Kahkashan Bano since birth. I do not know the name of my father. I am residing in Mohalla-Dariya Khan, Basti with my mother. I am not aware of my age. I am student of class-2 in St. Joseph School, Basti. I am being properly clothed and looked after by my mother. I along with my mother reside with my maternal grand-mother. I do not know Sri Abdul Moiz Ansari and as such do not want to reside with him. I want to reside with my mother. My mother and my maternal grand mother both love me and shower on me their affection. If I am forcibly sent to Sri Abdul Moiz Ansari, I would run back to my ' mother's house. Even if Sri Abdul Moiz Ansari provides me good food and clothe, I am not prepared to reside with him as he is an unknown person to me. My mother fulfills all my wishes and also provides games material to me."
Heard counsel for the parties.
Before proceeding to dwell upon the merits of the case certain facts as are transparent from the record are admitted to the parties. It is admitted that the child Mohd. Soeb Ansari is aged about 7 years. It is also admitted that the respondent who married the appellant on 18-11-79 divorced her on 27-12-81. At the time of such divorce it is not disputed that the child Mohd. Soeb Ansari is aged about 1-1/2 years.
10. Learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously urged that in a lis like the present, one before the court the only issue which is to be seen is the welfare of the minor and it is the only paramount consideration for disposal of such matters. It has thus been submitted that legality apart the court should take into account the paramount consideration the welfare of the minor.
11. Learned counsel for the respondent has very strenuously submitted that the respondent is in a much better position being equipped with affluence to maintain the child and protect his welfare and watch his future. From the above submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, it is not disputed that the court should take into consideration the welfare of the minor which is the only paramount consideration.
12. Learned counsel for the respondent has also submitted that the statement of the child should not be given due weight as the minor is not intelligent enough to form an opinion about his future welfare. This submission would be dealt with later.
13. It has now to be extracted from the glaring facts revealed on record as regards the welfare of the Child which is the only paramount consideration for the court.
14. This is also the settled law that the welfare of the minor is to be the paramount consideration for the court and not the legal right of either the appellant or the respondent. The interest of the minor is supreme.
15. In the case of Dr. Mrs. Veena Kapoor v. Varinder Kumar Kapoor (AIR 1982 S.C. 792) it has been held that in matters concerning the custody of minor children the paramount consideration is the welfare of the minor and not the legal right of this or that particular party.
16. In the case of Rosy Jacob v. Jacob A. Chakramakkal (AIR 1973 SC 2090 (it was held that the controlling consideration governing the custody of the children is the welfare of the children concerned and not the right of their parents. The dominant consideration in making orders under Section 25 of the Act is the welfare of the minor children. It has to be seen that who would be in a better position to be able to impart natural and selfless affection. Further in case of a conflict or dispute between the mother and the father about the custody of the minor the court has to adopt a somewhat different but more pragmatic approach. No doubt the father may have a legal right to claim the custody of the child but at the same time fitness of father has to be considered, determined and weighed predominantly in terms of the welfare of the minor. If it is found that the father cannot promote the welfare equally or better than the mother, he cannot claim indefeasible right to such custody. Merely father's fitness to maintain the minor cannot override consideration of the welfare of the minor. Statute has presumed that the father is generally in a better position to look-after the minor being the head of the family earning bread for it. In any case it has to be seen primarily the welfare of the minor while determining the question of his custody. But merely because the father agrees to maintain the minor showing all affection would not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the welfare of the minor would be better promoted by granting custody to him. The mother may be equally affectionate towards the minor. If she is possessed of requisite financial resources, she would be always in adantageous position of guaranteeing better health, education and maintenance for the minor. A minor is not a mere chatel nor a plaything. A child has to grow up in a normal balanced manner. In the case of Subarabi v. D. Mohammed (AIR 1988 Kerala 30) it has been held that merely because the respondent (father) is better placed economically, the custody of the child cannot be denied to the petitioner (mother). Further merely that the mother is not financially solvent as the father custody of the child cannot be deprived of from its mother.
17. In the case of Mohammed Khalid v. Smt. Zeenat Parveen and Ors. (AIR 1988 Allahabad 252) a similar view was taken. It is well established that in a proceeding under the Act for the custody of a minor it is the welfare in the widest sense of the term that is to be considered, though the father as natural guardian may have a prima-facie right to a minor's custody. It can be negatived if minor's welfare lies in keeping him in the custody of his mother. Merely because the father is the natural guardian under the personal law applicable to him, the custody of the minor cannot be entrusted to him having in mind overall consideration of his physical and material well being, education, up-bringing, happiness etc., the dominant consideration shall be the interest of the minor than the claims of the rival parties. Humanitarianism would also permit as the mother is the most competent and suitable person to protect the interest of the minor and safeguard his welfare. To the affection and love of a mother there is no substitute. Universal phenomenon and human approach have acknowledged that the mother's affection for the child is unparalleled. It cannot be bartered away nor can be shared either by the father or by any one.
18. The respondent divorced the appellant after consumating marriage for a very short span of time that is about 3 years. The minor born of this wedlock at the time of the divorce was only 1-1/2 years old. It is indisputable that a child of one year cannot remember the father. The appellant has reared the child for 7 years showering all affections and protecting his welfare by imparting him better education and maintaining him to her utmost. Admittedly, the applicant is not economically weak. She is a teacher in a school earning more than Rs. 1000/-. The respondent is a private practitioner. He may be having sufficient resources to maintain the child. The respondent has claimed that he is residing with his other family members which has been seriously challenged by the appellant. Rather the appellant staying with her mother, brother and other family members is not disputed. Even the child has admitted that he is residing with his mother who is staying with her brother and mother and other family members and such members of the family are showering affection and love on him. Another aspect of the case is that after divorcing the appellant the respondent married again. Such marriage went on the rocks leaving the respondent alone. It has also to be considered that the respondent is still in the psalon of his life and may marry again much to the detriment of the minor. Human complexities and trivialities of the societies cannot be ignored. If the respondent marries again and have children from such wife, the affection and love to the minor would gradually diminish. Courts cannot keep a close eye to the vicissitudes of such a situation. Human frailties have been resulted in causing miseries to such minor.
19. In the case of Smt. Ajnunnisa v. Mukhtar Ahmad and Anr. (AIR 1975 Allahabad 67) it has been held that where a minor aged about 10-11 years is in the custody of his mother and has intelligently exercised his preference to continue to stay with her, his custody cannot be disturbed and come to his father though he is legal guardian of the minor in the personal law (Mohammadan Law). A mere claim to legal guardianship after such a situation will not stand on a higher footing than the claim of the real matter to continue to have the custody of the minor who has remained in her custody since the birth of the child. Presently the minor Mohd. Shoeb Ansari from the time of his birth is residing with his mother. Merely because the respondent is legal guardian even then the child cannot be extracted from the custody of the appellant. In a proceeding under Section 25 it is too well established. It is not the guardianship of the minor which is of importance but the welfare of the minor which has to be taken into consideration. The minor was examined by this Court. He was found to be intelligent and smart. He preferred to stay with his mother. Defiantly he expressed not to live with his father. To the suggestion that in case he is directed to live with his father, the minor openly stated that he would run back to his mother. Merely because he was produced in court from the custody of the mother that will not cause dent the truthfulness of his statement. It is an innocent expression of a minor. It can also not be said that the child was tutored. He was asked questions by the court to which he replied. Further the minor never lived with the respondent who admittedly may not be alien to the minor but is certainly a stranger. It would take years for the child to grow affection for the respondent. It will certainly affect his natural growth. Such an artificial exercise of showing affection by father would not inspire the minor howsoever genuine the affection may be, but to the child it would always be artificial. The overzealousness with which the affection would be shown would further retard the natural growth of the minor. The welfare of the child in any case would be with the mother.
20. In the case of Mt. Siddiqunisa Bibi v. Nizamuddin Khan and Ors. a Division Bench of this court headed by Hon. Sulaiman A.C.J. it was held that the necessary condition in the exercise of discretion under Section 25 is that the ward should have left or have been removed from the custody of the guardian of his person. If the ward has not left or has not been removed hum such custody, Section 25 does not apply. The minor since the time of his birth is staying with his mother and has neither been removed nor was ever residing with his father (respondent).
21. In the case of Mt. Haliman Khatoon v. Ahmadi Begum and Ors. (AIR 1949 Alld 627) it has been held that the mother imparts natural affection. Her natural affection for her son cannot be excelled by any one else.
22. From the above it is crystal clear that the appellant is in a better position to protect the welfare of the minor as he cannot form intelligence preference in matters relating to his custody. Reliance has been placed in the case of S. Rama Iyer v. K.V. Natraja (AIR 1948 Madras 294) and Smt. Hafizur Rahman v. Smt. Shakila Khatoon (1983 AWC 572).
23. In the case of S. Rama Iyer v. K.V. Natraj Iyer (supra) it has been held that the child of 12 to 14 years cannot form intelligent preference in matters relating to his custody. This court while considering the lis between the parties was not only swayed by the statement of the child but by the intelligence, which is not the monopoly of any one. In any case a child is always intelligent enough as to where he would receive affection and love. He may not be conscious as regard the future but his upbringing and affection as has been found to be with the mother (respondent) cannot be assailed.
24. The case of Hafizur Rahman v. Smt. Shakila Khatoon does not help the respondent. It has been held that the object recognising the custody under law is in a nut-shell to rear the child for which the mother is the best suited and is preferred in comparison to the father. Looking to the entire surrounding circumstances of the case it will be in the interest of the child that he stays with his mother who would be seized with his welfare instead to permit him to live with the respondent. The trial court only considered the aspect as regards the legality of the respondent to claim the custody. The paramount consideration as regards the welfare of the child was illegally ignored. This appeal thus deserves to be allowed and the order of the trial court is liable to be set aside.
25. In the result the appeal is allowed. The judgment and order dated 1-9-88 is hereby set aside. The child is directed to remain in the custody of the appellant. However, the appellant may permit the respondent to see his child twice a month on the date and the time intimated 3 days in advance for a period of half an hour.