Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
S.M. Kiran Pasha vs Government Of Andhra Pradesh And Ors. on 4 July, 1988
Author: B.P. Jeevan Reddy
Bench: B.P. Jeevan Reddy
JUDGMENT Jeevan Reddy, J.
1. W.P. No. 8610/1988 was filed by one Sri S. M. Kiran Pasha, Chairman, Cuddapah Municipal Council, on 6-6-1988 for the issuance of "a writ, order or direction, and more particularly one in the nature of a writ of mandamus directing detention of the petitioner herein under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities of, Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986, on the basis of the offences under Crime Nos. 30, 31, 32 and 33 of 1987/88 ...". (It is evident that there is a typographical error in the above prayer. The relief sought for is not to detain the petitioner, but to restrain the respondents from detaining the petitioner under the said Act). In this writ petition he filed WPMP. No. 10680/80 for "an order directing the respondents to refrain from making an order detaining the petitioner under the provisions of the A.P. Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 (Act No. 1 of 1986) pending disposal of the above writ petition .....". The writ petition was posted before a learned single Judge on 8-6-1988, on which day it was admitted (Rule Nisi issued). In WPMP. No. 10680/88 the learned Judge passed an order, the operative portion of which reads thus :-
"Having carefully considered the facts and circumstances, the respondents are directed not to take the petitioner into preventive custody under the Act 1/86 for a period of fifteen days from today on the basis of the cases already registered, viz., F.I.Rs. in Crime Nos. 30, 31, 32 and 33/88 of Pendlimari Excise Station.
This petition will be posted for further orders on 22-6-1988. Respondents will file counter in the meantime."
As a matter of fact, an order of detention under S. 3 of Act 1 of 1986 was passed by the District Magistrate (District Collector) on 3-6-1988 itself. In pursuance of the said order, the petitioner was taken into custody on 10-6-1988 at Cuddapah. At the time of arrest the order of detention as well as the grounds of detention were served upon him. Soon after the arrest the petitioner's counsel apprised the District Magistrate of the orders of this Court. After obtaining legal advice, the District Magistrate released the petitioner on 13-6-88, in pursuance of the interim order dt. 8-6-1988, aforesaid.
2. When WPMP. No. 10680/88 came up for orders on 22-6-1988, a counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of the District Magistrate bringing the above facts to the notice of the Court and raising a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the writ petition. It was submitted that the petitioner having come to know of the detention order, avoided service thereof and got this writ petition filed without disclosing that an order of detention was already made. In any event, it was submitted that in view of the order of detention made even prior to the filing of the writ petition, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. The learned single Judge, after hearing the parties, referred the matter to a Bench on the question of maintainability of the writ petition, and also because, normally speaking, a writ of habeas corpus is heard by a Bench. Accordingly, the writ petition came up for orders before us on 23-6-1988. On that day, the learned counsel for the petitioner requested for an adjournment to the next day. It came up for orders on 27-6-1988.
3. W.P. No. 9358/1988 was filed by one Sri T. G. Panduranga Shetty on 21-6-1988 for issuance of a "writ, order or direction, more particularly one in the nature of writ of mandamus, or any other writ, order or direction declaring the orders of the first respondent herein, in his Proceeding in Re. No. C1/1449/M/88, dt. 8-6-1988 passed under S. 3(1)(a) read with S. 3(2) of the Prevention of Black Marketing and Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980, directing the writ petitioner be remanded to the Central Jail, Rajahmundry and detained therein and also the consequential notification of the 1st respondent dt. 16-6-1988 published in Kurnool District Gazette (Extraordinary) dated 16-6-1988 under S. 7(1)(b) of Act. 1 of 1980 directing the writ petitioner to appear before first respondent at Kurnool Collectorate not later than 5-30 p.m. on 22-6-1988, as illegal, mala fide, arbitrary, void and without jurisdiction ....". In this writ petition two miscellaneous petitions were also filed. WPMP No. 11709/88 asked for an order restraining the operation of the proceedings of the 1st respondent dt. 8-6-1988 and the consequential order dt. 16-6-1988. WPMP No. 11710/88 prayed for suspending the operation of the order dt. 18-6-1988 passed in Crl. MP. No. 568/88 under S. 82 of the Cr.P.C. This writ petition came up before the same learned single Judge on 23-6-1988. The learned Judge directed this writ petition also to be heard along with W.P. No. 8610/88, since the point on which the earlier writ petition was referred to Bench, also arises in this writ petition. Accordingly, both the writ petitions were posted together and we have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners, as also the learned Advocate-General for the respondents.
4. A.P. Act 1 of 1986 is an Act providing for preventive detention, within the meaning of Clause (4) of Art. 22 of the Constitution. The provisions of this Act conform to the provisions of similar statutes made by Parliament. The Act is made to provide for preventive detention of six classes of persons mentioned in the title of the Act itself. It also contains provisions as required by Clause (5) of Art. 22. So far as the Prevention of Black-Marketing and Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980 is concerned, it is also a preventive detention Act made by Parliament with a view to prevent black-marketing and to maintain supplies of commodities essential to the community and for matters connected therewith. The provisions of this Act are well known, and need not be mentioned.
5. The first and preliminary objection of the learned Advocate-General is that both the writ petitions are not maintainable. It is submitted that once an order of detention is made by the competent authority under the provisions of the Act, the validity whereof is not questioned in these writ petitions, the person against whom the order is made cannot ask for a writ of mandamus restraining the authority from giving effect to the order of detention, without surrendering himself to, and obeying the order of detention; he must first surrender himself to the authority and then ask for a writ of habeas corpus; he cannot evade the service of the order, keep himself away from reach of law, and yet file and maintain a writ petition in this Court questioning the said order. It is submitted that since the petitioner in W.P. No. 9358/88 has not been detained so far, neither the order of detention, nor the grounds of detention could be served upon him. In the absence of grounds of detention, this Court cannot go into or pronounce upon the validity or otherwise of the order of detention. So far as the petitioner in W.P. No. 8610/88 is concerned, it is submitted, he filed the writ petition suppressing the fact that an order of detention was already made on 3-6-1988, though he was aware of it. When he was arrested in pursuance of the said order, the order and grounds of detention were served upon him, but then he was released when the interim order of this Court was brought to the notice of the District Magistrate. This Court merely directed that the respondents shall not take the petitioner into preventive custody for a period of fifteen days from the date of the order, i.e., 8-6-1988. The said period expired on 22-6-1988. By another order passed on that day, the said direction was extended by one more day, i.e., up to 4-15 p.m. on 23-6-1988. After the said date the petitioner, as a law abiding citizen, ought to have surrendered himself and then questioned the order of detention by way of habeas corpus. This Court would not, it is submitted in this writ petition, go into or pronounce upon the legality or validity of the detention order. Indeed, it is pointed out that the writ petition itself has become infructuous, inasmuch as an order of detention was made even prior to the filing of the writ petition. Certain earlier decisions of this Court are brought to our notice, to which we shall presently refer.
6. On the other hand, it is contended by Sri P. Ramachandra Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P. No. 9358/88, and Sri V. R. Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P. No. 8610/88, that the writ petitions as filed are maintainable in law, and that there is no law compelling the petitioners to first surrender themselves to the authority and then alone approach this Court by way of habeas corpus. It is contended that liberty of individual is sacrosanct, and where it is threatened and a person approaches this Court under Art. 226, this Court should not refuse to examine his grievance on any technicality. The orders in these cases are, prima facie, untenable in law, and the facts and grounds upon which the orders are made have no relation to the objects of the enactments. It is submitted that the orders are vitiated by mala fides, inasmuch as the said orders are made by the concerned District Magistrates under political pressure and with a view to wreak political vengeance upon the petitioners. So far as W.P. No. 9358/88 is concerned, Mr. P. Ramachandra Reddy submitted that the order of detention does not even mention that the petitioner had obtained anticipatory bail from the concerned Criminal Court, and that the said order of bail was still extant. This, according to the learned counsel, not only shows non-application of mind on the part of the District Magistrate, but also vitiates the order of detention. Reliance is placed upon a decision of the Supreme Court in this behalf. So far as W.P. 8610/88 is concerned, Mr. V. R. Reddy filed a copy of the grounds of detention before us and asked us to look into the same with a view to satisfy ourselves that ex facie they are not relevant under the Act. He submitted further that he is applying for amendment of the writ petition asking for the quashing of the order of detention. Counsel also relied upon certain decisions which we shall refer to at the appropriate stage.
7. The objection raised by the learned Advocate-General pertains not so much to the realm of power of this Court but to the practice and procedure it should observe in such matters. So far as the question of power is concerned, none can deny the power of this Court to quash an illegal/invalid order of detention, whether by issuing an appropriate writ, order, or direction - by whatever name called. Neither Cls. (4) to (6) of Art. 22, nor the relevant enactments say that the only method of challenging an order of detention is by way of habeas corpus. The power of this Court to quash springs from Art. 226, and not from any other Article of the Constitution, or enactment. Undoubtedly, liberty is the most cherished and most sacrosanct of all fundamental rights guaranteed by our Constitution. As is often said, only a person who is deprived of liberty realizes its value. To protect such a truly basic and inalienable right, the Court would not hesitate to exercise its power, if necessary by overriding all procedural objections and technicalities of law. A person against whom an order of detention is issued can straightway approach this Court, and this Court is not powerless to call upon the State, or the appropriate authority, to produce the order and grounds of detention, examine the same and quash such order if it is found to be illegal or invalid. But all this is in the realm of power, and the power of the Court is not in question. Indeed, in an extraordinary case where it appears that the power under any of these preventive enactments is being used by the State vindictively and in an outrageous fashion, or where the order of detention is ex facie invalid, this Court will certainly interfere, ignoring all technical and procedural objections. But, as we said, the more important aspect is the one relating to the practice and procedure this Court should evolve and follow in such matters, normally speaking. And this procedure and practice has to be evolved and applied not blindly following the precedent, if any, but having regard to the constitutional scheme and giving due regard to the legislative will - whether of Parliament, or Legislature - as expressed in the enactment. Now, we are not unaware of the fact that "preventive detention laws are repugnant to democratic Constitutions and they cannot be found to exist in any of the democratic countries of the world" - as observed by Mahajan, J. in Gopalan's case . We are equally aware of the fact that preventive detention is unknown in U.S.A. and that "it was resorted to in England only during war time" and that "no country in the world", as observed by Mukherjea, J. in Gopalan, "has made this an integral part of their Constitution as has been done in India". Indeed, Mukherjea, J. termed this situation "unfortunate". But we cannot get away from the fact - and saying this gives us no pleasure, we must confess - that our Constitution has recognized and expressly provided for preventive detention. Both the Parliament and the State Legislature are empowered to make laws providing for preventive detention, no doubt subject to the restrictions and safeguards provided by Art. 22. While there was one preventive detention Act in 1950, today there are at least three Central enactments providing for preventive detention, besides several State enactments. Probably this is the response of the Parliament and Legislatures to the growing threats to public order, national economy, and probably public health. The very idea behind preventive detention is to forestall, to pre-empt, the undesirable activity. In a given situation, the State has to act fast and prevent a person from doing a wrong, which would be far more beneficial to public interest than waiting till the act is done and punishing him thereafter. This is the consideration and probably the justification underlying Cls. (4) to (6) of Art. 22, and the several preventive detention enactments made by Parliament and State Legislatures. The Courts cannot disregard this aspect. The very Constitution which has guaranteed several fundamental rights, including individual liberty, and has clothed this Court with extraordinary powers of control and supervision, by Arts. 226 and 227, has, at the same time, recognized the need for preventive detention and has empowered the Parliament and State Legislatures to make laws providing for preventive detention subject, of course, to the prescribed restrictions; (vide Entry 3 in List III - Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution). In such a situation, it is but appropriate and proper that this Court evolves and follows a practice and procedure where it would not, ordinarily, entertain a challenge to a preventive detention unless the person concerned submits himself to the order. This Court would not encourage persons against whom orders of preventive detention are made by the competent authority under a valid enactment, to avoid the process of law and at the same time seek the protection of law from this Court. There is no presumption that any and every order of detention is bad. The normal rule shall therefore be - "surrender to the order first and then approach this Court". Only in extraordinary cases, where it appears that the State is exercising its power under a preventive detention statute for an oblique purpose, or in an outrageous and/or vindictive manner, or where the order of detention is ex facie invalid would this Court depart from this rule. Now, what would be such extraordinary case cannot - and, indeed, should not - be defined or specified. It is better left to the sound judgment and decision of this Court.
8. Apart from the consideration mentioned in the preceding para, there will be a practical difficulty in entertaining such writ petitions. Unless the person is arrested, he would not be served with the order of detention and grounds of detention, and in the absence of order of detention, and particularly the grounds of detention, it would not be possible for this Court to say, whether prima facie or otherwise, that the detention is invalid or illegal. Even for the purpose of entertaining the writ petition, the Court must be satisfied that the order of detention is prima facie illegal and invalid, and that cannot be said without looking into the grounds. Production of the order of detention also would not do, because the order of detention does not contain the grounds, facts and reason for which detention is made. The order merely recites the satisfaction of the detaining authority, as has been the practice, in this State, over the last more than two decades.
9. Having said this, we may now notice the practice this Court has been following hitherto in these matters, and as we shall presently show, the decisions of this Court fully fortify and affirm our view.
10. In W.P. No. 927/1974 disposed of on 22-2-1974, a Bench of this Court comprising Alladi Kuppuswami and Lakshmaiah, JJ. observed thus :
"We do not think this Court would be justified in exercising its jurisdiction under Art. 226 in this case where a person, on whom an order of detention is sought to be served and who is absconding, has filed this writ petition for the issue of a writ of mandamus quashing that order. The proper course for him was to surrender himself and file a writ of habeas corpus ..... Even assuming that such an order was passed in certain other cases, we are not bound by the decision of a single Judge and would not be justified in passing a similar order if we are satisfied that it is not a fit case for granting a writ of mandamus; (per Alladi Kuppuswami, J.) ....."
Lakshmaiah, J. added :
"He who seeks a relief from this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution must conform to law. But he who has chosen to defy law by absconding is not entitled to the relief under Art. 226 of the Constitution ...."
Indeed, it is of interest to note how the matter came up before the Bench. The said writ petition initially came up before a learned single Judge, S. Obul Reddi, J. (as he then was), and it was brought to his notice that two similar writ petitions were admitted and all further proceedings stayed by another learned Judge. Obul Reddi, J. however, was not agreeable to the said course and, accordingly, he directed the matter to be placed before a Bench for decision.
11. In W.P. Nos. 772 and 773 of 1974, disposed of on 7-3-1974, another Division Bench comprising A. Sambasiva Rao and Muktadar, JJ. took the same view. After noting that writ of mandamus lies entirely within the discretion of this Court, the Bench observed :
"Instead of surrendering themselves to the authorities in compliance with the orders dt. 17-9-1973 and filing an application for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioners have prayed for the issue of a writ of mandamus. The idea behind this normal approach is too glaring to be mentioned. The proper course, in the circumstances stated above, would have been for the petitioners to surrender themselves to the authorities in compliance with the detention orders dt. 17-9-1973 and then move this Court for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus. We are supported in our conclusion by the decision of a Bench of this Court in W.P. No. 927/74, dated 22-2-1974 ....."
and then added :
Mr. E. Manohar, the learned advocate for the petitioners, contended that he would endeavour to satisfy this Court that these petitions are maintainable in the circumstances of the case. We are not prepared to encourage him, because we are convinced that when a person is detained under a special Act, the only course open to him is to surrender to the authorities in pursuance of the order of detention and move this Court by a petition for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus. We are not inclined to exercise our discretion in favour of a person who is trying to avoid the due implementation of the legal process ....."
12. A similar view was expressed by another Division Bench, as late as 17-2-1984. P. Ramachandra Raju and R. Jagannadha Rao, JJ. observed in W.P. No. 9756/83 and Writ Appeal No. 1126/83 :
"The proper remedy which may be available to the petitioner is a writ of habeas corpus after the petitioner makes himself available for detention. Without making himself available for detention the petitioner cannot seek either a writ of mandamus or writ of certiorari."
But then it was argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner in that case that the order was mala fide, which he submitted was evident from the circumstances which preceded the issuance of the detention order. It was submitted that the order of detention made by the Government was obliquely motivated. Responding to this argument, the Bench observed :
"It is therefore obligatory on us to ensure the personal liberty of the petitioner, a constitutional right available to him. If the approach is made by this Court in that direction, the petitioner is entitled to have the detention order quashed by either a writ of certiorari, or by a direction in the nature of mandamus, directing the 1st respondent not to subject the petitioner to any detention and compel him to thereafter move for a habeas corpus ....."
The Bench examined the complaint of mala fides and found no substance in it and, accordingly, dismissed the writ petition.
13. To the same effect is the decision of a learned single Judge, P. Rama Rao, J. in B. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P., (1984) 1 APLJ 269, where the learned Judge condemned in strong language persons who avoid the service of detention order, evade detention, and at the same time approach this Court for quashing the order.
14. Mr. P. Ramachandra Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner, placed strong reliance upon a Division Bench judgment of Bombay High Court in Jayantilal Bhagwandas v. State of Maharashtra (1981) 1 Cri LJ 767. In this decision the Bombay High Court approached the question mainly from the stand-point of power. It observed, following an earlier unreported decision of that Court (at pp. 769-70) :
"Article 226 of the Constitution clothes the High Courts with authority to issue to any person or authority throughout the territories in relation to which they exercise jurisdiction, directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warrant to and certiorari for the enforcement of the rights conferred, inter alia, by Art. 21. Art. 226 is couched in language wide enough to protect a person against an illegal invasion of his right to freedom by protecting him while still free and by regaining his freedom for him if he has already been wrongfully detained. We cannot countenance and do not accept the Advocate-General's submission that the High Courts are impotent to give relief against the prospect of illegal detention and must first require the intended detenu to surrender to the illegal detention. We are satisfied that the High Courts may under the provisions of Art. 226 issue a direction, order and writ in the nature of mandamus and/or certiorari quashing an illegal order of detention and may by direction, order and writ in the nature of prohibition enjoin the person threatening the illegal detention from executing the threat."
15. As we have said hereinbefore, there can hardly be any dispute about the power of this Court. The more relevant question is : how should that power be exercised consistent with the constitutional scheme and having due regard to the legislative intent ? This aspect unfortunately does not appear to have been brought to the notice of the learned Judges. The Bench reasoned that if the Court can act on the strength of a mere post-card, it can surely intervene on the strength of a petition. It is true that the Court can act on a mere post-card from a person detained - and this Court has entertained hundreds of such writ petitions on the basis of mere telegrams and letters over the last few years - but, they would be cases where the person is already under detention. We are not aware of any case where the Court acted on the letter or telegram of a person complaining of an order of detention who, at the same time, is avoiding the process of law and evading arrest and detention. We must again qualify that what we are stating is the normal rule. In an extraordinary case this Court shall certainly intervene to uphold the liberty of individuals, ignoring all technicalities and procedural objections.
16. Reference is also made to a Full Bench decision of the Gujarat High Court in Vedprakash v. State, . The Full Bench held that a detenu cannot ordinarily seek a writ of mandamus in a case where he has not surrendered, nor has been served with an order of detention. In such a case, it was held, he cannot ordinarily invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226. But, it was observed, in exceptional cases and in rarest of rare cases where the order of detention appears to be ab initio void, the detenu can invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 even before he surrenders and even before the order of detention is served upon him. The Court, at the same time, indicated certain limitations which the Court should observe in such an exceptional situation. They are : (i) no stay of detention can be granted pending such writ petition; (ii) the Court cannot call upon the State to produce the grounds of detention, nor can it review the same, since such a course would go against the procedure established by law; (iii) the Court will not also investigate the facts of the case, nor look into the grounds at that preliminary stage; (iv) a petition of such nature must come to an end once the respondent states on oath that an order of detention has been validly passed against the person concerned. We must say that the broad principle evolved by the Full Bench accords with our view, though we do not wish to express any opinion on the correctness or advisability of the limitations which the Court has placed upon itself even in an extraordinary case where it chooses to entertain a writ petition from a person who has not surrendered to the order.
17. Now let us examine the writ petitions before us from the stand-point of the rule evolved herein.
18. W.P. No. 8610/1988 : The prayer in this writ petition, which we have set out at the inception of this judgment, is for issuance of an appropriate writ, order or direction restraining the respondents, including the District Magistrate, from detaining the petitioner under A.P. Act I of 1986, on the basis of offences under Crimes Nos. 30, 31, 32 and 33 of 1987/88. Evidently the writ petition seeks to restrain a statutory authority from exercising the power vested in him by law; such a writ petition would not ordinarily lie. The presumption of the petitioner that an order of detention is going to be made against him, based upon the offences registered under Crimes Nos. 30, 31, 32 and 33 of 1987/88 also does not appear to be correct, as would be evident from a perusal of the grounds of detention. Not only do the grounds refer to Crimes Nos. 31, 32 and 33 of 1987/88, they also refer to offences under Crimes Nos. 20/88, 73/88, and 17 of 1984/85. Moreover, as urged by the learned Advocate-General, an order of detention was made even before the writ petition was filed, which means that the prayer in the writ petition has become infructuous. We must, however, make it clear that it is neither the defect in the prayer nor the fact that an order of detention was made even prior to the filing of the writ petition, that is dissuading us from entertaining it. The real and substantive reason therefore is that we do not find any extraordinary or special reasons in this case to depart from the normal rule. The petitioner has, no doubt, alleged mala fides, but we find that the allegations in that behalf are very vague. Firstly, it is submitted that he was elected as the Chairman of the Cuddapah Municipal Council, as an independent candidate, defeating both Telugu-Desam and Congress (I) candidates. It is alleged that before the petitioner filed his nomination, "the leaders of the Telugu Desam Party in the district" tried to persuade him to contest as their party-candidate which he is said to have politely declined. The names of the persons who approached him are not mentioned. Then again, it is stated that even after the election "the Telugu Desam leaders including the local M.L.A. have been exerting pressure" upon him to join their party, or at least to support them in local problems. Here again the names of the Telugu Desam leaders are not mentioned. Though it is mentioned that the local M.L.A. is bringing pressure upon the police and the Excise Authorities, this allegation is again too general in nature. Neither the name of the 'local M.L.A.' is given nor is he impleaded 'eo nomine' as a respondent. We find that not only excise offences were registered against the petitioner after the Telugu Desam Party came into power, but number of cases were also registered against him even during the earlier years when Congress (I) party was in power. The number of cases registered against the petitioner are too many and are spread over a period of about 14 years. We are, therefore, unable to attach any significance to the plea of mala fides. This opinion we are expressing merely to show that this is not an extraordinary, or special case warranting this Court to depart from the normal rule, and is not meant as a reflection upon any of the grounds or reasons which may be available to the petitioner, as and when the validity of his detention is examined on merits. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed strong reliance upon the circumstance that in November 1987 the petitioner was summoned to the Police Station for taking his photographs, which attempt was dropped later, after it was questioned in this Court. It is really un-understandable as to why the petitioner was proposed to be summoned to Police Station for taking his photographs when he was a fairly well known figure in that town, being the Chairman of the Municipal Council. But that circumstance, in our opinion, does not establish that the entire administrative machinery is being misused by the local M.L.A. who, it is said, happens to be a Cabinet Minister, to hound the petitioners. It is not as if the petitioner is an important leader of a political party opposed to the Ruling Party. There is no allegation that the Collector and District Magistrate has lent herself as a willing tool to the alleged machination of the said local M.L.A. Once we are of the opinion that there are no extraordinary or special reasons to depart from the normal rule, we will not look into or examine the relevance or correctness of the grounds as we would do in a writ of habeas corpus.
19. W.P. No. 8610/1988, accordingly, fails and is dismissed. No costs.
20. W.P. No. 9358 of 1988 : In this case, the petitioner has neither been served with the order of detention, nor the grounds of detention. He has no doubt produced a copy of the order of detention. (It is stated that the said copy was obtained from the file in which proceedings under S. 7 of the Act and S. 82 of the Cr.P.C. were taken against the petitioner). Be that as it may, here too we do not find any special reasons warranting departure from the normal rule. The petitioner herein is detained on the ground that he is acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community, within the meaning of S. 3(1) of the Central Act 7 of 1980. Even according to the petitioner's own submissions, certain stocks of edible oils and oil-seeds were seized from him on 5-4-1988; that proceedings under S. 6-A of the Essential Commodities Act were taken in that behalf, and that the appropriate authority has already directed confiscation of about 1/3 of the stock seized. It is stated that an appeal is preferred and is now pending against the order of confiscation. This fact would itself militate against the petitioner's plea that there is no prima facie material to show that the petitioner is acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of essential supplies.
21. Mr. Ramachandra Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that the grounds upon which detention has been ordered are not at all relevant or permissible under the Act. He contended that taking all the grounds alleged against the detenu as correct, still no case is made out for detaining the petitioner. We are afraid we cannot scrutinize this argument for the simple reason that the grounds of detention are not before us, nor are they available to the petitioner. It is, therefore, not possible for the petitioner to say on what grounds he has been detained he can only surmise about them. But we cannot act upon such surmises. We therefore, desist from expressing any opinion upon the question whether the grounds upon which the petitioner has been detained are relevant, and are valid.
22. Learned counsel then argued that the order of detention does not even show that the petitioner had been granted anticipatory bail by the Court, and that no effort was made by the authorities to even apply for cancellation of the bail. Learned counsel submitted that this fact must be mentioned in the order itself, and the failure to do so vitiates the order of detention. Strong reliance is placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Anant v. State of Maharashtra, . We are afraid the said decision does not support the learned counsel's proposition. It was an appeal from a decision of the Bombay High Court in a writ of habeas corpus. The following observations are relied upon (at p. 138 of AIR) : (at p. 32 of Cri LJ) :
"The one contention strongly pressed before us by the petitioner's counsel is that the detaining authority was not made aware at the time the detention order was made that the detenu had moved applications for bail in the three pending cases and he was enlarged on bail on 13-1-1986, 14-1-1986 and 15-1-1986. We have gone through the detention order carefully. There is absolutely no mention in the order about the fact that the petitioner was an undertrial prisoner, that he was arrested in connection with the three cases, that applications for bail were pending and that he was released on three successive days in the three cases. This indicates a total absence of application of mind on the part of detaining authority while passing the order of detention ....."
In that case the Court did not consider whether the said facts should be mentioned in the order of detention itself, and whether it would not be sufficient if these facts are mentioned in the grounds of detention. Therefore, the said observations cannot be understood as laying down that all the said facts should be mentioned in the order of detention itself.
23. This petitioner too had alleged that the order of detention is the result of political pressure brought by the Telugu Desam Government upon the Collector and District Magistrate. We, however, find that this allegation is too vague to merit any consideration. The allegation is that the petitioner's family (T.G.L. family) has always been supporters of Congress (I) Party, that the petitioner's first cousin was the Chairman of Zilla Parishad, Kurnool, until 1985, and that a senior paternal uncle of his was also a M.L.A. from this district. It is alleged that the business and political rivals of the petitioner's family have brought about his detention with a view to settle political scores. It is not stated in what manner would the detention of the petitioner enhance the prospects of Ruling Party, nor the names or particulars of the alleged political and business rivals are mentioned. We, therefore, do not find any special reasons to depart from the normal rule in this case as well.
24. The writ petition, accordingly, fails and is dismissed. No costs.
25. We make it clear that any observations made herein will not stand in the way of the petitioners if and when they challenge their detention in an appropriate proceeding.
26. Petition dismissed.