Bombay High Court
Swati Vasant Patil And Anr. vs Kandivli Education Society And Ors. on 2 November, 2001
Equivalent citations: 2002(3)BOMCR51
Author: H.L. Gokhale
Bench: H.L. Gokhale, V.K. Tahilramani
JUDGMENT H.L. Gokhale, J.
1. The petitioners herein are two teachers working in the Junior College run by the 1st respondent-Education Society. The 2nd respondent is the Headmistress of the Junior College run by the said Education Society. This petition is filed to challenge the orders of termination dated 3rd July, 2001 issued by the 1st respondent-Education Society to both the petitioners. Respondent Nos. 4 and 3 are the State of Maharashtra and the Deputy Director of Education respectively. Respondent Nos. 5 and 6 are the teachers who are appointed in place of the two teachers after their termination.
2. Mr. Mihir Desai appears for the petitioners. Mr. Panickar appears for respondent Nos. 1 and 2. Mrs. Kalyanram, AGP appears for respondent Nos. 3 and 4 and Mr. Gangan appears for respondent No. 5. Respondent No. 6 is served.
3. Inasmuch as this matter is concerning the alleged wrongful termination of the petitioners services and since the petitioners are keen in going back on their duty at the earliest and also inasmuch as respondent Nos. 1 and 2 want to know their legal rights in this behalf, we thought it advisable that the petition be heard finally at the admission stage itself. Early hearing of this matter is also necessary on the background on which the matter has come to this Court viz. the Shikshan Sevak Scheme introduced recently by respondent No. 4. The petition is accordingly heard finally and is being disposed of with this order.
4. At the outset, it is material to note that the Junior College run by the 1st respondent-society is a college fully aided and recognised by respondent Nos. 3 and 4. The 1st respondent-education society is an Institution run by a linguistic minority. It is also an accepted position that as far as the service conditions of the employees of private schools (which include junior colleges) are concerned, they are all governed under a State Act known as "Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulations Act, 1977 (for short, "MEPS Act"). The MEPS Act contains various provisions for the purposes of regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of the members of the teaching and non-teaching staff of recognised schools. As far as minority schools are concerned, it is provided in section 3(2) of said Act that the provisions of this Act shall not apply to the recruitment of the head of a minority school and any other persons (not exceeding three) who are employed in such schools and whose names are notified by the Management to the Director or the Deputy Director for this purpose.
5. It so happened that some-times in the year 2000 respondent No. 4 State of Maharashtra took an over view of the expenditure required to be incurred on the Secondary and Higher Secondary Education. It was noted that the expenditure was rising and that it was becoming increasingly difficult to make appropriate financial provisions for the same. The State of Maharashtra, therefore, examined the schemes introduced in the other States such as Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat and came out with a scheme known as "Shikshan Sevak Scheme" (a scheme to engage para teachers). The scheme was introduced through the Government Resolution (G.R.) dated 27th April, 2000. The teachers and their organisations were of the view that the said scheme reduced the pay, rights and facilities of the teachers. In fact, their pay and other service conditions were considerably affected. Some such teachers organisations, therefore, filed a few writ petitions in this Court. All of them came to be heard by a Division Bench (Coram : A.P. Shah & V.C. Daga, JJ.). The Division Bench was of the view that the matter requires consideration and hence the group of petitions being Writ Petition No. 2940 of 2000 and others, Bombay Suburban Secondary School Teachers Association & others v. Secretary, Shri Samartha Education Society & others, were admitted. The Division Bench gave certain interim directions by its order dated 16th August, 2000. The State Government had indicated to the Division Bench its willingness to accept the suggestions which emerged during the course of the discussion before the Division Bench. The Government, therefore, issued another G.R. in modification of the earlier G.R. The subsequent G.R. dated 13th October, 2000 along with its annexures is the one now prevalent in the State as the G.R. laying down the Shikshan Sevak Scheme. The issues raised in the present petition are concerning and arising out of some of the provisions of this G.R. These provisions will be referred to later on.
6. The two petitioners herein are well qualified young ladies. The 1st petitioner has done her Master of Science (M.Sc.) in Physics with First Class and has thereafter taken the Degree of Bachelor of Education (B.Ed.). Similarly the 2nd petitioner has done her M.Sc. with Chemistry. She has also obtained First Class in M.Sc. and taken her Degree in Bachelor of Education (B.Ed.). Thus they are fully qualified to become teachers in a junior College. They were recruited after following the prescribed procedure for selection.
7. The case of the petitioners is that they were appointed as Part-time Lecturers by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 by their letters dated 3rd January, 2000 for the balance of the academic year 1999-2000. They were issued a letter of termination on 3rd March, 2000 to be effective from 30th April, 2000. Both these posts were thereafter converted into full time posts and were advertised in newspapers. Pursuant to the interviews held, they were selected and appointed on the full time posts of Shikshan Sevaks. As per the Shikshan Sevak Scheme, the petitioners were appointed for a period of three years i.e. from 20th June, 2000 to 20th June, 2003 on a fixed 'monthly honorarium' of Rs. 5,000/-. Clause (5) of the appointment letter stated that on completion of three years satisfactory service, the petitioners will be absorbed on a regular basis, however, the service of a Shikshan Sevak will not count towards the pension or pensionary benefits. Clause 2(3) of this appointment letter stated that in the event of misconduct, the appointment will be cancelled. The said clause reads as follows :-
"During the tenure of the term of appointment, your appointment will be cancelled any time for any misconduct on your part. For this purpose, the term of your appointment will not be binding on the School Management. However, you can prefer an appeal against the termination of your appointment or for any other grievance, before the appointed committee."
The appointment letter at the top thereof stated that it was as per the form provided in Appendix 'A' to the Shiksan Sevak Scheme in the G.R. dated 13th October, 2000.
8. The petition states that after the appointment of these petitioners, they worked continuously for one year and there were no complaints from either side whatsoever. The results of the classes taught by the petitioners were also very good inasmuch as they were above 80%. It is at this time that they were served with the letters dated 15th June, 2001 by respondent No. 2 informing them that their appointment period had ended on the last working day of the academic year 2000-2001 i.e. on 21st April, 2001. The management had received an order from respondent No. 3 that surplus teachers were to be absorbed and hence, the management will not be able to continue them in service from the current academic year. The petitioners took up the issue with the teachers' Union and then through the union with respondent No. 3. Respondent No. 3 examined the issue and wrote to respondent Nos. 1 and 2 on 20th June 2001 pointing out to them that the College Management had not sent the proposals of appointment of the Shikshan Sevaks and called upon them to send the proposals within two days. In para 2 of that letter, respondent No. 3 stated as follows :-
"It is mandatory to issue the appointment order for a period of three years on the post of Shikshan Sevak as per the Government Resolution dated 13-10-2000. In the event the appointment is issued only for one year and the services are terminated by making any change, that will be in contempt of the order passed by the High Court and you will be solely responsible for the same."
9. It is material to note that in the meanwhile respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are reported to have received complaints from some of the students, against the petitioners with regard to their teaching. One such complaint is supposed to be dated 16th June, 2001. A photo copy of that complaint was tendered along with the compilation of documents by respondent Nos. 1 and 2. It is clearly seen in the complaint dated 16-6-2001 that the figure indicating the month of June i.e. "6" is written over the figure "7". Mr. Mihir Desai, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, submitted that it is in fact a complaint dated 16-7-2001, but the figure "7" is changed to figure "6". This submission of Mr. Desai deserves to be accepted also for the reason that the signature of the Headmistress on this complaint acknowledging its receipt appears in the margin of this letter and below that she has put the date 16-7-2001. Obviously, if the complaint was of 16-6-2001, there was no reason for the Headmistress to put the date 16-7-2001. Thus, obviously it is received subsequent to their dismissal. Besides, in this complaint, there is no grievance against the 2nd petitioner viz. Archana V. Tajnekar and her name does not appear therein. In that, the name of the 1st petitioner also appears to be added therein and it is a different handwriting. The complaint is essentially against one Professor Pandey and all the statements therein are about him and nothing is stated particularly even about the 1st petitioner. It is stated in that complaint that the student who was writing that letter had given his own willingness not to appear for the H.S.C. examination because of the force exerted by this Professor. Thus, even in its contents, there is nothing against the two petitioners.
10. Thereafter two more complaints dated 27th June and 29th June, 2001 are relied upon. It is interesting to note that in the complaint dated 27th June, 2001 also the name of the 2nd petitioner clearly appears to have been added and it is not in the same hand-writing as that of the author of that letter. Both these complaints of 27th and 29th June, 2001 are by a few students. The first complaint states that Professor, Pandey and these two petitioners at times used harsh words, they lacked knowledge and their English was poor. The complaint of 29th June, 2001 is against one Miss Nutan and one Miss Sandhya. There is no mention of the names of the petitioners in this complaint at all.
11. It is sought to be contended by the respondents that the services of the petitioners were terminated because of these complaints by issuing the impugned orders of termination dated 3rd July, 2001. However, as seen from the above, out of the three complaints one is received after the dismissal order. In one complaint of 29th June, 2001 there is not a mention of either of the petitioners. In the complaint of 27th June, 2001 name of the second petitioner is added subsequently and there is hardly any substance in the allegations against the first petitioner. In the meanwhile, a little later, the petitioners received the copies of the letters addressed to respondent Nos. 1 and 2 by respondent No. 3 dated 5th July, 2001 stating therein that they were appointed for the period 20th June, 2000 to 30th April, 2003 and the grants for that period were being approved. It is thus the contention of the petitioners that whereas they were appointed as the Shikshan Sevaks for a period of three years, respondent Nos. 1 and 2 wanted to terminate their services somehow or the other at the end of April 2001. That was initially on the alleged ground of accommodating other surplus teachers who were to be absorbed (as seen in the letter dated 15-6-2001). Subsequently since the management received the letter dated 20th June, 2001 from respondent No. 3 asking them to send the proposal for approval of the petitioners, respondent Nos. 1 and 2 resorted to terminating the services of the petitioners on the alleged ground of their services being not satisfactory. In the reply it is stated that they were terminated because of their misbehaviour also. In fact, respondent No. 2 wrote a letter dated 25th June 2001 to the petitioners informing that she had received several oral complaints from the students about their teaching and behaviour. The letter asked them to be careful and perform the duties diligently in future. That letter was replied by both the petitioners by their representation dated 29-6-2001. It is interesting to note that no complaints prior to the letter dated 25-6-2001 are placed on record by respondent Nos. 1 and 2. What they have placed on record are one complaint received on 16-7-2001 and two complaints dated 27th June, 2001 and 29th June, 2001. Thereafter the impugned letters of termination dated 3rd July, 2001 were issued. The letters merely state as follows :
"Madam, This is to inform you that, your services as Shikshan Sevak in S.V.P. Jr. College of Science is terminated w.e.f. 4th July, 2001. You are hereby paid an amount of Rs. 2470/- as 15 days salary in lieu of notice period, P.T. deducted Rs. 30/.
Yours faithfully, Sd/-
Mahesh Chandarana) The Kandivali Education Society."
Mr. Desai submitted that obviously this action is mala fide, it is in breach of the directive given by respondent No. 3 to regularise the petitioners and it is sought to be defended on the fabricated grounds of misbehaviour and unsatisfactory services.
12. The petition was opposed by filing an affidavit-in-reply of the Headmistress affirmed on 17th September 2001. In this reply, reliance is placed firstly on the above-referred Clause 2(3) of the appointment order which states that for misconduct, the appointment of a teacher can be cancelled. It is submitted that this termination is during the probation period. Secondly, it is submitted that if the petitioners are aggrieved, they have an alternative Forum to go to the Grievance Committee. Lastly, it is submitted that respondent No. 1 Education Society is a minority institutional protected under Article 30 of the Constitution of India and hence, no direction as sought by the petitioners can be issued. In para 3 of the reply, it is submitted that initially respondent No. 3 wanted surplus teachers from other institutions to be absorbed and, therefore, termination of the petitioners had become necessary. It is alleged that because of the pressure brought by the petitioners those teachers did not turn up and the earlier direction to accommodate them was cancelled. In para 4, it is stated that both the petitioners were arrogant and their work was not satisfactory and that the complaints had been received from the students as pointed out above. One of the two teachers now appointed in place of the petitioners i.e. respondent No. 5 has also filed a reply stating that she has been subsequently appointed as a Lecturer in Chemistry and she has come in place of petitioner No. 2 and that her services should not be disturbed. No reply is filed by respondent Nos. 3 and 4 but they are generally supporting the petitioners.
13. As noted above, it was submitted on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 that initially the petitioners were sought to be discontinued in view of the directions of respondent No. 3 to accommodate teachers who had become surplus in other institutions. No affidavit-in-reply has been filed by respondent No. 3. However, Mrs. Kalyanram, learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for respondent Nos. 3 and 4, submitted that these appointments had to be for a period of three years. During this period of three years, if the Shikshan Sevak commits a misconduct of any type, his appointment was liable to be cancelled by the Appointing Authority which had to be done with the prior approval of the Deputy Director of Education. She pointed out that in fact Clause 14 of this G.R. of 13th October, 2001 provided that while issuing appointment letter, it was necessary to include the following conditions therein :-
"14 Terms and conditions for the Shikshan Sevak.---The appointment letter be issued to the candidate selected as Shikshan Sevak after taking an undertaking from him as per the format given in Annexure-C. In the appointment letter, following terms and conditions be incorporated by the appointing authority :
(1) The Shikshan Sevak will have to work in any school under the jurisdiction of the appointing authority.
(2) If the Shikshan Sevak indulges into a misconduct of any type during the period of his appointment, his appointment is liable to be cancelled by the appointing authority. In cases pertaining to private educational institutions the appointment of the concerned Shikshan Sevak will be cancelled after the prior permission of the Regional Deputy Director.
(3) .....................
(4) .....................
(5) ......................
(6) ......................
(7) ......................
Mr. Desai points out that Clause 2(3) of the appointment letter referred to earlier is not in consonance with this Clause 14 of the G.R. though it is as per the format provided in the appointment letter. Ms. Kalyanram is fair enough to accept that this Clause 2(3) as provided by the State Government is not in consonance with Clause 14 of the Government Resolution. Mr. Desai and Ms. Kalyanram submit that in any case it is the substantive provision of the Resolution i.e. Clause 14(2) which will prevail and not the defective provision of Clause 2(3) of the appointment letter. In this connection, it is also material to note that Clause 2(5) of the appointment letter referred to above is also contrary to the G.R. of 13-10-2001. Clause 2(5) states that the service of Shikshan Sevak will not count towards pension, but Clause 8(2) of the G.R. states that this service shall count towards pension and other retirement benefits.
14. Mr. Desai learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, therefore, submitted that the orders of termination issued to the two petitioners were unjustified, bad in law and initiated by a vindictive approach. He submitted that under the M.E.P.S. Act, if the employees were terminated they could approach the School Tribunal which was a regular quasi judicial authority. The pay and other service conditions of the employees were also for better before the introduction of the Shikshan Sevak Scheme. On the ground that the State was facing financial difficulties, this scheme had been introduced. The petition challenging the scheme was admitted and was pending final disposal in this Court. During the pendency of that petition, the scheme framed by the State Government was modified by the State in the light of the suggestion from the Court. Under the modified scheme of 13th October, 2000 also, though some improvement was brought about over the earlier Shikshan Sevak Scheme, the provisions thereof were still not very satisfactory. Firstly, the pay of the teachers even those with qualifications such as M.Sc. B.Ed. to teach in a Junior College would be fixed at Rs. 5,000/- for a period of 3 years. The payment was by way of 'honorarium'. Under Clause 8(2) of the G.R., new appointment order was to be issued after these three years though the service during this period was to be counted towards pension and retirement benefits. He submits that during this period, as far as protection to service is concerned, whatever that was provided had to be read strictly, otherwise the scheme would become oppressive. The provision of Clause 14 of the G.R. of 13th October, 2000 required that in the event of a misconduct, service of the teacher concerned was liable to be cancelled by the appointing authority. As far as private educational institutions are concerned, the only restriction placed on them was that they had to obtain a prior permission of the Deputy Director. Clause 14(2) did not prevent the Management from taking necessary decission but before it was acted upon, this permission was necessary. He submitted that this condition was not complied with and, therefore, the decision of the respondents terminating the two petitioners-teachers was illegal. Mr. Desai then submitted that apart therefrom, the decision was unjustified also and was arrived at without any opportunity to defend. He pointed out that for full one year both these teachers had taught to the satisfaction of the Management and there was no complaint whatsoever. The results were over 80% inspite of a clear appointment for a period of three years, when teachers were told that their services were to be terminated at the end of one year, they took up the matter with the Deputy Director of Education. Initially the management tried to justify the termination of the teachers on the ground that surplus teachers were to be accommodated. When the Deputy Director withdrew the earlier communication in that behalf and asked the management to take back these two petitioners, respondent Nos. 1 and 2 came out with the plea that their services were not satisfactory. For that also they relied upon three complaints by the students written sometimes in June 2000. One of the letters was received subsequent to dismissal. One did not contain any allegation against either of the petitioners. The third one was a letter written by a few students who had just joined and surely, the management had to look into such complaints properly. The management could not simply accept those complaints as the gospel truth. This was particularly on the background that both the petitioners had worked satisfactorily for over a year and there was not a single complaint against them. Mr. Desai, therefore, submitted that the termination was unjustified as well.
15. His last submission is that the termination was vindictive inasmuch as the Management had tried to rely upon documents in a convenient manner. He pointed out as above that two of the complaints/letters were of no use. In the letter of 27th June, 2001, the name of the 2nd petitioner-Miss Tajnekar appears to have been added subsequently. This is clear from para 2 of this letter wherein the name of the 1st petitioner appears in the same handwriting and thereafter the name of Miss Tajnekar is added in a different handwriting. There is also reason to accept that this complaint is not at all against the 2nd petitioner because the 1st paragraph states that the signatories are voicing grievances of the students complaining about the Lectures of Science, especially Professor Pandey (Biology) and Professor Swati Patil (Physics). Thereafter there are two paragraphs containing the complaints which are as follows :-
"Madam, We are sure we are voicing the grievances of hundreds of other students while complaining about the lecturers of science college of your highly esteemed college especially Professor Pandey (Biology) & Professor Swati Patil (Physics).
COMPLAINTS :
(1) Professor Pandey :-
Teaching is irrelevant and not up to the syllabus as given in the books prescribed by the Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education.
(2) Professor Swati Patil, Ms. Tajnekar she tries her level best but cannot interpret what she wants to explain and at times she uses 'Harsh' words. She lacks basic knowledge and her English is also poor."
Thus, these two paragraphs indicate that first part is against Professor Pandey, whereas the second part is against the the 1st petitioner. The second paragraph all throughout states that she tries her level best but cannot explain what she wants to explain and at times she uses harsh words, she lacks basic knowledge and her English is also poor. Now, if this paragraph was against the 2nd petitioners-Miss Tajnekar also, then the name of Miss Tajnekar would have appeared in the initial paragraph itself wherein only the names of Professor Pandey and Professor Swati Patil are mentioned. Thereafter para-1 is devoted to Professor Pandey and para 2 will have to be construed as devoted to Professor Swati Patil because as seen from what is written in para 2 it is concerning only one teacher. If the students were complaining against two teachers in this paragraph, they would have stated that these two teachers cannot intepret or they use harsh words or they lack in the knowledge etc. All throughout, the language in para 2 is that she cannot explain, she uses harsh words, she lacks basic knowledge etc. Thus, Mr. Desai submitted that this paragraph is only about the 1st petitioner and not about the 2nd petitioner. He, therefore, submits that as far as the 2nd petitioner is concerned, there is no material whatsoever against her.
16. Thereafter, Mr. Desai submits that this letter of 27th June, 2001 is by students who had just joined in the 12th Std. and within about a fortnight of the college starting they have written in this manner. The first petitioner had not taught these students in the 11th standard and she teaches only the 12th standard students. What is surprising is that College Management has taken this complaint to heart on the background of the two petitioners teaching for one full year without any complaint whatsoever and when the results of the classes taught by them were above 80%. Mr. Desai, therefore, submits that these complaints are motivated by the Management and are mala fide. The petitioners were not given any opportunity to explain with respect to these complaints. In this submission, the complaints are totally baseless and unjustified. Both the petitioners are well qualified, and have taught for one full year to the satisfaction of the Management. Suddenly the Management cannot turn and on the basis of one letter say that their services are unsatisfactory and are terminated. It is precisely for a situation like this that a prior permission of the Deputy Director was required. He submits that as seen from above, clearly the decision of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 was vindictive and mala fide to say the least.
17. Mr. Panickar, learned Counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 submitted at the outset that under the G.R. dated 13th October, 2001, a Grievance Committee had been provided under Clause 17 thereof and the petitioners ought to approach that Grievance Committee and this petition should not be entertained in view of this alternative remedy. He drew our attention to a short order dated 9th August, 2001 passed by a Division Bench in Writ Petition No. 3387 of 2001 recording that another teacher in that matter had agreed to approach the Grievance Committee and the Grievance Committee was directed to decide the complaint expeditiously. He drew our attention to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Scooters India & others v. Vijai E.V. Eldred, . In that matter, the writ petition had been filed by a workman whose services were automatically terminated on account of unauthorised absence for more than 10 years. The Apex Court had laid down that he had an alternative remedy under the industrial laws.
18. Mr. Panickar secondly submitted that the petitioners were essentially probationers during this period of three years and the management had every right to terminate their services. He relied upon an unreported judgment of a Division Bench of this Court dated 18th August, 1993 in Writ Petition No. 1094 of 1985, Mohammed Haji Saboo Siddik & others v. The State of Maharashtra & others. In that matter, respondent No. 3 was a Lecturer in a Polytechnic. During the period of probation of two years, he had been terminated from service and his termination was interfered by the Tribunal. The Division Bench has held that as far as performance of the probationer is concerned, it is to be assessed by the employer and thereafter it was for the employer to take the decision as to whether the probationer is to be confirmed in service or not. The Division Bench had interfered with the order of the trial Court. Mr. Panickar thereafter referred to few judgments of the Apex Court. Firstly, he referred to the judgment in the case of K.V. Krishnamani v. Lalit Kala Academy, wherein the Apex Court held that the object of probation is to test the suitability and if the appointing authority finds that the candidate is not suitable, it certainly has power to terminate the services. Then he relied upon a judgment in the case of Krisnadevaraya Education Trust & another v. L.A. Balakrishna, . In that matter, the Court had observed that during the period of probation suitability of the recruit/appointee has to be seen. If his services are not satisfactory which means that he is not suitable for the job, then the employer has a right to terminate the services as a reason thereof. The Court observed in that matter that in order to avoid the allegations that the order is stigmatic the employer should not stage any reasons why services are terminated. Mr. Panickar lastly relied upon a judgment in the case of H.F. Sangati v. R.G. High Court of Karnataka & others, reported in A.I.R. 2001 S.C.W. 886. In that matter, a Munsif had been discontinued during the probation period by the communication of Registrar General of Karnataka High Court and the order has been upheld by the Apex Court. Mr. Panickar, therefore, submits that the termination of two petitioners during the probation period could not be interfered with by this Court if the management was of the view that their services were not satisfactory.
19. Lastly, Mr. Panickar submitted that the 1st respondent-Education Society was a minority institution and, therefore, this Court ought not to interfere in writ jurisdiction as it would affect the rights of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India. In this behalf, he relied upon few judgments viz. in the cases of (i) Bihar State Madarsa Education Board v. Anjuman Ahle-Hadees & another, reported in 1994 Supp. (2) S.C.C. 509, (ii) Lilly Kurian v. University Appellate Tribunal & others, , (iii) Yunus Ali Sha v. Mohamed Abdul Kalam & others, and (iv) Committee of Management, St. John Inter College v. Girdhari Singh & others, . In the case of Bihar State Madarsa Education Board (supra), no teacher or Madarsa was to be discharged or dismissed from service without the prior approval of the Board. It was held that particular Clause 24 of the Bihar State Madarsa Education Board Act gave tremendous control in the hands of the Board to meddle with the affairs of the minority institutions. In Lilly Kurian's case (supra), the dispute was between the Management and the teacher of a private college in relation to the conditions of service. Under section 60(7) of the Kerala University Act, a power was given to the Appellate Tribunal to pass appropriate orders. It was held that the said section and section 61 conferring right of appeal were violative of Article 30(1) of the Constitution. In the case of Yunus Ali Sha (supra), the appellant was running a Madarsa. Government was giving a lump sum grant to the institution to be distributed amongst the teachers and the staff. The school was under the control of Director of Education through the Special Officer for Mohammedan Education. The Apex Court held that the Management of the institution was by an independent body with full control over the appointment, termination and disciplinary action against the employees. This can be done without obtaining prior approval of the Director or the Inspector of Schools unlike in the case of other aided educational institutions. In the case of Committee of Management, St. John Inter College (supra), the provision requiring permission of the Inspector before the termination was held not applicable to the minority institution. Mr. Panickar, therefore, submitted that since respondent No. 1 was a minority institution it had the protection under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India and any interference into the decision of the Management cannot be permitted.
20. Mr. Desai, learned Counsel for the petitioners, submitted in rejoinder that this was a new scheme framed by the State Government, under which this problem had arisen. The Grievance Committee was not constituted when the petition was filed. The defence with regard to the minority character and the rights of the 1st respondent-institution based thereon could not be decided by the Grievance Committee. Besides, the question as to whether the teachers during this period of three years were probationers had also to be looked into. Therefore, in his submission, the petitioners should not be relegated to approach the Grievance Committee. That apart, the existence of an alternative Forum was a matter of self restriction for the High Court Mr. Desai submitted that, in a matter like the present one coming up soon after framing of the scheme, it was desirable that this Court resolves, the above two controversies with respect to the rights of the teachers during this period and the rights of the teachers in minority institution.
21. As far as the question with respect to the petitioners being probationers is concerned, Mr. Desai submitted that their appointments were under the particular scheme in terms of the High Court guidelines. Under the M.E.P.S. Act, the teachers were supposed to be on probation for a period of two years. Now, under the scheme, the Shikshan Sevaks were to be on a fixed honorarium for three years. The probationers always had a right to claim benefits for the service rendered during probation period. Under the scheme, even after completion of 3 years of satisfactory service, fresh appointment order was to be issued, though this service was to count for retirement benefits. The Shikshan Sevaks were given only a minimum protection, namely, that the decision of the Management of private schools to terminate their services had to be forwarded to the concerned Deputy Director and after his permission the appointment could be cancelled. Mr. Desai submits that whether the service was satisfactory or nor had to be on the basis of some materials and in the case of private schools some scrutiny by the Government Officer was necessary. All that the Managements were expected to do was to place their decision and justifying material before the Deputy Director. In a given case, the Deputy Director would certainly give an approval. In the present case, the permission was not sought at all and the submission of Mr. Desai was that the non-compliance of this particular provision under Clause 14 had rendered the termination bad.
22. Lastly, with respect to the minority character of the school, Mr. Desai submitted that it was too late in the day to raise this question. Under section 3(2) of the M.E.P.S. Act, 1977 the recruitment of the Headmaster and three other teachers were kept out of the provision of that Act. This provision had been operating and had been upheld and explained by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bengali Education Society, Nagpur & others v. Presiding Officer, School Tribunal, Nagpur & others, reported in 1991 Maharashtra Law Journal page 864. It was canvassed before the Division Bench that the society running a minority school is free from all fetters which private schools are required to abide by in the matter of recruitment of personnel such as the Head of the teaching establishment. Even with respect to them, the Court (per Daud, J.) held in para 9 of that judgment as follows :-
"It cannot be said that the Head of the minority school is totally stripped of the protection given by the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act. The different provisions of the Act have to be so read as to reconcile one with the other. If section 3 is to be read in isolation it would amount to this, that the Head of a Minority School and three named persons would be totally deprived of protection and for no better reason than that the Management had singled them out for notification. A better way to read sections 3 and 5 would be to hold that section 3(2) can be taken recourse to, only when there is a vacancy in the post of Head of Minority School and three other posts. Once the vacancy is filled up, the incumbent after completion of two years becomes an automatically confirmed employees. Once the confirmation takes effect, he gets the protection of section 4(6) in that he cannot be suspended, dismissed, removed, otherwise terminated or reduced in rank, except in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules made in that behalf. Unless an attempt is made to reconcile, the exemption contemplated by the provision of section 3(2) would become a charter of oppression. Giving a minority the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice is recognised by Article 30(1) of the Constitution. But the right guaranteed permits regulatory measures designed towards the achievement of the goal viz. making minority educational institutions effective instruments for imparting of education. Uncertainty of tenure for the person manning the post of a Head would endanger this goal."
(Underlining supplied)
23. Mr. Desai then referred to the observations of the Apex Court in the case of Frank Anthony Public School Employees Association v. Union of India & others, . In that matter, the Management of the private schools wanted to be excluded from the coverage of the provisions of Delhi Education Act which made a number of provisions for the benefit of the teachers covered under that Act. The Apex Court examined earlier judgments including those in Ahemedabad St. Xaviers College Society v. State of Gujarat, and All Saints High School v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, amongst others and held that regulatory measures cannot be construed to be infringing Article 30(1). The Court further held that whether a particular measure is in the ultimate analysis, designed to achieve such goal, without of course nullifying any part of the right of management in substantial measure will have to be examined in each case. In paras 15 and 16, the Court observed as follows :-
"The mere prescription of scales of pay and other conditions of service would not jeopardise the right of the management of minority institutions to appoint teachers of their choice. The excellence of the instruction provided by an institution would depend directly on the excellence of the teaching staff, and in turn, that would depend on the quality and the contentment of the teachers. Conditions of service pertaining to minimum qualifications of teachers, their salaries, allowances and other conditions of service which ensure security, contentment and decent living standards to teachers and which will consequently enable them to render better service to the institution and the pupils cannot be said to be violative of the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 30(1). The Management of a minority education institution cannot be permitted under the guise of the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 30(1) to oppress or exploit its employees any more than any other private employee."
(Underlining supplied)
24. Mr. Desai then relied upon another judgment in the case of Mrs. Y. Theclamma v. Union of India others, in that matter, the Court held that there was no conflict between the judgment in the case of Frank Anthony (supra) and earlier judgment in the case of Lilly Kurian, . In paras 11 and 12 of the judgment, the Apex Court observed as follows :-
"11. It would be seen that the decision of the Court in Frank Anthony Public School's case, with regard to the applicability of sub-section (4) of section 8 of the Act to the unaided minority educational institutions is based on the view taken by the majority in All Saints High School's case which, in its turn, was based on several decisions right from In re, The Kerala Education Bill, 1957, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 956 down to St. Xavier, including that in Lilly Kurian v. Sr. Lewina, . It is therefore difficult to sustain the argument of learned Counsel for the respondent that the decision in Frank Anthony Public School's case holding that sub-section (4) of section 8 of the Act was applicable to such institutions was in conflict with the decision of the Constitution Bench in Lilly Kurian's case and therefore required reconsideration. The contention of learned Counsel for the respondents that sub-section (4) of section 8 of the Act requiring the prior approval of the Director for the suspension of a teacher was a flagrant encroachment upon the right of the minorities under Article 30(1) of the Constitution to administer educational institutions established by them is answered in all the earlier decision of this Court right from In re The Kerala Education Bill, 1957 down to that in All Saints High School's case which have been referred to by the Court in Frank Anthony Public School's case. These decisions unequivocally lay down that while the right of the minorities, religious or linguistic, to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice cannot be interfered with, restrictions by way of regulations for the purpose of ensuring educational standards and maintaining excellence thereof can validly be prescribed."
"12. It cannot be doubted that although disciplinary control over the teachers of a minority educational institution is with the Management, regulations can be made for ensuring proper conditions of service for the teachers and also for ensuring a fair procedure in the matter of disciplinary action. As the Court laid down in Frank Anthony Public School's case, the provision contained in sub-section (4) of section 8 of the Act is designed to afford some measure of protection to the teachers of such institutions without interfering with the Managements right to take disciplinary action. Although the Court in that case had no occasion to deal with the different ramifications arising out of sub-section (4) of section 8 of the Act, it struck a note of caution that in a case where the Management charged the employee with gross misconduct, the Director is bound to accord his approval to the suspension. It would be seen that the endeavour of the Court in all the cases has been to strike a balance between the constitutional obligation to protect what is secured to the minorities under Article 30(1) with the social necessity to protect the members of the staff against arbitrariness and victimisation."
(Underlining supplied)
25. Lastly, Mr. Desai referred to the judgment in the case of C.M.C.H. Employees Union & another v. Christian Medical College Vellore Association & others, wherein the Apex Court held that the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act did not interfere the right of the minorities to establish and administer education institutions. The submission of Mr. Desai, therefore, was that it is a regulatory mechanism under Clause 14 of the Shikshan Sevak Scheme which only required the school/college Management to obtain prior permission of the Regional Director before the order of cancellation of appointment was issued. The clause did not prevent the Management from taking the decision. All that it required was that the decision may be forwarded to the Deputy Director of Education for scrutiny and only when he grants his approval that the appointment can be cancelled. He submitted that it must be noted that the rights of the teachers were much reduced under the Shikshan Sevak scheme as against the M.E.P.S. Act. This was only a small protection without affecting the rights of the Management and in his submission these rights need not differ depending upon as to whether the institution is a minority institution or otherwise.
26. We have gone through the rival submissions made by the learned Counsel for the petitioners as well as for the School Management and for the Government. As far as the first objection to the maintainability of the petition on the ground of non-exhausting an alternative remedy is concerned, it is necessary to note that when the petition was filed, this Grievance Committee contemplated under the G.R. of 13th October, 2001 was not constituted. It has come to be constituted during the pendency of this petition. Although respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are contending that the petitioners must approach that committee, Clause 2.3 of the appointment letter and Clause 14(2) of the G.R of 13th October 2001 are required to be interpreted for the smooth functioning of this committee. Clause 2.3 in the appointment letter states that although the appointment can be cancelled during the tenure of the term of appointment for misconduct at any time, an appeal is available for any grievance before the appointed committee. As against that, Clause 14(2) of the G.R. states that for a misconduct of any type appointment is liable to be cancelled, but in the case of a private educational institution appointment will be cancelled after the prior permission of the Regional Deputy Director.
27. A joint reading of the two clauses will mean that first the private school Management will have to obtain the permission of the Deputy Director of Education and thereafter against the order of cancellation of appointment an appeal will lie to this committee. In the instant case, it is contended by the petitioners that such permission has not been sought and hence the termination is void ab initio. Now, the question has to be decided as to whether this prior permission is necessary. It is an aspect which has a bearing on the stage wherefrom the Grievance Committee will start functioning. Since it is a matter bearing upon jurisdiction of a particular authority, as laid down by the Apex Court in the case of State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Karnataka & others, reported in 1991 Suppl. (1) S.C.C. 240, the courts have alone the function of determining authoritatively the meaning of a statutory enactment and to lay down the frontiers of jurisdiction of any body or Tribunal constituted under the statute or scheme. Besides, as laid down in a number of judgments and particularly the Constitution Bench in the case of A.V. Venkateswaran v. R.S. Wadhwani & another, it is held as follows :-
"The Rule that the party who applies for the issue of high prerogative writ should, before he approaches the Court, have exhausted other remedies open to him under the law is not one which bars the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain the petition or to deal with it, but is rather a Rule which courts have laid down for the exercise of their discretion."
We have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting the first objection that the alternative remedy is not exhausted or that the petitioners must approach the Grievance Committee before filing this petition.
28. Now, with respect to the second submission, of Mr. Panickar about the petitioners being probationers, we would like to record that the Shikshan Sevak Scheme does not use any such phrase. A probationer on completion of the period of probation gets the benefits of the service during the period of probation. That is no so in the present case, except that after completion of three years of service, the Shikshan Sevak would become eligible for fresh appointment thereafter. In this period of three years there are no increments and other monetary benefits. Leave is permissible only for five days. This service is to count only for retirement benefits provided one is appointed as a teacher after three years. Thus it is a sort of a contractual arrangement whereunder the teacher also has to give a guarantee/undertaking in writing on his/her appointment. Besides, the clauses of the scheme speak of "cancellation of appointment" and not "termination of service" as it is otherwise understood. Thus the relationship of this para-teacher with the appointing authority is purely contractual. We have, therefore, our doubts as to whether the various propositions concerning the probationers will have an applicability to this kind of contractual appointment.
29. Besides, even in the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Krishnadevaraya Education Trust (supra), in para 6, the Court stated as follows :-
"If such an order is challenged, the employer will have to indicate the grounds on which the services of a probationer were terminated. Mere fact that in the response to the challenge the employer states that the services were not satisfactory would not ipso facto mean that the services of the probationer were being terminated by way of punishment. The probationer is on test and if the services are found not to be satisfactory, the employer has, in terms of the letter of appointment, the right to terminate the series."
The above quotation shows that even in the case of probationer where the order of termination is challenged the employer will have to indicate the grounds on which the services were terminated. In the instant case, from the record which is placed before this Court, there was no material at all against petitioner No. 2, and the material against petitioner No. 1 was also so flimsy and obviously, a motivated one that it could not be relied upon.
30. Then we come to the question of inter-relationship between Clause 2.3 of the appointment letter and Clause 14(2) of G.R. dated 13th October, 2001 as stated earlier. This is because although on one hand, respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are stating that the petitioners are discontinued during the probation period for non-satisfactory work, they are also saying in their reply that they are terminated for mis-behaviour. If that is the plea of the Management, then it becomes a termination because of a stigma. Even in the case of termination for a misconduct the above-referred Clause 2.3 permits the Management to cancel the appointment any time for a misconduct on the part of the employee but subject to a right of appeal to the appointed committee. However Clause 14(2) of the G.R. dated 13th October, 2001 provides that if Shikshan Sevak indulges into a misconduct of any type during the period of his appointment, his appointment is liable to be cancelled by the appointing authority, but in a private management, that will however be after obtaining the prior permission of the Deputy Director of Education. Thus, as per Clause 14(2) of the G.R. the appointment of the Shikshan Sevak is not cancelled until after the prior permission of the Regional Deputy Director is received. This permission of the Regional Deputy Director is to be obtained in the event the Shikshan Sevak indulges into a misconduct and the appointing authority takes a decision that the appointment be cancelled for the same. Thus, the appointing authority will have to form an opinion that the appointment should be cancelled for the misconduct. Inasmuch as it is a cancellation of appointment for a misconduct, surely some modicum of opportunity to explain ought to be provided to the teacher before the Management forms the opinion that the Shikshan Sevak had indulged into a misconduct. The consequence of formation of such opinion is cancellation of the appointment and reduction of the tenure which is otherwise for 3 years and it is a prejudicial civil consequence. A fair opportunity to defend is, therefore, necessary before arriving at this decision. Thereafter this decision will have to be forwarded to the Deputy Director of Education for his approval when the appointment will be cancelled. Under Clause 2.3 the aggrieved Shikshan Sevak will have an opportunity of appeal before the appointed committee against that order.
31. A joint reading of these two clauses will lead to the above procedure. This is because as such the rights of the Shikshan Sevak are very much reduced rights. A fair opportunity to defend is certainly implied when an opinion is to be formed that the Shikshan Sevak had indulged into a misconduct. Thereafter the approval of the Regional Deputy Director is to be sought for the decision and then there would be an appeal to the appointed committee. Unless these provisions are read in this particular manner grave prejudice will be caused to the teachers and to the education in general. If there is no responsibility to give a fair opportunity, the Management will simply allege a misconduct and straightway issue an order of termination as is seen in the present case. In the present case, for that matter the requirement of making an application to the Deputy Director was also not followed when the stand of the Management is that the petitioners were terminated for misconduct. That was their only defence surviving after the Deputy Director had rejected the Management's earlier decision to discontinue them on the ground that some other surplus teachers were to be accommodated.
32. The requirement of prior approval of Deputy Director is provided for private Managements. This is because it is quite possible that the private Managements may adopt a vindictive attitude as seen in the present case. It appears that the Management was dissatisfied principally because the petitioners approached the Deputy Director through the teachers union. In fact they were pointing out that they were appointed for 3 years and to remove them to bring in surplus teachers was not called for. The Deputy Director having accepted their submission, the Management came with the theory of misconduct. Now, if there is no provision for scrutiny by the Deputy Director at this stage, the entire scheme will come under disrepute. Later on when the Shikshan Sevaks are appointed as regular teachers, they are entitled to retirement benefits for this service of 3 years. To protect whatever minimum rights that the Shikshan Sevak have, a scrutiny by the Deputy Director at the stage of termination is necessary and is justified in the facts of the present case. If the Management was to approach the Deputy Director he would not have approved their termination for misconduct and this entire anxiety to the petitioners would have been avoided.
33. The requirement of fair opportunity, then approval of the Deputy Director to decisions of private Management and then an appeal to the Committee will have to be read into in this scheme. This is because as stated earlier as such the rights of the Shikshan Sevak are very much reduced rights. Under the M.E.P.S. Act, the teachers could not be removed except after a fair opportunity and they have an access to the regular school Tribunal. In the Shikshan Sevak Scheme, the Tribunal is substituted by the Appellate Committee. That being so, there will have to be some minimum original proceeding giving an opportunity to explain and defend to the teachers. The role of the Deputy Director is also relevant because it is at the instance of the State Government and because of its financial difficulties that the rights of the teachers have been reduced. The Government, therefore must play role and see to it that the school Managements do not misuse their powers. In the absence of any such application to the Deputy Director of Education, the termination of the petitioners, in the present case, will have to be held as bad in law.
34 As stated earlier, we have examined the material placed by the Management before the Court. Out of the three complaints, one is received on 16-7-2001 subsequent to the order of termination dated 3-7-2001. In the complaint of 29th June, 2001, there is no mention of names of both the petitioners. As far as the complaint of 27th June, 2001 is concerned, the name of the 2nd petitioner is added in that by different handwritings. As far as the 1st petitioner is concerned, this complaint was not made by a few of her students in 12th Std. and within 15 days of their joining they were alleging that she was not a competent teacher. Without holding any inquiry and without giving any opportunity to the 1st petitioner the Management seems to have accepted that complaint although the results given by both the petitioners were very good and there were no prior complaints whatsoever against them. These unverified complaints cannot be considered as a material on record even against petitioner No. 1. Besides, for these complaints of 27th and 29th June, 2001, the order of termination is of 3rd July, 2001 i.e. just within one week hereafter. This is on the background that the Management had issued a termination letter earlier on 15th June, 2001 claiming that the petitioners had become surplus. The criticism of Mr. Desai will have, therefore, to be accepted that this order of termination is a motivated one.
35. As far as the defence of the Management that it is a minority school, it is too late in the day to raise it. As far as the M.E.P.S. Act is concerned, under section 2(3) of the said Act, the minority schools do have the authority to recruit the Headmaster and three teachers of their choice. Section 3 of this Act initially read as follows :-
"3(1) The provisions of this Act shall apply to all private schools in the State of Maharashtra, whether receiving any grant in aid from the State Government or not.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the provisions of this Act shall not apply to the recruitment, conditions of service and conduct and discipline of the Head of minority school or any other persons (not exceeding three) who are employed in such school and whose names are notified by the Management to the Deputy Director for this purpose."
The Act was amended by introduction of Bill No. XI of 1987 in Maharashtra Legislative Council on July 7, 1987. One of the important amendment was to sub-section (2) of section 3 and after the amendment the said sub-section (2) reads as follows:
"Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the provisions of this Act shall not apply to the recruitment of the Head of minority school and any other persons (not exceeding three) who are employed in such school and whose names are notified by the Management to the Deputy Director for this purpose."
This provision had come up for consideration before Division Bench in the case of Bengali Education Society (supra). The Division Bench has interpreted the provisions to mean that it is confined to recruitment of the Head teacher and three more persons and not beyond. A similar view is taken by the another Division Bench in the case of Gunvantlal Kantilal Khamar v. State of Maharashtra & others, Appeal No. 268 of 1988 decided on 17-12-1992 reported in 1993(1) C.L.R. 295. In that matter also the Division Bench held that the only right reserved in the minority school by sub-section (2) is in respect of the recruitment to the Head of the minority school. The Court considered the above-referred amendment to section 3(2) and held that the intention of the legislature was clear that every employee of a minority school should be governed by the provisions of the Act in respect of the matters relating to conditions of service and conduct and discipline rules. If the Shikshan Sevak Scheme was not to be brought into force, the teachers would have been continued to be governed under the M.E.P.S. Act as interpreted under the above two judgments. That position cannot alter merely because the Shikshan Sevak Scheme has come into force.
36. In the case of Bihar State Madarsa Education Board (supra) relied upon by Mr. Panickar, the State wanted to control the Madarsa Education and the Constitution of the Managing Committee of Madarsa, That was surely an interference into the rights guaranteed by Article 30(1) of the Constitution. Similar was the situation in the case of Yunus Ali Sha (supra). In that matter, the Government of Orissa was giving lump sum aid to the institutions engaged in Mohammedan Education and it was for the institute to distribute the same amongst the teachers and the staff. The Headmaster (Head Maulbi) and the Assistant Teacher of that institution were sought to be removed but the termination was set aside by the Orissa High Court on the ground that the approval of Director of Education was not obtained under the Orissa Education Act. Now, the Orissa High Court had ignored the provisions of section 2 of the said Act which clearly stated that nothing in that Act shall apply to the educational institution of their choice established and administered by minorities. Thus, the Act had no applicability to these institutions at all. In Lilly Kurian, 1997(2) S.C.C. 24 the power of appeal was uncanalised and unguided. In the case of Committee of Management, St. John Inter College (supra), the Apex Court referred to the judgment in the case of Frank Anthony (supra) and observed in Para 6 that in the concerned Act, there was no guideline under the relevant section to be followed by the Inspector in the matter of approving or dis-approving of the order of termination of an employee in aided educational institution.
37. In the present case, we are faced with a situation where under a very restrictive contractual scheme certain limited rights are given to all the teachers. The right of the Management to take disciplinary action even during this contract period is not taken away. Only a permission of the Director of Education is to be obtained. This implies a very minimum scrutiny as to whether there are circumstances which will justify grant of such permission. This does not imply a full-fledged hearing or adjudication. All that this means is that some kind of very limited fetter is placed on the Management of private school and the Management will have to only disclose its material before the Deputy Director of Education, whereupon permission is to be granted. But in a case where the Management was flouting the earlier directions of the Deputy Director of Education and when it had no material to justify the allegation of misconduct, it would certainly lead to an appropriate order by the Deputy Director of Education. Respondent No. 1-Management does not want even this limited scrutiny. In our view, such regulations have been upheld in Frank Anthony's case (supra) and there is no reason for this Court to depart therefrom.
38. In the case of All Saints High School v. Government of A.P., after exhaustively analysing all the cases decided earlier including Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society v. State of Gujarat, , Fazal Ali, J., summarized the scope and ambit of Article 30(1) into nine propositions. Proposition No. 3 thereof reads as follows :-
"3. While the State or any other statutory authority has no right to interfere with the internal administration or the State can certainly take regulatory measures to promote the efficiency and excellence of educational standards and issue guidelines for the purpose of ensuring the security of the services of the teachers or other employees of the institution."
In Gunvantalal's case (supra), the Division Bench of this Court observed as under :-
"In the Frank Anthony's decision Mr. Justice Chinnappa Reddy in paragraph 13 observed that there appears to be a general and broad consensus about the content and dimension of the Fundamental Right guaranteed by Article 30(1) of the Constitution. The learned Judge observed that the decision in Ahmedabad St. Xaviers case correctly lays down the principles. The learned Judge then observed that the question in each case is whether the particular measure is, in the ultimate analysis, designed to achieve such goal, without of course nullifying any part of the right of Management in substantial measure."
The Apex Court judgments have been followed in the above-referred two Division Benches judgments of this Court and there is no reason now to depart therefrom when merely an approval of the Deputy Director is required to the decision of the private Managements while cancelling the appointment of the Shikshan Sevak even in a minority school.
39. As stated earlier, the scheme has been envisaged because of the financial difficulties of the State Government. Hopefuly, the State should be able to revert back at the earliest to the position prevalent prior to the scheme. In any case, the scheme is pending a scrutiny in this Court. In this interregnum, we are concerned with the reduced rights of the teachers. It is quite possible that during this interregnum, the situation could be exploited by unscrupulous Government Officers or by school/college Management. We cannot but express our serious misgivings about the approach of the scheme. The authorities must not forget that if they neglect teachers it is the students who will suffer, causing serious prejudice to the Society at large. In the present matter, two extremely well qualified teachers have chosen to take this profession on the meagre salary offered to them. That is partly, because of their interest in education and partly because of their family circumstances. Such teachers and for that matter all the teachers have to be treated honourably by the State Government and the school/college Management. It is, therefore, necessary that these minimum regulations will have to be read as they are and without any dilution. Such regulatory measures cannot be construed as infringing upon the rights of a minority institution under Article 30(1) of the Constitution or else. This article will be used as an instrument of oppression and not advancing the cause of education in general and that of minorities in particular.
40. It is noticed during the course of these proceedings that Clause 2(3) and Clause 2(5) of the appointment letter are defective and contrary to Clause 14(2) and 8(2) of the G.R. dated 13-10-2001. The Government will have to issue necessary correction to the format of appointment order. We direct respondent Nos. 3 and 4 to issue the corriggendum within two weeks. In any case, we declare that Clauses 14(2) and 8(2) of the G.R. dated 13-10-2001 will prevail over Clauses 2(3) and 2(5) of the formal of the appointment letter to the extent they are contrary to the G.R.
41. For the reasons stated above, the petition is allowed and the order dated 3rd July, 2001 passed in the case of both the petitioners is set aside. The 1st respondent-Management is directed to reinstate both the petitioners forthwith with continuity in their service and with full back wages. The services of respondent Nos. 5 and 6 are not approved by the Deputy Director of Education in place of the petitioners. That being so, the services of respondent Nos. 5 and 6 will stand discontinued at the end of October 2001, though they will receive the wages for the period July to October 2001, during which period they have served and which burden will be borne by the Management. Rule is made absolute accordingly.
42. Respondent No. 1-Management will pay costs of Rs. 5,000/- to the petitioners.
43. Respondents to act on an authenticated copy of this judgment.
Certified copy expedited.