Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Charan Singh vs G. Vittal Reddy And Anr. on 7 March, 2003
Equivalent citations: 2003(4)ALD183
Author: R. Subhash Reddy
Bench: R. Subhash Reddy
JUDGMENT G. Biskhapathy, J.
1. All these appeals were filed by the workmen against the orders passed by the learned Single Judge in the appeals filed against the orders of the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation. Since common question of law is involved in all these Appeals, they are disposed of by this common order.
2. In a lorry accident that took place, several workmen including the crew of the lorry sustained injuries. Since the accident had taken place out of and in the course of employment of the workmen, claims were laid before the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Nizamabad, who was designated as the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. Evidence was adduced by the workmen concerned. Not only the workmen were examined but the doctor who had issued Disability Certificate was also examined. The learned Commissioner relying on the evidence of the workmen and also the medical evidence coupled with the certificate of disability, allowed the claims fixing various percentages of disability depending on the nature of injuries sustained by them.
3. Against those orders of Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, the Insurance Company carried the matter in appeal before this Court. The learned Single Judge after hearing the batch of appeals, found fault with the order of the Commissioner on the ground that the doctor who was examined by the workmen-claimants was not the doctor who had treated the workmen, and, therefore, even though the matter required remand, reduced the compensation to 50% and allowed the appeals filed by the Insurance Company to that extent. Aggrieved by the said order of the learned Single Judge, the present appeals under Letters Patent have been filed.
4. The learned Counsel for the appellant-claimants submits that the order of the learned Single Judge is wholly illegal and contrary to law. The learned Judge failed to take into consideration the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act relating to assessment of compensation under Section 4 and that the finding of learned Single Judge that the doctor who treated the workmen ought to have been examined for assessing the proper disability with reference to the medical evidence is not correct and the same is liable to be set aside.
5. Learned Counsel for the respondents submits that the order of the learned Single Judge is based on consent and concession made by both the Counsel for parties and that the learned Judge was inclined to remand the matter for fresh consideration as the doctor who treated workmen ought to be examined. Therefore, the learned Counsel submits that the order as passed by the learned Single Judge is quite legal and valid and same needs no interference by this Court.
6. It is not in dispute that the accidents had taken place and the workmen employed on the lorries received several injuries. Accordingly claims were made by them depending on the injuries vis-a-vis the loss of earning capacity. Before the Commissioner, the injured workmen as well as doctor were examined and loss of disabilities vis-a-vis loss of earning capacity was assessed on the basis of the evidence adduced before the Commissioner.
7. The question that calls for consideration is whether the doctor who has treated the injured workmen has to be necessarily examined before the Commissioner for assessing the compensation under the provisions of the Act?
8. For this purpose, it is necessary to refer to Section 4 of the Workmen's Compensation Act wherein the compensation was required to be assessed in cases of death, total disablement and also permanent partial disablement. Section 4, which is relevant, is extracted below:
"4. Amount of compensation :--(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the amount of compensation shall be as follows, namely:-
(a) Where death results from the injury an amount equal to fifty per cent of the monthly wages of the deceased workman multiplied by the relevant factor; or an amount of fifty thousand rupees, whichever is more;
(b) Where permanent total disablement results from the injury.
An amount equal to sixty par cent of the monthly wages of the injured workman multiplied by the relevant factor; or An amount of sixty thousand rupees whichever is more;
Explanation I :--For the purpose of Clause (a) and Clause (b) "relevant factor" in relation to a workman means the factor specified in the second column of Schedule IV against the entry in the first column of that Schedule specifying the number of years which are the same as the completed years of the age of the workman on his last birthday immediately preceding the date on which the compensation fell due:
Explanation II :--Where the monthly wages of a workman exceed two thousand rupees, his monthly wages for the purpose of Clause (a) and (b) shall be deemed to be two thousand rupees only,
(c) Where permanent partial disablement results from the injury
(i) in the case of an injury specified in Part II of Schedule 1, such percentage of the compensation which would have been payable in the case of pemanent total disablement as is specified therein as being the the percentaga of the loss of earning capacity caused by that injury, and
(ii) in the case of an injury not specifisd in Schedule I, such percen-tage of the compensation payable in the case of permanent total disable' ment, as is proportionate to the loss of earning capacity (as assessed by the qualified medical practitioner) permanently caused by the injury, Explanation I :--Where more injuries than one are caused by the same accident, the amount of compensation payable under this head shall be aggregated but not so in any case as to exceed the amount which would have been payable if permanent total disablement had resulted from the injuries.
Explanation II :--In assessing the loss of earning capacity for the purposes of Sub-clause (ii), the qualified medical practitioner shall have due regard to the percentages of loss of earning capacity, in relation to different injuries specified in Schedule I;
(d) Where temporary disablement, whether total or partial resultsfrom the injury A half'monthly payment of the sum equivalent to twenty-five per cent of monthly wages of the workman to paid in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (2).
(1-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1) while fixing the amount of compensation payable to a workman in respect of an accident occurred outside India, the Commissioner shall take into account the amount of compensation, if any, awarded to such workman in accordance with the law of the country in which the accident occurred and shall reduce the amount fixed by him by the amount of compensation awarded to the workman in accordance with the law of that country.
(2) The half-monthly payment referred to in Clause (d) of Sub-section (1) shall be payable on the sixteenth day--
(i) from the date of disablement where such disablement lasts for a period of twenty-eight days or more, or
(ii) after the expiry of a waiting period of three days from the date of disablement where such disablement lasts for a period of less than twenty-eight days; and thereafter half-monthly during the disablement or during a period of five years whichever period is shorter.
Provided that--
(a) there shall be deducted from any lump sum or half-monthly payments to which the workman is entitled the amount of any payment or allowance which the workman has received from the employer by way of compensation during the period of disablement pior to the receipt of such lump sum or of the first half-monthly payment, as the case may be; and
(b) no half-monthly payment shall in any case exceed the amount, if any, by which half the amount of the monthly wages of the workman before the accident exceeds half the amount of such wages which he is earning after the accident.
Explanation :--Any payment or allowance which the workman has received from the employer towards his medical treatment shall not be deemed to be a payment or allowance received by him by way of compensation within the meaning of Clause (a) of the proviso.
(3) On the ceasing of the disablement before the date on which any half-monthly payment falls due, there shall be payable in respect of that half-month a sum proportionate to the duration of the disablement in that half-month.
(4) If the injury of the workman results in his death, the employer shall, in addition to the compensation under Sub-section (1) deposit with the Commissioner a sum of one thousand rupees for payment of the same to the eldest surviving dependant of the workman towards the expenditure of the funeral of such workman or where the workman did not have a dependant or was not living with his dependant at the time of his death to the person who actually incurred such expenditure."
9. We are now concerned with permanent partial disablement as contained in Clause (c) of Section 4(1). The requirement in case of non-schedule injury as contemplated by the statute is that the assessment of the percentage of permanent total disablement proportionate to the loss of earning capacity has to be made by the qualified medical practitioner, and, in the instant case, it is not disputed that the doctor who was examined on behalf of the claimants was not qualified medical practitioner and in fact, it is accepted that he falls under this category of qualified medical practitioner. If that is to be taken into consideration, whether the evidence of the doctor who had treated the workmen concerned, can be treated as the essential requirement keeping in view the above provision. As it is, Workmen's Compensation Act is a beneficial legislation enacted for protecting the interests of Workmen who are the victims of accidents during the course of their employment and, therefore, clear-cut method has been stipulated in the Act itself. In case of scheduled injuries, even in the absence of any medical evidence, the compensation will automatically follow as per the schedule to the said Act. But, the difficulty comes only in the case of non-scheduled injury in respect of which, assessment has to be made by the qualified medical practitioner as contemplated under the Act. From this, it cannot be concluded that the qualified medical practitioner should be only the medical practitioner who has treated the workmen concerned. If that is to be accepted, it leads to several anomalies. The doctor who treated the workmen may not be available for various reasons and the workmen cannot be expected to stay at a particular station forever. Further, the permanent disability cannot be assessed immediately on the next day of the sustaining the injuries. In order to assess the permanent disability, naturally, wounds have to be healed so as to make assessment of the permanent disability in relation to loss of earning capacity. The learned Single Judge has recorded finding in his order that the Doctor who treated the workmen ought to have been examined and the certificate issued by the Doctor after lapse of time ought not to have been relied on. But under the provisions of the Act and rules made thereunder, there is no such requirement to prove the disability by examining the very same doctor who treated the workmen and to obtain such certificate from the very same doctor.
10. We do not like to burden this judgment with various principles on interpretation of statutes. But, however, the basic principles governing the interpretation of statute can be succinctly traced out.
11. It is a settled proposition that the words in statute are first understood in their natural, ordinary or proper sense and phrases and sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless it leads to absurdity or unless something in the context or in the object of statute suggest contrary. The rule of literal construction to be upheld unless it leads to absurdity; the Supreme Court in Jugalkishore Saraf v. Raw Cotton Company Limited, AIR 1955 SC 376, observed thus:
"The cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statutes literally, that is, by giving to the words their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning, the Court may adopt the same. But, if no such alternative construction is possible, the Court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation. In the present case the literal construction leads to no apparent absurdity and therefore, there can be no compelling reason for departing from that golden rule of construction."
In Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan, , it was held thus:
"The words used in the material provisions of the statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy or object of the act can legitimately arise. Therefore, the intention of the Legislature has always to be gathered by was used by it, giving to the words their plain, normal, grammatical meaning and if the strict grammatical interpretation gives rise to an absurdity or inconsistency such interpretation should be discarded and an interpretation which will give effect to the purpose the Legislature may reasonably be considered to have had, will be put on the words, if necessary even by modification of the language used." (See; Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gamma of of Vedum Vasco De Gama, AIR 1990 SC 981).
12. The justification of the rule that words are to be understood and their natural, ordinary and popular sense it also well expressed by Justice Frankfurter in (322 U.S. 607) observed thus:
"After all legislation when not expressed in technical terms is addressed to common run of men and is therefore, to be understood according to sense of the thing, as the ordinary man has a right to rely on ordinary words addressed."
Thus, applying the above principles, it is needless to state that the words used by the Legislature in Section 4, are quite plain and give no room for ambiguity. We are not inclined to go into the aspect as to the interpretation of statute, in case of ambiguising wording or the application of principle of casus omisus.
13. It is also pertinent to state that the Workmen's Compensation Act is a beneficial piece of legislation conceived in the interest of the workmen, who are the victims of accidents arising out of and in the course of employment and the Act provides for cheaper and quicker disposal relating to compensation through Special Tribunals. The procedure as contemplated under part-V of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder are summary in nature. The Commissioner while passing the Orders shall record concisely a judgment, giving findings on each issue and reasons for such finding. Under Schedule-I, a legal fiction is created by the Legislature wherein injuries referred to in the said Schedule are deemed to result in permanent disablement vis-a-vis the percentage of loss of earning capacity. Thus, the statute itself simplified the process of calculation of loss of earning capacity with reference to the scheduled injuries. While, in case of non-scheduled injuries resulting in permanent partial or total disablement, the assessment by qualified Medical Practitioner is necessary as required under Section 4(c)(ii) of the Act. The words "Qualified Medical Practitioner" is also defined under Section 2(1)(i) which means "any person registered under any Central Act, Provincial Act or any Act of the Legislature of a State providing for the maintenance of a register of medical practitioners, or, in any area where no such last mentioned Act is in force, any person declared by the State Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, to be a qualified medical practitioner for the purpose of this Act.
14. Thus, when the Section is very clear and specific regarding the assessment to be made by a qualified medical practitioner, there is no reason to import additional meaning so as to mean that the qualified medical practitioner should be one, who has treated the injured workman. A provision in a beneficial piece of legislation has to be interpreted in such a way as to assure the benefit and not to deny the benefit that is sought to be conferred by statute. Thus, if Section 4 is read with reference to Schedule-I, the inevitable conclusion is that in case of non-scheduled injuries, the percentage of total disablement as is proportionate to the loss of earning capacity has to be assessed by the qualified medical practitioner and it is not necessary that the Doctor, who treated the workman should be the only assessing authority. It is also not in dispute that the doctor, who was examined before the Commissioner fell within the definition of qualified medical practitioner.
15. Under those circumstances, we are of the considered view that Section 4(1)(c) does not stipulate a requirement of assessment by the medical practitioner who had treated the workmen concerned at the first instance. It is always open for the qualified medical practitioner to assess the loss of disability vis-a-vis loss of earning capacity with reference to the injuries sustained by him and if the employer or the Insurance Company was not satisfied with the assessment made by the medical practitioner, whose evidence was produced, contra evidence ought to have been adduced by the Insurance Company to rebut or impeach the evidence of the medical officer adduced on behalf of the workmen. In the absence of such evidence, we cannot find fault with the order of the learned Commissioner.
16. The learned Counsel for the Insurance Company submits that the evidence of the doctor ought not to have been relied on as the certificate issued by him was tainted with extraneous considerations and virtually she submits that fraud was played by the claimants in collusion with the doctor. But, this contention cannot be accepted under any circumstances. If fraud is alleged, it is for the employer and the Insurance Company to plead and prove the same and it cannot be decided on oral submissions. Admittedly, in the instant case, no such plea was raised nor any evidence was adduced before the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation. As can be seen from the order of the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, neither the oral evidence nor any documentary evidence was adduced, except filing the Insurance Policy. In such a case, to find fault with the workmen that they colluded with doctor to get maximum compensation, at this belated stage, would be nothing but doing substantial injustice to the workmen. Thus, viewed from any angle, we are not impressed by the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the Insurance Company. Under these circumstances, the orders of the learned Single Judge are not sustainable in law. Accordingly, they are set aside and the order passed by the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation is restored.
17. All the Letters Patent Appeals are allowed. No costs.