Jharkhand High Court
Indian Oil Corporation Limited (A ... vs Smt. Saroja Devi on 28 November, 2025
Author: Anubha Rawat Choudhary
Bench: Anubha Rawat Choudhary
2025:JHHC:35816
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
S.A. No. 391 of 2016
Indian Oil Corporation Limited (a company having its registered
office at G-9, Ali Yawar Jung Marg, Bandra (East), Mumbai, P.O. &
P.S.- Bandra, District- Mumbai, through Manoj Gupta, Manager
(Retail Sales), Divisional Office, Indian Oil Corporation Limited,
Kamani Centre, Bistupur, P.O. & P.S.- Bistupur, Town Jamshedpur,
District East Singhbhum, at present Ranchi Divisional Office, Retail
Sales, 2nd Floor, S.P.G. Mart, Bahu Bazar, P.O.- Doranda, P.S.- Lower
Bazar, District- Ranchi 834001
... ... Defendant/Respondent/Appellant
-Versus-
1. Smt. Saroja Devi, Wife of Ram Nandan Prasad Singh, resident of
Ahir Toli, Karam Toli, P.O.- Morabadi, P.S.- Lalpur, Town of
Ranchi, District- Ranchi
... ... Plaintiff/Appellant/Respondent
2. Rohit Oraon, son of Rameshwar Oraon, Tunki Tola, Bariatu Road,
P.O. & P.S.- Bariatu, Town of Ranchi, District- Ranchi
3. Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, P.O- G.P.O., P.S.- Kotwali,
District- Ranchi
4. Deputy Sales Manager, Indian Oil Corporation Limited, Marketing
Division, 133/C/1/A, Vidya Marg-C, Ashok Nagar, Ranchi-834002
... ... Defendants/Respondents/Proforma respondents
---
CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY
---
For the Appellant : Mr. Rahul Kumar Gupta, Advocate
: Mr. Rahul Lamba, Advocate
: Mr. Anish Kamal, Advocate
: Ms. Swati Singh, Advocate
For the Resp. No. 1 : Mr. A. K. Sahani, Advocate
For the Resp. No. 2 : Mr. Saurabh Shekhar, Advocate
: Mrs. Sonam, Advocate
: Mr. Aman Dayal Singh, Advocate
---
CAV on 07.08.2025 Pronounced on 28.11.2025
1. This 2nd appeal has been filed against the Judgment and Decree dated 24.05.2016 (Decree sealed and signed on 13.06.2016) passed by the learned Additional Judicial Commissioner-V at Ranchi in Title Appeal No.148 of 2006 whereby and whereunder the title appeal was allowed and the suit of the plaintiff was decreed, reversing the 2025:JHHC:35816 Judgment and Decree dated 20.09.2006 (Decree sealed and signed on 01.11.2006) passed by the learned Sub-ordinate Judge-VI, Ranchi in Title Suit No.141/2000. The appellant was the defendant before the learned trial court. The suit was dismissed and the 1st appeal was allowed and accordingly, the contesting defendant Indian Oil Corporation (herein after referred to as IOC) is the appellant before this court. The learned 1st appellate court directed the defendants to remove their structure over the suit property and give vacant possession of the suit property to the plaintiff within two months of the date of judgment and decree and further directed them to pay mesne profits after adjusting the account.
2. Admittedly the plaintiff is the owner of the suit property. The suit was filed for the following reliefs:
(A) Declaration that since 01.12.1996, the defendants are in illegal and unauthorized possession of the suit property owned by the plaintiff and described in the schedule and have no right and authority to use and occupy the same for running a retail outlet for sale of petrol, High Speed diesel, lubricants, etc. and for any other purpose whatsoever.
Alternatively, (B) Declaration that tenancy of the defendants, if at all any, stood determined with effect from 31.03.2000 because of non-payment of rent and defendants have no right to sue and occupy plaintiff's property described in the schedule for running a retail outlet for sale of petrol, High Speed diesel, lubricants, etc. and for any other purpose whatsoever.
(C) Consequent to relief (A) or relief (B), decree of delivery of khas possession of the suit property described in the schedule by evicting the defendants and their agents, servants and employees therefrom. (D) Decree for payment of mesne profits and arrear rent as the case may be after taking accounts.
(E) Decree for perpetual injunction restraining the defendants, their agents, servants and employees from interfering with plaintiff's peaceful possession of the suit property described in the schedule in any way or manner.
(F) Costs and/or incidental to the suit.
2
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(G) Any other relief(s) to which the plaintiff is found
entitled at law or in equity.
3. This 2nd appeal was admitted for final hearing vide order dated 23.04.2019 and additional substantial questions of law were framed vide order dated 24.04.2023 by referring to the judgement passed in the case of Rajendra Pratap Singh versus Rameshwar Prasad reported in (1998) 7 SCC 602 (paragraph 11). The substantial questions of law to be answered are as follows: -
(i) Whether notice under Section 106 of the T.P. Act is a valid notice in the eyes of law?
(ii) Whether finding of the Appellate Court is perverse?
(iii) Whether the learned first appellate court erred by not drawing adverse inference against the plaintiff for not entering the witness box though the fact of the suit revolves round the meeting in which the terms and condition of the lease was settled down by the plaintiff and the defendant on 25.11.1996?
(iv) Whether the learned first appellate court committed a perversity by not treating Ext. C to be a written agreement for the purpose of Section 53-A of Transfer to Property Act between the parties to the suit in respect of the lease of the suit property?
4. The case of the plaintiff as per the plaint is as under: -
a. Pursuant to notices and advertisement issued by the Defendant No.1 (IOC) in local newspaper in 1995-96 inviting offers from land owner for grant of long-term lease for 30 years with provision for renewal in respect of land, the plaintiff offered her land for long term lease of 30 years subject to enhancement of rent every ten years and subject to reimbursement of all expenses incurred by plaintiff for levelling and developing the land.
b. After negotiation, plaintiff gave revised offer for grant of lease for 30 years at a monthly rental of Rs.4,800/- subject to 3 2025:JHHC:35816 enhancement of rent by 15% every ten years and subject to payment of costs incurred by the plaintiff for developing and levelling the land. The plaintiff got the land developed and levelled as required by the defendants and incurred expenses to the tune of Rs.2,20,000/- to be reimbursed to the plaintiff. c. Without entering into lease agreement with the plaintiff and to accommodate Rohit Oraon [Defendant No.3] and his father, the management of IOC gave retail outlet agency for sale of petrol and High-speed diesel and for the said purpose, the defendants forcibly took possession of the suit land on 01.12.1996 and enclosed the area within a boundary wall.
d. The plaintiff further stated that because of the inordinate delay on the part of the management of Defendant No.1 and because of the laches on their part, terms and condition of the lease was never settled and hence, any deed of lease could not be executed and registered.
e. The Defendant by show of force and by abusing power and authority took possession of the entire area of the plaintiff's land, but the defendants did not reimburse the expenses of Rs.2,20,000/- incurred by the plaintiff and without knowledge and consent of the plaintiff, management of Indian Oil corporation caused deposit of some money in the Bank account of the plaintiff with the malafide intention of making a claim that such amount has been paid as rent. Said unilateral deposit of money by defendants in plaintiff's bank account could not be construed and treated as payment of rent of the suit property and/ or acceptance of such rent by plaintiff and/or creation of relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and any or more of the defendants.
f. The plaintiff further stated that no relationship of landlord and tenant was ever brought into effect between the plaintiff and any of the defendants in respect of the suit property or any portion thereof, whether expressly or by implication, and defendants' possession of the suit property and intended user of 4 2025:JHHC:35816 the same as a retail outlet for sale of petrol and High-speed diesel etc. by defendant no 3 is absolutely illegal. g. As an afterthought and in order to justify the defendants' illegal acts and omissions, a lawyer's notice dated 13.03.1998 was sent to the plaintiff on behalf of IOC and the plaintiff sent reply dated 10.04.1998 controverting the allegations and implication in the notice dated 13.03.1998. The plaintiff filed a writ petition being CWJC No.3548 of 1999(R) before the High Court and the Hon'ble Court vide order dated 11.01.2000 was pleased to direct the plaintiff to file suit before the competent civil court. Thereafter, the plaintiff sent and served lawyer's notice dated 19.02.2000 on the defendants asking them to quit and vacate the suit property by 31.03.2000 and claiming payment of Rs.2,20,000/- together with mesne profits for illegal use and occupation of the suit property from 01.12.1996. In the notice, it was clearly mentioned that there is no relationship of lessor and lessee between the plaintiff and the defendants and in case defendants set up untenable plea of such relationship, eventuality the notice dated 19.02.2000 is to be treated as notice determining tenancy/lease, (if at all any) on the ground of such non-payment of rent. In-spite of the receipt of the notice, the defendants did not vacate the suit property.
5. On receiving notices, the Defendant Nos.1 and 2 representing IOC appeared and filed their written statement jointly and asserted, interalia, as under: -
I. The suit is not maintainable and is only a counter blast to the suit filed by the defendants against the plaintiff for decree of specific performance of contract which has been registered as Title Suit No.66/2000 pending in the court of Munsif, Ranchi. II. The suit is in fact a suit for eviction of the defendant from suit property under the provision of Bihar Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction Control) Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as BBC Act).5
2025:JHHC:35816 III. In response to the advertisement published by the defendants, the plaintiff wrote a letter offering to give land on lease on monthly rent of Rs.6,000/- and thereafter, there was communication between the plaintiff and the defendants consequent upon which defendants gave letter to the plaintiff on 25.12.1996 stating inter-alia that initially the period of lease shall be 30 years and after expiry of the period of thirty years, the lease would be renewed for further thirty years, rent would be Rs.4,800/- per month and rent would be increased by 15% after expiry of every ten years and the lessee i.e. the IOC (lessor) would deposit rent in bank account of the plaintiff till the entire loan taken by the plaintiff was completely liquidated.
The expenses of Rs.2,20,000/- said to be incurred by the plaintiff was denied and any stipulation that any expenses would be reimbursed was also denied.
IV. It was denied that to accommodate the Defendant No.3 and his father, management of Indian Oil corporation gave retail outlet agency for sale of petrol and high-speed diesel and for the said purpose, they took forcibly possession of the suit land. They denied the allegation made against Defendant No.3. It was asserted that the IOC does not have any role in selecting the dealers, since the Dealer Selection Board is non-operative. V. During negotiation, these defendants made inquiry from the bank and the Bank of India by letter dated 12.11.1996 informed the defendants that the plaintiff had taken loan of Rs.2 lacs and to obtain the said loan, the plaintiff mortgaged the land-in- question. As a matter of fact, the plaintiff acknowledged by the documents dated 31.12.1996 that the defendants have taken possession of the land.
VI. After having taken possession, the defendants incurred sufficient expenses and established retail outlet on the land and also raised structure over the same. The defendants also set up the pump for delivery of petroleum product to the customers and for storage of petrol they placed a tanker under the ground.
62025:JHHC:35816 It was denied that the defendants took possession of the property against wishes of the plaintiff. It was asserted that after having taken possession of the property, the defendants started the retail outlet and raised structures over the same. The plaintiff never objected to such establishments and construction. It was denied that the management of Defendant No.1 caused any delay and any laches on their part. VII. It was false to say that the terms and condition of the lease were not settled. By the letter dated 25.11.1996, the plaintiff requested defendants to deposit monthly rent with Bank of India, Main Road Branch, Ranchi mentioning her Loan Account No.1640 and also disclosed her Savings Bank Account No.27910. She directed the defendants to deposit the rent in the said account till the loan taken by her was totally liquidated. On such request only, the defendants started depositing the rent in the loan account of the plaintiff.
VIII. They further stated that the defendants deposited a total sum of Rs.1.77 Lakhs (approximately) in the loan account of the plaintiff and the plaintiff was fully aware of the facts. The rent was being deposited by the defendants in her loan account. As a matter of fact, bank used to intimate from time to time about the receipt of the money from the defendants.
IX. In terms of the agreement, these defendants purchased non-
judicial stamp of Rs.49,100/- and intimated the plaintiff and requested her to execute and register the deed of lease. The defendants also got the lease drafted and sent a copy of the same to the plaintiff but the plaintiff expressed her difficulty to execute the deed immediately. In particular the plaintiff was reluctant to execute the lease deed in favour of the defendants during the subsistence of mortgage and the plaintiff requested the defendants to keep the matter postponed till the entire loan amount was repaid to the bank. As six months i.e. permissible limit was about to expire, the defendants had to return the non-
72025:JHHC:35816 judicial stamp by incurring the loss of 10% on the total value of the stamp.
X. It is false to allege that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendants. After negotiation, defendants took possession of the property and they continued to deposit the rent in loan account of the plaintiff and the plaintiff also accepted the rent and therefore, the establishment of retail outlet in the suit property is not illegal. The defendants have taken approval from the authorities concerned and even plaintiff has also approved expressly and also by necessary implication establishment of the retail outlet. The claim of the plaintiff of Rs.2,20,000/- is baseless. It is false to allege that the tenancy stood determined w.e.f. 31.03.2000 because of non-payment of rent. The defendants regularly deposited rent in the loan account of the plaintiff and thereafter the defendants have been remitting rent by money order. The plaintiff without informing the defendants wrote a letter to the bank on 01.02.2000 stating that she had deposited the balance of the loan amount and she requested the bank to return the papers. It was asserted that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief as prayed for.
6. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial court had framed the following issues for consideration:
1. Is the suit as framed maintainable?
2. Has the plaintiff valid cause of action?
3. Is the suit barred under the principles of waiver, estoppel and acquiescence?
4. Is the suit barred by non-joinder of necessary party i.e. the Deputy Commissioner of Chhotanagpur?
5. Is there any relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and defendants?
6. Is this suit the counter blast to this suit filed by the defendants against this plaintiff prior to filing of suit i.e. TS No 66/2000?8
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7. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the decree as claimed for in the suit?
8. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for payment of mesne profit and arrear of rents?
9. Whether the defendant is in possession of the suit property in part performance of contract by the terms of which the plaintiff agreed to grant a lease of the suit properties to the defendant no 1 and 2 for a period of 30 years?
10.Whether the defendants have developed the suit land after taking valid possession of the property and have spent huge money for such development?
11.To what relief or reliefs if any the plaintiff is entitled for?
7. In course of trial, the plaintiff examined altogether nine witnesses. PW-1 is Raj Kumar Lal, PW-2 is Jitendra Kumar Pandey, PW-3 is Satish Kumar, PW-4 is Bhajo Hari Mahto, PW-5 is Sunil Kumar Singh, PW-6 is Shrawan Kumar Singh, PW-7 is Aditya Kumar, PW-8 is Ram Nandan Prasad Singh and PW-9 is Jairam Singh.
8. The plaintiff exhibited the following documents in support of her case.
Ext-1- the legal notice dated 10.4.1998 sent by plaintiff to advocate Shri Amar Nath Gupta in reply to notice dated 13.3.1998.
Ext-1/1 - is another notice dated 19.2.2000 given on behalf of plaintiff to M/s Indian Oil Corporation.
Ext-2 to 2/2 - are three rent receipts.
Ext-3 - is the order of mutation.
Ext-4 to 4/2- are the three receipts in the name of the plaintiff issued by Jharkhand electricity Board.
Ext-5 is the power of attorney given by plaintiff Saroja Devi in favour of her husband Sri Ram Nandan Prasad Singh to contest the proceedings.
92025:JHHC:35816 Ext-6- is the sale deed dated 8.12.1989 by which the schedule land has been purchased by the plaintiff.
Ext-7 to 7/3 are four postal receipts dated 19.2.2000. Ext-8 is the daily newspaper Ranchi Express dated 19.11.1999. Ext-9 to 9/7- are the photographs of the schedule property Ext-10- is the certified copy of the order passed by the Hon'ble High court Ranchi in CWJC No. 3458 of 1999(R) dated 11.01.2000.
9. The defendants examined four witnesses. DW-1 is the Sanjay Bharti, DW-2 is Shrinivas Arunanchalam, DW-3 is Amar Bahadur Singh and DW-4 is Rohit Oraon.
10. The defendants exhibited the following documents:
Ext-A is letter dated 02.6.1996 by which plaintiff Saroja Devi made offer to CDM, Indian Oil, Jamshedpur for leasing out her plot for 30 years on monthly rent of Rs.6,000/- which was to be increased by 15% every 10 years. Ext-B is the xerox copy of handing over/taking over note dated 31.12.1996 signed by the plaintiff and Sanjay Bharti with regard to 52.5 decimals of land of Plot No.119(P), Khata No.128.
Ext-C is the revised offer letter dated 25.11.96 given by plaintiff Saroja Devi to Chief Divisional Manager, Indian Oil, Jamshedpur Ext-D is the letter dated 12.11.1996 written by Chief Manager, Bank of India to the Sales Officer, IOCL, Namkum, Ranchi Ext-E is the letter dated 28.11.1996 written by Chief Manager, Bank of India to Indian Oil Corporation, Eastern Region, Kolkata.
Ext-F is the certified copy of Plaint of Title Suit No.66/2000. Ext-G is the letter dated 11.09.1997 of Chief Manager, Bank of India to the Sales Officer, Indian Oil corporation, Ranchi. Ext-H & H/1 are Non-Encumbrance Certificates dated 23.08.1996 over the suit property.
102025:JHHC:35816 Ext-I is No objection certificate dated 28.12.1996 issued by District Arms Officer, Ranchi Ext-J is the registered letter dated 29.9.2003 issued by Indian Oil Corporation to the plaintiff attaching demand draft of Rs.4800/- dated 23.09.2003.
Ext-K is photocopy of Sale Deed dated 04.12.1989 in favour of plaintiff regarding suit land.
Ext-L is notice dated 13.03.1998 given by India Oil Corporation through Deputy Manager, Sales, Ranchi to the plaintiff.
Ext-M & M/1 are two advertisement notices published in the newspaper on behalf of Indian oil (Marketing Division Easter Region) through Chief Divisional Manager, Jamshedpur Divisional Office, Indian Oil corporation, Bishtupur, Jamshedpur inviting application for long term lease/ outright sale of land by interested land owners for various sites.
11. The learned trial court first decided issue no.9, being the most important issue. The learned trial court observed that in order to claim benefit of part performance of agreement under section 53-A of the Transfer of property Act, there has to be an agreement and in consequence of such an agreement the property is handed over and if the person in possession has done something in part performance of the agreement then the person in possession cannot be evicted by any court of law even if the agreement is not registered. Thereafter, the learned court examined the facts of the case and came to a finding that exhibit-A (the initial offer of the plaintiff) and exhibit- C (the revised offer of the plaintiff) constituted a written agreement between the parties and the defendants came in possession of the property pursuant thereto and also done work on the property. The learned trial court also held that the defendant no.1 was ready and willing to perform their part of the agreement in view of the statement in the plaint of another pending suit i.e., T.S. No. 66 of 2000 which was marked exhibit- F. Exhibit B was relied upon being the note of handing over 11 2025:JHHC:35816 of the property by the plaintiff to the defendant-IOC. The learned court then disbelieved the case of the plaintiff that the defendants were in forceful possession of the suit property by considering exhibit A, B, and C and held that the defendants were in possession pursuant to part performance of the agreement and were entitled to protection under section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. The findings are quoted as under: -
" In order to find out the defence taken by the defendant in light of this provision, my attention has been drawn by the defendant that pursuant to the advertisement made by defendant required land for opening a out-let, the plaintiff Saroja Devi made the offer of giving the land which is in dispute to the defendant and she also came in writing with this offer vide Exhibit-A dated 2.6.96 the reading where of clearly speaks that the plaintiff that is Saroja Devi had given in writing her readiness to give the land in dispute for 30 years on payment of rent of Rupees 6,000 per month further to increase of 15% every 10 years. This offer by the Saroja Devi, the plaintiff, has been given in writing to the defendant. But thereafter another negotiation was made on 25.11.96 which is again in writing given by plaintiff Saroja Devi to the defendant and in this fresh offer the plaintiff has agreed in writing to let-out the suit property from specifically specified in the written offer on a reduced monthly rent of Rupees 4,800 with request to the defendant to deposit rental in her loan account no. 1640 of which the saving Bank Account no.27910 of Bank of India, Main Branch, Ranchi. This document is Exhibit-C. On the basis of the Exhibit-A and C one thing is absolutely clear on the record that there was written agreement between the plaintiff and defendant with regard to leasing out the disputed premises for 30years with certain conditions. Now my attention has further been drawn towards Exhibit-B this Exhibit-B is also very very important in order to decide this issue. This Exhibit-B is the note of handing over of disputed plot by Saroja Devi the plaintiff to the defendant and this Exhibit has been signed by Saroja Devi and the defendant and the reading where of will again clearly speak that the disputed plot had been handed over by the plaintiff to the defendant with her free consent with a consent that it was the defendant who was supposed to develop the land for his use out of the corpus fund of the corporation. This Exhibit is relevant for two purposes that in pursuance of the written agreement the disputed plot was handed over to the defendant and defendant had the authority to develop the same for its own use in part performance of the contract. This fact 12 2025:JHHC:35816 has also says that defendant has come in possession over the disputed plot in performance of the written agreement i.e, Exhibit A and C and has also done the work over the same in part performance of the Contract. With regard to the important aspect of defence is to be taken under section 53(A) of T.P. Act which is the willingness of doing his part of his contract by the defendant i.e. the payment of rent and other things. My attention has been drawn towards Exhibit F which is the certified copy of T.S.No.66/2000 filed by defendant of the instant suit against the plaintiff of the instant suit for specific Performance of Contract which is still pending in the court and prayer in this regard has been made very specifically that the plaintiff of the instant suit be directed to execute the lease deed in favour of the defendant of the instant suit. This fact, if taken into consideration, will speak clearly that the defendant of this case is still ready and willing to perform his part of the Contract.
On the other hand, the case of the plaintiff from the very beginning of the pleadings made in the plaint is that the defendant has come in forceful possession of the suit premise. I fail to understand that any man of ordinary prudence would ever accept the contention of the plaintiff of defendant coming over the suit premises by forcible means in a situation when Exhibit A,B and C are dominantly projecting a very strong case of coming in possession over the suit premise by defendant in pursuance of an agreement if a party comes in possession of a property in pursuance of an agreement, then to my mind he can never be called or termed as a trespasser are taking the possession forcible. Viewed, thus, the contention of the plaintiff that the defendant has come in possession of the suit property by force is nothing else but a bundle of lies which is not sustainable at all and should be out rightly thrown down in the dustbin of litigation. When I examined the entire evidence of the defendant, the documentary evidence as well as the oral, in this regard, I am of the convinced view that the defendant has taken the possession and have actually come over the possession of the suit property under Written agreement entered into between the plaintiff and defendant and has also done something in part performance of the contract and also he is still ready to perform his part of the contract and as such I find overwhelming evidence on the record that his possession over the suit property is fully and completely defended, protected and fortified by the provisions of section 53(A) of the Transfer of Property Act and viewed, thus, no person or authority under the law can evict the defendant of such justified possession of land.13
2025:JHHC:35816 In this view of the matter, I am of the view that this important issue is decided in favour of the defendant."
12. The learned trial court decided Issue No.10 in favour of the defendant holding that the development work over the suit property has been done by the defendant. The learned trial court decided Issue No.5 against the plaintiff holding that there was a relationship of landlord and tenant over the suit property between the plaintiff and the defendant-IOC. The learned trial court decided Issue No.6 against the plaintiff holding that there is overwhelming evidence on the record that the suit seems to be a counter blast to the earlier suit. The learned trial court decided Issue No.7 against the plaintiff holding that the plaintiff has no right to get a decree of eviction of the defendant from the suit property. The learned trial court decided Issue No.8 against the plaintiff holding that once it is held that the plaintiff is not entitled for a decree of eviction against the defendant and the possession of the defendant is protected, there is no question of any relief in form of mesne profit or arrear of rent to the plaintiff. The learned trial court decided Issue Nos.3 and 4 holding that the suit is not barred by waiver, acquiescence and estoppel and decided Issue No.1 against the plaintiff holding that the suit as framed is not maintainable. Further, the learned trial court decided Issue No.2 against the plaintiff holding that there is no valid cause of action in favour of the plaintiff in the suit. The learned trial court also decided Issue No.11 against the plaintiff holding that the plaintiff is not at all entitled for any relief including the equitable relief. The learned trial court ultimately dismissed the suit on contest.
13. The learned 1st appellate court recorded its findings as under:
"10. Issue no 9- ............
Protection of section 53A of the TP Act is available only as a defence. It is settled law. Now in this case admitted position and also established by the evidence that the plaintiff is the lawful owner of the suit property. ..................
Notice and advertisement was published on behalf of the Indian Oil corporation on 15.5.1996 inviting offer for outright sale/ long lease minimum for 30 years with option for renewal regarding location situated in Ormanjhi on NH-33 within two kilometer from Ormanjhi through Chief Divisional Manager, Jamshedpur division, Indian Oil corporation Center, 14 2025:JHHC:35816 Jamshedpur. Offer was to be sent in sealed envelope and to reach before 3 PM on 3.6.1996. The said envelope for each site should contain no encumbrances certificate for minimum period of 13 years attested copies of the title deed legal opinion on marketability of the property offered from an advocate and the detailed sketch showing the same. The corporation reserves the right to accept/ reject any offer in whole/ part without assigning any reason whatsoever as recited in Ext-M and M/1.
In response to the aforesaid invitation of offer plaintiff offered her plot at Ormanjhi to give it on 30 years lease and rent per month will be 6000/-. Rent has to be increased by 15% every ten years. After every 30 years renewal can be done after fresh negotiation. This offer was made through letter in writing dated 2.6.1996 under signature of the plaintiff and addressed to Chief Divisional Manager Indian Oil corporation Jamshedpur as per Ext-A. It also transpires from the pleadings and evidence of the parties that this offer was not accepted by the Chief Divisional Manager, Indian Oil corporation, Jamdhespur. It also emerges from the pleadings and oral evidence on behalf of the plaintiff that revised offer for grant of lease for 30 years at monthly rental of 4800/- subject to escalation of rent by 15% every ten years was also given by the plaintiffs which is also admitted to the defendants .It is case of the defendant that this revised offer is contained in Ext-C, letter dated 25.11.1996 from Saroja Devi plaintiff to the Chief Divisional Manager, Indian Oil corporation, Jamshedpur which recites ----------
To, The Chief Divisional Manager, Indian Oil, Jamshedpur.
Sub- Revised offer for land for development of the RO by you at Ormanjhi on NH 33 Distt-Ranchi.
Dear sir, Today I had a meeting with the IOC's Negotiation committee at Ranchi my revised offer of Rs.6000/- (Six thousand) was taken up for the committee.
After the meeting, I hereby agreed to accept Rs.4800/- (Four thousand) per month as rent for the land. Land proposed to be leased to IOC is;
Plot no 119 Khata mo 128 Thana no 32 PS- Ormanjhi Mauza- Chakla area 52.5 decimal.
Lease will be initially for thirty years. After thirty years lease may be renewed for further thirty years after fresh negotiation. We want 15% increase in rent after every ten years of initial 30 years lease.15
2025:JHHC:35816 I also hereby request that monthly rent may be deposited with Bank of India Main branch, Ranchi in my account no 1640 saving bank account no is 27910. You pay rent to the bank directly till the loan be totally paid.
The land document now in possession of the bank will be deposited with the IOC after the loan is cleared. I am also agreeable to sign lease deed with required stipulation as above.
Ext-C bears signature of the Saroja Devi in Hindi. Now it transpires from Ext-C that it was offer regarding land of plaintiff showing terms on which she was offering her land to Indian Oil corporation and this offer was made by the plaintiff to Chief Divisional Manager, Indian Oil corporation Jamshedpur. Therefore, Chief Divisional Manager, Indian Oil corporation Jamshedpur was to accept or reject this offer on behalf of the Indian oil corporation. But on perusal of written statement of the defendants no 1 and 2 I do not find any clear cut or categorical pleadings on their behalf that this offer was ever accepted by the Chief Divisional Manager, Indian Oil corporation Jamshedpur on behalf of the IOC. Even there is no pleading that this offer was accepted by any other authorised person on behalf of the IOC. Though, it has been pleaded on their behalf that an agreement was reached between the plaintiff and the IOC. But until and unless there is evidence of acceptance of this offer of the plaintiff as made in Ext-C. I am unable to decipher that an agreement was reached between the plaintiff and the IOC. Since invitation of offer was made by the IOC through Chief Divisional Manager, Jamshedpur as per Ext-M. Therefore, usual manner of acceptance on behalf of the Indian Oil corporation was to be in writing under the signature of Chief Divisional Manager Jamshedpur accepting this offer but there is no such evidence coming from the side of the defendants. There is no pleadings that anybody else on behalf of the IOC accepted offer and the same was communicated to the plaintiff. It has been submitted on behalf of the appellant that the IOC official who was present in the meeting for negotiation has admitted in his cross examination in para 16 as DW-2 that Saroja Devi does not know english and she was talking with them in Hindi. There is no evidence on behalf of the defendants that the contents of Ext-A, B and C were read over and explained to her /plaintiff in Hindi. Therefore, the signature of the plaintiff on these documents does not prove that she has executed the document being aware of its contents. Though I find that it is admitted to the plaintiff that she made offer and revised offer regarding suit land to the IOC through its Chief Divisional Manager, Jamshedpur.
After taking into consideration the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the defendants I find there is no evidence on the record when the offer made in Ext-C was accepted by defendants at what time and at what place. I also find from the perusal of the Ext-C that it does not disclose the date from 16 2025:JHHC:35816 which the tenancy to take effect which is also essential term for the lease or proposed lease.
It also transpires form Ext-D that letter dated 12.11.1996 written by Chief Manager, Bank of India to sales officer Indian Oil corporation, Namkum, Ranchi that the bank has sanctioned a loan of Rs.2 lacs on 10/12/1996 to Mrs. Saroja Devi for Sahri Barh Dhaba at Ormanjhi and the said loan was secured by way of mortgage of the land of Mrs Saroja Devi. Bank also expressed its no objection to receive rent to the credit of Mrs Saroja Devi in his loan account from Indian Oil corporation.
The defendants are claiming that an agreement was reached between the plaintiff and the Indian Oil corporation on 25.11.1996 for which they are seeking specific performance of lease by Title suit no 66/2000 pending in the court of Sub Judge I, Ranchi. But even after 25.11.1996 as per their own document Ext-E which is letter dated 28/11/1996 sent by the Chief Manager Bank of India to M/s Indian Oil corporation eastern, Kolkata it transpires that Indian Oil corporation by fax message dated 27/11/1996 sought additional information from the bank in connection with captioned loan account. Bank has provided details of land offered as security to them as :- Khata no 128 plot no 119 PS No 32 Area 58 decimals. It transpires form the letter dated 12/02/1998 sent to the Mrs Saroja Devi from Indian Oil corporation stamp papers for carrying registration of the lease deed was purchased by the corporation on 17.3.1997 and the same were returned to the DC office on 23.9.1997 since registration of the deed was not carried out. It has been pleaded on behalf of the defendants that after agreement and contract between the parties rent for land was being regularly paid and paid to the account of the plaintiff Saroja Devi. It transpires from Ext G filed and proved on behalf of the defendants that for the first time by cheque no 17806 dated 1/09/1997 Rs,3,8,400/- was deposited in the loan account no 1640 of Saroja Devi through sales officer of the Indian Oil corporation. Therefore, it transpires that no rent or any money was paid till 10/09/1997 by the defendants to the plaintiff. Further this amount was paid after knowing fully well that plaintiff is no more interested in executing and registering lease in favour of IOC.
Further it has been pleaded and submitted on behalf of the defendant that in part performance of the agreement dated 25/11/1996 they obtained possession of the land on 31/12/1996 as evident from Ext-B. Ext-B is not original document but is a Xerox copy. It does not bear original signature of the plaintiff Saroja Devi. This document has been marked Exhibit with objection by the plaintiff. I am unable to understand what was the hurry on behalf of the IOC and its officials the defendants to take possession of the suit land when there was no lawful agreement reached between the parties since no verbal or written consent given to the offer of the plaintiff dated 25/11/1996 on behalf of the defendants. As already mentioned 17 2025:JHHC:35816 that the stamp for the proposed lease were purchased by the defendant on 17/3/1997. it transpires that before 17.3.1997 the defendant had no intention to make any commitment regarding the offer of the plaintiff dated 25/11/1996. Therefore, they had not given and communicated any acceptance of the said offer. Therefore, I find that the act of the defendant taking possession of the suit property evidenced by Ext-B cannot be equated as acceptance of the said offer because creation of an agreement between the parties requires meeting of mind on the same matter in the same sense. This fact also finds support from the circumstance that though it has been pleaded by the defendant that a draft of lease was prepared and sent to the plaintiff but no such draft adduced in evidence by the defendant to rule out the possibility that there were no new terms and conditions in the proposed lease to be executed between the parties. Since introduction of any new terms and condition in the draft would amount to new offer from the side of the defendants. Therefore, the defendants have deliberately suppressed the form of proposed lease.
Ext-I which is no objection certificate dated 28.12.96 issued by the District Arms Officer Ranchi to the Chief Divisional Manager IOC, Jamshedpur that the issuing authority has no objection for installment of the M.S / H.S.D Pump on the land of khata no 128 plot no 32 for area 0.53 acres. it appears that these formalities to be completed only after execution of proper lease by the plaintiff in favour of the defendants. But from the aforesaid documentary evidence and the pleadings of the parties and even after considering the oral evidence adduced on behalf of the defendants and the plaintiffs I find that no agreement was reached between the plaintiff and the defendant no 1 on 25.11.1996 since there was no acceptance on behalf of the defendants no 1 through Chief Divisional Manager, Indian Oil Corporation Jamshedpur and the question of its communication to the plaintiff could arise only after acceptance. There is no evidence that such acceptance was ever given by the Chief Divisional Manager Jamshedpur and ever communicated to the plaintiff. Therefore, without proper acceptance of the offer dated 25.11.1996 no agreement could be reached between the parties. Therefore, there is no concluded contract between the parties. Further it transpires from the said offer given by the plaintiff on 25/11/1996 that there was no date given in the offer from which tenancy or the lease was to start. It was essential for such contract of lease as per law declared by the Hon'ble Apex court.
And after taking into consideration evidence available on record I find that learned lower court has erred and wrongly held that there was a written agreement between the defendants and plaintiffs with regard to leasing of the suit property for thirty years. Learned lower court has treated Ext-C as written agreement which was actually only offer from the side of the 18 2025:JHHC:35816 plaintiff containing certain terms and conditions and it also transpires that the very essential terms for the proposed lease was further to be negotiated regarding date from which land of the plaintiff was to be leased. It also transpires from para 24 of the plaint of title suit no 66/2000 filed by the Indian Oil corporation regarding cause of action that in the seventh line word on and thereafter vacant space for date and word when were initially printed and thereafter deleted. Therefore, no time of acceptance of the offer of defendants (present plaintiff) was given in it.
Learned counsel for the appellant/ plaintiff in support of his submission has relied on following cases ................ ............................
Most essential requirement for the defence and protection of section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act is existence of contract in writing between parties. Existence of the contract requires existence of agreement between the parties. Further agreement requires existence of an offer from a party and its acceptance from the other party. Therefore, logically if there is no acceptance of offer in a case there cannot be an agreement between the parties.
Therefore I find that that first and foremost condition for the protection available under section 53A of the Transfer of property Act is that
1. There must be contract to transfer for consideration immovable property.
2. Contract must be in writing signed by the transferor or someone on his behalf.
3. Writing must be in such words from which terms necessary to constitute transfer can be ascertained Are not fulfilled in the present case.
Ext-C admittedly a document of offer from the side of the plaintiff cannot be equated with contract between the parties. Since there is no evidence of acceptance of this offer from the side of the defendants specifically by the person who was authorized to give such acceptance on behalf of the Indian Oil corporation. Admittedly no lease was executed and registered in this case. Further it transpires from the evidence on behalf of the parties that no any rent or money was deposited or paid by the defendants to the plaintiff till October 1997. It further transpires from the para 22 of the Written statement of the defendants that defendants deposited total sum of Rs. 1,77000/- approximately in the loan account of the plaintiff. While it has been pleaded in para 10 of plaint of title suit no 66/2000 that Rs.62385/- has been deposited in loan account of the defendant (plaintiff) both statements are contradictory.
Therefore, finding of the learned lower court on this issue is set aside and this issue is decided against the defendants and in favour of the plaintiff.19
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11. Issue no 10- It has been pleaded on behalf of the plaintiff that they have levelled the suit land and developed the land and incurred expenses to the tune of Rs.2,20,000/- for which the Indian Oil corporation and the defendant gave undertaking to reimburse plaintiff in this regard.
On the other hand, it has been pleaded on behalf of the defendants that management of the Indian Oil corporation developed land for the purpose of opening retail outlet for sale of petrol pump and high-speed diesel and they have raised structure over the same after taking possession of the property. Defendants also set up pump for the delivery of the petroleum products to the customers and placed tanker under the ground for search of petroleum. Only oral evidence has been adduced on behalf of both the parties regarding this matter. The witnesses examined on behalf of the defendants DW-1, 2 and 3 have stated that in establishing petrol pumps the company has incurred expense of Rs.30 lacs. But there is no documentary proof to substantiate this oral evidence that Rs.30 lacs has been incurred by the company. Though it appears that petrol pump is running on the suit property therefore necessary infrastructure to run petrol pump is definitely present on the suit property. On the other hand, plaintiff has failed to adduce any documentary evidence regarding his claim in leveling and developing the land. Therefore, this issue is decided in favour of the defendants and against the plaintiff and the finding of the learned lower court is confirmed in this regard.
12. Issue no 5 - Case of the plaintiff is that no lease was executed regarding suit property on her behalf in favour of the defendant Indian Oil corporation. No agreement was reached ever between the parties regarding lease of the suit property. No concluded contract between the parties. Money paid by the defendants in the loan account of the plaintiff was one sided without her consent and the same does not amount payment of rent and any acceptance of rent on her behalf. On the other hand it has been pleaded on behalf of the defendants that they are tenant of the plaintiff and there is relationship of landlord and tenant between them and they are regularly paying rent as per agreement reached between the parties dated 25/11/1996 Ext-C. I have already concluded after taking into consideration documentary and oral evidence adduced on behalf of the parties that Ext-C is only an offer containing certain terms and conditions on which plaintiff was ready to lease suit property. But this offer was not accepted by the defendant no 1 or on its behalf by any authorized persons specifically Chief Divisional Manager, Jamshedpur. Therefore, no agreement was reached between the parties on 25/11/1996 and no concluded contract. Admittedly no lease was executed between the parties. Further it has been established on the record that for the execution of the proposed lease defendant purchased stamp for the first time 20 2025:JHHC:35816 on 27.3.1997. Admittedly no rent was paid till then to Plaintiff in light of the so-called agreement. There is no evidence when the proposed tenancy was to start. Defendants unilaterally deposited the cheque in loan account of the plaintiff on 10.9.1997 which was cleared in the month of October 1997. Under the aforesaid facts and circumstances established on the record since there being no agreement between the parties no concluded contract no lease executed. I hold that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendants. The findings of learned lower court are hereby reversed and this issue is decided in favour of the plaintiff/ appellant against the defendants/ respondents...........
13. Issue no. 7 and 8- Since it is established on record that plaintiff is owner of the suit property and defendants are in permissive possession of the suit property. Further I have already found that possession of the defendants is not protected under section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. Plaintiffs have given due notice to the defendants to vacate the suit property as per Ext-1/1 stating therein to give vacant possession of 54 decimal land of the plaintiff by the expiry of 31.3.2000 and to clear all dues of the plaintiff including mesne profits from 1/12/1996 at commercial rate. Further stated that without notice and consent of the plaintiff Indian Oil corporation deposited some amount time to time in her bank account which is less than the dues and mesne profits which should be calculated at the rate of Rs.4800/- per month have been payable if lease had been executed. It is admitted position that defendants are in possession of the suit property against the wish and will of the plaintiff therefore plaintiff is entitled for decree to get vacant possession of the suit property and the defendants are liable to vacate the suit property after removing all their constructions as claimed in suit and plaintiff is also entitled for mesne profits at the rate of Rs.4800/- (four thousand eight hundred only) from 31.12.1996 up to 31.12.2006 and thereafter Rs.5500/- (Rs. Five thousand five hundred only) per month up to the date of vacating the suit property by the defendants after adjusting the account regarding any amount paid by the defendants. Accordingly, both the issues are decided in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants."
14. Thus, the learned 1st appellate court observed that the issue no. 9 as framed by the learned trial court, was the most important issue and the same was discussed from paragraph 10 onwards. The learned 1st appellate court observed that the protection under section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is available as a defence. The plaintiff is the lawful owner of the suit property was not in dispute. The court was of the view that the notice and advertisement was 21 2025:JHHC:35816 published by the defendant no. 1 on 15.05.1996 inviting offer for long term lease and the defendant no. 1 reserved their right to accept or reject the offer in whole/part without assigning any reason whatsoever (Exhibit- M and M/1). The plaintiff responded to the advertisement through letter dated 02.06.1996 (exhibit-A). It transpired from the pleadings and the evidence of the parties that this offer was not accepted by the Chief Divisional Manager, Indian Oil Corporation and the plaintiff revised the offer at a monthly rent of Rs. 4800/- subject to escalation of rent by 15% every 10 years. This revised offer is contained in exhibit- C in the letter dated 25.11.1996 from the plaintiff to the Chief Divisional Manager. The said exhibit- C has been quoted by the learned 1st appellate court in the impugned judgment. The plaintiff had offered that the monthly rent may be deposited with Bank of India in her loan account till the loan is totally paid and she also agreed to sign the lease deed with required stipulation. The learned appellate court was of the view that exhibit- C was offer regarding land showing terms on which she was offering the land to Indian Oil Corporation and therefore, the Chief Divisional Manager was required to accept or reject the offer on behalf of defendant no. 1. The court observed that in the written statement there was no clear-cut pleading on their behalf that the said offer was accepted by the Chief Divisional Manager, Indian Oil Corporation on behalf of defendant no. 1 and even there was no pleading that this offer was accepted by any of the authorities on behalf of the defendant no. 1. It was also observed that it was pleaded on behalf of the defendant that an agreement was reached between the plaintiff and the Indian Oil Corporation, but in absence of any evidence of acceptance of this offer of the plaintiff, as made through Exhibit- C, the learned 1st appellate court was of the view that the court was unable to decipher that an agreement was reached between the plaintiff and the Indian Oil Corporation. The Court also observed that the usual manner of acceptance on behalf of the defendant was no.1 was to be in writing under the signature of Chief Divisional Manager, Jamshedpur accepting the offer, but there was no such evidence and there was no pleading that the offer of the 22 2025:JHHC:35816 plaintiff was accepted by defendant no. 1 and the same was communicated to the plaintiff. The Court also went on to consider that the plaintiff did not know English even as per D.W. 2 and there was no evidence on behalf of the defendants that contents of exhibits- A, B and C were read over and explained to her in Hindi and the Court was of the view that the signature of the plaintiff on these documents does not prove that she had executed the documents being aware of their content. It was further found by the learned 1st appellate court that it was admitted by the plaintiff that she made the offer and revised offer regarding suit land to the defendant no. 1 through its Chief Divisional Manager, Jamshedpur. The learned court ultimately recorded a finding that there was no evidence placed on record to prove that exhibit- C was accepted by the defendants and it does not even disclose the date from which the tenancy was to take its effect. The Court also took into consideration from Exhibit-D dated 12.11.1996 which is the letter written by the Chief Manger, Bank of India to Sales Officer, Indian Oil Corporation, Namkum that the Bank had sanctioned a loan of Rs. 2 lakhs on 10.12.1996 to the plaintiff for Shahari Bhahari Dhaba at Ormanjhi and the said loan was secured by mortgage and the bank also expressed its no objection to receive rent to the credit of the plaintiff in the account from Indian Oil Corporation. The Court also recorded that it transpired from exhibit- G that the defendants, for the first time, by cheque dated 01.09.1997 deposited Rs. 38,400/- in the loan account of the plaintiff through the sales officer of Indian Oil Corporation and thus, no rent was paid till 10.09.1997 and the learned court recorded that this amount was paid after knowing fully well that the plaintiff was no more interested in executing or registering lease in favour of Indian Oil Corporation.
15. The learned 1st appellate court ultimately held that the learned trial court erred in holding that there was a written agreement of lease between the defendant-company and the plaintiff with regard to the suit property for 30 years. After having held that there was no concluded contract between the parties, the court recorded that the defendants were not entitled for protection under section 53-A of the 23 2025:JHHC:35816 Transfer of Property Act. Ultimately, the trial court judgment was set- aside and the appeal was allowed.
Findings of this Court 1st substantial question of law- Whether notice under Section 106 of the T.P. Act is a valid notice in the eyes of law?
16. By referring to the 1st substantial question of law framed vide order dated 23.04.2019 and upon a query by this Court in relation to the said substantial question of law as to which document from the record is referred as the purported notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act, learned counsel for the Respondent No.1(plaintiff) has submitted that at best the notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act is referrable to exhibit- 1/1 dated 19.02.2000 which was a notice issued after the disposal of the writ petition and prior to filing of the suit.
17. However, he submitted that at no point of time it was the case of the plaintiff that a notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act was ever issued in view of the fact that the plaintiff never claimed that the defendant was put in possession by virtue of any lease or there was any tenancy between the parties. He has also placed the exhibit- 1/1 fully and has submitted that the tenor of the exhibit - 1/1 also discloses that the relationship of landlord and tenant is completely denied and it is not the case of the plaintiff that there ever existed any relationship of landlord and tenant nor there is any lease. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 1 has also submitted that the learned 1 st appellate court has given a clear finding that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. Learned counsel for the respondent no.1 submitted that therefore no such question of law was ever framed by the learned 1st appellate court or the learned trial court. He submitted that this substantial question of law actually does not arise for consideration under the facts and circumstances of this case.
18. Learned counsel for the appellant does not dispute that no issue or point of determination was framed by the learned trial court or by the learned 1st appellate court with regard to notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act. He has also not been able to show any 24 2025:JHHC:35816 other document except exhibit- 1/1 which could at best be referrable to notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act.
19. Learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that the prayer of the plaintiff was contradictory and plaintiff had also claimed that if there is any tenancy, then on account of default, the defendant should be evicted. However, on perusal of the Exhibit- 1/1, he also could not substantiate that the same can be said to be a notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act as by that document, the plaintiff denied the relationship of landlord and tenant. He submitted that under such circumstances, 1st substantial question of law framed vide order dated 23.04.2019 may not be answered as it does not arise for consideration by this Court.
20. Though in the 1st substantial question of law, no exhibit referrable to section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act has been mentioned, but during the course of arguments, it transpired that at best notice dated 19.02.2000 [ exhibit- 1/1] asking the defendant to evict the suit premises can be said to be a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.
21. It was never the case of the plaintiff that a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was issued as the plaintiff denied the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. The plaintiff also took the ground of default in payment of rent as an alternative if at all it is found that there is a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties.
22. This Court finds that neither it was the case of the plaintiff that the notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was issued nor it was urged by the defendant-IOC that such notice was issued under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act or such a notice was at all required to be issued. Further, from the perusal of the exhibit- 1/1 also, the same does not appear to be a notice in terms of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act as the plaintiff had clearly denied the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. Rather, in the said notice [exhibit- 1/1] it was alleged that no lease- deed was ever executed between the plaintiff and IOC and one Rohit 25 2025:JHHC:35816 Oraon [defendant no.3] abused the influential position of his father and enabled the defendant to occupy the suit property without there being any tenancy agreement between the parties on which the defendants have set-up a petrol pump. The plaintiff clearly and emphatically denied the existence of any lease or tenancy in favour of the defendants.
23. In view of the submissions and considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the tenor of notice dated 19.02.2000, this Court is of the view that exhibit-1/1 is not a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, but at the same time, the substantial question of law no. (i) does not arise for consideration in the present case. The relationship of landlord and tenant was emphatically denied by the plaintiff and it was neither the case of the plaintiff that a notice under section 106 of Transfer of Property Act was issued nor any such objection was taken by the defendants in their written statement nor the parties joined issue on such point. Also, ssubstantial question of law no. (i) does not arise for consideration in view of the answer to other substantial questions of law being decided through this appeal. The 1st substantial question of law is accordingly answered.
Substantial question of law nos. (ii), (iii) and (iv)
(ii)Whether finding of the Appellate Court is perverse?
(iii)Whether the learned first appellate court erred by not drawing adverse inference against the plaintiff for not entering the witness box though the fact of the suit revolves round the meeting in which the terms and condition of the lease was settled down by the plaintiff and the defendant on 25.11.1996?
(iv)Whether the learned first appellate court committed a perversity by not treating Ext. C to be a written agreement for the purpose of Section 53 A of Transfer to Property Act between the parties to the suit in respect of the lease of the suit property?
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24. While referring to substantial question of law no. (ii), it has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that there was a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. It has been submitted that this is apparent from exhibit- C dated 25.11.1996 - the letter written by the plaintiff read with exhibit-D which is letter dated 12.11.1996 written by the Chief Manager, Bank of India to Sales Officer, Indian Oil Corporation, Namkum, stating that the bank has sanctioned loan of Rs. 2 lakhs to the plaintiff on 10.12.1996 for Sahri Bahar Dhaba at Ormanjhi and the said loan was secured by mortgage of the suit property and the bank also expressed its no objection to receive rent from IOC to the credit of Mrs. Saroja Devi - the plaintiff in her loan account in the bank. Further, it was argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that Exhibit- G revealed that an amount of Rs. 38,400/- was deposited in the loan account of the plaintiff vide cheque dated 01.09.1997 through the Sales Officer of IOC and consequently, the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties was proved. It was also argued that as per exhibit-B the possession of the land was handed over to the defendant IOC. It has also been argued that the plaintiff had also taken an alternative stand that if at all there is landlord-tenant relationship between the parties, the defendant-IOC is a defaulter in payment of rent. Exhibit- C dated 25.11.1996 issued by the plaintiff to the Chief Divisional Manager, IOC is said to be the letter of acceptance by the plaintiff so far as the rent and arrangement between the parties is concerned and a suit for specific performance of the agreement has been filed by the defendant IOC which was pending.
25. On the other hand, it has been argued by the learned counsel for the respondent(plaintiff) that the exhibit- C which is a letter dated 25.11.1996 was only a counter-offer as certain terms were proposed by the plaintiff and the parties had acted upon pursuant to exhibit-C.
26. To this, the learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that since suit for specific performance of contract has been filed by the defendant-IOC, the present suit seeking eviction has been filed and 27 2025:JHHC:35816 the present suit is a counter-blast of the suit for specific performance of contract.
27. Accordingly, it has been submitted by the learned counsel for the defendant that the finding of the 1st appellate court is perverse and the learned 1st appellate court has committed perversity by not treating exhibit-C to be a written agreement for the purpose of protection of the defendant-IOC under section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
28. After going through the materials on record, this Court finds that it is not in dispute that in the month of November, 1995 and also in February, 1996, the defendant -IOC had invited offers for setting up a petrol pump through newspaper advertisement from land owner having land abutting NH-33 and within 2 KM from Ormanjhi for grant of long-term lease for 30 years subject to renewal and specifications were also provided. Pursuant to the advertisement, the plaintiff offered her property and after negotiation, the plaintiff issued a letter dated 25.11.1996 (exhibit-C) to the Chief Divisional Manager, IOC wherein the plaintiff revised her offer and agreed to accept Rs. 4800/- per month as rent for the land and stated that the lease would be for a period of 30 years which may be renewed for further 30 years after fresh negotiation and also stipulated that there should be an increase of 15% in rent after every 10 years of initial 30 years lease. A request was also made that the monthly rent be deposited with Bank of India, Main Branch in her saving bank account and the defendant - IOC would pay rent directly till the loan is totally repaid in the account. It was also indicated in exhibit-C that the land documents were in possession of the bank and would be deposited with IOC after the loan is cleared and the plaintiff was also agreeable to sign lease- deed with required stipulation as above.
29. This Court has gone through the exhibit-C and is of the considered view that exhibit-C was only an offer made by the plaintiff to Chief Divisional Manager, IOC who was yet to accept or reject offer on behalf of IOC.
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30. The plaintiff asserted that there was no agreement between the plaintiff and the contesting defendants (IOC) and the contesting defendants asserted that an agreement was reached on 25.11.1996 (Exhibit-C) for which they had filed a suit seeking specific performance of lease by Title Suit No. 66 of 2000 which was pending. The learned court recorded that IOC by FAX message dated 27.11.1996 was seeking additional information from the bank in connection with loan account of the plaintiff and the bank had furnished the details regarding the land offered as security. Further a letter dated 12.02.1998 was sent to the plaintiff by IOC from which it transpired that Stamp Papers for carrying out registration of lease deed was purchased by IOC on 17.03.1997 and the same was returned to Deputy Commissioner's Office on 29.09.1997 and in the meantime, certain ad-hoc amount was deposited in the loan account of the plaintiff by IOC on 01.09.1997 in spite of the fact that lease deed was not yet executed, although stamp papers were purchased on 17.03.1997. The IOC claimed that there was concluded contract vide agreement dated 25.11.1996 (exhibit-C) but on the face of letter dated 25.11.1996 issued by the plaintiff, it is apparently a counter offer and there is no material placed on record by IOC to even prima facie demonstrate that by issuance of letter dated 25.11.1996 (exhibit-C), it could be said that a concluded contract was entered into between the parties. The exhibit-C was at best a counter offer. Further, exhibit-B is photocopy of the document regarding possession which was marked with objection, but there is no explanation as to why the original of exhibit-B was not produced and exhibited in the court. The defendant
-IOC has not even exhibited the draft lease deed to demonstrate as to what terms and conditions were incorporated and whether there were any new or varied terms and conditions.
31. This Court finds that the learned 1st appellate court has rightly recorded that the letter dated 25.11.1996 (exhibit-C) issued by the plaintiff was an offer and the learned 1st appellate court has also rightly recorded that there was no clear pleading on behalf of the defendant - IOC that the said offer was ever accepted by Chief 29 2025:JHHC:35816 Divisional Manager of IOC or by any other authority on behalf of IOC. The learned 1st appellate court has also considered the exhibit-D whereby the bank had expressed no objection to receive rent in the credit of the plaintiff from IOC and also to the deposit of some amount by cheque dated 01.09.1997 in the loan account of the plaintiff and has recorded a finding that the amount was paid after knowing fully well that the plaintiff was no more interested in executing or registering the lease in favour of IOC. The learned 1 st appellate court has also considered the submission of the defendant- IOC that in part performance of the agreement dated 25.11.1996 (exhibit-C), they obtained possession of the land on 31.12.1996 and for this, exhibit- B was referred, but the learned 1st appellate court recorded that exhibit-B was not the original document but a xerox copy and it did not bear the original signature of the plaintiff and this document was marked with objection by the plaintiff. However, the learned 1st appellate court has recorded that the act of the defendants in taking possession of the suit property evidenced by Ext-B cannot be equated as acceptance of the said offer (exhibit-C) as the agreement requires meeting of mind on the same matter and in the same sense.
32. The learned Court has also considered exhibit-I which is a no objection certificate dated 28.12.1996 issued by the District Arms Officer, Ranchi to the Chief Divisional Manager, IOC, Jamshedpur, but observed that those formalities were required to be completed only after execution of proper lease by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant. Ultimately, the learned 1st appellate court held that no agreement was reached between the parties and held that in absence of any agreement, the pre-condition for claiming protection under section 53-A of Transfer of Property Act does not arise.
33. The learned 1st appellate court has also recorded that the learned trial court wrongly treated exhibit-C as written agreement which was actually only an offer from the side of the plaintiff containing certain terms and conditions and it also transpired that the very essential terms for the proposed lease were further to be 30 2025:JHHC:35816 negotiated regarding the date from which the land of the plaintiff was to be leased out.
34. This Court has gone through the judgments of the learned trial court as well as learned 1st appellate court as well as the documents referred to at the time of hearing and is of the considered view that the learned 1st appellate court has not committed any perversity by not treating exhibit-C to be a written agreement for the purpose of section 53-A of Transfer of Property Act between the parties and is also of the view that the findings of the learned 1st appellate court does not suffer from any perversity.
35. So far as substantial question of law no. (iii) is concerned, admittedly the plaintiff did not depose before the court and instead, her power of attorney deposed before the Court. However, the facts and circumstances of the present case essentially reveal that the case of the plaintiff and the contesting defendant - IOC was primarily based on documentary evidences and Rohit Oraon, son of Rameshwar Oraon, though was made defendant in the case, but he did not file any written statement to contest the suit. However, said Rohit Oraon has been examined as witness from the side of the IOC as D.W. 4.
36. Having recorded that exhibit-C was also an offer which cannot be treated as an agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant- IOC, and said exhibit-C was a letter issued by the plaintiff, the examination of the plaintiff and her cross-examination would not have cut much ice in favour of the defendant -IOC. The plaintiff had asserted Rohit Oraon to have taken forcible possession of the suit property, but this fact was never denied by Rohit Oraon by filing a written statement. It was the defendant who was asserting a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. It was for them to prove their case which the defendant- IOC has miserably failed to prove. In order to substantiate that there was consensus ad- idem between plaintiff and the defendant-IOC, the defendant had produced documents like xerox copy of some documents with regard to handing over and taking over of the land vide exhibit-B dated 31.12.1996, but no reason has been assigned for not producing the 31 2025:JHHC:35816 original and the exhibit-B was marked with objection. Merely because the bank agreed for deposit of money in the loan account of the plaintiff by way of rent from IOC and merely because certain amount was deposited in the loan account of the plaintiff, the same was not enough to come to a conclusion that there was a concluded contract between the parties on the point of lease or tenancy.
37. This court also finds that the D.W-2 in his cross examination has admitted at Para-14 that in the meeting held on 25.11.1996, he and S.N. Singh and Amitabh Chatterjee, Chief Manager, Jamshedpur Office were present and except them, no other person was present and the minutes of the meeting were recorded in the internal notes. He further admitted at Para-18 that on 25.11.1996, the plaintiff had not made any agreement, rather revised offer was written in a blank paper in the name of the company. He further admitted at para-19 that it is not written in Exhibit-C that the contents of the letter were read over and explained to the plaintiff in Hindi and after understanding the same, she had made her signature. Further, D.W-3 during cross- examination has admitted at Para-34 that he is the constituted attorney of the Defendant No.1, but he has not filed any document relating to the constituted attorney. He further admitted at Para-35 that he has filed the Written Statement on his oath. He also admitted at Para-37 that the defendants have not filed any document of the bank relating to deposit of Rs.2,77,000/- in the loan account of the plaintiff and in para 38 that no document was filed to show deposit of rent till October 1997. He also admitted at Para-39 that no document of lease was prepared relating to the disputed land.
38. This court finds that even the witnesses of the defendant- IOC have not fully supported the case of the defendants, inasmuch as, the D.W-2 has admitted that the plaintiff had not made any agreement, rather revised offer was written in a blank paper in the name of the company and D.W-3 admitted that the defendant has not filed any document of the bank relating to deposit of Rs.2,77,000/- in the loan account of the plaintiff and no document was filed to show deposit of rent till October 1997 although in the evidence in chief he stated that 32 2025:JHHC:35816 the defendant IOC had deposited Rs.2,77,000/- in the loan account of the plaintiff. This witness also admitted that no document of lease was prepared relating to the disputed land.
39. This Court is of the view that non-examination of the plaintiff before the Court has no bearing in the matter and the learned 1 st appellate court has not committed any error in not drawing adverse inference against the plaintiff for not entering the witness box. The written statement of the contesting defendants did not reveal as to when, how and in what manner there was consensus ad-idem between the parties with respect to the terms and conditions of lease and as held above, issuance of letter dated 25.11.1996 (exhibit-C) by the plaintiff was only an offer from the side of the plaintiff and cannot be said to be the terms and conditions of lease being settled by the plaintiff and the defendant on 25.11.1996.
40. Accordingly, it is held that the learned 1st appellate court has not erred in not drawing adverse inference against the plaintiff for not entering the witness box. Further the learned 1st appellate court has not committed any perversity by not treating Exhibit- C to be a written agreement for the purpose of Section 53-A of Transfer to Property Act between the parties to the suit in respect of the lease of the suit property and the impugned judgement passed by the learned 1 st appellate court does not suffer from any perversity or illegality. The learned 1st appellate court has passed a well-reasoned judgement considering every aspect of the matter and taking into consideration the evidences placed on record and also meeting the reasons given by the trial court while setting aside the judgement passed by the learned trial court.
41. In the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (1998) 7 SCC 602 (Rajendra Pratap Singh Vs. Rameshwar Prasad), it has been held that if an instrument is signed by only one party, it does not mean that both parties had not executed it together and it has also been held that whether both parties have executed the instrument, will be a question of fact to be determined on evidence, if such a determination is warranted from the pleadings of the particular 33 2025:JHHC:35816 suit. It has been held that merely because the document shows only signature of one of the parties, it is not enough to conclude that non- signing party had not joined in the execution of the instrument.
42. This Court is of the considered view that the said judgment does not help the appellant in any manner in view of the fact that exhibit-C has been held to be only a counter-offer by the plaintiff to the defendant- IOC by considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case and not because the defendant-IOC had not signed the said document. The learned 1st appellate court, after considering the materials on record, held that exhibit-C was a counter-offer and the said finding has been upheld by this Court.
43. Accordingly, the substantial question of law nos. (ii), (iii) and
(iv) are decided against the appellant (defendant -IOC) and in favour of the respondent (plaintiff).
44. This 2nd appeal is accordingly dismissed.
45. Pending interlocutory application, if any, is dismissed as not pressed.
46. Let this judgment be communicated to the learned court concerned through 'FAX/email'.
(Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J.) Date of Judgment: 28.11.2025 Pankaj Date of Uploading: 03.12.2025 34