Allahabad High Court
Udayvir And 2 Others Thru. Sri Furkan vs Board Of Revenue, U.P. At Prayagraj ... on 6 July, 2022
Author: Abdul Moin
Bench: Abdul Moin
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH AFR Court No. - 7 Case :- WRIT - B No. - 247 of 2022 Petitioner :- Udayvir And 2 Others Thru. Sri Furkan Respondent :- Board Of Revenue, U.P. At Prayagraj Thru. Its Secy. And 13 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Dharm Raj Mishra,Ratnesh Singh Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Ashok Kumar Singh,Pankaj Gupta,Rahul Kumar Singh,Vijai Bahadur Verma Hon'ble Abdul Moin,J.
1. Heard Mohd. Arif Khan, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Dharm Raj Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Sri Abhinav Narain Trivedi, learned Chief Standing counsel assisted by Sri Hemant Kumar Pandey, learned counsel appearing for the State-respondents, Sri Vijay Bahadur Verma, learned counsel appearing for the respondents no. 4 to 12 and Sri Pankaj Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the respondent no. 14.
2. Instant petition has been filed praying for the following main reliefs:-
(i) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the judgment and order dated 21.04.2022, contained in Annexure No. 1, passed by the Opposite Party No. 1, judgment and order dated 05.07.2018/31.08.2020, contained in Annexure No. 2, passed by the Opposite Party no. 2 and judgment and order dated 25.05.1988, contained in Annexure No. 3, passed by the Opposite Party No. 3 with all consequential benefits.
(ii) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the Opposite Parties to restrain the private respondents from creating any third party right or changing the nature of land in dispute without reference to the judgments and orders, contained in Annexure Nos. 1 to 3 impugned in the petition, with all consequential benefits and allow the relief claimed in the suit in favour of the petitioner.
3. The case set forth by the petitioner is that a suit under Section 229-B of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Reforms Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1950") was filed by the father of the petitioners no. 1 & 2 and father-in-law of the petitioner no. 3. The said suit was dismissed vide order dated 25.05.1988. Being aggrieved, the petitioners filed a first appeal under the provisions of Section 331 (3) of the Act, 1950 which was dismissed vide order dated 05.07.2018 as corrected on 31.08.2020. Still being aggrieved, the petitioners filed a Revision No. 119 of 2021 under Section 333 of the Act, 1950 which has been dismissed vide impugned order dated 21.04.2022, a copy of which is annexure 1 to the writ petition and hence the writ petition.
4. A preliminary objection was raised by Sri Hemant Kumar Pandey, learned Standing counsel as well as Sri Vijay Bahadur Verma, learned counsel appearing for the respondents no. 4 to 12 that taking into consideration the specific provision of Section 331 (4) of the Act, 1950, the petitioners ought to have filed a second appeal and the revision itself was not maintainable under Section 333 of the Act, 1950. The same was opposed by the learned Senior Advocate by contending that there is no specific bar under Section 333 of the Act, 1950 per which the revision would not be maintainable.
5. Considering the same, this Court vide order dated 05.07.2022 had passed an order framing a question which for the sake of convenience is reproduced below:-
"Supplementary affidavit filed today be kept on record.
Heard Mohd. Arif Khan, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mohd. Aslam and Sri Dharam Raj Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, Sri Hemant Kumar Pandey, learned counsel appearing for the State, Sri Pankaj Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the Gaon Sabha and Sri Vijay Bahadur Verma, Advocate who files his Vakalatnama on behalf of respondents no. 5 to 12.
The question which needs to be gone into at the first instance is as to whether after dismissal of the appeal by the Commissioner vide order dated 05.07.2018/31.08.2020 which was filed by the petitioners under the provisions of Section 331 (3) of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1950"), the petitioner correctly filed a revision before the Board of Revenue under the provisions of Section 333 of the Act, 1950 or he should have filed a second appeal under the provisions of Act, 1950.
All the learned counsels would come prepared with this question tomorrow i.e 06.07.2022.
Put up this case tomorrow i.e 06.07.2022 for further hearing at 0215 P.M. Till tomorrow, status quo as of today shall be maintained by all the parties pertaining to land in dispute."
6. All the learned counsels have been heard on the question as to whether the revision filed by the petitioners was correctly filed under the provisions of Section 333 of the Act, 1950 or whether the petitioners ought to have filed a second appeal under the provisions of Section 331 (4) of the Act, 1950.
7. Learned Senior Advocate while supporting the filing of the revision petition by the petitioners under Section 333 of the Act, 1950 argues that (a) it is the choice of the petitioners regarding the forum i.e to file a second appeal under the provisions of Section 331 (4) of the Act, 1950 or to file a revision under Section 333 of the Act, 1950. He contends that as both the forums are available to the petitioners, consequently they chose to avail the remedy of revision under Section 333 of the Act, 1950 and as such, there is no infirmity in having chosen to file a revision & (b) bare reading of Section 333 of the Act, 1950 would indicate that there is no bar in filing of a revision even after the appeal has been decided inasmuch as and once the legislature in its wisdom has not used a word "Second Appeal" under Section 333 of the Act, 1950, as such the said provision cannot be read in a restrictive manner so as to restrain or restrict filing of the revision under the provisions of Section 333 of the Act, 1950 after having filed an appeal under Section 331 (3) of the Act, 1950.
8. In support of his arguments, learned Senior Advocate has placed reliance on a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Lachman Das Vs. Santosh Singh reported in 1996 All Civil Journal 324. No other ground has been urged by the learned Senior Advocate.
9. On the other hand, Sri Vijay Bahadur Verma, learned counsel appearing for the respondents no. 4 to 12 has placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in the case of Mirza Kishwar Beg Vs. Board of Revenue and Ors reported in RD (1975) 373 to contend that this Court has categorically held that once an appeal has been filed then the revisional jurisdiction cannot be invoked either at the instance of a party or by the Board itself suo moto.
10. Elaborating the same, Sri Verma argues that Section 333 of the Act, 1950 itself stipulates that the power of revision can be invoked either where no appeal lies or where an appeal lies but has not been preferred meaning thereby that the power of revision under Section 333 of the Act, 1950 could only be invoked by the petitioners in case they had not filed an appeal under the provisions of Section 331 (3) of the Act, 1950 and once the petitioners had filed an appeal, they could not subsequent thereto be permitted to invoke the power of revision of the Board under Section 333 of the Act, 1950.
11. Sri Hemant Kumar Pandey, learned Standing counsel has adopted the arguments of Sri Vijay Bahadur Verma, Advocate and further argues that once the petitioners having themselves chosen to invoke Section 331 (3) of the Act, 1950 while challenging the order passed under Section 229-B of the Act, 1950, consequently in case of being aggrieved by the order passed in the first appeal dated 05.07.2018/31.08.2020, the only remedy available to them was to have filed the second appeal under the provisions of Section 331 (4) of the Act, 1950. He argues that keeping in view the provisions of Section 333 of the Act, 1950 and the petitioners having themselves filed a first appeal as such, the power of revision was not available to them and they could only have filed a second appeal.
12. Heard learned counsel appearing for the contesting parties and perused the records on the question which has been framed by this Court vide order dated 05.07.2022.
13. From a perusal of the records it is apparent that against the dismissal of the suit filed under Section 229-B of the Act, 1950, an appeal was filed under Section 331 (3) of the Act, 1950 which was dismissed vide order dated 05.07.2018 as corrected on 31.08.2020. The petitioners thereafter filed a revision under Section 333 of the Act, 1950 before the Board of Revenue which has been dismissed vide impugned order dated 21.04.2022 against which the instant petition has been filed.
14. The question is as to whether the petitioners had a remedy of filing of a revision under Section 333 of the Act, 1950 more particularly when their first appeal had already been dismissed and it was the petitioners who were aggrieved against the order of the dismissal of the first appeal.
15. For this purpose, the Court would have to consider the provisions of Section 331 read with Schedule II & Section 333 of the Act, 1950 which for the sake of convenience are reproduced below:-
"331. Cognizance of suits, etc. under this Act. - (1) Except as provided by or under this Act no court other than a court mentioned in Column 4 of Schedule II shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908), take cognizance of any suit, application, or proceedings mentioned in Column 3 thereof [,] [or of a suit, application or proceedings based on a cause of action in respect of which any relief could be obtained by means of any such suit or application :] [Provided that where a declaration has been made under Section 143 in respect or any holding or part thereof, the provisions of Schedule II insofar as they relate to suits, applications or proceedings under Chapter VIII shall not apply to such holding or part thereof.] [Explanation. - If the cause of action is one in respect of which relief may be granted by the revenue court, it is immaterial that the relief asked for from the civil court may not be identical to that which the revenue court would have granted.] [(1-A) Notwithstanding anything in sub-section (i), an objection, that a court mentioned in Column 4 of Schedule II, or, as the case may be, a civil court, which had no jurisdiction with respect to the suit, application or, proceeding, exercised jurisdiction with respect thereto shall not be entertained by any appellate or revisional court unless the objection was taken in the court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice.] (2) Except as hereinafter provided no appeal shall lie from an order or [decree] passed under any of the proceedings mentioned in Column 3 of the Schedule aforesaid:
[(3) An appeal shall lie from any decree or from an order passed under Section 47 or an order of the nature mentioned in Section 104 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) or in Order 43, Rule 1 of the First Schedule to that Code passed by a court mentioned in Column No. 4 of Schedule II to this Act in proceedings mentioned in Column 3 thereof to the court or authority mentioned in Column No. 5 thereof.
(4) A second appeal shall lie on any of the grounds specified in Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) from the final order or decree, passed in an appeal under sub- section (3), to the authority, if any, mentioned against it in Column 6 of the Schedule aforesaid.]
333. Power to call for cases (1) The Board or the Commissioner or the Additional Commissioner may call for the record of any suit or proceeding [other than proceeding under sub-section (4-A) of Section 198] decided by any court subordinate to him in which no appeal lies or where an appeal lies but has not been preferred, for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed in such suit or proceeding and if such subordinate court appears to have;
(a) exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law; or
(b) failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or
(c) acted in the exercise of jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity; the Board or the Commissioner or the Additional Commissioner, as the case may be, may pass such order in the case as he thinks fit. (2) If an application under this section has been moved by any person either to the Board or to the Commissioner or to the Additional Commissioner, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by any other of them.] [Schedule II] (Section 331) Court of Serial No. Section Description of proceedings Court of original jurisdiction First appeal Second appeal 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 12 Application for recovery of possession Assistant Collector 1st Class Commissioner Board 2 13 Thekedar's application for the grant of land or extension in the period of cultivation. Collector Commissioner NIL 3 14 Application to deposit money by mortagee.
Assistant Collector 1st Class do NIL 4 33 Proceedings for correction of records of rights Compensation Officer do NIL 5 117 Application for Payment of compensation on account of development. Assistant Collector Incharge of sub-division do NIL 6 [***]
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-
-
-
7 [137] Application for cancellation of certificate.
Assistant Collector do NIL 8 [***]
-
-
-
-
9 140 Application for refund.
Assistant Collector do NIL 10 140-A Application for the refund of 1/3 of the deposit to land holder. Assistant Collector Commissioner NIL 11 143&144 Application for declaration.
Assistant collector Incharge of Subdivision.
[Collector] [***] 12 157(2) Application for determination of the share of the lessor and partition. Assistant Collector 1st Classes do do 13 161 Application for permission to make exchange.
Assistant Commissioner 1st Class Commissioner Board 14 163 [Application for declaration of any transfer to be void.] [Assistant Collector 1st Class.] do do 15 167 read with 201 or 202 (a) Suit for the ejectment of a transferee of a [Bhumidhar with non-transferable rights] or asami. Assistant Collector 1st Class.
do do 16 176 [suit for the division of a holding or a bhumidhar] [***] do do do 17 183, 184 Application for surrender Tahsildar do do 18 186 Application for service of notice in respect of abandoned holding. do do do 19 191 read with 202 (a) Suit for ejectment of Assami Assistant Collector 1st Class.
do Board 20 [***] 20-A [***] 21 202(b) to (h) Suit ejectment of asami.
Assistant Collector 1st Class.
Commissioner Board.
22 206 read with 201 or 202 (a) Suit for ejectment of a [bhumidhar with non-transferable rights] or asami. do do do 23 208 Suit for injunction or for repair of the waste or damage.
do do do 24 209 Suit for ejectment of persons occupying land without title [and damages] do do do 25 [***]
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-
-
-
26 212 Suit for ejectment of persons from land of public utility Collector do do 27 212-B Suit for possession of the land or for compensation for wrongful dispossession Assistant Collector 1st Class do do 28 213 Objection against the fixation of rent by [Gaon Sabha].
[Tahsildar] do do 29 215 Suit for determination of rent and for arrears.
[do] do do 30 218 Suit for commutation of rent.
[Assistant Collector incharge of Sub-Division] do do 31 220 Application for recovery of arrears of rent and ejectment.
Tahsildar do do 32 222(5) Suit for recovery of canal dues.
Assistant Collector 1st Class. Tahsildar do do 33 227 Suit for recovery of canal dues.
Tahsildar do do 34 [229] 229-B 229-C Suit for declaration of rights.
Assistant Collector 1st Class do do 35 232 Application for restoration of possession by an adhivasi whom clause (b) of Section 20 is applicable. Assistant Collector incharge of sub-division do do 36 233 Application for determination of rent of adhivasi Assistant Collector 1st Class do do 37 233-A Application for commutation of rent.
Assistant Collector do do 38 234 Suit for ejectment of adhivasi do do do 39 244 Suit by bhumidhar or sirdar for reimbursement of land revenue. Assistant Collector 1st Class.
do do 40 246(2) [***] ..
..
..
41 245(3) [***] ..
..
..
42 250 251 Application for reduction or variation of land revenue.
Assistant Collector in-charge of sub-division do do 43 284-A Suit for ejectment of per of any sons occupying attached land without title and for damages. Assistant Collector 1st Class
16. A perusal of Section 331 of the Act, 1950 would indicate that except as provided under the Act, 1950 no Court other than a Court mentioned in Column 4 of Schedule II shall take cognizance of any suit, application or proceedings mentioned in Column 3 thereof or of a suit, application or proceedings based on a cause of action in respect of which any relief could be obtained by means of any suit or application.
17. Sub Section (3) of Section 331 of the Act, 1950 provides that an appeal shall lie from any decree or from an order passed under Section 47 or an order of the nature mentioned in Section 104 of the Code of Civil Procedure or in Order 43, Rule 1 of the First Schedule to that Code passed by a Court mentioned in Column 4 of Schedule II to the Act in proceedings mentioned in Column 3 thereof.
18. Sub Section (4) of Section 331 of the Act, 331 provides that a second appeal shall lie on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 from the final order or decree passed in an appeal under Sub Section (3) to the authority, if any, mentioned against it in Column 6 of the Schedule.
19. Schedule II, so far as it pertains to Section 331 of the Act, 1950 specifically provides at Serial No. 34 that under Section 229, 229-B and 229-C i.e suit for declaration of rights, the Court of original jurisdiction would be Assistant Collector Ist Class while a first appeal would lie to the Commissioner and a second appeal shall lie to the Board of Revenue. Thus, when Section 331 (4) is read along with Schedule II it is apparent that a second appeal against an order passed in first appeal shall lie to the Board of Revenue.
20. Section 333 of the Act, 1950, so far as it is relevant for the facts of the instant case, provides that the Board may call for the record of any suit or proceedings decided by any Court subordinate to him in which no appeal lies or where an appeal lies but has not been preferred. Thus, it is apparent that a revision under Section 333 of the Act, 1950 would be available only in those cases either in which no appeal lies or though an appeal lies but had not been preferred.
21. In the instant case, it is admitted that an appeal against the order passed under Section 229-B of the Act, 1950 was filed by the petitioners under Section 331 (3) of the Act, 1950 and thereafter they have filed a revision under Section 333 of the Act, 1950. However, keeping in view the specific provisions of Section 331 (4) of the Act, 1950 which uses the word "shall", it was mandatory for the petitioners, if aggrieved against the order passed under Section 331 (3) of the Act, 1950, to have filed a second appeal. It is settled proposition of law that an appeal is creation of statue. Once the statue, in its wisdom has specifically mandated under Section 331 (4) of the Act, 1950 for filing of second appeal by use of the word "shall", as such, in case the petitioners were aggrieved against the order passed under Section 331 (3) of the Act, 1950 they could only have filed a second appeal and no revision under Section 333 of the Act, 1950 was maintainable. This would also be clear from the words used in Section 333 of the Act, 1950 wherein it has been provided that the Board may call for the records of any suit or proceedings decided by any Court subordinate in which either no appeal lies or where an appeal lies but has not been preferred. Thus, the revision under Section 333 of the Act, 1950 can only be filed either where the petitioners had no remedy of filing an appeal (which is not the case) or where they had not filed the appeal which is also not the case inasmuch as the petitioner admittedly filed an appeal under Section 331 (3) of the Act, 1950. Thus, the revision under Section 333 of the Act, 1950 was clearly not maintainable and was wrongly preferred by the petitioners.
22. The arguments of learned Senior Advocate that as Section 333 of the Act, 1950 does not quantify or define "Appeal" as first appeal or and second appeal, as such he would be empowered to file a revision under Section 333 of the Act, 1950 as per litigants choice of choosing the forum, is clearly misconceived inasmuch as there cannot be two forums open to a litigant at his choice to either file a second appeal or a revision for in case the said argument of the learned Senior Advocate is accepted then Section 333 of the Act, 1950 would be treated as an alternative forum to Section 331 (4) of the Act, 1950, which would be absolutely a wrong interpretion of law. The reason is that the statutory scope and purpose of Section 333 is to be availed only in those situations or legal circumstances where against an order or judgment rendered by the subordinate Court either no appeal lies or where an appeal lies but it has not been preferred. However, those cases in which the statute provides the forum of second appeal, the power of revision can never be treated to be synonymous to power of appeal as it would defeat the very purpose of creation of the different forum.
23. The matter can also be looked from another perspective inasmuch as obviously the intention of legislature cannot be to make two forums available to a litigant and that too, at his own choice and thus merely because Section 333 of the Act, 1950 has only used the word "Appeal" and not second appeal, the same has to be reasonably interpreted to mean that where an appeal has been preferred under Section 331 (3) of the Act, 1950, the forum of filing of a revision under Section 333 of the Act, 1950 would not be available.
24. In this regard, the Court may refer to a judgment of this Court in the case of Mirza Kishwar Beg (supra) wherein this aspect of the matter has been considered and it was categorically held that once an appeal has been preferred then in such a case the revisional power could not be invoked by the Board either at the instance of a party or by the Board itself suo moto.
25. This aspect of the matter has also been considered by Uttrakhand High Court in the case of Prema Devi Vs. Mathura Dutt Pandey reported in AIROnline 2019 Utr 564 wherein the Court has held as under:-
6. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that being aggrieved against the Appellate Court's order passed in an statutory appeal, no revision will lie under the Act, because once a special statute provides a Forum of Second Appeal under Section 331(4) to be read under II Schedule of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, 1950, in that eventuality, the person, who is aggrieved by the First Appellate Court's order, is bound to invoke the Forum, which has been statutorily created of preferring a Second Appeal under sub Section (4) of Section 333 of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, 1950, which has to be decided in the light of the provisions contained under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which has been made applicable over the second appellate proceedings under the Act, by reference. Even otherwise, this Court is of the view that once the statutory appeal has been decided, any judgement rendered by the appellate Court would not be revisable as appellate judgements are not revisable.
7. While on the other hand, the argument which has been extended by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs/respondents is that the provisions contained under Section 333 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, though it apparently seems to be a revisional power given under the Act, which has been vested with the Board or the Commissioner, as the case may be, hence, it would be amounting to exercise the same powers as contemplated under Section 331(4) of the Act could be treated as to be para materia provision and a forum to challenge the First Appellate Court's order. This Court is not in agreement with the argument as extended by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs/respondents the reason being that if his argument as extended is accepted then the provisions contained under Section 333 as to be treated as an alternative Forum to Section 331(4), it would be absolutely a wrong interpretation of law for the reason being that the statutory scope and purpose of Section 333, is to be availed in those situations or legal circumstances where any order or a judgement rendered by any subordinate Court could be subject to revision at the behest of the party aggrieved or even the revisional Court can suo moto take its call and initiate the proceedings of a revision. But in these cases where the Statute is providing a forum of second appeal, the powers of revision can never be treated to synonyms to powers of appeal, as it would defeat the very purpose of creation of the different forum.
8. But, if we compare the powers conferred to the second appellate Court under Section 331(4) of the Act, it does not provide that the Second Appellate Court can ever suo moto exercise the powers and take cognizance of an order passed under Section 331(1) of the Act until and unless the aggrieved party files a second appeal, like that provided in Revisional Power under Section 333.
9. Secondly, if the scope of revisional power, which is vested under Section 333 of the Act, would be confined in its application within the scope as provided therein the 3 clauses of the provisions under Section 333 of the Act, which is para materia to the provisions contained under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It happens to be absolutely distinct to the appellate power where the provision of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been made applicable by reference, under Section 331(4)
10. If the argument as extended by the counsel for the plaintiffs/respondents is accepted, it will run contrary to the intention of the legislation itself the reason being that if Section 333 is to be read as a substitute or a synonymous to the provisions contained under Section 331(4) of the Act, it would rather limit the jurisdiction of interference by the Revisional Court as against the First Appellate Court's order within the scope of its interference provided under Section 3 clauses contained therein under Section 333, whereas on the other hand, the provisions contained under Section 331(4) is wide enough to enable the parties to place there case both on facts and law and thus the argument, which has been extended by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs/respondents is not accepted.
11. There is another logic as to why the argument of the learned counsel for the revisionist to treat the proceedings under Section 333 as to be the proceedings of the same parlance as that provided under Section 331(4) is not acceptable from the viewpoint that if this logic is accepted, then there was no need for the legislature to provide for a specific Forum for redressal of the grievance by a party, who is aggrieved by a First Appellate Court's judgement by preferring a second appeal that too within the ambit of Section 100 of the C.P.C. Hence, there was no necessity for the legislature to contemplate different provisions under the Act itself for redressal of the grievance as against the First Appellate Court's order because if the argument as extended is accepted then it will have an adverse effect as it would be leaving the forum to be chosen by the choice of the party, which is aggrieved by first appellate Court's order, selection of a forum cannot be made available by choice of a litigant to invoke a forum which suits to his convenience which is not the intention of the legislature.
26. As regards the judgment cited by learned Senior Advocate in the case of Lachman Das (supra) the same pertains to the distinction between appeal and revision. There cannot be any quarrel to the settled proposition of law inasmuch the scope of appeal and revision are clearly different. As such, the said judgment would have no applicability in the facts of the instant case.
27. Keeping in view the aforesaid discussion as well as the judgment of this Court in the case of Mirza Kishwar Beg (supra) and the judgment of Uttrakhand High Court in the case of Prema Devi (supra) the Court holds that the revision which was filed by the petitioners was wrongly filed and the Board patently erred in entertaining the same.
28. Considering the aforesaid, the writ petition is partly allowed. The impugned order dated 21.04.2022 passed by the Board of Revenue, a copy of which is annexure 1 to the writ petition is set aside. It is provided that it would be open for the petitioners to file a second appeal within a period of two weeks from today.
29. Sri Vijay Bahadur Verma, learned counsel appearing for the respondents no. 4 to 12 fairly submits that in case the appeal is filed within the aforesaid time then he would not be raising the plea of limitation before the Board of Revenue. It is thus provided that in case the second appeal is filed within the aforesaid time period then the Board of Revenue shall proceed to decide the same on merits.
30. It would be open for the petitioners to file an application for stay which will be considered by the Board of Revenue expeditiously.
31. The Court records the valuable assistance given by Sri Abhinav Narain Trivedi, learned Chief Standing counsel and Ms. Vaishnavi Bansal, Law Clerk Trainee of this Court. Order Date :- 6.7.2022 Pachhere/-
(Abdul Moin, J.)