Gauhati High Court
Page No.# 1/34 vs Manoranjan Saikia And 8 Ors on 22 January, 2025
Author: Devashis Baruah
Bench: Devashis Baruah
Page No.# 1/34
GAHC010257972023
2025:GAU-AS:669
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : CRP(IO)/361/2023
AIKON SAIKIA AND ANR
W/O- SRI RAM CHANDRA SAIKIA,
BRINDABAN PATH, H.NO. 2,
RUPNAGAR, P.S.- BHANGAGARH,
P.O.- INDRAPUR 781032
DISTRICT- KAMRUP(M), ASSAM.
2: RAM CHANDRA SAIKIA
S/O BATAHURAM SAIKIA
BRINDABAN PATH
H.NO. 2
RUPNAGAR
P.S.- BHANGAGARH
P.O.- INDRAPUR 781032
DISTRICT- KAMRUP(M)
ASSAM
VERSUS
MANORANJAN SAIKIA AND 8 ORS
SON OF LATE TARANATH ASIKIS,
VILLAGE- PUB-SARANIA,
P.O. AND P.S.- CHANDMARI,
GUWAHATI-3, DISTRICT- KAMRUP(M),
ASSAM.
2:BHUPEN SAIKIA
SON OF LATE TARANATH SAIKIA
VILLAGE- PUB-SARANIA
Page No.# 2/34
P.O. AND P.S. CHANDMARI
GUWAHATI-3
DISTRICT- KAMRUP(M)
ASSAM.
3:BIPUL SAIKIA
SON OF LATE TARANATH SAIKIA
VILLAGE- PUB-SARANIA
P.O. AND P.S. CHANDMARI
GUWAHATI-3
DISTRICT- KAMRUP(M)
ASSAM.
4:MANTU SAIKIA
SON OF LATE TARANATH SAIKIA
VILLAGE- PUB-SARANIA
P.O. AND P.S. CHANDMARI
GUWAHATI-3
DISTRICT- KAMRUP(M)
ASSAM.
5:GAJIN SAIKIA
SON OF LATE TARANATH SAIKIA
VILLAGE- PUB-SARANIA
P.O. AND P.S. CHANDMARI
GUWAHATI-3
DISTRICT- KAMRUP(M)
ASSAM.
6:PRATIVA MEDHI SAIKIA
WIFE OF LATE MANIK SAIKIA
VILLAGE- PUB-SARANIA
Page No.# 3/34
P.O. AND P.S. CHANDMARI
GUWAHATI-3
DISTRICT- KAMRUP(M)
ASSAM.
7:HEMEN SAIKIA
SON OF LATE MANIK SAIKIA
VILLAGE- PUB-SARANIA
P.O. AND P.S. CHANDMARI
GUWAHATI-3
DISTRICT- KAMRUP(M)
ASSAM.
8:PARI SAIKIA
DAUGHTER OF LATE MANIK SAIKIA
VILLAGE- PUB-SARANIA
P.O. AND P.S. CHANDMARI
GUWAHATI-3
DISTRICT- KAMRUP(M)
ASSAM.
9:HEMAPRAVA SAIKIA
WIFE OF LATE TARANATH SAIKIA
VILLAGE- PUB-SARANIA
P.O. AND P.S. CHANDMARI
GUWAHATI-3
DISTRICT- KAMRUP(M)
ASSAM
Page No.# 4/34
For the Petitioner(s) : Mr. K. K. Mahanta, Sr. Advocate
: Mr. B. D. Deka, Advocate
: Mr. S. Gautam, Advocate
For the Respondent(s) : Mr. S. Afridi, Advocate
Date of Hearing : 22.01.2025
Date of Judgment : 22.01.2025
BEFORE
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE DEVASHIS BARUAH
JUDGMENT AND ORDER (ORAL)
Heard Mr. K. K. Mahanta, the learned Senior counsel assisted by Mr. B. D. Deka, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners. I have also heard Mr. S. Afridi, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondents.
2. This is an application under Article 227 of the Constitution challenging the order dated 30.10.2023 passed by the learned Court of the Civil Judge No.2, Kamrup (M) at Guwahati in Petition No.3557/2023 arising out of Title Suit No. 432/2023 whereby the application seeking rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, (for short 'the Code') was rejected.
3. At the outset, this Court finds it relevant to observe that when an application seeking rejection of a plaint filed under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code is rejected, the Code provides a remedy in terms with Section 115 of the Code and accordingly, the exercise of the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is not called for.
Page No.# 5/34
4. Be that as it may, taking into account that the impugned order was passed on 30.10.2023 and the instant application was filed on 14.11.2023 which is within the prescribed period for filing an application under Section 115 of the Code, this Court converts the instant proceedings to a proceedings under Section 115 of the Code.
5. The question which arises in the instant proceedings is as to whether the plaint filed by the Respondents herein as plaintiffs is required to be rejected in terms with Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code or in other words whether upon a meaningful reading of the statements in the plaint, the suit appears to be barred by any law and in the instant case barred by the laws of limitation as prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short 'the Act of 1963').
6. To appreciate the issue involved in the instant proceedings, it is relevant to briefly take note of the statements made in the plaint and the relief(s) so sought for. A perusal of the plaint reveals that the predecessor-in- interest of the plaintiffs namely one Shri Taranath Saikia (since deceased) was the absolute owner and possessor of a plot of land measuring 1 Bigha, 2 Kathas 4 Lechas covered by Dag No.2562 of K. P. Patta No. 579 situated at village Sahar Sarania Part-II in Mouza Ulubari in the District of Kamrup (M) Assam. The said land have been specifically described in Schedule-A to the plaint. It has been further stated in the plaint that after the death of Late Taranath Saikia, the plaintiffs have inherited the Schedule-A land except the 2 Kathas of land which was sold to one Shri Arup Chakraborty by Late Taranath Saikia during his lifetime. The said 2 Kathas of land which were sold to the said Shri Arup Chakraborty has been specifically described in Page No.# 6/34 Schedule-B to the plaint.
7. It has been specifically alleged in the plaint that other than Late Taranath Saikia transferring the Schedule-B land to one Shri Arup Chakraborty, neither the predecessor of the plaintiffs nor the plaintiffs have signed any other document of transfer. It has been further alleged that the plaintiffs are in possession of the entire Schedule-A land except the Schedule-B land. The plaintiffs have further alleged in the plaint that sometime in the month of January, 1986, one Smti Premada Medhi and her family tried to intrude and grab the Schedule-A land under shadow of some agreement with Late Taranath Saikia for which Late Taranath Saikia had filed legal proceedings against the attempting trespassers in the Court of the Magistrate on 12.02.1986. In the said legal proceedings, Late Taranath Saikia had appointed the Defendant No.2 as his advocate to protect his land and conduct all legal suits and proceedings. It is further stated in the plaint that the learned Magistrate had passed an order on 30.04.1992 under Section 145/146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short 'Cr.P.C.') against Smti Premada Medhi.
8. Subsequent thereto, the said Smti Premada Medhi had filed a Criminal Revision application before this Court which was registered and numbered as CRL Revision No. 285/1992. The Defendant No. 2 as an advocate of Late Taranath Saikia had appeared and vide an order dated 20.03.1995 passed by this Court, the said CRL Revision No. 285/1992 was disposed of by upholding the order of the Magistrate. It has been alleged in the plaint that while the aforesaid litigation was going on, the Defendant No.2 had taken signature of Late Taranath Saikia on several blank papers, stamp papers and documents Page No.# 7/34 by telling that such signatures are necessary for filing petitions, cases etc. as regards the suit land. The Defendant No. 2 had got information as to the pros and cons of the land of Late Taranath Saikia being the advocate and such documents were never returned by the Defendant No.2. The plaintiffs alleged that the Defendant No. 2 might have misused the said signed papers of Late Taranath Saikia or might have forged the signature of Late Taranath Saikia for creating land document of the suit land in favour of his wife i.e. defendant No. 1 without the knowledge of Late Taranath Saikia or his legal heirs.
9. Be that as it may, the plaintiffs continued to remain in exclusive possession over the Schedule-A land except the Schedule-B land without any claim from any persons and without any disturbance until 01.05.2023, when some land brokers came to the suit land which was fully described in Schedule-C to the plaint and they wanted to measure the land. The plaintiffs alleged that they did not allow them to enter into the said land. Upon enquiry made by the plaintiffs, it was informed that the suit land belonged to some advocate with the surname Saikia and the said advocate had instructed to measure the land and to find customer. The plaintiffs were however not informed about the name of the advocate. Subsequent thereto, again on 30.05.2023, certain land brokers again came to the suit land and this time they told that they want to measure the land for giving the land to some builder as per consultation with an advocate of the Gauhati High Court.
10. The plaintiffs were at dark, as alleged in the plaint, as to who had sent those land brokers for measurement of the land. Subsequent thereto, in the Page No.# 8/34 month of June, 2023, several persons visited the suit land by telling themselves as prospective customers of the land and such persons failed to pronounce the name of any person who was trying to sell the suit land without the knowledge of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs had enquired but could not find at whose behest these persons have visited the Schedule-C land. It was further mentioned that on 01.06.2023, the Defendant No.2 came to the residence of the plaintiffs situated over the suit land and informed the plaintiffs that 1 Katha 10 Lechas of land on the side of Shri Arup Chakraborty belonged to him and he asked the plaintiffs to vacate the land within one month. It was alleged that the plaintiffs wanted to see the title deed of the advocate, which the Defendant No.2 refused stating that he was not bound to show his title deed and told the plaintiffs that he would come with police if the possession of the said land is not handed over to him.
11. The plaintiffs further have alleged that the plaintiffs have denied the claim of such advocate and further informed that without the title deed, no land would be vacated and nobody would be allowed to enter the campus of the Schedule-A land. It is further alleged that on 01.07.2023 some persons came to the suit land with dao and spade in their hands and they wanted to enter into the Schedule-A land but the plaintiffs resisted them. On such resistance by the plaintiffs, the Defendant No.2 came to the suit land and provided an illegible Xerox copy of a sale deed wherein the letters and digits were almost unreadable. The copy of the said illegible Deed of Sale alleged to have been provided to the plaintiffs by the Defendant No.2 was filed by the plaintiffs along with the suit. The plaintiffs alleged in the plaint that from the copy of the said sale deed, it could be learnt that 1 Katha 10 Lechas of land of some Dag Nos. 1498 and 1499 of K.P. Patta No. 350 of village Natun Page No.# 9/34 Town Sarania, Mouza Ulubari, District-Kamrup, Assam was shown to have been purchased by the Defendant No. 1, who is the wife of the Defendant No. 2 from Late Taranath Saikia for valuable consideration of Rs. 25,000/- by the registered Sale Deed No.3008 under Serial No.6459 dated 24.12.1986. It was also alleged that on the same date, a certified copy of the Jamabandi (record of rights) of the land was also furnished to the plaintiffs which was another document filed by the plaintiffs at the time of instituting the suit.
12. It is the further case of the plaintiffs that after the aforesaid incident on 01.07.2023, an FIR was lodged by the defendants before the Police of the Chandmari Police Station. On 07.07.2023, the Police of Chandmari Police Station called the plaintiffs to the police station and on appearance of the Plaintiff No.9 along with her sons, the police not only directed the plaintiffs to give up the land measuring 1 Katha 10 Lechas in favour of the Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 but also threatened that the plaintiffs will have to face dire consequences if the plaintiffs disturb the Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 in taking possession of the said land described in Schedule-C to the plaint. It was further alleged that one S.I. namely Shri Kamal Thakuria, had threatened the plaintiffs that he will arrest the plaintiffs, if the plaintiffs do not hand over the possession of the Schedule-C land to the defendants.
13. It has been further mentioned in the plaint that on 08.07.2023, the plaintiffs informed the Deputy Commissioner of Police (Guwahati Central Zone), Kamrup (M), about such disturbances by the police in having, holding and enjoyment of their own land. In the said information dated 08.07.2023, the Plaintiff No.9 had further informed that the Defendant No.2 somehow got a forged document of sale and he had made illegal claim over the Page No.# 10/34 Schedule-C land.
14. The plaintiffs have further stated that they are in possession of the Schedule-A land and the defendants are trying to dispossess the plaintiffs from the Schedule-C land which is the part of the Schedule-A land. On the basis of the above averments made in the plaint, the plaintiffs have sought for the following reliefs which are reproduced herein under:
"(i) A decree of declaration that the plaintiffs are the absolute owner and possessor of schedule-C (Which is part of Schedule-A) property and the defendants No. 1 and 2 have no semblance or right, title, interest and possession over the said property of Schedule-C on the strength of the sale deed No. 3008/86 dated 24.12.1986, and that the said sale deed No. 3008/86 is not binding upon the plaintiffs in respect of the Suit property of Schedule-C.
(ii) A decree declaring and holding that the Sale Deed No.3008 under S.L.No. 6459 dated 24.12.1986 registered before Sub-Registrar Guwahati is illegally and fraudulently created by defendants No. 1 and 2 taking advantage of privilege enjoyed by the defendant No. 2 as advocate of the vendor Tara Nath Saikia to intrude into and misuse instruction and signature of said client of defendant No.2, and a consequential decree for cancellation of the said sale deed by issue of appropriate precept to the concerned Sub-Registrar of Kamrup(M), Guwahati.
(iii) A decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendants No. 1 and 2 and their men, heirs, attorney, etc from entering into the premises of Schedule-C property and restraining them from disturbing the plaintiffs in peaceful possession and enjoyment of Schedule-C property and restraining the defendants in making alienation and making construction over the Schedule-C land during pendency of the suit or at any other time.
(iv) The costs of the suit may be given in favour of the plaintiffs.
Page No.# 11/34
(v) Any other relief/reliefs may be given to the counterclaimants to which they are entitled to under the law and equity.
(vi) Alternatively and in addition to the aforesaid relief if the defendants forcefully enter into the possession of Schedule-C land during pendency of this suit then the plaintiffs may be given the decree of recovery of Khas Possession of Schedule-C land by evicting such intruders which will be informed to the Hon'ble Court at the time of such forceful and illegal anticipated intrusion by defendants and by their men and agent."
15. It is pertinent to mention herein that from a perusal of the above quoted reliefs, it would be seen that the plaintiffs have sought for a declaration that the plaintiffs are the absolute owner and possessor of the Schedule-C land which is a part of the Schedule-A land property and the Defendant Nos.1 and 2 have no semblance of any right, title, interest and possession over the said property described in the Schedule-C land on the strength of the Sale Deed No.3008/86 dated 24.12.1986 and the said Sale Deed No.3008/86 is not binding upon the plaintiffs in respect to the suit property described in Schedule-C land. It is further seen that the plaintiffs have also sought for a declaration holding that the Deed of Sale bearing Deed No.3008 under Sl. No. 6459 dated 24.12.1986 is illegal and fraudulently created by the Defendant Nos.1 and 2 taking advantage of privilege enjoyed by the Defendant No.2 as advocate of the vendor Late Taranath Saikia to intrude into and misuse instructions and signature of his client by the Defendant No.2 and the consequential decree for cancellation of the Sale Deed by issuance of an appropriate precept to the concerned Sub-Registrar of Kamrup (Metro) Guwahati. It is very relevant to take note of that in addition to the above reliefs, the plaintiffs have also sought for a Page No.# 12/34 permanent injunction restraining the Defendant Nos.1 and 2 and their men, heirs, attorneys etc. from entering into the premises of the Schedule-C property and restraining them from disturbing the plaintiffs in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the Schedule-C property and further restraining the defendants in making alienation and making construction over the Schedule-C land during the pendency of the suit or any other time. It is further seen that in the alternative, there is a prayer that if during the pendency of the suit, the plaintiffs are dispossessed, then a decree for recovery of possession of the Schedule-C land.
16. In the backdrop of the statements contained in the plaint, the Defendant Nos.1 and 2 have jointly filed an application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code seeking rejection of the plaint on the ground that the suit is barred by limitation inasmuch as a relief of cancellation of the sale deed would be governed by Article 59 of the Schedule to the Act of 1963 which provides for a limitation period of three years. It has been stated that as the deed of sale is of the year 1986 and the suit was filed in the year 2023, the suit was heavily barred by the limitation. It was further stated that Late Taranath Saikia had never challenged the Deed of Sale during his lifetime and as such the legal heirs cannot belatedly challenge the same after a lapse of three decades. It was further mentioned that the Defendant No.1's name was mutated way back on 03.09.1990 and since the date of her mutation, the Defendant No.1 had been paying the land revenue. It was also stated in the application that the Plaintiff No.9 obtained mutation in the year 2013 subsequent to the mutation in favour of the Defendant No.1 and as such the Plaintiff No.9 would have derived knowledge of the impugned Sale Deed and as such, the Plaintiff No.9 had due knowledge about the Deed of Sale made Page No.# 13/34 in favour of the Defendant No.1 in the year 1986.
17. The said application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code was registered and numbered as Petition No.3557/2023. The plaintiffs filed objection to the said application stating inter alia that the application so filed for rejection of the plaint was totally misconceived. It was further mentioned that the provisions of Article 59 of the Schedule to the Act of 1963 have been completely misconceived and misconstrued by the Defendant Nos. 1 and 2.
18. On the basis of the plaint as well as after hearing the parties, the learned Trial Court vide an order dated 30.10.2023 had rejected the application seeking rejection of the plaint and thereby fixed the matter on 18.01.2024 for filing the written statement.
19. In the backdrop of the above, let this Court take note of the submissions so made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Parties.
20. Mr. K. K. Mahanta, the learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners submitted that the Sale Deed in question was executed by Late Taranath Saikia during his lifetime and registered on 24.12.1986. Pursuant thereto, the land contained in the said Sale Deed was mutated on the basis of an order passed by the Circle Officer dated 03.09.1990 in connection with Mutation Case No.253 of 1989-1990. The learned Senior counsel submitted that these aspects of the matter would be seen from the documents relied upon by the plaint which can be duly taken into account while deciding an application for rejection of a plaint. The learned Senior Page No.# 14/34 counsel further submitted that Late Taranath Saikia thereafter expired in the year 2007 and the name of the Plaintiff No.9 was inserted vide a mutation order dated 10.12.2013 along with other pattadars.
21. The learned Senior counsel therefore submitted that as the Deed of Sale was duly registered, the plaintiffs would have deemed knowledge on the basis of the Explanation to Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. In addition to that, the plaintiff No.9 would have due knowledge at the time when she sought for mutation of her name after the death of Late Taranath Saikia and when the mutation order was issued stating inter alia that her name was mutated along with other Pattadars. He therefore submitted that as the suit was filed only in the year 2023 which is 37 years after the registered Deed of Sale as well as 10 years after the date on which the Plaintiff No.9's name was mutated, the suit challenging the Deed of Sale dated 24.12.1986 was barred by limitation.
22. In addition to that, the learned Senior counsel submitted that the plaintiffs could not have also sought for a declaration as had been sought for over the Schedule-C land taking into account that in terms of Article 56 of the Schedule to the Act of 1963 to declare the forgery of an instrument issued or registered, the same is to be filed within three years from the date when such instrument is issued or registered becomes known to the plaintiffs. He therefore submitted that the plaintiffs had due knowledge as on 10.12.2013 about the insertion of the name of the Defendant No.1 in the record of rights in respect to the suit patta and as such the relief so sought for seeking declaration is also barred by limitation.
23. The learned Senior counsel further submitted that when the suit is Page No.# 15/34 filed for cancellation of the Sale Deed, the other reliefs becomes consequential reliefs. He submitted that as the suit is barred for seeking declaration about the deed of sale dated 24.12.1986 being not binding as well as for cancellation of the registered Deed of Sale, the consequential relief of permanent injunction cannot be granted.
24. To support his submissions, the learned Senior counsel relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Mallavva and Another Vs. Kalsammanavara Kalamma (Since Dead) by Legal Heirs and Others reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3846 and the judgment in the case of Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Others Vs. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Another reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3844. The learned Senior counsel further submitted that this is a case of clever drafting thereby to create an illusion of a cause of action and as such, this is the fit case where the suit should be nipped at the bud as held by the Supreme Court in the case of T. Arivandandam Vs. T.V. Satyapal and Another reported in (1977) 4 SCC 467.
25. Per contra, Mr. S. Afridi, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondents who are the Plaintiffs in the suit submitted that the plaintiffs had no knowledge about the purported Deed of Sale dated 24.12.1986 till a photocopy of the said Deed of Sale was handed over on 01.07.2023 by the Defendant No.2. The learned counsel submitted that a perusal of the said Deed of Sale would show that the land described in the said Deed of Sale is a plot of land admeasuring 1 Katha 10 Lechas covered by Dag No.1498 and 1499 of KP Patta No.350 of village Natun Sarania under Mouza Ulubari whereas the land in question as described in Schedule-A and Page No.# 16/34 Schedule-C falls in Dag No.2562 of K.P. Patta No.579 of village Sahar Sarania Part-II Mouza Ulubari in the district of Kamrup (Metro) Assam. He therefore submitted that the said purported Deed of Sale under no circumstances can be said to be in relation to the Schedule lands described in the plaint. The learned counsel further submitted that the Deed of Sale dated 24.12.1986 as well as the copy of the Jamabandi dated 01.09.2016 was only handed over to the plaintiffs on or after 01.07.2023 as would appear from the reading of the plaint. The learned counsel for the Respondents therefore submitted that the question of the suit being barred by limitation in terms with Article 56 or even under Article 59 of the Schedule to the Act of 1963 does not arise.
26. Additionally, he submitted that the plaintiffs have made categorical statements in the plaint that they are in possession of the suit land which have been described in Schedule-C to the plaint. The plaintiffs have further sought for a permanent injunction that their possession should not be disturbed as they are in possession of the suit land. This relief which have been sought for under no circumstances can be barred by limitation inasmuch as the threatening which was made as per the statements made in the plaint have been only in the month of June, 2023 and subsequent thereto, the suit was filed in the year 2023 itself. The learned counsel for the Respondents therefore submitted that even assuming for argument sake although not admitting that certain relief(s) as sought for relating to declaration and cancellation of the Deed of Sale can be said to be barred by limitation, then also the suit cannot be held to be barred by limitation insofar as the permanent injunction is concerned. The learned counsel therefore submitted that the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 does not permit that a suit can be bifurcated or can be partly rejected and under such circumstances, Page No.# 17/34 the question of interference with the impugned order dated 30.10.2023 passed by the learned Trial Court does not arise.
27. Per contra, Mr. K. K. Mahanta, the learned Senior counsel replying to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the Respondents submitted that the Deed of Sale dated 24.12.1986 though refers to Dag Nos. 1498 and 1499 of K. P. Patta No.350 of village Natun Town Sarania, Mouza Ulubari but the plaintiffs by way of clever drafting have not mentioned that initially the Dag No.2562 of K.P. Patta No.579 was Dag Nos.1498 and 1499 of K.P. Patta No.350.
28. This Court has duly heard the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the parties and also perused the records which were called for.
29. Rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code is a drastic power conferred upon the Court to terminate a civil action at the threshold. The condition precedent to the exercise of the power under Order VII Rule 11 therefore are stringent and have been consistently been held to be so by the Courts. It is well settled that it is the averments in the plaint that has to be read as a whole to find out whether it discloses a cause of action or whether the suit is barred under any law. The stand of the defendants in the written statement or even in the application seeking rejection of the plaint are wholly immaterial in a proceedings for rejection of the plaint or in other words, if the averments in the plaint expressly do not disclose a cause of action or a reading thereof, the suit appears to be barred by law, the plaint can be rejected. In all other situations, the claims will have to be adjudicated in the course of the trial. In the case of Dahiben Vs. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) Dead Through Legal Representatives and Others reported in Page No.# 18/34 (2020) 7 SCC 366, the Supreme Court further observed that having regard to the provisions of Order VII Rule 14 of the Code, the documents filed along with the plaint are required to be taken into consideration for deciding the application under Order VII Rule 11(a). It was further observed that when documents are referred in the plaint, it forms the basis of the plaint and it should be treated as a part of the plaint. The Supreme Court in the said judgment further observed that the test for exercising the powers under Order VII Rule 11 is that if the averments made in the plaint are taken in the entirety in conjunction with the documents relied upon, would the same result in a decree being passed.
30. In the backdrop of the above, this Court finds it relevant to take note of that a perusal of the plaint nowhere mentions that the plaintiffs had any knowledge that their predecessor Late Taranath Saikia had executed the Deed of Sale bearing Deed No.3008 dated 24.12.1986. There is also no averments in the plaint that they had knowledge prior to 01.07.2023 about the record of rights dated 01.09.2016. The specific case of the plaintiffs as would be seen from a reading of the plaint and more particularly Paragraph Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 is that it was only on 01.07.2023 that the Defendant No.2 had provided an illegible Xerox copy of the alleged Sale Deed No.3008 dated 24.12.1986 as well as provided a certified copy of the Jamabandi dated 01.09.2016 of land of Dag No.2562 of KP Patta No.579 of village Sahar Sarania Part-II Mouza Ulubari.
31. This Court further takes note of that in the averments contained in the plaint, there is not a single whisper that the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs was the owner of land in Dag Nos. 1498 and 1499 of Patta No.350 Page No.# 19/34 of village Natun Town Sarania, Mouza Ulubari. In the plaint, the specific averments contained is that the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs was the owner and possessor of a plot of land measuring 1 Bigha, 2 Katha 4 Lechas covered by Dag No.2562 of KP Patta No.579 situated at village Sahar Sarania Part-II of Mouza Ulubari in the District of Kamrup. The question as to whether the said Sale Deed bearing Deed No.3008 dated 24.12.1986 is in respect to the land described in Schedule-C which is a part of Schedule-A is a question of fact which can only be decided in the trial.
32. This Court further takes note of that the learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners had submitted that the Dag numbers and the Patta numbers contained in the Deed of Sale dated 24.12.1986 is in respect to the same land which is the subject matter of the suit. The said submission had been made on the basis of an averment made in an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code by the Petitioners. As well settled, the learned Trial Court or even this Court cannot take note of the said averments made in the application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code or even take into account any evidence being produced by the Petitioners who are the Defendants in the suit at the stage of rejection of the plaint.
33. This Court further finds it relevant to take note of the submission made by the learned Senior counsel for the petitioners who submitted that by virtue of Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the plaintiffs had due notice. It is relevant to take note of that the Deed of Sale bearing Deed No.3008 dated 24.12.1986 was not executed by the plaintiffs rather was purportedly executed by the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs. Under such circumstances, the question arises as to whether such an aspect Page No.# 20/34 pertaining to the application of Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 can be done so at the stage of rejection of a plaint. The answer to the same can be found in the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Chhotanben and Another Vs. Kiritbhai Jalkrushnabhai Thakkar and Others reported in (2018) 6 SCC 422 wherein a Deed of Sale bearing deed No.4425 dated 18.10.1996 was challenged in a suit filed on 18.10.2013 being Special Civil Suit No.193/2013 later on re-numbered as Regular Civil Suit No.166/2015. In the said suit, the plaintiffs categorically stated that till 2012, they had no knowledge whatsoever about the execution of the registered Sale Deed concerning the ancestral property. Pursuant to the filing of the suit, an application was filed by the Defendants under Order VII Rule 11 for rejection of the plaint on the ground that the suit was barred by limitation having been filed after 17 years. The said application for rejection of the plaint was dismissed by the learned Trial Court observing inter alia that as to whether the suit was barred by limitation or not is a subject matter of trial. A revision application thereupon was preferred before the High Court challenging the order of the learned Trial Court rejecting the application under Order VII, Rule 11(d) of the Code for rejection of the plaint. The High Court allowed the application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code filed by the defendants and reversed the decision of the learned Trial Court on the finding that the suit was barred by limitation. The basis on which the High Court had passed that order allowing the application for rejection of the plaint was on the ground that a plaintiff had affixed the thumb impression as witness in the very document in the year 1996 which was challenged in the year 2013. The High Court further took into consideration that the revenue entries have also been mutated soon after the registered Deed of Sale in Page No.# 21/34 favour of the defendants in the year 1997. The High Court further observed that a mutation order in the village form has been affected on the basis of such registered Deed of Sale on 21.01.1997 and a copy of which was issued on the 31.03.1997. It was under such circumstances, the High Court had observed that the suit was barred by limitation for having been preferred after the expiry of three years. The order passed by the High Court was put to challenge before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in the said case observed that in the application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code, the Court is required to examine the averments made in the plaint. The plaint is to be required to be read as a whole and the defense available to the defendants or the plea taken by them in the written statement or an application filed by them cannot be the basis to decide the application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code.
34. It was further observed that though the limitation to challenge the registered deeds of sale ordinarily would start running from the date on which the sale deed was registered, however, as the plaintiffs had no knowledge as averred in the plaint till 2013 regarding the execution of such sale by their brothers, i.e. by the Defendant Nos.1 and 2 in favour of the Defendant Nos. 3 to 6 and they had acquired knowledge only on 26.12.2012 and thereupon took steps to obtain certified copy of the Sale Deed and on receipt thereof realized the fraud played on them by their brothers have approached the Court by filing the suit, the High Court was wrong in allowing the application for rejection of the plaint. Paragraph Nos. 14 to 19 of the said judgment being relevant are reproduced herein under:
"14. After having cogitated over the averments in the plaint and the reasons recorded by the trial court as well as the High Court, we have no manner of Page No.# 22/34 doubt that the High Court committed manifest error in reversing the view taken by the trial court that the factum of suit being barred by limitation, was a triable issue in the fact situation of the present case. We say so because the appellant-plaintiffs have asserted that until 2013 they had no knowledge whatsoever about the execution of the registered sale deed concerning their ancestral property. Further, they have denied the thumb impressions on the registered sale deed as belonging to them and have alleged forgery and impersonation. In the context of totality of averments in the plaint and the reliefs claimed, which of the articles from amongst Articles 56, 58, 59, 65 or 110 or any other article of the Limitation Act will apply to the facts of the present case, may have to be considered at the appropriate stage.
15. What is relevant for answering the matter in issue in the context of the application under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC, is to examine the averments in the plaint. The plaint is required to be read as a whole. The defence available to the defendants or the plea taken by them in the written statement or any application filed by them, cannot be the basis to decide the application under Order 7 Rule 11(d). Only the averments in the plaint are germane. It is common ground that the registered sale deed is dated 18-10-1996. The limitation to challenge the registered sale deed ordinarily would start running from the date on which the sale deed was registered. However, the specific case of the appellant-plaintiffs is that until 2013 they had no knowledge whatsoever regarding execution of such sale deed by their brothers, original Defendants 1 and 2, in favour of Jaikrishnabhai Prabhudas Thakkar or Defendants 3 to 6. They acquired that knowledge on 26-12-2012 and immediately took steps to obtain a certified copy of the registered sale deed and on receipt thereof they realised the fraud played on them by their brothers concerning the ancestral property and two days prior to the filing of the suit, had approached their brothers (original Defendants 1 and 2) calling upon them to stop interfering with their possession and to partition the property and provide exclusive possession of half (½) portion of the land so designated Page No.# 23/34 towards their share. However, when they realised that the original Defendants 1 and 2 would not pay any heed to their request, they had no other option but to approach the court of law and filed the subject suit within two days therefrom. According to the appellants, the suit has been filed within time after acquiring the knowledge about the execution of the registered sale deed. In this context, the trial court opined that it was a triable issue and declined to accept the application filed by Respondent 1-Defendant 5 for rejection of the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d). That view commends to us.
16. The High Court on the other hand, has considered the matter on the basis of conjectures and surmises and not even bothered to analyse the averments in the plaint, although it has passed a speaking order running into 19 paragraphs. It has attempted to answer the issue in one paragraph which has been reproduced hitherto (in para 10). The approach of the trial court, on the other hand, was consistent with the settled legal position expounded in Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra2, Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. v. Vessel M.V. Fortune Express and also T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal.
17. These decisions have been noted in Church of Christ Charitable Trust and Educational Charitable Society v. Ponniamman Educational Trust, where this Court, in para 11, observed thus : (SCC p. 714, para 11) "11. This position was explained by this Court in Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra, in which, while considering Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code, it was held as under : (SCC p. 560, para 9) '9. A perusal of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC makes it clear that the relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding an application thereunder are the averments in the plaint. The trial court can exercise the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC at any stage of the suit--before registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant at any time before the conclusion of the trial. For the Page No.# 24/34 purposes of deciding an application under clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11 of Order 7 CPC, the averments in the plaint are germane; the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement would be wholly irrelevant at that stage, therefore, a direction to file the written statement without deciding the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC cannot but be procedural irregularity touching the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court.' It is clear that in order to consider Order 7 Rule 11, the court has to look into the averments in the plaint and the same can be exercised by the trial court at any stage of the suit. It is also clear that the averments in the written statement are immaterial and it is the duty of the Court to scrutinise the averments/pleas in the plaint. In other words, what needs to be looked into in deciding such an application are the averments in the plaint. At that stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement are wholly irrelevant and the matter is to be decided only on the plaint averments. These principles have been reiterated in Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property and Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. v. Vessel M.V. Fortune Express."
18. The High Court has adverted to Church of Christ Charitable Trust and Educational Charitable Society, which had the occasion to consider the correctness of the view taken by the High Court in ordering rejection of the plaint in part, against one defendant, on the ground that it did not disclose any cause of action qua that defendant. The High Court has also noted the decision relied upon by the contesting respondents in Mayur (H.K.) Ltd., which has restated the settled legal position about the scope of power of the Court to reject the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC.
19. In the present case, we find that the appellant-plaintiffs have asserted that the suit was filed immediately after getting knowledge about the fraudulent sale deed executed by original Defendants 1 and 2 by keeping them in the Page No.# 25/34 dark about such execution and within two days from the refusal by the original Defendants 1 and 2 to refrain from obstructing the peaceful enjoyment of use and possession of the ancestral property of the appellants. We affirm the view taken by the trial court that the issue regarding the suit being barred by limitation in the facts of the present case, is a triable issue and for which reason the plaint cannot be rejected at the threshold in exercise of the power under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC."
35. The facts in the instant case is similar inasmuch as it is the specific case of the plaintiffs that they had come to know about the Deed of Sale and the contents of the Jamabandi on 01.07.2023. This Court further finds it relevant to take note of another judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Salim D. Agboatwala and Others Vs. Shamalji Oddhavji Thakkar and Others reported in (2021) 17 SCC 100 wherein the Supreme Court dealt with the question of the starting point of limitation/reckoning date/computation of the period of delay for the purpose of adjudication of an application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code. The Supreme Court in the said judgment further dealt with the doctrine of notice as postulated in Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and as to whether the same can be brought into service for the purpose of deciding an application for rejection of the plaint. The Supreme Court observed that Explanation to Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 cannot go to the rescue of the respondents therein. It was observed that Section 3 of the Act of 1882 provided that a person is said to have notice of a fact (i) either when he actually knows the fact or; (ii) when, but for willful abstention from an enquiry or search which he ought to have made, or gross negligence he would have known.
Page No.# 26/34
36. It was further observed that two ingredients of the relevant part of Section 3 of the Act of 1882 providing as to when a person is said to have notice are matters of facts to be established through evidence. It was categorically observed that the plea of constructive notice raised to sustain a plea of limitation cannot be accepted at the stage of dealing with an application for rejection of plaint. Paragraph Nos. 14 to 17 of the said judgment being relevant are reproduced herein under:
"14. But a defendant in a suit cannot pick up a few sentences here and there from the plaint and contend that the plaintiffs had constructive notice of the proceedings and that therefore limitation started running from the date of constructive notice. In fact, the plea of constructive notice is raised by the respondents, after asserting positively that the plaintiffs had real knowledge as well as actual notice of the proceedings. In any case, the plea of constructive notice appears to be a subsequent invention.
15. The decision in Ram Niwas which revolved around Explanation II under Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, cannot go to the rescue of the respondents. Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, provides that a person is said to have notice of a fact, (i) either when he actually knows that fact; or (ii) when, but for wilful abstention from an enquiry or search which he ought to have made, or gross negligence, he would have known it. The relevant part of Section 3 together with Explanation II thereunder reads as follows:
"3. Interpretation clause.-- ... "a person is said to have notice" of a fact when he actually knows that fact, or when, but for wilful abstention from an enquiry or search which he ought to have made, or gross negligence, he would have known it.
Explanation II.--Any person acquiring any immovable property or any Page No.# 27/34 share or interest in any such property shall be deemed to have notice of the title, if any, of any person who is for the time being in actual possession thereof."
16. The two ingredients of the relevant part of Section 3 providing as to when "a person is said to have notice", are matters of fact to be established through evidence. The respondents in this case cannot even fall back upon Explanation II which holds that a person acquiring an immovable property will be deemed to have notice of the title of a person in actual possession thereof. In this case, it was the Court Receiver who was in possession and management of the entire estate at the time of the impugned proceedings and hence Explanation II cannot be used by the defendants.
17. The decision in Rajasthan Housing Board also reiterates the two ingredients of Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and hence the same cannot be raised in an application under Order 7 Rule 11. It should be pointed out at this stage that Section 32-G(1) of the Act contemplates a public notice in the prescribed form to be published in each village. It is not the case of the respondents that the plaintiffs had real or constructive notice of the proceedings by virtue of such a public notice. It is not even known whether a public notice was ever published. Therefore, the plea of constructive notice raised with a view to sustain the plea of limitation cannot be accepted at the stage of dealing with an application for rejection of the plaint."
37. This Court further takes note of the submission made by the learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners who submitted that as an application for mutation was filed by the Plaintiff No.9 after the death of Late Taranath Saikia in the year 2007. Thereupon, in the year 2013, the name of the Plaintiff No.9 was inserted. The plaintiffs as per the submission of the learned Senior counsel for the Petitioners would have constructive Page No.# 28/34 notice of the registered deed of sale. In the opinion of this Court, the said submission is too far-fetched inasmuch as the mutation order is not on record. Further to that, without the mutation order, by which the name of the Plaintiff No.9 was mutated, it cannot be presumed that in the mutation order the name of the Defendant No.1 or even the details of the Deed of Sale bearing Deed No.3008 dated 24.12.1986 was mentioned. This aspect can only be decided on the basis of evidence.
38. This Court further finds it relevant to observe that in the certified copy of the Jamabandi (record of rights) which was handed over to the plaintiffs on 01.07.2023 by the Defendant No.2 as alleged in the plaint, though there is a mention that the name of the Defendant No.1 was inserted on the basis of some purchase but there is no mention whatsoever about any Deed of Sale. It is further relevant to take note of that mutation entries do not confer title and therefore merely on the basis that the name was entered in the record of rights cannot be a ground at this stage to reject the suit on the ground that it is barred by limitation. This Court further finds it relevant to take note of another judgment to the Supreme Court in the case of P.V. Guru Raj Reddy represented by GPA Laxmi Narayan Reddy and Another Vs. P. Neeradha Reddy and Others reported in (2015) 8 SCC 331 wherein the Supreme Court observed that the claim of the plaintiffs with regard to the knowledge of the essential facts giving rise to the cause of action as pleaded would have to be accepted as correct for a decision while deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code. Paragraph Nos. 6 and 9 of the said judgment are reproduced herein under:
"6. In the present case, reading the plaint as a whole and proceeding on the Page No.# 29/34 basis that the averments made therein are correct, which is what the Court is required to do, it cannot be said that the said pleadings ex facie disclose that the suit is barred by limitation or is barred under any other provision of law. The claim of the plaintiffs with regard to the knowledge of the essential facts giving rise to the cause of action as pleaded will have to be accepted as correct. At the stage of consideration of the application under Order 7 Rule 11 the stand of the defendants in the written statement would be altogether irrelevant.
9. Both the suits were filed in July 2002 which is well within three years of the date of knowledge, as claimed by the plaintiffs, of the fact that the property had not been transferred in the name of Plaintiff 2 by Defendants 1 and 2. The aforesaid averments made in the plaint will have to be accepted as correct for the purposes of consideration of the application under Order 7 Rule 11 filed by Defendants 1 and 2. If that be so, the averments in the plaint would not disclose that either of the suits is barred by limitation so as to justify rejection of the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC."
39. In the instant case, it would be seen that in the plaint it has been categorically mentioned that it was only on 01.07.2023, the plaintiffs had knowledge about the existence of the purported registered Deed of Sale bearing Deed No. 3008 dated 24.12.1986 and further about the mutation order dated 01.09.2016.
40. This Court further finds it relevant to take note of the judgments referred to by the learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners. The first judgment so referred to is the judgment in the case of T. Arivandandam (supra) wherein the Supreme Court had categorically observed that a duty is cast upon the upon the Court that if on a Page No.# 30/34 meaningful, non-formal reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, the Court should exercise its power under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code taking care to see that the grounds mentioned therein is fulfilled. The proposition of law as stated in the judgment in T. Arivandandam (supra) is well settled but the question arises as to whether in the facts of the instant case and a reading of the plaint can it be stated that the suit so filed is manifestly vexatious and meritless in a sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue. The answer in the opinion of this Court is in the negative. This Court at the cost of repetition reiterates that for the purpose of deciding an application for rejection of plaint, the averments made in the plaint are to be taken as true and on the basis thereof, the question to be asked is would the plaintiff be entitled to a decree. In the opinion of this Court, the plaintiffs in the instant proceedings succeeds in that aspect insofar as the question of rejection of plaint is concerned.
41. The learned Senior counsel for the Petitioner further referred to the judgment of Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Others (supra). It is relevant to take note of that the said case pertains to an application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code being allowed by the Supreme Court on the ground that from the averments made in the plaint, the suit was barred by limitation. It is apposite herein to mention that in the said case, the predecessor of the plaintiffs as well as the plaintiff was well aware about the Court auction held in the year 1938 as well as the registered sale deed in the year 1952 but did not challenged those sale. This aspect of the matter would be apparent from a perusal of Paragraph 20 of the said judgment.
Page No.# 31/34
42. This Court further finds it relevant to take note of paragraph 26 in the case of the Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Others (supra) wherein the Supreme Court makes it very clear that the limitation is a mixed question of law and fact and the question of rejecting the plaint on that score has to be decided after weighing the evidence on record. However, in a case wherein it is glaring from the averments of the plaint that the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation, the Court should not be hesitant in granting the relief and drive the parties back to the Trial Court. Paragraph 26 of the said judgment being relevant is reproduced herein under:
"26. At this juncture, we wish to observe that we are not unmindful of the position of law that limitation is a mixed question of fact and law and the question of rejecting the plaint on that score has to be decided after weighing the evidence on record. However, in cases like this, where it is glaring from the plaint averments that the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation, the Courts should not be hesitant in granting the relief and drive the parties back to the trial Court. We again place it on record that this is not a case where any forgery or fabrication is committed which had recently come to the knowledge of the plaintiff. Rather, the plaintiff and his predecessors did not take any steps to assert their title and rights in time. The alleged cause of action is also found to be creation of fiction. However, the trial Court erroneously dismissed the application filed by the appellants under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC. The High Court also erred in affirming the same, keeping the question of limitation open to be considered by the trial Court after considering the evidence along with other issues, without deciding the core issue on the basis of the averments made by the Respondent No. 1 in the Plaint as mandated by Order VII Rule 11
(d) of CPC. The spirit and intention of Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC is only for the Courts to nip at its bud when any litigation ex facie appears to be a clear abuse of process. The Courts by being reluctant only cause more harm to the Page No.# 32/34 defendants by forcing them to undergo the ordeal of leading evidence.
Therefore, we hold that the plaint is liable to be rejected at the threshold."
43. The learned Senior counsel further referred to the judgment in the case of Mallavva (supra) and referred to paragraph No.38 of the said judgment. This Court had duly perused the said judgment and more particularly Paragraph No.38, which in the opinion of this court is not at all applicable to the instant proceedings in view of the fact that the instant suit is not only a suit seeking declaration of the right, title and interest of the plaintiffs over the Schedule-C land along with prayer for cancellation of the deed of sale bearing Deed No.3008 dated 24.12.1986 but also is a suit for permanent injunction. It is opposite herein to mention that this is not a suit for recovery of possession. In the instant case, as per the averments made in the plaint, the plaintiffs have categorically stated that they are in possession of the Schedule-C land and as such, have sought for permanent injunction to the effect that the Defendants be restrained from disturbing the plaintiffs' possession and peaceful enjoyment over the Schedule-C land. This Court at this stage finds it relevant to observe that this relief so sought for under no circumstances can be said to be barred by law for the purpose of rejection of the plaint. It is important to observe that even if this Court is persuaded to observe that the reliefs of declaration and cancellation is barred by law of limitation, then also in view of the statements made in the plaint that the plaintiffs are in exclusive possession of the suit land described in Schedule-C to the plaint which for the purpose of the rejection of the plaint has to be deemed to be correct, the relief of permanent injunction so sought for cannot be said to be barred by the law of limitation or any other law. In this regard, this Court finds it relevant to refer to a recent judgment Page No.# 33/34 of the Supreme Court in the case of Central Bank of India and Another Vs. Smti Prabha Jain and Others reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 121. Paragraph Nos. 24 and 25 being relevant are quoted herein below:
"24. Even if we would have been persuaded to take the view that the third relief is barred by Section 17(3) of the SARFAESI Act, still the plaint must survive because there cannot be a partial rejection of the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the CPC. Hence, even if one relief survives, the plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 of the CPC. In the case on hand, the first and second reliefs as prayed for are clearly not barred by Section 34 of the SARFAESI ACT and are within the civil court's jurisdiction. Hence, the plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC
25. If the civil court is of the view that one relief (say relief A) is not barred by law but is of the view that Relief B is barred by law, the civil court must not make any observations to the effect that relief B is barred by law and must leave that issue undecided in an Order VII, Rule 11 application. This is because if the civil court cannot reject a plaint partially, then by the same logic, it ought not to make any adverse observations against relief B."
44. Taking into account the above, this Court is of opinion that the application so filed by the defendants seeking rejection of the plaint was rightly rejected by the learned Trial Court vide the order dated 30.10.2023. Accordingly, this Court does not find any merit in the instant application for which the instant application stands dismissed.
45. This Court further takes note of that this Court vide an order dated 16.11.2023 issued notice and stayed the further proceedings of Title Suit Page No.# 34/34 No.432/2023. Subsequent thereto, vide another order dated 16.08.2024, the records of Title Suit No.432/2023 was requisitioned.
46. Taking into account that the instant proceedings have been dismissed, this Court vacates the interim order of stay of the suit and further directs the parties to appear before the learned Trial Court on 17.02.2025.
47. On the said date, the Defendants are given a further liberty to file their written statement, if so advised. The Registry is further directed to immediately send the records back to the learned Trial Court and taking into account that this Court has already fixed the matter on 17.02.2025 before the learned Trial Court, the Registry shall employ the services of special messenger so that the records are placed before the learned Trial Court on or before the next date so fixed.
48. Before parting with the records, this Court finds it relevant to observe and clarify that the observations so made in the instant judgment should only be construed as observations made for the purpose of adjudication of an application for rejection of the plaint. The said observations shall not affect any of the parties during the trial of the suit.
JUDGE Comparing Assistant