Orissa High Court
Brundaban Kandhapani vs State Of Odisha on 16 July, 2025
Author: Biraja Prasanna Satapathy
Bench: Biraja Prasanna Satapathy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CRLA No.365 of 2015
In the matter of an application under Section-374 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure.
..................
Brundaban Kandhapani .... Appellant
-versus-
State of Odisha .... Respondent
For Appellant : M/s. Mr. A.C. Behera.
For Respondents : M/s. C.K. Pradhan,
Addl. Government Advocate
PRESENT:
THE HONBLE JUSTICE BIRAJA PRASANNA SATAPATHY
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Date of Hearing: 18.06.2025 and Date of Judgment:16.07.2025
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Biraja Prasanna Satapathy, J.
1. This matter is taken up through Hybrid Mode.
2. Heard Mr. A.C. Behera, learned counsel for the Appellant and Mr. C.K. Pradhan, learned Addl. Government Advocate for the State.
// 2 //
3. The present appeal has been filed by the Appellant-accused challenging the judgment dtd.10.07.2015 so passed by learned Sessions Judge, Rayagada in C.T. Case No.15 of 2011. Vide the said judgment, the appellant was convicted and sentenced to undergo RI for a period of one year under Section 498-A IPC and RI for a period of seven years under Section 304-B of the IPC and RI for a period of one years and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- under Section-4 of the D.P. Act. In default of payment of fine, further RI for two months was passed. It was further directed that all the sentences shall run consecutively.
4. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that the appellant married the deceased in a Temple in the month of October, 2009. After his marriage, the appellant since was serving as a Constable and attached to the residence of S.P., Rayagada, he along with the deceased remained in a rented house at Rayagada.
Page 2 of 32
// 3 // 4.1. It is contented that while on duty on 21.05.2010, appellant got a telephonic call that the deceased is unwell and accordingly the appellant after returning back with due permission, took the deceased to the Hospital, where the deceased while under treatment died. However, the informant, who happens to be the father of the deceased, lodged the F.I.R giving rise to Rayagada P.S. Case No.98 dtd.22.05.2010, corresponding to G.R. Case No.196 of 2010 in the file of learned S.D.J.M., Rayagada. The F.I.R was registered for the offence under Sections-302/304-B/498-A of the I.P.C read with Section 4 of the D.P. Act. 4.2. It is contended that after submission of the final form and commitment of the matter, the appellant was charged to face the trial for the offence under Sections- 498-A, 304-B of the I.P.C and Section- 4 of the D.P. Act.
4.3. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that the prosecution in order to prove its Page 3 of 32 // 4 // case examined as many as 25 nos. of witnesses and the defence in turn examined two witnesses. While P.W.1 is the informant, P.W.2, 10, 12 and 19 are the brothers of the informant. P.W.3, while is the sister of the deceased, P.W.11 is the mother of the deceased. P.W.21 is the I.O of the case and P.Ws.7, 22 and 23 are the concerned doctors, who treated the deceased.
4.4. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that P.W.1 as the informant and other P.Ws related to the deceased and / or informant supported the prosecution story and laid evidence to the effect that after marriage of the deceased along with the appellant in a Temple in the year 2009, appellant demanded money from the in-laws to purchase a motor cycle. Accordingly, on such demand, P.W.1 gave cash of Rs.5,000/- to the appellant as an advance for purchase of the motor cycle. But after two days of such payment, P.W.1 received the information that the Page 4 of 32 // 5 // deceased has been admitted to Rayagada Hospital. On finding that the deceased is no more, the F.I.R was lodged by P.W.1, alleging commission of offence under Sections-302/304-B/498-A of the I.P.C read with Section 4 of the D.P. Act.
4.5. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that even though the witnesses related to the deceased including the informant supported the prosecution allegation regarding demand of dowry and consequential death of the deceased, but in fact while residing along with the deceased in a rented house and while on duty on 21.05.2010, appellant was informed about the illness of the deceased. Accordingly, with due permission of the higher authority, appellant along with P.W.6 took the deceased to the District Head Quarter, Hospital, Rayagada. However, during treatment at about 12 P.M. in the mid-night, the deceased died in the hospital.
Page 5 of 32
// 6 // 4.6. Statement of P.W.6 supporting the aforesaid stand of the appellant reads as follows:-
"I know the accused standing on the dock. The deceased Madhuri was the wife of the accused Brundaban Kandhapani. On one night about two years back Madhuri at about 10 PM, Madhuri came to our house and knocked at the door. I opened the door. She told that she was feeling head reeling and suffering from vomiting and requested me to inform her husband (the accused) over phone. Since there was no balance in my mobile, I asked my neighbour to give his mobile and informed the accused Brundaban by that mobile. Thereafter, the accused, who was performing his duty at Collector's residence came and I along with the accused took Madhuri to the Dist Head Quarters Hospital, Rayagada. During treatment at about 12 AM in the night Madhuri died in the hospital. On the next day morning police came and took my signature on a paper stating that my signature is required as I had taken Madhuri to the hospital. Ext-5/1 is my signature.
At this stage the learned P.P declares the witness hostile and prays to allow him to u/s 154 Evidence Act. examine the witness U/S 154 Evidence Act. Heard. The prayer is allowed:-
2. It is not a fact that on 22.5.2010 police seized some broken bangles, one fade green colour gapin, four empty Chiroquine phespate tablets, one paper containing ball pen writing one Block colour NOKIA mobile hand-sot from the house of the accused Brundaban Kandhapani and prepared seizure list and thereafter I signed on it, It is not a fact that I had stated before the police regarding seizure of some black bangles, fade green colour napkin, four empty covers of Chloroquine tablets, one black and white NOKIA mobile phone of Madhuri Kandhapapin from the spot. It is not a fact that I am concealing the truth Dow being gained over by the accused.
CROSS EXAM.BY DEFENCE :-
Page 6 of 32
// 7 // The accused and his wife Madhuri were residing in a house in front of our house for about six months. The accused and his wife were living peacefully and I have never seen any quarrel between them. It was a plain paper when I signed on that paper vide Ext-5/1."
4.7. It is also contended that there is no dispute that the appellant was on duty on 21.05.2010 in the residence of S.P., Rayagada, when he was informed about the illness of the deceased, for which appellant with due permission of his higher authority came back and took the deceased along with P.W.6 to District Head Quarter Hospital for her treatment.
4.8. Statement of P.Ws.14, 15 in support of the aforesaid submission reads as follows:-
P.W.14 "14-1. I know the accused Brundaban Kandhapani standing on the dock. On 21.5.2010, I was on guard- duty at the residence of S.P, Rayagada. On that day the accused Brundaban Kandhapani and Havildar Rama Chandra Dala Behera wore also on duty at the residence of S.P, Rayagada.
2. On 21.5.2010 after 11.30 PM, the accused sought permission from the Havilder Rama Chandra Dala Behera who was in-charge of Guard-duty to allow him to go as his wife was sick. The Havildar after making necessary entry in the diary allowed the accused to go On the next day morning I how that the wife of the accused Brundaban Kandhapani died at Rayagad hospital.Page 7 of 32
// 8 //
3. On 28.5.2010, the S. I of Police Ratha Babu of Rayagada PS seized the station diary of residence Guard of S.P, Rayagada on production by the Havildar Rama Chandra Dalabehora and prepared seizure list vide Ext-8(marked earlier). Ext-8/2 is my signature. The S.I of Police also left the seized Station Diary under zima of the Havildar Rama Chandra Dalabehera on execution of a Zimanama vide Ext-9 (marked earlier). Ext-9/2 is my signature.
CROSS EXAM.BY DEFENCE :-
Declined".
P.W.15 "I know the accused Brundaban Kandhapani standing on the dock. On 21.5.2010 I was on guard-duty at the residence of S.P. Rayagada. The accused Brundaban Kandhapani and Havildar Rama Chandra Dalabehera were also on duty at the residence of S.P, Rayagada on that day.
2. On 21.5.2010 after 11.30 PM, the accused sought permission from the Havildar Rama Chandra Bala Behera who was in-charge of guard-duty to allow him to go as his wife was sick. The Havildar after making necessary entry in the diary allowed the accused to go.
On the next day morning I heard that the wife of the accused Brundaban had died.
3. On 26.5.2010, the S.I of Police Ratha Babu of Rayagada PS seized the Station Diary of Residence Guard of S.P, Rayagada on production by the Havildar R.Ch.Dalabehera and prepared seizure list vide Ext-8 (marked earlier).Ext-8/3 is my signature.
4. The S.I of Police also left the seized Station Diary under zima of the Havildar Rama Chandra Dalabehera on execution of a Zimanasa vide Ext-9 (marked earlier). Ext-9/3 is my signature...
CROSS EXAM.BY DEFENCE :-
Declined".Page 8 of 32
// 9 // 4.9. It is further contended that even though P.W.1 and the related witnesses of the deceased supported the prosecution story, but P.W.1 in his cross-
examination specifically submitted as follows:-
"I had not given anything to my daughter at the time of marriage. One month after marriage, came to know from my daughter that the accused was demanding money for purchasing a motor cycle. Prior to that all daughter had not told me about the same. After receiving information regarding demand of money by the accused from my daughter, i had not reported the matter at P.S.I. had given cash of Rs.5000/- to the accused as an advance towards purchase of motor cycle".
4.10. Similarly, P.W.3, who happens to be the sister of the deceased in her cross-examination has stated as follows:-
"It is not a fact that I had not stated before the police that on 17.5.2010 my sister Madhuri informed my father over phone that the accused was demanding dowry articles.
xxx xxx xxx It is a fact that I had not stated before the police that there was mark of assault on the back and swelling on the neck of Madhuri".
4.11. Reliance was also placed to the deposition of P.W.11, who happens to be the mother of the deceased. Page 9 of 32
// 10 // It is contended that in her cross-examination, P.W.11 submitted as follows:-
"I had not given any report regarding torture to Madhuri by the accused during the life time of Madhuri".
4.12. P.W.12, who happens to be the brother of the informant in his cross-examination also submitted as follows:-
"I cannot say the specific date on which my brother Dandapani had given Rs.5,000/- to the accused as advance for purchase of the motor cycle as I had not come along with the brother on that date".
4.13. Similarly, P.W.9 in his cross-examination submitted as follows:-
"During the discussion he told that in a nothing to give to the girl in dowry and the accused replied that he did not want anything.
xxx xxx xxx I cannot say when P.W.1 gave Rs.5,000/- to the accused".
4.14. It is contended that P.W.21, who happens to be the I.O. in his cross-examination also fairly admitted that the deceased did not have any injury on the neck. Page 10 of 32
// 11 // Her wearing apparels were not stained with blood. In his evidence, P.W.21 also further stated that as per the station diary, the accused was on duty at S.P's residence from 9 P.M. to 10 A.M. He left the guard room at 11.50 P.M. 4.15. P.W.21 also further stated as follows:-
"It is a fact that P.W.1 has not stated before me that the accused was demanding Rs.50,000/- for a Pulsar motor cycle but that he has stated before me that his daughter telephoned him and told me weeping that the accused was desirous of a Pulsar motor cycle as dowry and arrange Rs.50,000/- for the motor cycle or else the accused would kill him".
4.16. In his further cross-examination, P.W.21 in Para-15 and 16 of his evidence stated as follows:-
"15. It is a fact that Chandrika (PW 3) has not stated before me that on 17.05.2010 her sister Madhuri (deceased) informed their father over phone that accused Brundaban was demanding Rs. 50,000/- for purchase of a motorcycle. But she has stated before me that their father had given Rs. 5,000/- to the accused towards purchase of a Pulsar motorcycle and that on 19.05.2010 Madhuri telephoned their father that unless the balance amount for the motorcycle was arranged Brundaban would kill her. It is a fact that she has not stated before me that on 22.05.2010 accused Brundaban informed her paternal uncle (Gopinath) over phone that Madhuri was ill and that when he asked him (accused) to give the phone to Madhuri he did not and that Brundaban took Madhuri to the Government Page 11 of 32 // 12 // hospital, Rayagada and at 4 AM he informed Gopinath over phone that Madhuri was dead.
16. It is a fact that Padulata (PW 11) has not stated before me that she along with her husband came to Rayagada and gave Rs. 5,000/- to the accused towards advance for the purchase of a motorcycle and assured him to give the rest amount. But she has stated before me that her husband had given Rs. 5,000/-to the accused towards purchase of the motorcycle. It is a fact that she has not stated before me that when her daughter (Madhuri) went away with the accused they performed their marriage at the Jagannath Temple, Rayagada. But she has stated before me that both of them had eloped and had married at the Jagannath Temple, Rayagada in the absence of family members of either side".
4.17. Relying on the aforesaid statements of the P.Ws and the evidence laid by D.W.1 and 2, learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that since the ingredients of Sections-304-B/498-A of the I.P.C read with Section 4 of the D.P. Act were never proved, conviction and sentence of the accused for the offence under Sections 304-B/498-A of the I.P.C read with Section 4 of the D.P. Act vide the impugned judgment is not sustainable in the eye of law.
4.18. In support of his submission, reliance was placed to a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Page 12 of 32 // 13 // Appasaheb & Another vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2007) 9 SCC-721. Hon'ble Apex Court in Para-9 to 11 of the said judgment has held as follows:-
"9. Two essential ingredient of Section 304-B IPC, apart from others, are (i) death of women is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances, and (ii) women is subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for "dowry". The explanation appended to sub-section (1) of Section 304-B IPC says that "dowry" shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
10. Section 2 of Dowry Prohibition Act reads as under :-
"2. Definition of "dowry" - In this Act "dowry" means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly-
(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or
(b) by the parent of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person, at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dowry or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (shariat) applies.
11. In view of the aforesaid definition of the word "dowry" any property or valuable security should be given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly at or before or any time after the marriage and in connection with the marriage of the said parties. Therefore, the giving or taking of property or valuable security must have some connection with the marriage of the parties and a correlation between the giving or taking of property or valuable security with the marriage of the parties is essential. Being a penal provision it has to be strictly construed. Dowry is a fairly well known social custom or practice in India. It is well settled principle of interpretation of Statute that if the Act is passed with reference to a particular trade, business or transaction and words are used which everybody coversant with that trade, Page 13 of 32 // 14 // business or transaction knows or understands to have a particular meaning in it, then the words are to be construed as having that particular meaning. (See Union of India v. Garware Nylons Ltd., AIR (1996) SC 3509 and Chemicals and Fibres of India v. Union of India, AIR (1997) SC 558). A demand for money on account of some financial stringency or for meeting some urgent domestic expenses of for purchasing manure cannot be termed as a demand for dowry as the said word is normally understood. The evidence adduced by the prosecution does not, therefore, show that any demand for "dowry" as defined in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was made by the appellants as what was allegedly asked for was some money for meeting domestic expenses and for purchasing manure. Since an essential ingredient of Section 304-B IPC viz. demand for dowry is not established, the conviction of the appellants cannot be sustained.".
4.19. Reliance was also placed to a decision of this Court passed on 02.11.2021 in JCRLA No.65 of 2008 (Bijaya Bhoi vs. State of Orissa). Placing reliance on the said decision, it is contended that in order to apply the provisions of Section-304-B of the I.P.C, the presumption as provided under Section-113(B) of the Evidence Act has to be proved.
4.20. It is contended that since from the prosecution evidence, it is well proved that soon before the death of the deceased, there was no demand of dowry nor the deceased was subjected to torture on the ground of such demand of dowry, conviction and sentence of the Page 14 of 32 // 15 // appellant under Sections-304-B/498-A of the I.P.C read with Section 4 of the D.P. Act is not at all sustainable in the eye of law. This Court in Para-9 of the decision in the case of Bijay Bhoi has held as follows:-
"9. Coming to the ingredients of the offence under section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, the essential ingredients are as follows:-
(i) The death of a woman was caused by burns or bodily injury or had occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances;
(ii) Such death should be occurred within seven years of her marriage;
(iii) The deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or by any relative of her husband;
(iv) Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with the demand of dowry; and
(v) Such cruelty or harassment of the deceased should be soon before her death.
Section 113(B) of the evidence Act is also relevant which deals with presumption as to the „dowry death‟. Presumption under section 113(B) is a presumption of law. On the proof of essential ingredients of offence under section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, it becomes obligatory on the part of the Court to raise presumption that the accused committed „dowry death‟. In case of Raman Kumar -Vrs.- State of Punjab reported in (2009) 16 Supreme Court Cases 35, it has been held as follows:-
"16. A conjoint reading of Section 113B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC shows that there must be Page 15 of 32 // 16 // material to show that soon before her death the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment. The prosecution has to rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental death so as to bring it within the purview of the "death occurring otherwise than in normal circumstances". The expression "soon before" is very relevant where Section 113B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC are pressed into service. The prosecution is obliged to show that soon before the occurrence, there was cruelty or harassment and only in that case, presumption operates. Evidence in that regard has to be led in by the prosecution. "Soon before" is a relative term and it would depend upon the circumstances of each case and no strait jacket formula can be laid down as to what would constitute a period of soon before the occurrence. It would be hazardous to indicate any fixed period, and that brings in the importance of a proximity test both for the proof of an offence of dowry death as well as for raising a presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act. The expression "soon before her death" used in the substantive Section 304-B IPC and Section 113B of the Evidence Act is present, with the idea of proximity test. No definite period has been indicated and the expression "soon before" is not defined. A reference to the expression "soon before"
used in Section 114 Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act is relevant. It lays down that a court may presume that a man who is in the possession of goods soon after the theft, is either the thief who has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession. The determination of the period which can come within the term "soon before" is left to be determined by the courts, depending upon facts and circumstances of each case. Suffice, however, to indicate that the expression "soon before" would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the cruelty or harassment concerned and the death in question. There must be existence of a proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the death concerned. If the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence." Page 16 of 32
// 17 // In the case of Ashok Kumar -vrs.- State of Haryana reported in (2010) 12 Supreme Court Cases 350, it has been held as follows:-
"14. We have already referred to the provisions of Section 304-B of the Code and the most significant expression used in the section is 'soon before her death'. In our view, the expressions 'soon before her death' cannot be given a restricted or a narrower meaning. They must be understood in their plain language and with reference to their meaning in common parlance. These are the provisions relating to human behaviour and, therefore, cannot be given such a narrower meaning, which would defeat the very purpose of the provisions of the Act. Of course, these are penal provisions and must receive strict construction. But, even the rule of strict construction requires that the provisions have to be read in conjunction with other relevant provisions and scheme of the Act. Further, the interpretation given should be one which would avoid absurd results on the one hand and would further the object and cause of the law so enacted on the other.
15. We are of the considered view that the concept of reasonable time is the best criteria to be applied for appreciation and examination of such cases. This Court in the case of Tarsem Singh v. State of Punjab: AIR 2009 SC 1454, held that the legislative object in providing such a radius of time by employing the words 'soon before her death' is to emphasize the idea that her death should, in all probabilities, has been the aftermath of such cruelty or harassment. In other words, there should be a reasonable, if not direct, nexus between her death and the dowry related cruelty or harassment inflicted on her. Similar view was expressed by this Court in the case of Yashoda v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2004) 3 SCC 98, where this Court stated that determination of the period would depend on the facts and circumstances of a given case. However, the expression would normally imply that there has to be reasonable time gap between the cruelty inflicted and the death in question. If this is so, the legislature in its wisdom would have specified any period which would attract the provisions of this Section. However, there must be existence of proximate link between the acts of Page 17 of 32 // 18 // cruelty along with the demand of dowry and the death of the victim. For want of any specific period, the concept of reasonable period would be applicable. Thus, the cruelty, harassment and demand of dowry should not be so ancient whereafter, the couple and the family members have lived happily and that it would result in abuse of the said protection. Such demand or harassment may not strictly and squarely fall within the scope of these provisions unless definite evidence was led to show to the contrary. These matters, of course, will have to be examined on the facts and circumstances of a given case."
4.21. Reliance was also placed to a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Chabi Karmakar vs. The State of West Bengal (Criminal Appeal No.1556 of 2013, decided on 29.08.2024). Apex Court in Para-7 & 8 of the judgment has held as follows:-
"7. The trial court raised a presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act to convict the appellants under Section 304-BIPC. The High Court did not go into the question of whether the trial court was right in relying upon Section 113-B of the Evidence Act.
In Charan Singh v. State of Uttarakhand [Charan Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2024) 13 SCC 649 :
2023 SCC OnLine SC 454] , where there were allegations against the husband that he was subjecting the deceased therein on the demand of a motorcycle and some land, this Court in relation to Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC, had noted that :
21. ........ It is only certain oral averments regarding demand of motorcycle and land which is also much prior to the incident. The aforesaid evidence led by the prosecution does not fulfil the prerequisites to invoke Page 18 of 32 // 19 // presumption under Section 304-BIPC or Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. ...
22.***
23. On a collective appreciation of the evidence led by the prosecution, we are of the considered view that the prerequisites to raise presumption under Section 304-
BIPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act having not been fulfilled, the conviction of the appellant cannot be justified. Mere death of the deceased being unnatural in the matrimonial home within seven years of marriage will not be sufficient to convict the accused under Sections 304-B and 498-AIPC."
Similarly, in the case at hand, it has not been proved by the prosecution that the deceased was subjected to cruelty soon before her death in connection with the demand of dowry and hence we are of the opinion that this is not a case of dowry death under Section 304- BIPC. PW 1 and PW 3 had only stated that the deceased used to tell them about her torture. PW 4 (mother of the deceased) did not speak about any demand of dowry after marriage. Moreover, this witness had said that Appellant 2 used to assault her deceased daughter as the deceased had objections to the illicit relation of Appellant 2 with another woman. PW 16, who is the cousin of the deceased, had deposed in court almost a year after the testimony of PWs 1, 3 & 4 and his deposition regarding the physical assault of the deceased in connection with the demand of dowry is also not believable. Considering the aforesaid, in our view, the trial court erred in raising a presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, even though the demand for dowry was not established.
8. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the State of West Bengal would rely on two judgments of this Court, seeking the appellants' conviction under Section 304-BIPC, both of which were decided by three-Judge Bench of this Court : Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2015) 6 SCC 477 and State of M.P. v. Jogendra v. Jogendra & Anr., (2022) 5 SCC 401 :
The facts in Rajinder Singh (supra) were entirely different. In that case, the deceased had died due to Page 19 of 32 // 20 // consumption of poison and there were specific allegations against in-laws in the form of evidence from the deceased's father, who had given credible evidence that the in-laws were demanding money for the construction of the house. There was also evidence of giving a she-buffalo to pacify the in-laws. Father of the deceased therein further deposed how the Sarpanch and ex-Sarpanch of their village went to the matrimonial home of the deceased for reconciliation where the father of the deceased had promised to give money after harvest of crops.
Jogendra (supra) was decided by taking into account the peculiar facts of that case where the evidence of PW 1 therein contained specific allegations of constant demand for dowry. It was stated that the deceased was asked to raise Rs.50,000 for the construction of house. He further stated that there was even an attempt by the "people of society" to settle the matrimonial discord between the parties.
In para 9 of Rajinder Singh (supra), this Court had discussed the ingredients of Section 304-BIPC as follows :
"9. The ingredients of the offence under Section 304- BIPC have been stated and restated in many judgments. There are four such ingredients and they are said to be:
(a) death of a woman must have been caused by any burns or bodily injury or her death must have occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances;
(b) such death must have occurred within seven years of her marriage;
(c) soon before her death, she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband; and
(d) such cruelty or harassment must be in connection with the demand for dowry."
The evidence placed before us, in the case at hand, is not sufficient to prove the fourth ingredient i.e. cruelty or harassment in connection with the demand for dowry, as laid down by the abovementioned case". Page 20 of 32
// 21 // 4.22. Reliance was placed to a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Karan Singh vs. State of Haryana (Criminal Appeal No.1076/2014, decided on 31.01.2025). Apex Court in Para-6 to 8 of the deceased has held as follows:-
"6. The following are the essential ingredients of Section 304-B:
a) The death of a woman must have been caused by any burns or bodily injury, or must have occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances;
b) The death must have been caused within seven years of her marriage;
c) Soon before her death, she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by the husband or any relative of her husband; and
d) Cruelty or harassment must be for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry
7. If the aforesaid four ingredients are established, the death can be called a dowry death, and the husband and/or husband's relative, as the case may be, shall be deemed to have caused the dowry death. Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 provides that dowry means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage or by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to the other party to the marriage or to any other person. The dowry must be given or agreed to be given at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage of the said parties. The term valuable security used in Section 2 of the Dowry Page 21 of 32 // 22 // Prohibition Act, 1961 has the same meaning as in Section 30 of IPC.
8. In this case, there is no dispute that the death of the appellant's wife occurred within seven years of the marriage. Section 113-B of the Evidence Act reads thus:
"113-B. Presumption as to dowry death.-When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, "dowry death" shall have the same meaning as in Section 304-B of Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)."
The presumption under Section 113-B will apply when it is established that soon before her death, the woman has been subjected by the accused to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry. Therefore, even for attracting Section 113-B, the prosecution must establish that the deceased was subjected by the appellant to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any demand of dowry soon before her death. Unless these facts are proved, the presumptions under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act cannot be invoked."
4.23. Making all the submissions, learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that since from the evidence of the prosecution, it is not at all proved that there is any demand of dowry and the deceased was subjected to torture on the ground of such demand of dowry just prior to her death, conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section-304-B of the Page 22 of 32 // 23 // IPC is not at all made out. Similarly, since as per the evidence of the P.W.1 and other related witnesses, it is not proved that the appellant raised demand for dowry after the marriage and the deceased was subjected to cruelty for such demand of dowry, conviction and sentence of the appellant for the offences under Sections-498-A of the I.P.C read with Section 4 of the D.P. Act is also not sustainable in the eye of law. 4.24. It is accordingly contended that the impugned order of conviction and sentence passed against the appellant vide the impugned judgment requires interference of this Court.
5. Mr. C.K. Pradhan, learned Addl. Government Advocate for the State on the other hand placing reliance on the evidence of P.Ws.1, 2, 3, 10, 11, 12 & 19 contended that in view of the evidence of the aforesaid witness, it is well proved that just prior to the death of the deceased, the appellant raised a demand Page 23 of 32 // 24 // for purchase of a motor cycle and for the same, a sum of Rs.5,000/- was provided to the appellant by P.W.1. 5.1. In support of the aforesaid submission, reliance was placed to the evidence of P.W.1 in his examination- in -chief:-
"Within one month of marriage, the accused asked my daughter Madhuri to bring one Pulsar motor cycle towards dowry from me. After receiving information from my daughter, I had given Rs.5,000/- to the accused Brundaban to purchase motor cycle. Two days thereafter the accused informed over phone to my brother Gopinath Kousalya that Madhuri has been admitted into Rayagada Hospital. Receiving information, I came to D.H.H., Hospital, Rayagada and found my daughter Madhuri lying dead".
5.2. Similarly, P.W.2 in his examination-in-chief has submitted as follows:-
"The marriage of Madhuri with the accused Brundaban had taken place in the year 2009 at Jagannath Temple, Rayagada. After marriage, the accused and Madhuri resided at Rayagada in a rented house. Thereafter, the accused demanded one motorcycle towards dowry from my brother Dandapani and my brother Dandapani had given Rs.5000/- as advance towards purchase of a motor cycle. Two days after the informant Dandapani had given Rs.5000/- to the accused, my brother Gopinath informed the Dandapani over phone to come to Rayagada as his daughter died."Page 24 of 32
// 25 // 5.3. Reliance was also placed to the evidence of P.W.3. P.W.3 in her examination-in-chief submitted as follows:-
"1- I know the accused Brundaban Kandhpani standing on the dock, who had affected love marriage with my sister Madhuri. The informant, Dandapani Kausalya is my father. In the month of October 2009, there was love marriage between my sister Madhari and accused Brundaban and four to five days thereafter they had also married at Jagannath Temple Rayagada. After marriage, my sister and accused resided rented house at Rayagada on 17th May, 2010 my sister Madhiri Informed my father over phone to give Rs.5000/- as the accused was demanding for purchase of a motor cycle .On 19.5.2010 Madhuri again telephoned my father informing that the accused demanding dowry articles her and was threatening to kill h hem On 22.5.2010 the accused Brundaba informed over phone to my paternal uncle Gopinath Kausalya that Madhuri was ill. When my paternal uncle asked the accused to give the phone to Madhuri, he did not give the phone to her. Thereafter, the accused took Madhuri to Govt. Hospital, Rayagada and at about 4AM the accused telephone to my paternal uncle Gopinath that Madhuri died. Being informed by Gopinath over phone, we came to Rayagada Govt. Hospital and found Madhuri was lying dead on a bed and blood oozing out of nose and mouth, mark of assault on her back and swelling mark on her neck.
5.4. Reliance was also placed to the evidence of P.W.10. P.W.10 in Para-3 of his evidence submitted as follows:-
"3. 5 to 6 days after marriage my niece Madhuri intimated that the accused used assault her demanding one PULSER Motorcycle as dowry. Thereafter my brother Page 25 of 32 // 26 // Dandapani came and gave Rs.5000/- to the accused Brundaban assuring to give rest amount for purchase of PULSER motorcycle within 2days."
5.5. Similarly P.W.11, who happens to be the mother of deceased in her evidence-in-chief in Para-2 submitted as follows:-
"2. One week thereafter Madhuri telephoned to my husband to come to Rayagada as the accused was torturing and assaulting her demanding dowry. Thereafter, I along with my husband had come to Rayagada and Madhuri told us that the accused used to assault how demanding one Motorcycles dowry. He gave Rs.5000/- towards advance for purchase of the motor-cycle and assured to give the balance amount to s days thereafter. Four days thereafter, the accused Brundaban telephoned to Gopinath to come to Rayagada hospital as Madhuri has been admitted into D.H.H. Rayagada, and we came to Rayagada hospital and found my daughter Madhuri was lying dead and blood was oozing out of her nose and ear and there were marks of nails on her neck and scratch injuries on her shoulders. We suspected the accused Might have killed Madhuri as he was assaulting her for dowry."
5.6. P.W.12, in Para-3 of the examination-in-chief also supported the prosecution story by submitting as follows:-
"3. Some days after marriage, Madhuri and my younger brother Gopinath informed that the accused Brundaban used to assault and ill-treat Madhuri demanding one PULSAR Motorcycle towards dowry. One day during the year 2010, my brother Dandapani came and gave Rs.5000/- towards advance for purchase of a motorcycle to the accused and assured to give the rest Page 26 of 32 // 27 // amount for purchase of motorcycle within a short period. Two days thereafter Madhuri intimated over phone that the accused was threatening to kill her unless the rest amount be paid to him and at that time she was crying "
5.7. Similarly, P.W.19 in his examination-in-chief in Para-4 submitted as follows:-
"4. Thereafter they continued to reside in a rented house behind the Rayagada Autonomous College 1 used to occasionally visit them. About a month or two after her marriage during one of my visited to their house Madhuri told me that the accused was demanding a Pulsar motor cycle on the pretext that unless dowry was given his family members would not except her in to the house hold. I informed the matter to my elder brother P.W.1. I later learning that without my knowledge he gave Rs.5000/- to the accused. The Madhuri also used to tell me that the accused was beating her for fulfillment of demand of the motor cycle. In our family we decided that in order to that the matter would be settled, our caste men and relations would sit and would perform a proper sendoff, of the bride and groom. My elder brother P.W.1 also told me that Madhuri was being tortured, which he heard from her. P.W.1 also told me that Madhuri telephoned him that unless some settlement was not done soon the accused was threatening to kill her. This was towards the end of 2009. On a 22nd of May, 2010, the month of which, I do not re-collect, past mid-night accused tele-phoned me to rush to the District Headquarters Hospital, Rayagada. By then we were a little disgusted with the continuous quarrel and bickering between Madhuri and accused. When he telephoned me the second time, I contacted P.W.1, P.W.1 advised me to let them settle their matter and not to go to the Hospital. About three hours later one Trinath Kousalya (P.W.10) a co-villager of the accused and another found me and told that Madhuri had expired. I went to the hospital. On enquiry the doctor told me that Madhuri had died around mid-night. I found a mark of injury on her left arm and neck. I sent Page 27 of 32 // 28 // for my brother and on morning they arrived P.W.1 lodged a report at police station".
5.8. Relying on the aforesaid evidence of the P.Ws, learned Addl. Government Advocate for the State contended that since the deceased died by committing suicide because of demand of dowry, which was partly fulfilled with payment of Rs.5,000/- by P.W.1, it is to be held that the deceased committed suicide because of the demand of dowry by the appellant.
5.9. It is accordingly contended that since demand of dowry just prior to the death of the deceased is well proved from the statement of the P.Ws, no illegality or irregularity can be found with the impugned judgment.
6. Having heard learned counsel appearing for the Parties and after going through the records, this Court finds on the death of the deceased, father of the deceased P.W.1 lodged the F.I.R, giving rise to Rayagada P.S. Case No.98, dtd.22.05.2010, corresponding to G.R. Case No.196 of 2010 in the file of Page 28 of 32 // 29 // learned S.D.J.M., Rayagada for the offence under Sections-302/304-B/498-A of the I.P.C read with Section 4 of the D.P. Act. However, the appellant faced the trial after being charged for the offence under Sections- 304-B/498-A of the I.P.C read with Section 4 of the D.P. Act.
6.1. It is found from the record that appellant married the deceased in the year 2009 in a Temple and there was no demand of dowry. While staying in a rented house at Rayagada, the deceased died after being taken to the Hospital in the night of 21/22.05.2010. 6.2. As found from the record, the appellant while on duty in the residence of S.P., Rayagada, he was intimated by P.W.6 about the illness of the deceased. P.W.6 was intimated about the illness of the deceased, by the deceased herself in the night of 21.05.2010. 6.3. As found from the record, the deceased was taken to the District Head Quarter Hospital, Rayagada by the Page 29 of 32 // 30 // appellant and P.W.6 and while under treatment the deceased died.
6.4. As found from the record, more particularly the chemical examination report, the deceased having taken chloroquine tablet, which is an ante-malaria drop, succumbed to the injury while under treatment after being taken to the Hospital by the appellant along with P.W.6. From the evidence of P.Ws, more particularly P.W.1 and other related witnesses of the deceased, though a plea has been raised that the appellant demanded dowry for purchase of a motor cycle and accordingly P.W.1 paid an advance amount of Rs.5000/- in that regard, but in view of the contradiction in the statement of such related PWs, this Court is unable to accept the stand of the prosecution regarding demand of dowry by the appellant. Not only that from the evidence available on record, it is not at all proved that soon before the death of the deceased, Page 30 of 32 // 31 // the deceased was subjected to torture by the appellant on the ground non-fulfillment of demand of dowry. 6.5. Therefore, as per the considered view of this Court, since the deceased was not subjected to torture on the ground of demand of dowry, soon before her death, ingredients of Section-304-B is not attracted and presumptions in terms of Section-113(B) of the Evidence Act cannot be taken. Placing reliance on the decisions in the case of Karan Singh, Chabik Karmakar etc. as cited (supra), it is the view of this Court that prosecution has miserably failed to prove the allegation of the offence under Sections-304-B/498- A of the I.P.C read with Section 4 of the D.P. Act against the appellant beyond all reasonable doubt. The prosecution has also failed to prove the material ingredients of the offence punishable under Section- 304-B. Not a single incident of cruelty covered by Section-498-A was also proved by the prosecution. Page 31 of 32
// 32 // 6.6. In view of the aforesaid analysis, this Court is of the view that without having any relevant and cogent material, appellant has been convicted vide the impugned judgment.
6.7. Therefore, this Court is inclined to quash the impugned judgment dtd.10.07.2015 so passed by learned Sessions Judge, Rayagada in C.T. Case No.15/2011. While quashing the said judgment, this Court sets-aside the order of conviction and sentence passed against the appellant and allows the appeal accordingly. Appellant be discharged from the bail bond so furnished.
7. Accordingly the CRLA stands disposed of.
(Biraja Prasanna Satapathy) Judge Orissa High Court, Cuttack Dated the 16th of July, 2025/Subrat Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: SUBRAT KUMAR BARIK Reason: Authentication Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK Date: 06-Aug-2025 14:12:13 Page 32 of 32