Madras High Court
Arijit Bagchi vs State Through on 15 December, 2017
Author: M.Dhandapani
Bench: M.Dhandapani
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT DATED: 15.12.2017 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE M.DHANDAPANI Crl.O.P.(MD)Nos.1883 of 2005, 673 of 2006 and 3013 of 2007 and M.P.(MD)Nos.1 of 2007 & 1 of 2009 in Crl.O.P.(MD)No.3013 of 2007 and Crl.M.P.(MD)No.407 of 2006 in Crl.O.P.(MD)No.673 of 2006 Crl.O.P.(MD)No.1883 of 2005: 1.Arijit Bagchi 2.G.S.Ravikumar 3.T.Sreenivasaghan ... Petitioners Versus 1.State Through The Inspector of Police, Karungal Police Station, Kanyakumari District. 2.Vaigundarajan, S/o.Subbaiah Nadar ... Respondents [R2 impleaded as per order of this Court, dated 24.06.2016 made in M.P.(MD)No.1 of 2009 in Crl.O.P.(MD)No.1883 of 2005] PRAYER: Criminal Original Petition is filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to call for the records and quash the proceedings in C.C.No.449 of 2004 on the file of the Principal District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate Court, Eraniel. For Petitioners : Mr.Krishna Srinivasan for Mr.C.Muthusaravanan ^For R1 : Mr.K.Anbarasan Government Advocate (Criminal side) For R2 : Mr.AR.L.Sundaresan Senior Counsel for Mr.R.Jegadeesh Pandian Crl.O.P.(MD)No.673 of 2006: 1.K.P.Sreenivasan 2.T.Sreenivasaghan 3.Ajit Bagchi 4.Jose Mathew ... Petitioners Vs. 1.State Through The Inspector of Police, Karungal Police Station, Kanyakumari District. 2.Valam Bellarmin, S/o.Yesudason ... Respondents [R2 impleaded as per order of this Court, dated 17.04.2016 made in Crl.M.P.(MD)No.2353 of 2006] PRAYER: Criminal Original Petition is filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to call for the records and quash the proceedings in P.R.C.No.12 of 2005 on the file of the Principal District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate Court, Eraniel, insofar as the petitioners/Accused 2 to 5 are concerned. For Petitioners : Mr.Krishna Srinivasan for Mr.C.Muthusaravanan For R1 : Mr.K.Anbarasan Government Advocate (Criminal side) For R2 : Mr.R.Anand for Mr.K.Anna Crl.O.P.(MD)No.3013 of 2007: R.B.Narendran ... Petitioner Vs. 1.State Through The Inspector of Police, Karungal Police Station, Kanyakumari District. 2.Subash Babu, S/o.Sivanadimai ... Respondents [R2 impleaded as per order of this Court, dated 24.06.2016 made in M.P.(MD)No.3 of 2007 in Crl.O.P.(MD)No.3017 of 2007] PRAYER: Criminal Original Petition is filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to call for the records and quash the proceedings in C.C.No.450 of 2004 on the file of the Principal District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate Court, Eraniel. For Petitioner : Mr.Krishna Srinivasan for Mr.C.Muthusaravanan For R1 : Mr.K.Anbarasan Government Advocate (Criminal side) For R2 : Mr.AR.L.Sundaresan Senior Counsel for Mr.R.Jegadeesh Pandian :COMMON ORDER
These Criminal Original Petitions have been filed by the Officials of Indian Rare Earths Limited [hereinafter referred to as 'IREL'], which was incorporated on August 18, 1950, with its first unit - Rare Earths Division (RED), Aluva, in Kerala. It became a full-fledged Government of India Undertaking under the administrative control of Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) in year 1963 and has taken over several companies, engaged in mining and separation of beach sand minerals in southern part of the country, by establishing two more Divisions, one at Chavara, Kerala and the other at Manavalakurichi (MK), Tamil Nadu.
2.For the sake of convenience, the petitioners, who are arrayed as accused in C.C.No.449 of 2004, P.R.C.No.12 of 2005 and C.C.No.450 of 2004 respectively and were working under different levels in IREL are hereinafter referred to as 'the Accused', the first respondent/Law Enforcing Agency are hereinafter referred to as 'the State' and the second respondent/de-facto complainants are hereinafter referred to as 'the complainants'.
3.Crl.O.P.(MD)No.1883 of 2005 has been filed by the petitioners/A2 to A4 [Crime No.461 of 2004 and C.C.No.449 of 2004], viz., (i) Arijit Bagchi, who was working as Deputy General Manager (Mining) and relieved from service on 31.03.2005 under Voluntary Retirement Scheme; (ii) G.S.Ravikumar, who was working as Senior Officer (Mines Survey) and relieved from service on 29.03.2004 under Voluntary Retirement Scheme; and (iii)T.Sreenivasaghan, who was working as Senior Manager (Mining) and relieved from service on 08.12.2014 on resignation, seeking quash of the proceedings in C.C.No.449 of 2004 on the file of the Principal District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate Court, Eraniel.
4.Crl.O.P.(MD)No.673 of 2006 has been filed by the petitioners/A2 to A5 [Crime No.401 of 2004 and P.R.C.No.12 of 2005], viz., (i) K.P.Sreenivasan, who was working as Chief General Manager and relieved from service on 30.09.2006 on reaching the age of superannuation; (ii) T.Sreenivasaghan, whose particulars have been mentioned above; (iii) Ajit Bagchi, whose particulars have been mentioned above; and (iv) Jose Mathew, who was working as Manager (Mining) and relieved from service on 01.06.2006 on resignation, seeking quash of the proceedings in P.R.C.No.12 of 2005 on the file of the Principal District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate Court, Eraniel.
5.Crl.O.P.(MD)No.3013 of 2007 has been filed by the petitioner/A1, viz., R.B.Narendran, who is working as Chief Manager (Production), seeking quash of the proceedings in C.C.No.450 of 2004 on the file of the Principal District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate Court, Eraniel.
6.K.P.Sreenivasan, who is the first petitioner in Crl.O.P.(MD)No.673 of 2006, was already discharged from the proceedings in C.C.No.449 of 2004 by this Court vide order dated 18.04.2005, in Crl.O.P.(MD)No.1882 of 2005, on the ground that at the relevant point of time, he was employed in Kerala Branch and was not available at the scene of occurrence.
7.In all the three cases, it is alleged that the accused persons with the help of their men were willfully engaged in stealing sand minerals from the patta land without the consent of the complainant in Cr.No.461 of 2004 and C.C.No.449 of 2004. On 20.12.2002 at about 3 p.m., at the instigation of A1, A2 to A4 along with A5 to A29 formed themselves into an unlawful assembly with deadly weapons to commit theft of sand minerals and intentionally trespassed into the patta land of M/s.V.V.Mineral Company. A2 instigated and directed A5 to A13 to commit theft of sand minerals in S.Nos.178/8A and 8B. A3 instigated and directed A14 to A21 to commit theft of sand minerals in S.No.178/10. A4 instigated and directed A22 to A29 to commit theft of sand minerals in S.No.178/11. Accordingly, A5 to A29 armed with spades willfully quarried away 200 loads of valuable sand minerals from the abovesaid patta lands of the company and kept the stolen sands worth Rs.10,00,000/- in their patta land for unloading operation to their company. A similar type of complaint was given in other two cases.
8.The F.I.R. in Crime No.4 of 2003 relating to Crl.O.P.(MD)No.1883 of 2005 was registered on 03.01.2003 and the charge sheet was filed on 07.04.2004, which was taken on file in C.C.No.449 of 2004. The F.I.R. in Crime No.337 of 2004 relating to Crl.O.P.(MD)No.673 of 2006 was registered on 25.06.2004 and the charge sheet was filed on 07.12.2004, which was taken on file in P.R.C.No.12 of 2005. The F.I.R. in Crime No.472 of 2003 relating to Crl.O.P.(MD)No.3013 of 2007 was registered on 22.11.2003 and the charge sheet was filed on 07.12.2004, which was taken on file in C.C.No.450 of 2004. Challenging the abovesaid three charge sheets, the present Criminal Original Petitions have been filed.
9.Mr.Krishna Srinivasan, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners/accused came out from different parts of India for their employment to the new place, like Manavalakurichi and they worked under different levels in Manavalakurichi in order to procure rare minerals for the purpose of utilizing it in the process of atomic energy generation. For that purpose, without any complaints whatsoever, they worked for more than 20 years in that particular place. Except the above said complaints, there is no other complaint either by private persons or by the Department, pending against them. The complainants entered into the mineral activities in the year 1980, in the said place, after purchasing some lands from the particular place. Initially, after purchasing the property in nearby IREL lands, they applied for licence to the District Administration. The Company also made objection, since the IREL Officials were engaged in procurement of rare minerals in the particular area and if the private mineral operator is allowed to operate in the particular area, it will affect their mining operations. In that situation, there was a dispute regarding the mining operation.
10.The learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that the petitioners' Company is engaged in Mining, Processing, Research and Development and Chemical Processing of mineral deposits with respect to prescribed substances/atomic minerals, including highly radioactive Monazite used for nuclear projects in the Country. The Manavalakurichi Unit of IREL was established by the Government of India, in the District of Kanyakumari, to provide employment for the people in and around the said area and the Manavalakurichi Plant and Mines is the second largest mining establishment in Tamil Nadu and Kerala. IREL Company in the course of its business applied for several mining leases to the Government of Tamil Nadu in fresh areas in Midalam and Manavalakurichi Villages. Pursuant to such applications, the Government of Tamil Nadu was pleased to grant the following Mining Leases in favour of IREL Company.
(i) G.O.Ms.No.3707, dated 01.11.1968 ? Manavalakurichi : 17.44 Acres (7.06 HA) Vattakottai 41.46 acres (16.78 HA). Subsequently, renewed vide G.O.3(D)No.6, dated 28.01.2000, for Manavalakurichi Beach (7.06 HA).
(ii) G.O.Ms.No.1085, dated 21.09.1977, Midalam and Keez Middalam area 79.56 acres (29.78.12 HA)
(iii) G.O.Ms.No.1114, dated 12.08.1981, Manavalakurichi, Lekshmipuram & Colachel Villages 348.83 acres (141.22.69 HA)
(iv) G.O.3(D) No.74, dated 17.06.1998, in Manavalakurichi Village (14.84 Ha)
(v) G.O.3(D) No.6, dated 28.01.2000, in Chinnavilai Village (7.06 Ha).
Besides obtaining Mining Leases, IREL also acquired lands in and around Manavalakurichi under the Provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, for the purpose of Mining and Mineral Processing.
11.The learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that IREL in order to cater to the increasing demands and to sustain their mining operations, requested the Atomic Minerals Directorate of Exploration and Research (AMD), a Division of DAE to conduct Geological Exploration in the larger extent of lands in Midalam Village. Atomic Minerals Directorate of Exploration and Research also agreed to conduct Geological Exploration on behalf of IREL on payment basis. Further, based on the geological Exploration Report of the AMD, IREL applied to the Government of Tamil Nadu for several fresh mining leases and some of them are still pending with the Government of Tamil Nadu, which are as follows:
(i) Mining Lease Application, dated 03.02.2000, for an area of 133.80 Ha in Ezhudesam Village, Vilavancode Taluk, Kanyakumari District and subsequently, reduced by IREL to 88.65 Ha.
(ii) Mining Lease Application dated 29.09.2000, for an area of 321.07 Ha in Keez Midalam, Midalam and Keez Kulam Village of Vilavancode Taluk, Kanyakumari District.
12.The learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that M/s.V.V.Minerals had also applied for fresh mining lease for 3.63 HA in Mel Middalam Village, which is a part of fresh mining lease application of IREL. However, the Government of Tamil Nadu on 10.03.2004 had granted mining lease to the said M/s.V.V.Minerals to an extent of 3.63 HA in Midalam Village, without considering the application of IREL, Manavalakurichi. Hence, IREL had challenged the said order by filing a Revision Petition before the Tribunal (Mines) on 20.04.2004 and the Tribunal (Mines) was pleased to grant stay of the operation of the said lease granted to M/s.V.V.Minerals on 26.05.2004. The petitioners are not traversing the further proceedings pursued by IREL and M/s.V.V.Minerals after the said Revision Petition was allowed in favour of IREL as the same are not relevant.
13.The learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that to the best knowledge of the petitioners, M/s.V.V.Minerals are not entitled to mine in Manavalakurichi and surrounding areas. Because of the inability to mine in the mineral rich areas of Manavalakurichi, in spite of having acquired the lands at huge costs, M/s.V.V.Minerals and its owners were frustrated and the said frustration forced them to foist several cases against the IREL and its Officials including the petitioners alleging grave charges against them. Further, M/s.V.V.Minerals started illicit mining without valid lease and licence, not only in their areas, but also in the areas leased to IREL. In this regard, IREL immediately wrote a letter to all the authorities concerned and the Central Government, through DAE, has also written a letter to the Home Secretary to take action against M/s.V.V.Minerals and their employees. Since the petitioners have not yielded to the pressure mounted by the complainants, the complainants' henchmen started threatening them by making frequent phone calls by adopting illegal tactics and also prevented them from discharging their official duties. Accordingly, they repeatedly sent petitions to the State Law Enforcing Agency as well as the District Administration in order to protect the interest of the IREL Company as well as to safeguard them from the private mining operators. Thereafter, in order to make some cases in favour of the complainants, they filed W.P.No.981 of 2004 before the Principal Seat of this Court seeking police protection for fencing the lands owned by M/s.V.V.Minerals in and around Manavalakurichi. In the said Writ Petition, an interim order was passed by the learned Single Judge of the Hon'ble Principal Seat of this Court on 27.01.2004 permitting M/s.V.V.Minerals to fence its own properties. Aggrieved over the same, the petitioners Company ? IREL preferred W.A.No.873 of 2004 and obtained an order of stay on 10.03.2004 and on 19.01.2005, the said writ appeal was allowed and W.P.No.981 of 2004 filed by M/s.V.V.Minerals seeking police protection for fencing their own lands was dismissed. The idea behind their threatening the Officials and filing cases against the IREL Officials is to procure more minerals from the coastal area.
14.The learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that at the relevant point of time since the complainants carried out illegal mining operation, the local residents viz., local fishermen objected to sand mining activities of the complainants and they also made a protest. In order to implicate these petitioners, the complainants foisted false cases against the petitioners. Since the petitioners were employees of the Government of India Undertaking, they do not have any intention to commit the theft; or to indulge in any illegal activities; or to engage the local persons to commit the crime as against the complainants.
15.The learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that the petitioners came from different parts of India and they do not have any knowledge about the local topography. The cases were foisted right from 03.01.2003 upto 25.06.2004. Within 18 months, three F.I.Rs. were registered against the petitioners in order to prevent the petitioners from performing their official duty and to create panic among the Government Officials, paving way to the complainants to do their mining activities in the particular area. Admittedly, there is no intention or instigation on the part of the petitioners to instigate the other persons to commit the theft in the particular area and hence, the complaints have not made out any prima facie case. Therefore, the petitioners are entitled to approach this Court by invoking the inherent jurisdiction available under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
16.The learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that the very interesting point in these cases is that A1, who was arrayed as an accused in Crime No.4 of 2003, at the relevant point of time, was not appointed as an employee in Manavalakurichi Village. He was an employee in Chavara, Kerala Unit. After perusing the entire records, this Court, by order dated 18.04.2005, allowed Crl.O.P.(MD)No.1882 of 2005 and discharged A1 from the charges which were pending against him in C.C.No.449 of 2004. That itself would go to show that without any application of mind, all the accused persons were implicated in the false cases at the instigation of the complainants by the State Law Enforcing Agency.
17.The learned counsel for the petitioners further urged this Court that the State Law Enforcing Agency itself decided after verification that the entire case was foisted against the Officials of IREL. Accordingly, they decided to withdraw the criminal cases launched against the accused persons and thereby, the Government passed G.O.Ms.No.1496, Home (SC) Department, dated 24.10.2007 and requested the Public Prosecutor/Assistant Public Prosecutor, who is incharge of that cases, to file a petition under Section 321 Cr.P.C. before the competent Court to withdraw the criminal prosecution launched against the IREL Officials. Based on the said Government Order, the Director General of Police, addressed a letter, dated 12.11.2007, to the Superintendent of Police, Kanyakumari District, directing him to address the Public Prosecutor/Assistant Public Prosecutor in-charge of the cases to withdraw the cases and send report of the compliance to Chief Officials at the earliest. Accordingly, the Assistant Director of Prosecution (Incharge), Eraniel, Kanyakumari District, filed petitions in C.M.P.Nos.5347, 5349 and 5351 of 2007 in C.C.Nos.449 and 450 of 2004 and P.R.C.No.12 of 2005 respectively under Section 321 Cr.P.C. before the Principal District Munsif- cum-Judicial Magistrate Court, Eraniel. On 19.12.2008, the learned Principal District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate, Eraniel, rejected the request made by the learned Assistant Director of Prosecution on the ground that the State has no right to decide the cases and the reasons given by the learned Assistant Director of Prosecution and the State of Tamil Nadu for withdrawal of prosecution is not convincing and cogent. As against the same, the State filed Revision Petitions in R.P.Nos.1 to 3 of 2009 under Section 397(1) Cr.P.C. before the District and Sessions Court, Kanyakumari District at Nagercoil and the same are pending.
18.The learned counsel for the petitioners urged this Court that mere pendency of petitions filed under Section 397(1) Cr.P.C. at the instigation of State Law Enforcing Agency before the Revisional Court, is not a bar for exercising the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. This Court has inherent jurisdiction, if a case is made by the Officials, to interfere with the charge sheets filed by the State Law Enforcing Agency.
19.The learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that the complainants launched criminal cases against the IREL Officials in the years 2003 and 2004, without any substance, and the said three complaints are similar in nature and the cases are instituted only to harm the Officials and to prevent them from doing their official duty.
20.In support of his submissions, the learned counsel for the petitioners relied on the following judgments:
(i) Chunduru Siva Ram Krishna and another Vs. Peddi Ravindra Babu and another [2009 (11) SCC 203], wherein at paragraphs 29, 35 and 36, it has been held as follows:
''29.The above decision was followed by this Court in Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Judicial Magistrate [1998 (5) SCC 749]. In para 28 of the said judgment this Court held thus:(SCC p. 760) ?28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused.?
35. No specific role is ascribed to any of the aforesaid persons except for stating that the huge quantities of paddy were diverted by Accused 1 and made to disappear with the active assistance of Accused 2 to Accused 9.
Without ascribing any specific role to any one of them the aforesaid allegation appears to us to be very bald and vague. Similarly the allegations made against Accused 2 and Accused 3 that they had helped their father in purchasing some property is also very vague as no specific role is ascribed to them.
36. In our considered opinion, no useful purpose would be served by allowing the prosecution against the aforesaid accused persons (the appellants herein). There is no concrete and direct allegation against all these persons ascribing any definite role to each one of them in the offence alleged. The statements shown to us as allegations amounting to prima facie evidence against them, according to us, are very bald and vague statements on the basis of which no case could be made out.''
(ii) State of Haryana and others Vs. Ch.Bhajan Lal and others [AIR 1992 SC 604], wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as follows:-
''102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceedings against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceedings is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.''
(iii) In R.P.Kapur Vs. State of Punjab [AIR 1960 SC 866], the Hon'ble Apex Court had summarised some of the categories of cases where the inherent power under Section 482 of the Code could be exercised by the High Court to quash criminal proceedings against the accused. These are: [AIR P.869, Para 6] ''(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the proceedings e.g. want of sanction;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or the complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.''
21.The learned counsel for the petitioners also submitted that in all the three F.I.Rs. and charge sheets, the allegation against the petitioners/accused is verbatim and similar in nature. The charge is that the petitioners/accused formed themselves into an unlawful assembly, instigated other accused persons to commit the theft. Except the said allegation, there was no allegation available for implicating the petitioners/accused in the above said crime. In view of such bald allegations made against them, without any substance, this Court can quash the charge sheets for want of evidence.
22.Per contra, Mr.AR.L.Sundaresan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the second respondent in Crl.O.P.(MD) Nos.1883 of 2005 and 3013 of 2007/de-
facto complainants submitted that on the basis of the complaints of the complainants, F.I.Rs. were registered in the year 2003.
23.Though the learned Senior Counsel invited the attention of this Court to the contents of the F.I.Rs., Charge sheets as well as the statements recorded under Section 161(3) Cr.P.C., it is not necessary for this Court to consider the contents of the same.
24.The sum and substance emphasized by the learned Senior Counsel is as follows:
''(i) F.I.R. in Crime No.4 of 2003 for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 379 and 506(i) I.P.C., dated 03.01.2003:
I.R.E.L. Company has illegally mined sand in S.Nos.178/8A, 8B, 10 and 11 without any valid permission from the Government. Therefore, in this context, on 20.09.2001, a complaint was given to the District Collector and the District Collector, in his letter, bearing No.483/Gm/2001, dated 3.10.2001, directed the IREL Company not to quarry sand in the patta lands and if at all sand can be mined only in the land belonged to them and it was directed that the sand can be quarried in the land owned by others after obtaining permission from the land owners and renewing the licence from the Government. I.R.E.L. Company officials illegally committed theft of 200 lorries of sand in S.Nos.178, 8A, 8B, 10 and 11 through their workmen. When the de-facto complainant questioned the same, they stated that at the instruction of I.R.E.L. Company Manager, they have illegally committed theft of sand and also threatened to kill him.
Charge Sheet in C.C.No.449 of 2004 for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 447, 379 and 506(ii) r/w. 109 I.P.C., dated 07.04.2004 :
A2 is the Mines Manager of the Company. A3 is the Surveyor and A4 is the Mines Mate of the respective Company. A5 to A29 are the persons engaged by A2 to A4 to steal sand minerals from the patta land belonged to M/s.V.V.Mineral Company. The officials of I.R.E.L. Company with the help of their men willfully engaged in stealing sand minerals from the patta land of the company without the consent of the owners. When this matter was brought to the knowledge of the District Collector, he has ordered in his letter No.483/Gm/2001, dated 3.10.2001, not to steal any valuable sands from the patta land of the company. As per this Court's order, the District Revenue Officer and the District Collector verified the patta lands of M/s.V.V.Mineral Company, as per 'A' Register, Chitta-Adangal and submitted a report, which reveals that the sand was stolen only from the patta land of M/s.V.V.Mineral Company without consent of the owner. At the abetment of A1, A2 to A4 along with A5 to A29 formed themselves into unlawful assembly with deadly weapons to commit theft of sand minerals and intentionally trespassed into the patta land of M/s.V.V.Mineral Company. A2 instigated and directed A5 to A13 to commit theft of sand minerals in S.Nos.178/8A & 8B and A3 and instigated and directed A14 to A21 to commit theft of sand in S.No.178/10. A4 instigated and directed A22 to A29 to commit theft of sand minerals in S.No.178/11. Accordingly, A5 to A29 were armed with spades willfully stolen 200 loads of sand minerals from the company lands and kept the stolen sand worth Rs.10,00,000/-, in their patta land for unloading operation to their company.
(ii) FIR in Crime No.472/2003 for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 447, 379 and 506(i) I.P.C., dated 22.11.2003:
One R.B.Narendran, Deputy Manager (Mining), Indian Rare Earths Ltd., Manavalakuruchi, along 25 persons entered into the patta land belonging to M/s.V.V.Minerals and illegally mined 200 lorries of valuable sand through Karthika Transport lorries. When the same was questioned, they threatened to kill them.
Charge Sheet in C.C.No.450/2004 for the offence punishable under Sections 147, 148, 447, 379 and 506(ii) r/w. 149 I.P.C., dated 07.12.2004:
A1 is working as Deputy Mines Manager in M/s.Indian Rare Earths Ltd., Manavalakuruchi, Kanniyakumari District. A2 to A26 are his close-associates. A27 to A29 are the lorry drivers of the Karthika Transport, who transported the sand minerals.
On 10.11.2003, at 10.45 a.m., at the instigation and direction given by A1, A2 to A29 in furtherance of their common object to commit theft of sand minerals from the patta land of M/s.V.V.Mineral Company formed themselves into an unlawful assembly with the deadly weapons like spades. At the instigation of A1, A2 to A10 willfully trespassed in S.No.55/9A of the patta land and committed theft of sand minerals with the help of spades and knowingly loaded the valuable sand in a lorry and illegally transported the same to the IREL Company. At the instigation of A1, A11 to A18 intentionally trespassed into the patta land of the company in S.No.56/2A and committed theft of sand minerals. At the instigation of A1, A19 to A26 trespassed into the patta land of company in S.No.56/3A and committed theft of sand minerals. The theft of stolen sand minerals worths about Rs.10,00,000/-.
25.The sum and substance emphasized by the learned counsel for the second respondent in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.673 of 2006 is as follows:
FIR in Crime No.337/2004 for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 447, 323, 324, 435, 379, 506(i) and 307 I.P.C. r/w. 3(1) of TNPPDL Act, 1982, dated 25.06.2004:
The defacto-complainant viz., Valam Bellarmin is working in M/s.V.V.Minerals Company at Melmidalam. When the de-facto complainant and the company workers were taking wet sand from the company's own lands near Kallankurusadi at Melmidalam, under the leadership of A1-Thason, the other 23 accused and 300 persons of Kurumpanai, who can be identified in person, armed with Vattukathi, Iron rods, heavy sticks, stones, cycle chain etc., came to the place and the first accused told the other accused that the I.R.E.L. General Manager-Sreenivasan, Mines Managers-Patchi and Jose Mathews had directed him to cause damage to their vehicles, to cut the workers into pieces and throw them into the sea and then only, they will run away from M/s.V.V.Mineral Company's lands. He commanded the other accused to carry out the orders of the I.R.E.L. Officers.
Charge Sheet in P.R.C.No.12/2005 for the offence punishable under Sections 147, 148, 447, 427, 323, 324, 325, 326, 435, 506(ii), 379, 307 and 109 r/w. 149 I.P.C., dated 07.12.2004:
A1 is the Fisherman by profession. A2 is working as General Manager of IREL, Manavalakurichi, Kannyakumari District. A3 is the Mines Engineer. A4 is the Mines Manager. A5 is the Deputy Manager of IREL, Manavalakurichi. A6 to A23 are the fishermen by profession and happens to be the close associates of A1.
It seems that at the instigation of top officials of IREL, the Melmiddalam Village folk used to grab valuable sand from the patta lands of M/s.V.V.Minerals without the consent of the land owners. As a result, the partners of M/s.V.V.Minerals lodged various criminal cases against these persons and the same are registered in Karungal Police Station. Moreover, M/s.V.V.Mineral Company made representation to the District Collector for the same subject matter and as a result, stringent action was initiated against the I.R.E.L. Company officials and others to prevent sand stealing from the patta lands of M/s.V.V.Mineral Company. So, an enmity arose between the two Companies in respect of claiming valuable sand minerals. Due to the enmity, on 25.06.2004, at about 11.30 a.m. at the instigation of A2 to A5, A1, A6 to A23 trespassed into the patta land of M/s.V.V.Mineral Company and caused damage to the vehicles worth about Rs.9,08,500/- and committed mischief.''
26.The complainants/Officials were arrayed as L.Ws., examined and their statements were recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. They endorsed the F.I.Rs. as well as the charge sheets. The Revenue Officials also examined further L.Ws., confirmed the ownership of the property in favour of the de- facto complainants. The learned Senior Counsel fairly conceded that no arrest was made and no vehicle was seized and no confession statement was recorded.
27.The learned Senior Counsel submitted that the State had already filed applications through the learned Additional Public Prosecutor for withdrawal of prosecution before the jurisdictional Court at Valliyur. The said applications were rejected by the lower Court. As against the same, the State had preferred revisions before the Court of Principal District Judge at Kanyakumari District in Crl.R.C.Nos.1 to 3 of 2009 and pending revisions, this Court cannot entertain the quash petitions filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C., which would amount to interfering with the power of the revisional Court. Further, the State's withdrawal applications are also pending for adjudication before the revisional Court. Though this Court has inherent power, such powers are limited when the very same issue is pending before the revisional Court. Hence, entertaining the petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is not sustainable.
28.The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that though the first complaint was given on 20.12.2002, the State Law Enforcing Agency registered the same only on 03.01.2003 and the second complaint was given on 11.10.2003 and the same was registered only on 22.11.2003. The second F.I.R. was not initially registered by the State Law Enforcing Agency. Against the inaction of the State Law Enforcing Agency, the second respondent filed Crl.O.P.No.36113 of 2003 before the Principal Seat of this Court and obtained an order. Thereafter, based on the direction of this Court only, the State Law Enforcing Agency registered the F.I.R. on 22.11.2003. Subsequently, the third complaint was given on 25.06.2004. The State Law Enforcing Agency registered the said complaint on the same day. In all these cases, the State Law Enforcing Agency drawn an Observation Mahazar, Seizure Mahazar and recorded statements under Section 161(3) Cr.P.C. from the employees of the Company. After recording the statements under Section 161(3) Cr.P.C. from the employees of the Company and conducting a detailed investigation with regard to the involvement of the accused instigating the other accused persons to commit the theft, the charge sheets were filed in the year 2004 and 2005. When the charge sheets were pending consideration before the trial Court, at this stage, whether the petitioners/accused committed the offence or not is not a matter before this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and if at all there is any disputed question of facts, the same has to be considered only by the trial Court after examination of the witnesses produced by the State Law Enforcing Agency. Hence, at this stage, this Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., cannot give a finding that the offence has not been made out.
29.The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that whether the statements recorded by the State Law Enforcing Agency under Section 161(3) Cr.P.C., is correct or not, can be decided only at the time of trial and this Court cannot conduct a roving enquiry as to whether the statements given by the employees of the Company before the State Law Enforcing Agency are correct or not, as an issue before this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The learned counsel further submitted that the delay in registering the F.I.Rs. is not due to the defacto complainants, but because, the State Law Enforcing Agency has not taken any steps in registering the cases against the accused persons. He further submitted that in one case, the defacto complainant approached the Principal Seat of this Court seeking a direction to the State Law Enforcing Agency to register an F.I.R. In view of the above, there is no delay on the part of the defacto complainants to file the complaints before the State Law Enforcing Agency. Since the petitioners/accused did not make out any prima facie case to interfere with the charge sheets filed by the State Law Enforcing Agency, at this stage, this Court is bound to accept the statements recorded under Section 161(3) Cr.P.C. as true and the veracity of the same has to be tested only at the time of cross-examination and not by invoking the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
30.The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that in Crl.O.P.(MD)No.3013 of 2007, the IREL Officials engaged lorries, by name Karthika Transport in order to steal the valuable sand minerals and the owner of Karthika Transport was examined by the trial Court. The owner has also given a statement before the trial Court that the lorries were engaged by the IREL Officials. However, no documents were filed before the trial Court in order to prove that the lorries were hired by the IREL Company Officials. The property damaged is worth about Rs.30 Lakhs and therefore, the said case is triable by the Sessions Court. In the said situation, entertaining petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is not maintainable.
31.The learned Senior Counsel has drawn the attention of this Court to various paragraphs in Ch.Bhajan Lal's case [cited supra] and in R.P.Kapur's case [cited supra] and submitted that, where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence or make out a case against the accused, the inherent power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. cannot be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
32.The learned Senior Counsel also submitted that when the allegations are made against the accused, on reading of the allegations, if it constitute any offence under any penal provisions for the time being in force, then normally the continuation of the prosecution should not be stalled unless there is a serious illegality or any materials placed before the Court showing perversity on the part of the Investigating Agency in falsely implicating the accused into the crime.
33.In support of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel relied on the following decisions:
(i) State of Haryana and others Vs. Ch.Bhajan Lal and others [AIR 1992 SC 604], wherein at paragraphs 108 to 118, it has been held as follows:
''108.In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extra-ordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima-facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers Under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
4. Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated Under Section 155(2) of the Code.
5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.
109.We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the Court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the F.I.R. or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whim or caprice.
110.It may be true, as repeatedly pointed out by Mr.Parasaran, that in a given situation, false and vexatious charges of corruption and venality may be maliciously attributed against any person holding a high office and enjoying a respectable status thereby sullying his character, injuring his reputation and exposing him to social ridicule with a view to spite him on account of some personal rancour, predilections and past prejudices of the complaint. In such a piquant situation, the question is what would be the remedy that would redress the grievance of the verily affected party? The answer would be that the person who dishonestly makes such false allegations is liable to be proceeded against under the relevant provisions of the Indian Penal Code-namely Under Sections 182 or 211 or 500 besides becoming liable to be sued for damages.
111.Reverting to the present case, the allegations made in the complaint, in our considered opinion, do clearly constitute a cognizable offence justifying the registration of a case and an investigation thereon and this case does not fall under any one of the categories of cases formulated above calling for the exercise of extraordinary or inherent powers of the High Court to quash the F.I.R. itself.
112.It was then urged by Mr.Parasaran with a considerable force and insistence that the entire proceedings against Ch. Bhajan Lal on account of the acrimonious political rivalry is vitiated either on being tainted with a mala fides or due to lack of bona fide and, therefore, the judgment impugned quashing the entire proceedings should not be interfered with. Much reliance was placed in support of the above submission on three decisions, namely (1) S. Pratap Singh v. The State of Punjab (1964) 4 SCR 733 : (AIR 1964 SC 72);
(2) State of Haryana v. Rajindra Sareen (1972) 2 SCR 452 : (AIR 1972 SC 1004); and (3) Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. 1985 (supp) 3 SCR 382 : (AIR 1986 SC 872).
113.We went through the entire materials very scrupulously but we are not persuaded to hold that the allegations of mala fides or lack of bona fide are substantiated and hence the decisions cited in this behalf cannot be availed of. It may not be out of place to mention here that when the third respondent, Ch. Devi Lal in the SLP was given up from the array of parties by the appellant, no objection was raised on behalf of Ch. Bhajan Lal. In fact, the learned Judge of the High Court before whom a similar contention was raised has rightly negatived that contention and held that the plea of mala fide as against Ch. Devi Lal is not available. Hence there is no merit in this contention.
114.No doubt, there was no love lost between Ch. Bhajan Lal and Dharam Pal. Based on this strained relationship, it has been then emphatically urged by Mr.K.Parasaran that the entire allegations made in the complaint due to political vendetta are not only scurrilous and scandalous but also tainted with mala fides, vitiating the entire proceedings. As it has been repeatedly pointed out earlier the entire matter is only at a premature stage and the investigation is not yet proceeded with except some preliminary effort taken on the date of the registration of the case, that is on 21.11.1987. The evidence has to be gathered after a thorough investigation and placed before the Court on the basis of which alone the Court can come to a conclusion one way or the other on the plea of mala fides. If the allegations are bereft of truth and made maliciously, we are sure, the investigation will say so. At this stage, when there are only allegations and recriminations but no evidence, this Court cannot anticipate the result of the investigation and render a finding on the question of mala fides on the materials at present available. Therefore, we are unable to see any force in the contention that the complaint should be thrown overboard on the mere unsubstantiated plea of mala fides. Even assuming that Dharam Pal has laid the complaint only on account of his personal animosity, that, by itself, will not be a ground to discard the complaint containing serious allegations which have to be tested and weighed after the evidence is collected. In this connection, the following view expressed by Bhagwati, CJ in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar and Ors. (1987) 1 SCC 288 at page 318 : (AIR 1987 SC 877 at P.891) may be referred to.
''It is a well established proposition of law that a criminal prosecution, if otherwise, justifiable and based upon adequate evidence does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or political vendetta of the first informant or the complainant.'' Beyond the above, we do not wish to add anything more.
115.It was again contended that mala fides are writ large on the extra- ordinary interest evinced by the police officers and the hasty direction given by the S.P. Needless to say that the question of mala fide exercise of power will assume significance only if an authority acts for unauthorised purpose. The proper test to be applied in such a case is as to what is the dominant purpose for which the power is exercised. The principle of dominant purpose is explained in the following decisions:
(1) The King v. Minister of Health [1929] 1 K.B. 619; (2)Rex v.
Brighton Corporation ex-parte Shoosmith (1907) 96 L.T. 762; (3) Earl Fitzwilliam's Wentworth Estate Co. Ltd. v. Minister of Town and Country Planning [1951] 2 K.B. 284; and (4) P.V. Jagannath Rao and Ors. v. State of Orissa and Ors. [1968] 3 SCR 789 : (AIR 1969 SC 215).
116.Applying the test, laid down in the above decisions to the present case, we are of the opinion that the dominant purpose of registration of the case and the intended follow up action are only to investigate the allegations and present a case before the Court, if sufficient evidence in support of those allegations are collected but not to make a character assassination of Ch. Bhajan Lal and their relatives. Therefore, we are not able to see any substance in this submission.
117.We have, so far, made a detailed and searching analysis on the legal issues with regard to the statutory duty of an Officer-in-charge of a police station in registering the First Information Report and commencing the investigation thereon as well the principles relating to the exercise of extra-ordinary and inherent powers of the High Court in quashing either the FIR or the entire criminal proceedings as the case may be; and bearing in mind the enunciation of law, we have given our anxious consideration and careful thought to all the contentions made by all the learned counsel with considerable force and emphasis. The resultant and inescapable logical conclusion which we unreservedly arrive at is that the order of the High Court quashing the First Information Report, viewed from any angle, cannot be sustained both on the question of law and facts. Consequently, we set aside that part of the judgment of the High Court quashing the First Information Report.
118.Lastly, a fervent, but inexorable plea was made requesting this Court to take judicial notice of the fact that the Justice Jaswant Singh Commission, appointed to enquire into the allegations of disproportionate assets of Ch. Bhajan Lal through corrupt means found that these allegations were baseless. Both Ch. Devi Lal and Dharam Pal in their affidavits filed before the High Court have stated that the allegations in the FIR are quite different from those which was the subject matter of enquiry before the Justice Jaswant Commission. Be that as it may, we are not inclined to give any finding one way or other merely on the report of the Justice Jaswant Singh Commission by taking judicial notice of the same.''
(ii) State of Bihar and another Vs. K.J.D. Singh [1993 CRI.L.J. 3537], wherein at paragraphs 3 and 5, it has been held as follows:
''3.After going through the record and hearing Mr.Goswami, learned senior counsel for the State and Mr.Ranjit Kumar, learned Counsel for the respondent, we are of the view that it is not a case in which the High Court should have cut short the normal process of the criminal trial. The exercise of the powers by the High Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C to quash the prosecution launched against the respondent at the stage when the trial had not even commenced was not proper. In view of the series of decisions of this Court starting with the judgment in R.P. Kapoor's case (1960) 3 SCR 388 :
(AIR 1960 SC 866) up to Janta Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary (1992) 4 SCC 305 : (1993 AIR SCW 248), the inherent power under Section 482 has to be exercised for the ends of the justice and should not be arbitrarily exercised to cut short the normal process of a criminal trial. After a review of catena of authorities, Pendian, J. in Janta Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary (supra) has deprecated the practice of staying criminal trials and police investigations except in exceptional cases and the present case is certainly not one of these exceptional cases.
5.We hasten to add that our observations made hereinabove are limited only for the purpose of determination of the question of exercise of powers by the High Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C, and nothing said by us should be construed as any expression of opinion on the merits of the case. It shall be open to the respondent to raise all such pleas as are available to him in law in his defence during the trial.''
(iii) Pratibha Vs. Rameshwari Devi and others [2008 (I) SCC (Cri) 399], wherein at paragraphs 12, 17 and 18, it has been held as follows:
''12.From the principles laid down in the abovementioned decisions, it is clear that the Court is entitled to exercise its inherent jurisdiction for quashing a criminal proceeding or an FIR when the allegations made in the same do not disclose the commission of an offence and that it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case. We also feel it just and proper to refer to a leading decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] in which this Court pointed out certain categories of cases by way of illustrations wherein the inherent power under Section 482 of the Code can be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The same are as follows: (SCC pp. 378-79, para 102) ?(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.?
17.This takes us to the second question which merits our determination, namely, whether the High Court was entitled to consider the investigation report submitted before it by four officers of the rank of Dy. Superintendent of Police even before the same could be filed before the Magistrate concerned. As noted hereinearlier, a bare perusal of the judgment of the High Court would also show that the High Court had relied on the investigation report in quashing the FIR. Now, the question is whether the High Court while exercising its powers under Section 482 of the Code was justified in relying on the investigation report which was neither filed before the Magistrate nor was a copy of the same supplied to the appellant.
18.In our view, the High Court has acted in excess of its jurisdiction by relying on the investigation report and the High Court was also wrong in directing the report to be submitted before it. It is now well settled that it is for the investigating agency to submit the report to the Magistrate. In this connection, we may refer to sub-section (2) of Section 173 of the Code which runs as under:
?173. (2)(i) As soon as it is completed, the officer in charge of the police station shall forward to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report.? (not necessary therefore omitted).?
From a bare reading of this provision, it cannot be disputed that after completion of the investigation, the officer in charge of the police station shall forward the report not to the High Court where the proceedings under Section 482 of the Code is pending but to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on such police report. Therefore, the High Court had acted beyond its power to direct the investigating agency to file the said report before it in the exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code. The procedure for submitting an investigation report has been considered by this Court in M.C. Abraham v. State of Maharashtra [2003 (2) SCC 649 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 628]. While considering the law on the question as to when the report of the investigating agency shall be submitted before the Magistrate where the case is pending, an observation made in Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra [AIR 1968 SC 117] was quoted with approval by B.P. Singh, J. in M.C. Abraham case [2003 (2) SCC 649: 2003 SCC (Cri) 628] (at SCC p. 659, para 16) with which we are also in full agreement and which is as follows: (Abhinandan Jha case [AIR 1968 SC 117], AIR pp. 122-24, paras 15 & 19-20) ?15. Then the question is, what is the position, when the Magistrate is dealing with a report submitted by the police, under Section 173, that no case is made out for sending up an accused for trial, which report, as we have already indicated, is called, in the area in question, as a ?final report?? Even in those cases, if the Magistrate agrees with the said report, he may accept the final report and close the proceedings. But there may be instances when the Magistrate may take the view, on a consideration of the final report, that the opinion formed by the police is not based on a full and complete investigation, in which case, in our opinion, the Magistrate will have ample jurisdiction to give directions to the police, under Section 156(3), to make a further investigation. That is, if the Magistrate feels, after considering the final report, that the investigation is unsatisfactory, or incomplete, or that there is scope for further investigation, it will be open to the Magistrate to decline to accept the final report and direct the police to make further investigation, under Section 156(3). The police, after such further investigation, may submit a charge-sheet, or, again submit a final report, depending upon the further investigation made by them. If ultimately, the Magistrate forms the opinion that the facts, set out in the final report, constitute an offence, he can take cognizance of the offence, under Section 190(1)(b), notwithstanding the contrary opinion of the police, expressed in the final report.
* * *
19. ? The functions of the magistracy and the police, are entirely different, and though, in the circumstances mentioned earlier, the Magistrate may or may not accept the report, and take suitable action, according to law, he cannot certainly infringe (sic impinge) upon the jurisdiction of the police, by compelling them to change their opinion, so as to accord with his view.
20.Therefore, to conclude, there is no power, expressly or impliedly conferred, under the Code, on a Magistrate to call upon the police to submit a charge-sheet, when they have sent a report under Section 169 of the Code, that there is no case made out for sending up an accused for trial.'' ''
(iv) Amit Kapoor Vs. Ramesh Chander and another [2012 (9) SCC 460], wherein at paragraphs 14 to 16, it has been held as follows:
''14.Right from State of W.B. v. Swapan Kumar Guha [1982 (1) SCC 561] which was reiterated with approval in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 SCC (Cri) 426], the Courts have stated the principle that: (Swapan Kumar case [1982 (1) SCC 561], SCC p. 577, para 21) ?21. ? if the FIR does not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence, the court would be justified in quashing the investigation on the basis of the information as laid or received.?
It is further stated that: (Swapan Kumar case [1982 (1) SCC 561], SCC p. 597, para 65) ?65. ? The legal position appears to be that if an offence is disclosed, the court will not normally interfere with an investigation into the case and will permit investigation into the offence alleged to [have been committed]; if, however, the materials do not disclose an offence, no investigation should normally be permitted.?
Whether an offence has been disclosed or not, must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. If on consideration of the relevant materials, the Court is satisfied that an offence is disclosed, it will normally not interfere with the investigation into the offence and will generally allow the investigation into the offence to be completed in order to collect materials for proving the offence.
15.In Bhajan Lal case [1992 SCC (Cri) 426], the Court also stated that though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined, sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae or to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein power under Section 482 of the Code for quashing of an FIR should be exercised, there are circumstances where the Court may be justified in exercising such jurisdiction. These are, where the FIR does not prima facie constitute any offence, does not disclose a cognizable offence justifying investigation by the police; where the allegations are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; where there is an expressed legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code; and where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. Despite stating these grounds, the Court unambiguously uttered a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too, in the rarest of rare cases; the Court also warned that the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice.
16.The abovestated principles clearly show that inherent as well as revisional jurisdiction should be exercised cautiously. If the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code in relation to quashing of an FIR is circumscribed by the factum and caution aforenoticed, in that event, the revisional jurisdiction, particularly while dealing with framing of a charge, has to be even more limited.''
(v) Viond Raghuvanshi Vs. Ajay Arora and others [2013 (10) SCC 581], wherein at paragraph 30, it has been held as follows:
''30.It is a settled legal proposition that while considering the case for quashing of the criminal proceedings the court should not ?kill a stillborn child?, and appropriate prosecution should not be stifled unless there are compelling circumstances to do so. An investigation should not be shut out at the threshold if the allegations have some substance. When a prosecution at the initial stage is to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is whether the uncontroverted allegations as made, prima facie establish the offence. At this stage neither can the court embark upon an inquiry, whether the allegations in the complaint are likely to be established by evidence nor should the court judge the probability, reliability or genuineness of the allegations made therein. More so, the charge-sheet filed or charges framed at the initial stage can be altered/amended or a charge can be added at the subsequent stage, after the evidence is adduced in view of the provisions of Section 216 Cr.P.C. So, the order passed even by the High Court or this Court is subject to the order which would be passed by the trial court at a later stage.''
(vi) Teeja Devi Alias Triza Devi Vs. State of Rajasthan and others [2014 (15) SCC 221], wherein at paragraphs 5 and 9, it has been held as follows:
''5.It has been rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that ordinarily power under Section 482 CrPC should not be used to quash an FIR because that amounts to interfering with the statutory power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence in accordance with the provisions of CrPC. As per law settled by a catena of judgments, if the allegations made in the FIR prima facie disclose a cognizable offence, interference with the investigation is not proper and it can be done only in the rarest of rare cases where the court is satisfied that the prosecution is malicious and vexatious.
9.We have no hesitation in holding that in the facts of the case, the High Court was not justified in interfering with the police investigation and quashing the FIR. This is not at all a rare case. Without a thorough investigation, it is not possible or proper to hold whether the allegations made by the complainant are true or not. Hence the investigation should have been allowed to continue so that on filing of the report under Section 173 CrPC the affected party could pursue its remedy against the report in accordance with law. Keeping in view the fact that the criminal case was at the stage of investigation by the police the High Court was not justified in holding that the investigation of the impugned FIR is totally unwarranted and that the same would amount to gross abuse of the process of the court.''
34.Mr.R.Anand, learned counsel for the second respondent in Crl.O.P.(MD)No.673 of 2006/de-facto complainant submitted that the defacto complainant had obtained a licence in the year 2004 and carrying on mining operation in a particular area. The petitioners formed themselves into an unlawful assembly and instigated the other accused to commit the theft and other accused persons were contract employees of IREL Company. Accordingly, they trespassed into the complainant's property and committed theft of 200 loads of sand from the complainant's place. The learned counsel also accepted that in all the three cases, the complainants made a complaint against the accused that they formed themselves into an unlawful assembly and instigated the contract employees, who committed theft of 200 loads of sand from the patta land of the complainants. In the present case, only on the basis of the statement of P.W.1-Dhasan that the petitioners/accused instigated the other persons to form themselves into an unlawful assembly and steal 200 loads of sand and attack the employees of the complainants, the State Law Enforcing Agency registered the cases against the petitioners/accused.
35.The learned counsel relied on the statements recorded under Section 161(3) Cr.P.C., Section 109 I.P.C. and Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act and the F.I.Rs., which were registered on 03.01.2003, 22.11.2003 and 25.06.2004 and submitted that there are materials implicating the petitioners in the F.I.Rs. as well as in the charge sheets and the said charge sheets are supported by the statements of the employees of the complainants recorded under Section 161(3) Cr.P.C., which cannot be tested in the petitions filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It can be decided only at the time of trial. The charge sheet filed under TNPPDL Act has to be tried by the learned Sessions Judge and other two cases have to be tried by the learned Judicial Magistrate. If this Court feels that the State Law Enforcing Agency had launched malicious prosecution, a direction can be issued to the trial Court to complete the trial as early as possible and the learned counsel adopted the arguments of the learned Senior Counsel on the principles of law.
36.The Hon'ble Apex Court in a catena of decisions repeatedly held that while exercising the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the High Court cannot act like an appellate Court and in this process, appreciate the factual allegations made in the charge sheet and documents/materials filed along with the charge sheet, which are yet to be proved in evidence. The Hon'ble Apex Court also repeatedly cautioned that as a matter of fact, the Court shall not form any opinion by simple reading of the contents of the charge sheet and perusing the materials collected in support of the charge sheet for holding that no prima facie case is made against any of the accused or allegations made in the charge sheet were so absurd, as it is only a matter of trial.
37.Mr.R.Anand, learned counsel for the second respondent in Crl.O.P.(MD)No.673 of 2006 submitted that in the present case, the other accused persons viz., A6 to A21 attacked the employees of the complainant and thereby, they sustained grievous injuries. They are not admitted in the Government Hospital. However, they are admitted in a private hospital and the private hospital doctor issued a certificate in favour of the employees of the Company, which was also marked as Material Object in the abovesaid crime number. There are enough materials to implicate the petitioners that they formed themselves into an unlawful assembly and instigated the other accused persons to commit the crime.
38.In support of his submissions, the learned counsel for the second respondent in Crl.O.P.(MD)No.673 of 2006 relied on the following decisions:
(i) Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal Vs. Ashutosh Ghosh and others [1979 (4) SCC 381], wherein it has been held as follows:
''Even as it is, we find that the High Court appears to have gone into minute details and weighed the pros and cons of the matter when this was beyond the inherent jurisdiction which was being exercised by the Court under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. On this ground alone order of the High Court stands vitiated and we do not want to make any observations on the merits of the case, which may prejudice either party.''
(ii) Suryalakshmi Cotton Mills Ltd. Vs. Rajvir Industries Limited and others [2008 (13) SCC 678], wherein it has been held as follows:
''22.Ordinarily, a defence of an accused although appears to be plausible should not be taken into consideration for exercise of the said jurisdiction. Yet again, the High Court at that stage would not ordinarily enter into a disputed question of fact.''
(iii) Sakiri Vasu Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others [2008 (2) SCC 409], wherein it has been held as follows:
''27.The High Court should discourage the practice of filing a writ petition or petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. simply because a person has a grievance that his F.I.R. has not been registered by the police, or after being registered, proper investigation has not been done by the police. For this grievance, the remedy lies under Sections 36 and 154(3) before the police officers concerned, and if that is of no avail, under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate or by filing a criminal complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C. and not by filing a writ petition or a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C.''
(iv) Hazari Lal Gupta Vs. Rameshwar Prasad and another [1972 (1) SCC 452], wherein it has been held as follows:
''12.The inherent power of the High Court under Section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code has been considered by this Court in R.P.Kapur Vs. The State of Punjab (1), and State of West Bengal Vs. S.N.Baska (2). In exercising jurisdiction under Section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code the High Court can quash proceedings if there is no legal evidence or if there is any impediment to the institution or continuance of proceedings but the High Court does not ordinarily enquire as to whether the evidence is reliable or not.''
(v) Radhey Shyam Khemka and another Vs. State of Bihar [1993 CRI.L.J. 2888 (SC), wherein it is has been held as follows:
''The ingredients of the different offences under the Penal Code need not be proved only by direct evidence, they can be shown from the circumstances of a particular case that the intention of the promoters or the directors was dishonest since very inception or that they developed such intention at some stage, for their wrongful gain and causing wrongful loss to the investors. All the circumstances and the materials to prove such a charge have to be collected during investigation and enquiry and ultimately have to be produced before the Court at the stage of trial for a verdict as to whether the ingredients of offence in question have been established on behalf of the prosecution.''
(vi) State of Bihar and another Vs. K.J.D.Singh [1993 Cri.L.J. 3537 (SC), wherein it has been held as follows:
''3.The exercise of the powers by the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the prosecution launched against the respondent at the stage when the trial had not even commenced was not proper. In view of the series of decisions of this Court starting with the judgment in R.P.Kappor's case (1960) 3 SCR 388 : (AIR 1960 SC 866) up to Janta Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary (1992) 4 SCC 305 : (1993 AIR SCW 248), the inherent power under Section 482 has to be exercised for the ends of the justice and should not be arbitrarily exercised to cut short the normal process of a criminal trial.''
(vii) State of Bihar Vs. Murad Ali Khan and others [AIR 1989 SC 1], wherein it has been held as follows:
''It is trite that jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. which saves the inherent power of the High Court, to make such orders as may be necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, has to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection. In exercising that jurisdiction the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations in the complaint are likely to be established by evidence or not. That is the function of the trial Magistrate when the evidence comes before him.''
(viii) Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. P.D.Jhunjuwala [AIR 1983 SC 158], wherein it has been held as follows:
'' ..... As to what would be the evidence against the respondents is not a matter to be considered at this stage and would have to be proved at the trial. We have already held that for purpose of quashing the proceedings only the allegations set forth in the complaint have to be seen and nothing further.'' However, all the decisions reiterated the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the decisions cited by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the second respondents in Crl.O.P.(MD)Nos.1883 of 2005 and 3013 of 2007.
39.Per contra, the learned counsel for the petitioners repudiating the allegations made by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the second respondents in Crl.O.P.(MD)Nos.1883 of 2005 and 3013 of 2007 and the learned counsel for the second respondent in Crl.O.P.(MD)No.673 of 2006 submitted that the complainants did not make out any case against the petitioners implicating them in the abovesaid offences.
40.The learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that if there is no specific role by any of the accused persons except stating that the accused persons formed themselves into an unlawful assembly and instigated the other accused persons to commit a theft and stolen 200 lorries of sand, it is not acceptable one. 200 lorries of sand cannot be unearthed from the particular area, that too, nearly 600 loads of sand cannot be unearthed on the face of it. Therefore, the charges levelled against the accused and implicating the Officials in the criminal cases, which is serious in nature, are not sustainable and the criminal law cannot be set in motion as a matter of course. In the present cases, in support of their allegations, the complainants produced only the employees of the Company and those persons were examined under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and they have given their statements, which are verbatim, repeating the allegations made in the F.I.R. The same is again copied and pasted in the charge sheets also.
41.The learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that the charges for the offences punishable under Sections 109 and 120 IPC has to be proved by concrete evidence. If a person instigates another person, before framing of charge against the accused, the test to be applied is whether prima facie case has been made out against them or not. The accused/petitioners had no intention of causing harm to the reputation of the complainants. In the absence of any material, 161(3) Cr.P.C. statements is not sufficient to implicate the accused persons in the case under the stringent provisions, namely, Sections 109 and 120-b I.P.C.
42.The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that pendency of revision petitions arising out of the order passed under Section 321 Cr.P.C., is not a bar to this Court while exercising its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., when manifest error committed by the State Law Enforcing Agency against the accused persons and this Court has power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., to curb the illegal action against the persons and protect them, irrespective of the cases pending against them.
43.In support of his submissions, the learned counsel for the petitioners relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Chunduru Siva Ram Krishna's case (cited supra) and also decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Chitresh Kumar Chopra Vs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) reported in 2010 (3) SCC (Cri) 367 : 2009 (16) SCC 605, wherein at paragraphs 17 and 18, it has been held as follows:
''17.Thus, to constitute ?instigation?, a person who instigates another has to provoke, incite, urge or encourage the doing of an act by the other by ?goading? or ?urging forward?. The dictionary meaning of the word ?goad? is ?a thing that stimulates someone into action; provoke to action or reaction? (see Concise Oxford English Dictionary); ?to keep irritating or annoying somebody until he reacts? (see Oxford Advanced Learner?s Dictionary, 7th Edn.).
18.Similarly, ?urge? means to advise or try hard to persuade somebody to do something or to make a person to move more quickly and or in a particular direction, especially by pushing or forcing such person.
Therefore, a person who instigates another has to ?goad? or ?urge forward? the latter with intention to provoke, incite or encourage the doing of an act by the latter.''
44.I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the materials available on record.
45.On perusal of the F.I.Rs. as well as the charge sheets, it is seen that the first complaint was lodged on 20.12.2002 by the complainant, the owner of the Company against the Officials of IREL Company alleging that at the instigation of A1, A2 to A4 along with A5 to A29 formed themselves into an unlawful assembly with deadly weapons to commit theft of sand minerals and intentionally trespassed into his patta land and illegally committed theft of 200 loads of valuable sand minerals, worth about Rs.10,00,000/- from his patta land. Thereafter, on 11.10.2003, the second complaint was lodged by one S.Suresh Babu, who had already threatened the IREL Officials through phone, before the respondent police disclosing the very same allegations made by the owner of M/s.V.V.Minerals. Again, on 25.06.2004, one Valam Bellarmin, who was an employee of M/s.V.V.Minerals in Melmidalam Village, lodged similar type of complaint, alleging that the accused persons engaged 300 persons of Kurumpanai, who can be identified in person and armed with Vattukathi, Iron rods, heavy sticks, stones, cycle chain etc., came to the occurrence place and caused damage to the vehicles. After completion of investigation, the Law Enforcing Agency filed charge sheets by examining the de-facto complainants' employees as well as Revenue Officials under Section 161(3) Cr.P.C.
46.On a perusal of the abovesaid complaints, it is seen that though the alleged occurrence had happened within a period of 18 months, the Law Enforcing Agency did not arrest any person or obtain any confession statement from the accused persons or recover sand from the concerned persons. However, they examined the employees of the complainants and filed charge sheets before the concerned jurisdictional Court. It is to be noted that though the accused at the relevant point of time were the Officials of Central Government Public Sector undertaking, their statements/ version have not been recorded by the Investigating Agency.
47.The allegation made in the complaints against the petitioners/accused, is verbatim and similar in nature that of the first complaint filed by the owner of M/s.V.V.Minearls.
48.On a perusal of the decisions cited by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the complainant, it is seen that the Court should not quash the proceedings at the initial stage and appropriate prosecution should not be stifled unless there are compelling circumstances to do so. An investigation should not be shut out at the threshold if the allegations have some substance. When a prosecution at the initial stage is to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is whether the uncontroverted allegations as made, prima facie establish the offence. At this stage, neither the Court can embark upon an inquiry, whether the allegations in the complaint are likely to be established by evidence nor the Court should judge the probability, reliability or genuineness of the allegations made therein.
49.The law is very clear that if the contents of the charge sheet are so vague, inadequate and/or absurd that even after reading them as a whole, it did not constitute prima facie case against any accused under the Indian Penal Code, the High Court can entertain the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Accordingly, this Court has power to entertain the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., if the above said ground really existed even prima facie in favour of any accused on facts/law so as to enable this Court to quash the charge sheet by invoking inherent jurisdiction of this Court irrespective of the fact that revision petitions arising out of the order passed under Section 321 Cr.P.C. are pending before the Sessions Court, in order to meet the ends of justice.
50.There is no quarrel over the proposition laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court with regard to the inherent jurisdiction to be exercised that only in the rarest of rare cases, if the de-facto complainant or the State Law Enforcing Agency did not make any prima facie case or reason to believe, the Court can interfere with the charge sheet filed by the State Law Enforcing Agency. Though the learned Senior Counsel drew the attention of this Court to the F.I.Rs. as well as the statements recorded under Section 161(3) Cr.P.C. and Mahazar drawn by the State Law Enforcing Agency and subsequently, the charge sheets filed by them, this Court referring themselves to deal with the factual aspects as to whether in the present cases, the complaints made out prima facie case against the accused persons to proceed with the trial or not.
51.In the present cases, the State Law Enforcing Agency not even recorded any statement from the other accused persons who were alleged to have been instigated by the accused petitioners either by way of confession or by any other mode authorised under the Code of Criminal Procedure and no accused was examined and without examining the other accused persons, forcing the petitioners to face the criminal cases before the trial Court, is not sustainable. No doubt, the petitioners are the Officials of IREL Company and came out from different parts of the country in order to render their service to the Government Organisation and they worked in the particular new places like Manavalakurichi and Melmidalam and except the present complaints, no complaints were filed against them. Therefore, this Court is of the view that if the Officials are allowed to face this type of criminal cases, no one will come forward and render their services to the Government Organisations. The cases are pending against the Officials for the past 13 years.
52.The Hon'ble Apex Court in Bhajan Lal's case (cited supra) has held that where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge, the inherent power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., could be exercised by the High Court to quash criminal proceedings against the accused.
53.In the present cases, the complainants entered into the mining operation in the year 1980 and the IREL Officials made objection for their licence process and therefore, in order to wreck vengeance against the Officials, the complainants launched malicious prosecution against them within a period of 18 months. On perusal of the charge sheets, it is seen that the complainants made allegation against the accused persons that they formed themselves into an unlawful assembly and instigated the other accused to commit theft of 200 lorries of sand in two acres of land, which is imaginary, belie and without any logic and common sense.
54.It is relevant to mention that the first accused in Crime No.4 of 2003 in C.C.No.449 of 2004 is not an employee in Manavalakurichi village, at the relevant point of time. However, he was implicated in the above said crime number as the first accused as if he illegally committed theft of 200 lorries of sand in the patta land of M/s.V.V.Mineral Company, along with the other accused. However, K.P.Sreenivasan, who is the first petitioner in Crl.O.P.(MD)No.673 of 2006, was an employee in Chavara, Kerala Branch, was already discharged from the proceedings in C.C.No.449 of 2004 by this Court vide order dated 18.04.2005, in Crl.O.P.(MD)No.1882 of 2005, the relevant paragraph reads as follows:
?5.After hearing the submissions made, this Court is of the considered view that the police agency, without proper investigation, has filed the final report in respect of the petitioner herein. Admittedly, even according to the prosecution, the occurrence of theft has taken place only on 20.12.2002. A perusal of the transfer order of the petitioner issued by the IRE would clearly reveal that the transfer order was issued on 5.3.2003 and the petitioner has joined duty only on 7.3.2003. Thus it would be quite indicative of the fact that subsequent to the order dated 5.3.2003, the petitioner has joined duty at Manavalakurichi on 7.3.2003 and it is quite evident that he would not have present either at the place of occurrence at Manavalakurichi or involved in the crime and the prosecution case is only unfounded and imaginary. It would be quite indicative of the fact that the investigation agency has not properly prosecuted the case. The name of the petitioner is not found in the FIR, but it is found in the charge sheet and it would clearly reveal that at the time when the charge sheet was laid, he became the General manager of IRE, Manavalakurichi, and hence his name was also added as one of the accused in the case, which in the opinion of the court was not warranted at all. Under the stated circumstances, without any hesitation whatsoever, the accusation made against the petitioner herein in C.C.No.449 of 2004 has got to be necessarily quashed. Accordingly, the proceedings in C.C.No.449 of 2004 in respect of the petitioner alone is quashed.?
55.The intention of the private mining operator and the complainant clearly reveal that in order to harm the Officials and prevent them from doing further activities with regard to the licence sought by the private mining operators, the private mining operators filed cases against the petitioners and filed stereo typed complaints against the Officials in order to create panic among them and achieve and without any disturbance of the Government Officials want to mine the particular area. When the first accused itself has been discharged on the ground that he was not an employee at the relevant point of time, the very same allegation against the other accused may not have any substance to implicate them in the above said crime.
56.In view of the above and the fact that the pendency of the criminal proceedings against the accused in the circumstances would have very serious repercussions on them, this Court considers it appropriate to quash all further proceedings against them in C.C.No.449 of 2004, P.R.C.No.12 of 2005 and C.C.No.450 of 2004 respectively, pending on the file of the Principal District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate Court, Eraniel. It is relevant to note here that some of the accused persons retired from job and now, they are aged about 70 years and some of the persons have given voluntary retirement.
57.On a perusal of the entire records, it is seen that since the petitioners have not yielded to the pressure mounted by the complainants, the complainants lodged the stereo type of complaints before the respondent police within a period of 18 months and also prevented them from discharging their official duties. Therefore, there is no prima facie case made out against the petitioners/accused.
58.In view of the above discussions and the decisions cited supra, I have no hesitation to quash the criminal complaints lodged against the accused in C.C.No.449 of 2004, P.R.C.No.12 of 2005 and C.C.No.450 of 2004 respectively, pending on the file of the Principal District Munsif-cum- Judicial Magistrate Court, Eraniel. Accordingly, the proceedings against accused in C.C.No.449 of 2004, P.R.C.No.12 of 2005 and C.C.No.450 of 2004 respectively, pending on the file of the Principal District Munsif-cum- Judicial Magistrate Court, Eraniel, shall stand quashed.
59.In the result, these Criminal Original Petitions are allowed. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.
To
1.The Principal District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate, Eraniel.
2.The Inspector of Police, Karungal Police Station, Kanyakumari District.
3.The Additional Public Prosecutor, Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, Madurai.
.