Bombay High Court
The State Of Maharashtra And Anr. vs Basappa Umanna Birajdar And Ors. on 11 October, 1996
Author: Vishnu Sahai
Bench: Vishnu Sahai
JUDGMENT Vishnu Sahai, J.
1. Since both Criminal Appeal No. 227 of 1983 and Criminal Revision No. 418 of 1982 arise out of the same set of facts and a common impugned judgment, we are disposing them off by one Judgment.
2. A perverse judgment of acquittal dated 30th August 1982 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Solapur, in Sessions Case No. 74 of 1982 acquitting the respondents for offences punishable under sections 302 r/w 34, 396 and 397 of the Indian Penal Code, has prompted the State of Maharashtra to file an appeal under section 378(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The same consideration has also prompted the original complainant to file Criminal Revision No. 418 of 1982.
3. Briefly stated, the prosecution case, as it emerges from the statements of the three eye-witnesses of the incident namely Shrishail Sidappa Birajdar, Dhanavva Sidappa Birajdar and Parshuram Bhimappa Nagnur alias Ramu, P.Ws. 2, 4 and 9 respectively, runs as under :-
(A) The informant Shrishail Sidappa Birajdar, (P.W. 2) was the only biological child of deceased Sidappa Birajdar. Dhanavva Sidappa Birajdar was the wife of the deceased. Parsuram Bhimappa Nagnur alias Ramu, who was aged slightly over nine years at the time of the incident, is the son of the sister of the wife of the informant. The respondents, excepting Appasaheb Chintamani Patil, are close relations of the informant and the deceased. The evidence is that respondents Ramkrishna Ningappa Birajdar and Umanna Ningappa Birajdar were brothers of the deceased and respondents Basappa Umanna Birajdar and Ningappa Mallappa Birajdar were the nephews of the deceased. Respondent Appasaheb Chintamani Patil is said to be an associate and a friend of the remaining respondents. The respondents on the one hand and the informant and others on the other were residents of the same village, i.e. Lonar which was situated within the limits of Police Station Mangalwedha, District-Solapur.
(B) There was acute enmity between the informant and the deceased on one hand and the respondents on the other.
In 1969, there was partition of agricultural lands between the deceased and his two brothers, viz. respondents Ramkrishna and Umanna. Ramkrishna and Umanna had a feeling that they got a raw deal in the partition and consequently 4-5 years prior to the incident they started quarreling with the deceased, the informant and others. The evidence is that they even got their names falsely inserted in the lands of the deceased. About 5-6 months prior to the incident, the informant and the deceased left their farm-house and started living in their house which was situated in the village. It is also alleged that Ramkrishna and Umanna used to damage the crops of the informant and others. Consequently, the deceased Sidappa filed an injunction suit against them in the Civil Court at Mangalwedha and got a temporary injunction which was also confirmed in appeal. This further strained the relations between the informant and the deceased on one side and the respondent Nos. 2 and 4 on the other. The evidence shows that on one or two occasions the said respondents had even tried to murder the informant and the deceased. The deceased had complained to the police against them by sending complaints through post. It appears from the evidence that the police in order to curb the growing antagonism between the informant and the deceased on one side and the respondent Nos. 2 and 4 on the other side, initiated Chapter proceedings against both the sides. It is also alleged that respondent Basappa had enticed away the wife of the informant and this had further strained the relations between the parties. The informant wanted to marry for a second time. In fact, his marriage was settled with the daughter of Baslingappa Shahapure of Basanhatti. On coming to know of it, respondents Ramkrishna, Umanna and Ningappa intimidated Baslingappa that if the marriage took place, his daughter and her husband (the informant) would be murdered. Eventually, the marriage was performed.
(C) Understandably, on account of this acute enmity, deceased Sidappa was very worried about the life of the informant and used to lock him inside the room at night.
(D) On 25-12-1981 between 11 to 11.30 p.m. Shrishail Sidappa Birajdar (P.W. 2), Dhanavva Sidappa Birajdar (P.W. 4), Parshuram Bhimappa Nagnur alias Ramu (P.W. 9) and the deceased Sidappa Birajdar were sleeping in their house. The evidence shows that Shrishail was sleeping in a room which was contiguous to the Sopa(Courtyard). In the Sopa, Dhanavva and Parshuram alias Ramu were sleeping on one cot and Sidappa Birajdar was sleeping front of the door of the room wherein Shrishail was sleeping. Inside the Sopa there was Chhapar in which a lantern was burning.
The evidence of Dhanavva is that she felt that her mouth had been gagged by someone. Consequently she woke up. She saw respondent Basappa armed with an axe; respondent Ramkrishna armed with a knife; and respondent Appasaheb and Ningappa armed with sticks. Basappa, Appasaheb and Ningappa dragged her husband Sidappa outside the Sopa. In order to prevent him from shouting, his mouth was gagged. Thereafter respondent Basappa inflicted an axe blow on the head of Sidappa and Ramkrishna assaulted Dhanavva with knife on her neck. She became unconscious.
It appears that about this time, Parshuram alias Ramu woke up. His evidence is that he saw respondent Appasaheb sitting near Dhanavva and respondent Ramkrishna inflicting bows with knife on Sidappa. respondent Basappa who had an axe in his hand came near him and asked him where the key was. He replied that he did not know. Respondent Basapa opened the door wherein Shrishail was sleeping. Shrishail started raising cries. Respondent Appasaheb took the radio which was inside the house.
It was at this juncture that Shrishail woke up. His evidence is that respondent Basappa opened the shutters of his room and flashed torch light. He flashed torch upon him by one hand and raised the iron bar with his other hand. He stated that on seeing this, Basappa, Ramkrishna and others started running away; Basappa had a torch and axe in his hand; Ramkrishna had a knife in his hand; Umanna and Ningappa had sticks in their hands. He also stated that he saw these respondents running away in the torch light.
(E) After the respondents had run away, Shrishail saw his father lying dead on the Chappar in front of the Sopa. He also saw that he had sustained a bleeding injury on his head. He raised cries hearing which Mayappa Vishnu, Hirgappa, Balappa, Balappa's wife, Ramanna Navnale and some others came there. The said persons gave water to Sidappa but by that time he was already dead. He saw that his mother Dhanavva was lying in an unconscious condition.
The evidence of Dhanavva is that some time between half an hour to one hour after the incident, she regained consciousness. She shouted that her neckless, Mangalsutra, golden ring and waist belt were missing.
(F) After the incident, Dhanavva and Parshuram @ Ramu informed Shrishail that they had seen the incident and informed him about their names.
(G) At about 5 a.m. Shrishail proceeded with Dhanavva in a bullock-cart. They reached Hunnur and from there at about 7 a.m. they got a bus and on the same came to Mangalwedha. They reached Mangalwedha Police Station at about 8.00 - 8.45 a.m.
4. The F.I.R. of the incident was lodged by Shrishail (P.W. 2) at Mangalwedha Police Station at about 12.10 p.m., on 26-12-1981. The evidence shows that Head Constable Babu Narayan Mane (P.W. 10) who was incharge of the Police Station at the said time commenced recording it at 11 a.m. and finished the same at about 12.10 p.m.
5. It appears from the evidence that immediately on reaching Police Station Mangalwedha, Head Constable Babu Mane(P.W. 10) sent Dhanavva Birajdar with a Yadi for medical examination to Zilla Parishad Dispensary, Mangalwedha. At the said dispensary at 8 a.m. the same day (on 26-12-1981) Dr. Ramchandra Yewale (P.W. 3) medically examined her and found on her person the following injuries :--
(i) Contused Lacerated wound 5 cms x 2 cms right ear pinna posterior having clear cut broders.
(ii) Incised wound 3 cms x 1/2 cm muscle deep on the right lateral aspect of mid neck. Horizontally it was clear cut wound.
(iii) Laceration 3 cms right lateral aspect of neck 1cm anterior to injury No 2 obliquely placed edges of wound clear cut.
In the opionion of Dr. Yewale, the said injuries were attributable to a sharp cutting instrument like knife and were inflicted within 24 hours.
6. The investigation of the case was conducted by Head Constable Babu Mane. After registering the case on the basis of the F.I.R., he immediately commenced it. He went to the Zilla Parishad Dispensary and saw Dhanavva. He requested the Executive Magistrate to record her dying declaration and himself left for the place of incident which was located in village Lonar. The informant Shrishail was with him. He drew up inquest panchnama and the panchnama of the place of the incident. He seized blood stained earth from the floor on the Sopa by the side of the cot and also from the floor of the Chappar under a panchnama. Thereafter he recorded statements of some witnesses, including Shrishail. The same day he recorded the statements of Vishnu and others. On 28-12-1981 he recorded statement of Dhanavva at Mangalwedha Dispensary. On that date he attached her blood stained clothes under a panchnama. On 1-1-1982 P.S. I. Talekar took over the investigation firm him but handed back the same to him on 4-1-1982. Three days thereafter, the investigation was taken over by P.S.I. Zambre who sent the blood stained articles to Chemical Analyser. The chargesheet in the instant case case was submitted on 21-3-1982 by P.S.I. Kulkarni.
7. Going backwards, the autopsy on the dead body of deceased Siddappa Birajdar was conducted on 27-12-1981 at about 10.40 a.m. by Dr. Ramchandra Yewale (P.W. 3). On the corpse, the doctor found the following anti-mortem injuries :-
(i) Incised wound on temporal parietal region of skull 4 cms above the right ear 14 cm x 4 cm Fractured bone and brain protruding out from the wound horizontally placed.
(ii) Incised wound on skull 3 cm posterior to right ear lobe on mastoid, temporal and occipital region on skull obliquely placed 7 cm x 4 cm at centre and 3 cm deep, spindle shaped.
(iii) Incised wound on right lower mid back 5 cm x 2 cm obliquely placed.
(iv) Incised wound on right upper part of scapular region on back 5 cm x 1 cm. 3 cm deep.
(v) Incised wound right upper shoulder mid back aspect 3 cm x 1 cm x 1 cm.
On internal examination, Dr. Yewale found fractures of :- the right tempero parietal bone; the left temporal parietal bone; and of mastiod, temporal and occipital bones on right side 3 cm oblique. He also found some brain matter protruding out.
Dr. Yewale opined that the death of the deceased was on account of injuries to the brain. He further opined that the external and internal injuries suffered by the deceased, were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause his death and that injury No. 1 was, individually, sufficient to cause his death.
8. The case was committed to the Court of Sessions in the usual manner.
In the trial Court, the respondents were charged on a triple count, viz., under section 302 r/w 34, 396 and 397 of the Indian Penal Code. To the said charges they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
In the trial Court, in all the prosecution examined as many as ten witnesses. Three out of them, viz. Shrishail Sidappa Birajdar, Dhanavva Sidappa Birajdar and Parshuram Bhimappa Nagnur alias Ramu (P.Ws. 2, 4, & 9 respectively) were examined as eye-witnesses.
In defence, no witness was examined.
9. The learned trial Judge, after recording the evidence of the prosecution witnesses; the statements of the respondents under section 313 of the Cr.P.C.; and hearing the learned Counsel for either of the sides, passed the impugned judgment acquitting the respondents, on all the counts.
10. It is this acquittal of the respondents which has been taken offence to by the State of Maharashtra and the original complainant. The former has assailed it by preferring Criminal Appeal No. 227 of 1983 and the latter by filing Criminal Revision Applicatioon No. 418 of 1982.
11. We have heard Mrs. Purnima Kantharia, Addl. Public Prosecutor for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 227 of 1983 and for the respondent No. 6 in Criminal Revision Application No. 418 of 1982. We have heard Mr. Nitin Pradhan, advocate for respondents Basappa Umanna Birajdar, Appasaheb Chintamani Patil and Umanna Hingappa Birajdar (Respondent Nos. 1, 3 and 4 respectively) in Criminal Appeal No. 227 of 1983. Although respondent Nos. 2 and 5, viz. Ramkrishna and Ningappa in Criminal Appeal No. 227 of 1983 have been served but they have not chosen to engage any Counsel. Mr. Nitin Pradhan pointed out that his oral instructions were that Ramkrishna Birajdar is dead. He said that he had received them a couple of months ago. However, he was not in a position to furnish any documentary evidence about the death of the said respondent. In these circumstances, we proceeded on the footing that the said respondent was alive and requested Mr. Nitin Pradhan to also argue his case and that of respondent No. 5 as an amicus curiae. He acceded to our request. For that we are grateful to him.
We may mention that in Criminal Revision Application No. 418 of 1982, the learned Counsel for the petitioner is Mr. K.Y. Mandalik. He is not present in the Court. Since the scope of a revision against acquittal is far narrower than an appeal against acquittal, wherein Mrs. Purnima Kantharia is appearing and the matter has been on the Board for a sufficiently long time, we are not inclined to adjourn the case. We may also mention that the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 in Criminal Revision Application No. 418 of 1982, though served, have not engaged any Counsel. We requested Mr. Nitin Pradhan to argue on their behalf as an amicus curiae and we are grateful to him for acceding to our request.
We have also perused the depositions of the prosecution witnesses; the material Exhibits tendered and proved by the prosecution; the statements of the respondents recorded under section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code; and the impugned judgment. After giving our anxious consideration to the matter, we are squarely satisfied that the view of the learned trial Judge in acquitting the respondents Basappa Umanna Birajdar and Ramkrishna Ningappa Birajdar for an offence under section 302 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code is a manifestly perverse view and warrants to be reversed. In our view, to this extent, Criminal Appeal No. 227 of 1983 has to be allowed. However, we are satisfied that the acquittal of the said respondents under sections 396 and 397 of the Indian Penal Code and that of the three other respondents, viz. Appasaheb Chintaman Patil, Umanna Hingappa Birajdar and Ingappa Birajdar on all the three counts, viz. 302 r/w 34, 396 and 397 of the Indian Penal Code, does not warrant our interference.
12. At the very outset, we have cautioned ourselves that we are examining the matter in an appeal against acquittal. It is true that the Code of Criminal Procedure draws no distinction between the powers of the Appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal from those in an appeal against conviction but the law as laid down right from the decision of the Privy Council Sheo Swarup v. Emperor, to the present day in substance is that unless the view of acquittal is not a possible view it should not be interfered with. See Khedu Mohton and others v. State of Bihar, and Tota Singh and another v. State of Punjab.
It would be pertinent to refer to the observations made by Their Lordships of the Apex Court in the case State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh, wherein in para 7 Their Lordships have observed thus :-
"We agree that this Court is not precluded or the Court hearing the appeal against acquittal is not prevented from examining and reappreciating the evidence on record. But the duty of a Court hearing the appeal against acquittal in the first instance is to satisfy itself if the view taken by the acquitting Court exercising appellate jurisdiction was possible view or not. And if the Court comes to conclusion that it was not, it can on reappreciation of evidence reverse the order.
It would also be useful in this connection to refer to the observations contained in para 9 of the Judgement of the Apex Court in the case Sanwat Singh and others v. State of Rajasthan, wherein Their Lordships of the Apex Court have observed that although it is true that in an appeal against acquittal, the appellate Court has full power to review the entire evidence and comes to its own conclusion".... ...... but in doing so it should not only consider every matter on record having a bearing on the questions of act and the reasons given by the Court below in support of its order of acquittal in its arriving at a conclusion on those facts, but should also express those reasons in its judgment, which lead it to hold that the acquittal was not justified."
13. It is bearing in mind the norms of interference set out above that we have reached the conclusions stated in paragraph 11.
14. After going through the evidence on record, we are squarely satisfied that the evidence adduced by the prosecution vis-a-vis respondents Basappa Umanna Birajdar, and Ramkrishna Ningappa Birajdar is implicitly reliable and their acquittal for an offence under section 302 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code is manifestly perverse.
As mentioned earlier in the instant case, three eye-witnesses, viz. Shrishail Birajdar, Dhanavva Birajdar and Parshuram alias Ramu, P.Ws. 2, 4 and 9 respectively, were examined by the prosecution. We are aware of the fact that being the son, wife and grand-son of the deceased respectively, their evidence has to be evaluated with caution. Consequently, while evaluating their testimony, we have exercised that caution.
15. The evidence of Dhanavva Birajdar, Parshuram alias Ramu and Shrishail Birajdar proves the participation of respondent No.1 Basappa and respondent No.2 Ramkrishna, beyond any shadow of doubt.
We would first like to take up the Statement of Dhanavva Birajdar (P.W. 4). Her evidence is that she was sleeping on a cot which was in the Sopa. Near her cot if front of the door of the room in the Sopa deceased Sidappa was sleeping on the ground. In the room adjoining the Sopa her son Shrishail was sleeping. She stated that at about 11.30 p.m. the respondents came to her house. Respondent Ramkrishna gagged her mouth. Consequently she woke up. She saw that respondent Basappa was armed with an axe, respondent Ramkrishna with a knife, respondent Appasaheb and Ningappa with sticks. She stated that respondents Basappa, Appasaheb and Ningappa dragged her husband outside by placing gagging his mouth; respondent Basappa dealt an axe blow on his head; and when she tried to raise cries, respondent Ramkrishna stabbed her with a knife on her neck. Thereafter she became unconscious.
The evidence of Parshuram alias Ramu (P.W. 9) is that he was sleeping with Dhanavva. At the time of the incident, he heard sound "Dhap" and found that respondent Appasaheb was sitting near Dhanavva and respondent Ramkrishna was inflicting knife blows on Sidappa Birajdar. He further stated that respondent Basappa asked him where the lock of the key was. (key of a lock of the room in which Shrishail was sleeping). He replied that he did not know. He also stated that thereafter respondent Basappa opened the door wherein Shrishail was sleeping. The respondent Appasaheb took away the radio from his house and thereafter the respondents ran away.
The evidence of Shrishail Birajdar (P.W. 2) is that he was sleeping in the room at the time of the incident. He heard the cries of his mother. Then he heard Basappa asking Parshuram to give the key. Thereafter Basappa opened one of the shutters of the room where he was sleeping and flashed torch upon his face. He, in turn, from one hand flashed torch upon Basappa and from the other raised iron bar which he was having. Thereafter Basappa who had a torch and axe, Ramkrishna who had a knife, Umanna and Ningappa who had the sticks, started running away. In torch light he saw them running away.
It is true that Parshuram alias Ramu is a child witness and at the time of the incident was aged slightly over nine years. But the learned trial Judge after conducting his preliminary examination has lightly concluded that he was possessed of sufficient understanding and thereafter gave oath to him. There is no rule of law that testimony of a child witness cannot be accepted. The law only requires that it should be scrutinised with caution. We have exercised that caution and are implicitly satisfied that Parshuram alias Ramu is a reliable witness.
16. A perusal of the ocular account to which we have referred in the preceeding para, would go to show that : (a) respondents Basappa Birajdar and Ramkrishna Birajdar, the former with an axe on the head and the latter with a knife, assaulted the deceased Sidappa Birajdar; and (b) respondent Ramkrishna Birajdar also assaulted Dhanavva Birajdar with a knife on her neck.
In para 7 of our judgment, we have set out the ante-mortem injuries suffered by the deceased Sidappa and in para 5 the injuries sustained by Dhanavva Birajdar. A perusal of para 7 would show that deceased Sidappa sustained five incised wounds. Two of them viz. injuries Nos. 1 and 2 were on his head. Injury No. 1 was an incised wound 14 cm x 4 cm on temporal parietal region of skull 4 cms above the right ear (Brain matter was protruding out) and injury No. 2 was an incised wound 7 cm x 4 cm x 3 cm deep, spindle shapped, it was on skull, 3 cm posterior to right ear lobe on mastoid, temporal and occipital region. These two injuries corroborate and lend assurance to the statement of Dhanavva Birajdar to the effect that respondent Basappa assaulted deceased Sidappa on his head with an axe. The three other incised wounds which were on right scapular region and right upper part of scapular region, corroborate the statement of Parshuram alias Ramu that reapondent Ramkrishna inflicted knife blows on the person of deceased Sidappa.
In para 5 we have set out the injuries received by Dhanavva Birajdar. Their perusal shows that in all she sustained three injuries out of which one was a contused lacerated wound on right ear pinna posterior having, clear cut borders; one was an incised wound on right lateral side of neck 3 cm x 1/2 cm horizontal; and one was laceration on right lateral side of neck 1 cm anterior to injury No. 2, edges of wound clear cut. The said injuries, in the opinion of Dr. Ramchandra Yewale (P.W. 3) who examined her, could be caused by a knife. These injuries corroborate and lend assurance to the statement of Dhanavva Birajdar that Ramkrishna Birajdar assaulted her with a knife.
It would be pertinent to point out that all the three eye-witnesses have stated that respondent Basappa was armed with an axe and Ramkrishna with a knife. In our opinion, the medical evidence goes a long way to vindicate this claim of the three eye-witnesses and renders truthful the prosecution story that respondent Basappa with an axe and Ramkrishna with a knife assaulted deceased Sidappa and respondent Ramkrishna assaulted Dhanavva with a knife.
17. Corroboration is forthcoming to the participation of the said respondents by the circumstance that they had a very strong motive to commit the crime. As mentioned earlier, respondent Ramkrishna was the brother of deceased Sidappa and respondent Basappa was the nephew of the deceased. The motive we have exhaustively set out in para 3 of our judgment and hence we are not specifying and discussing it here.
18. In our view, had these two respondents not assaulted deceased and Dhanavva in the manner stated above, they would not have been implicated by the eye-witnesses who were their very close relations.
19. Corroboraton to the ocular testimony is also forthcoming by the statements of two of the neighbours of the deceased, viz. Vishnu Ramanna Kasaraddi and Hergappa Myappa Raut, P.Ws. 5 & 7 respectively. The evidence is that both these witnesses reside in the immediate proximity of the house of the deceased. They stated that at the time of the incident, they woke up on the cries of Shrishail and when they went inside his house they found that Sidappa was lying dead and Dhanavva injured. They also stated that Shrishail told them about the incident and mentioned to them the names of the respondents. (The evidence is that Shrishail was informed about the incident by Parshuram and his mother Dhanavva after she regained consciousness.
We have gone through the evidence of Vishnu Kasaraddi and Hergappa Raut and we find that nothing could be elicited from them in their cross-examination which would affect the core of their evidence. We find that their evidence inspires confidence and certainly indicates that immediately after the incident the names of the respondents were known to the witnesses.
20. As a matter of fact, the three eye-witnesses have also implicated respondents other than Basappa and Ramkrishna, i.e. respondents Appasaheb, Umanna and Bingappa. However, their participation in the incident is not corroborated by the medical evidence in as much as these respondents are said to be armed with sticks and there are no stick injuries either on the person of the deceased or on that of Dhanavva. As a matter of fact, the eye-witnesses do not allege that they assaulted either of the two victims with sticks. In our view, since the three eye-witnesses were enemical to the said respondents and there is also some delay in the lodging of the F.I.R., it would be hazardous to reverse their acquittal in the absence of corroboration, in respect of their participation, forthcoming from medical evidence. In a situation such as this, the safer course and the more prudent one would be to sustain the acquittal of the said respondents. Judged from this angle, the view of acquittal of the said respondents cannot be castigated as perverse.
21. We make no bone in observing that the learned trial Judge, as is apparent from a perusal of the impugned judgment, grossly erred in not bearing in mind four things :-
Firstly, he has been oblivious to the fact that Dhanavva was an injured eye-witness whose evidence stood corroborated by the medical evidence. He should not have lost sight of the fact that the evidence of an injured witness, unless there are glaring infirmities which militate against the meat of the evidence of such a witness, should not be rejected. On scanning through the impugned judgment, we find that the learned trial Judge has hardly given any weightage to the fact that she was an injured eye-witness.
Secondly the learned trial Judge has completely lost sight of the fact that the respondent Ramkrishna Birajdar was the real brother of Dhanavva's husband and respondent Basappa the real nephew of her husband. He should have remembered that people who are known from before and especially such close relations as these two respondents could have been recognised by Dhanavva, her son Shrishail and her grandson Parshuram alias Ramu by their gait and voice and in fact no light was necessary for their recognition.
In this connection, the learned trial Judge would have done well to remember the observations of Their Lordships of the Apex Court in para 4 of the Judgment Kirpal Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, which are to the following effect :-
"It is true that the evidence about identification of a person by the timbre of his voice depending upon subtle variations in the overtones when the person recognising is not familiar with the person recognised may be somewhat risky in a criminal trial. But the appellant was intimately known to Rakkha Singh and for more than a fortnight before the date of the offence he had met the appellant on several occasions in connection with the dispute about the sugarcane crop. Rakkha calling Karam Singh to come out of the hut and had also heard the appellant, as a prelude to sugarcane. In the examination-in-chief Rakkha Singh has deposed as if he had seen the actual assault by the appellant, but in cross-examination he stated that he had not seen the face of the assailant of Karam Singh. He asserted however that he was able to recognize the appellant and his two brothers from their 'gait and voice' ".
The third thing which the learned trial Judge did not bear in mind was that there was no possibility of the three eye-witnesses being got up or tutored. We say this because a perusal of para 3(D) shows that all the three eye-witnesses have deposed about different aspects of the prosecution story, pertaining to the main incident. Had they been tutored or got up witnesses, in a parrot like manner they would have mechanically and uniformly deposed about the incident. The absence of the same is an inbuilt guarantee of the truthfulness of ocular account furnished by them and goes a long way to strengthen the prosecution case.
The last thing which the learned trial Judge seems to have completely over-looked was that there was acute enmity between Shrishail and respondent Ramkrishna in as much as the former in his cross-examination has admitted that in the election pertaining to Lonar Vividha Karyakari Seva Sahakari Society he was defeated and the panel of respondent Ramkrishna was elected and Ramkrishna was the Chairman of the said Society. Had it been a case of a false implication, then Shrishail Birajdar would have assigned the main role in the incident to respondent Ramkrishna Birajdar. The absence of this fact is also a circumstance which has weighed with us in accepting the prosecution case as being natural and truthful.
It is an other matter that by way of abundant precaution we have chosen to sustain the acquittal of the respondents, other than Basappa and Ramkrishna.
22. We would now like to deal with the reasons given by the learned trial Judge for recording the acquittal of the respondents in the impugned judgment. In para 13 he has summarised them :
The first is that there was delay on the part of the Investigating Officer in recording the statement of Dhanavva under section 161 of the Cr.P.C. We regret that this reason does not sound to be plausible. The learned trial Judge completely lost sight of the fact that Dhanavva had sustained three injuries on vital parts of body as a result of which she remained admitted in Mangalwedha dispensary for about 15 days. A bare look at her injuries indicates that on 26th and 27th December she must not have been in a condition to give her statement. If in these circumstances she was interrogated on 28th December, i.e. 2 days after the incident it can certainly be no ground for rejecting her testimony. The second reason given by the learned trial Judge is that there was insufficient light on the place of the incident to enable the witnesses to have identified the accused. With this aspect we have already dealt in para 23 wherein relying on the decision of the Apex Court (supra), we have held that in order to recognise close relations, no light is required because they can be recognised by their gait and voice. We would also like to point out that according to the prosecution, there were two sources of light in which the accused persons were recognised namely a lantern and a torch. In our view simply because in the spot panchanama it was not mentioned that a lantern was burning in the chhapar which was a part of the Sopa and the informant did not mention about it in the F.I.R., cannot give rise to the inference that no lantern was burning. The learned trial Judge seems to have lost sight of the fact that deceased Sidappa Birajdar was apprehending danger to his life and to that of his son Shrishail. In fact, he was so apprehensive about the danger to the life of the latter that during the night hours the latter used to sleep in a locked room. In such a situation, it was only natural that a lantern should have been burning in the chappar. It may be that before the Investigating Officer came on the place of the incident, the lantern might have been removed by the eye-witnesses or some others. Certainly, the eye-witnesses have not been questioned on this aspect. Regarding omission of lantern light in the F.I.R. the learned trial Judge became oblivious to the fact that the informant having lost his father and his mother being in a precariously injured condition when he lodged the F.I.R., must have been under great mental tension. Hence, in our view no capital can be made of the fact that there is no mention of lantern light in the F.I.R. We would also like to point out that the learned trial Judge erred in doubting the torch which was with Shrishail Birajdar. He became oblivious to the fact that there was perpetual threat to Shrishail's life from the respondents. It was on account of that threat, as stated by him, that he used to sleep not only in a room which was locked from the outside but with an iron-bar and torch. In such a situation, it was natural for Shrishail to have torch with him. Simply if during investigation, there is no reference to it, would be no ground for rejecting this source of light.
The third reason given out by the learned trial Judge is that the respondents would not have been interested in removing ornaments and radio from the house of Dhanavva. Again this in our opinion, appears to be a matter of conjecture on the part of the learned trial Judge. if after fatally killing the deceased and injuring Dhanavva, the respondents also thought of taking away the gold ornaments and ring, we do not find anything improbable.
The fourth reason given by the learned trial Judge is that in the house of Sidappa which was searched by Head Constable Mane on 27-12-1981, no incriminating articles were found. The learned trial Judge seems to have lost sight of fact that the respondents would not have been indiscreet enough either to keep the weapons of the assault or the looted articles in their house.
The fifth reason given by the learned trial Judge was that there has been an inordinate delay in the lodging of the F.I.R. We certainly cannot fault this reason as wholly untenable. The evidence shows that at about 5 a.m. Shrishail along with Dhanavva left for Mangalwedha Police Station which they reached at about 8.30 a.m. Mr. Pradhan was perfectly justified in urging that if this was so then why the recording of the F.I.R. did not commence before 11 a.m. In cross-examination, head constable Mane (P.W. 10) was specifically asked about this and he could not give any answer. In our view, the circumstance that the F.I.R. was not lodged for 2.1/2 hours after the informant had reached the Police Station shows that it might be that the names of respondents Nos. 3 to 5 who though armed with sticks (did not use them) may have been falsely inserted. However, we are not prepared to go to the extent of holding that this circumstance shows that names of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 namely Basappa Birajdar and Ramkrishna Birajdar have been falsely inserted in the F.I.R. In paras 17 to 21 we have given our reasons for believing the prosecution case in respect of these two respondents. Not only is their participation clinched by the medical evidence but we would again like to emphasise that had it been a case of false implication, then the informant Shrishail would have certainly given the main role to his arch-enemy respondent Ramkrishna Birajdar in the F.I.R. because it was against his panel that he had lost the election of the Society and he was the Chairman of the Society. That he has not done so, is an in-built guarantee of the fact that the informant Shrishail was not on a witch-hunting campaign when he lodged the F.I.R.
23. In our view, the reasons given by the learned trial Judge, so far they relate to the acquittal of the respondents Basappa and Ramkrishna are manifestly perverse.
24. Mr. Nitin Pradhan, learned Counsel for the respondents undaunted by the fact that defending the acquittal of respondents Basappa and Ramkrishna was a herculean task left no stone unturned. He made a number of submissions before us.
He firstly urged that the weapons of assault, viz.knife and axe were not shown to the doctor and he was not questioned if the injuries of the victims could be caused by them. The fallacy of this submission is that it proceeds on the assuption that the said weapons were recovered during investigation. The truth is to the converse. Since they were not recovered, there was no question on the part of the prosecution of showing them to Dr. Ramchandra Yewale (P.W. 3) when he gave evidence in the instant case and asking him whether the injuries of the victims could be caused by them.
Secondly, Mr. Pradhan urged that the spot panchnama shows that people were residing in the immediate proximity of the informant and the deceased and it is strange that they have not been examined as eye-witnesses of the incident. Mr. Pradhan seems to have over-looked the normal human conduct and that is in the night hours people do not like to move out from their houses and rush to the place where a fatal assault is being made because they apprehend danger to their own life. The instinct of self-preservation is certainly more paramount in human beings than their love to become a witness in a case of assault. In this connection it would also be pertinent to point out that two neighbours of the informant namely (P.W. 5) Vishnu Kasaraddi and (P.W. 7) Hergappa Raut who are alleged to have reached the place of the incident immediately after the respondents left it, have been examined and they deposed that Shrishail mentioned to them the names of the respondents.
Thirdly, Mr. Pradhan urged that the learned trial Judge justly concluded that there was no light on the place of the incident and in the absence of the same they could not have been able to identify the respondents. We regret that we cannot accede to his submission. As mentioned earlier, they were close relations of the respondents. Hence they could have recognised them by their gait and voice as held in (supra).
Mr. Pradhan finally urged that it appears to be a case of dacoity and since the docoits were unknown and could not be identified, the witnesses have implicated the respondents on account of enmity. We regret that we also do not find any merit in this argument. Had it been a case of dacoity, there was no reson for respondent Basappa to have asked Parshuram alias Ramu for the key of the lock of the room wherein Shrishail was sleeping. This circumstance unmistakably shows that the paramount object of the respondents was to assault Shrishail and his father Sidappa. The acute enmity between these persons and the respondents which we have set out in paragraph 3(B) strengthens this inference. In our view, the taking away of ornaments of Dhanavva or the radio lying inside the house was only an incidental act.
25. For the said reasons, we are squarely satisfied that the learned trial Judge acted perversely in rejecting the prosecution case against respondents Basappa Birajdar and Ramkrishna Birajdar. The question which arises is as to what is the offence which is made out against the said respondents. In the trial Court, they were charged for three offences, viz., 302 r/w 34, 396 and 397 of the Indian Penal Code. Since we propose to sustain the acquittal of respondents Appasaheb, Umanna and Ningappa, these two respondents cannot be convicted for an offence under section 396 of the I.P.C. which is a dacoity with murder, for the minimum number of persons necessary for dacoity, which is a part of this offence, is five as per the provisions contained in section 391 of the I.P.C. They also cannot be convicted for the offence punishable under section 397 of the Indian Penal Code which deals with minimum punishment to be awarded to an offender who at the time of committing robbery or dacoity is armed with deadly weapon.
A perusal of section 397 of the I.P.C. shows that there should be either dacoity or robbery. Since the number of persons who participated in the incident is now reduced to two, dacoity goes. Even the offence of robbery is not made out. Robbery is defined in section 390 of the I.P.C. The said section reads thus :-
"390. Robbery - In all robbery there is either theft or extortion.
When theft is robbery-- Theft is 'robbery' if, in order to the committing of the theft, or in committing the theft, or in carrying away or attempting to carry away property obtained by the theft, the offender, for that end, voluntarily causes or attempts to cause to any person death or hurt or wrongful restraint, or fear of instant death or of instant hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint.
When extortion is robbery-- Extortion is 'robbery' if the offender, at the time of committing the extortion, is in the presence of the person put in fear, and commits the extortion by putting that person in fear of instant death, or instant hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint to that person or to some other person and, by so putting in fear, induces the person so put in fear then and there to deliver up the thing extorted.
Explanation- The offender is said to be present if he is sufficiently near to put the other person in fear of instant death, or of instant hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint".
The said section stipulates that either theft is robbery or extortion is robbery. On the facts found in the present case, it cannot be said that this is a case where extortion is robbery. In fact there is no averment of extortion. Even theft would not be robbery in this case.
In a recent Division Bench decision of this Court to which one of us (Vishnu Sahai, J.) was a party rendered on 1st august 1996 in Criminal Appeal No. 800 of 1982, The State of Maharashtra - Appellant v. JosephMingel Koli and others - Respondents, reported at this Court in paragraph 30 held thus :-
"An analysis of section 390 I.P.C. would show that inorder that theft may constitute robbery, prosecution has to establish :-
(a) if in order to the committing of theft;
or
(b) in committing the theft;
or
(c) in carrying away or attempting to carry away property obtained by theft;
(d) the offender for that end i.e. any of the ends contemplated by (a) to (c);
(e) voluntarily causes or attempts to cause to any person death or hurt or wrongful restraint or fear of instant death or of instant hurt or instant wrongful restraint.
In other words, theft would only be robbery if for any of the ends mentioned in (a) to (c) the offender voluntarily cause or attempts to cause to any person death or hurt or wrongful restraint or fear of instant death or of instant hurt or instant wrongful restraint.
If the end does not fall within (a) to (c) but, the offender still causes or attempts to cause to any person death or hurt or wrongful restraint or fear of instant death or of instant hurt or instant wrongful restraint, the offence would not be robbery.
We wish to emphasis that (a) or (b) or (c) have to be read conjuctively with (d) and (e). It is only when (a) or (b) or (c) co-exist with (d) and (e) or there is a nexus between any of them and (d) and (e) would theft amount to robbery."
In the instant case, commission of theft was not the primary object. The same was to kill Sidappa and Shrishail. Theft of golden ornaments of Dhanavva and of the radio lying inside the house was an incidental act. In our view, no offence of robbery would be made out. Hence these respondents are not guilty of an offence punishable under section 397 of the I.P.C.
26. Respondents Basappa and Ramkrishna, in our view, would be guilty of an offence under section 302 r/w 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Circumstances show that these respondents went to the place of the incident together being armed with an axe and knife respectively. They conjointly assaulted the deceased with those weapons on vital parts of his body. They thereafter ran way together. All this shows that they committed the murder of the deceased in furtherance of their common intention. Consequently, both the respondents, namely Basappa Umanna Birajdar and Ramkrishna Ningappa Birajdar would be squarely guilty for an offence punishable under section 302 r/w. 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
The sole question which survives is as to what sentence, viz. that of death or imprisonment for life should be awarded to them. We have given our thoughtful reflection to the said question. The Apex Court has held that death sentence should be restricted to the rarest of rare cases. In our view, if the overall circumstances are borne in mind, the instant case cannot be categorized amongst rarest of rare cases wherein death sentence is warranted. In our judgment, a sentence of imprisonment for life would meet the ends of justice.
27. In the result, this Criminal Appeal and Revision Application are disposed off in the following manner :
Criminal Appeal No. 227 of 1983 is partly allowed and partly dismissed.
It is dismissed as regards respondents Appasaheb Chintamani Patil, Umanna Ningappa Birajdar and Ningappa Mallappa Birajdar on all the counts. We maintain the acquittal of these respondents. The said respondents are on bail. They need not surrender. Their bail bonds shall stand cancelled and their sureties discharged.
It is also dismissed to the extent that we sustain the acquittal of respondents Basappa Umanna Birajdar and Ramkrishna Ningappa Birajdar for offences punishable under section 396 and 397 of the Indian Penal Code.
It is allowed to the extent that we set aside the impugned judgment acquitting respondents Basappa Umanna Birajdar and Ramkrishna Ningappa Birajdar for an offence punishable under secton 302 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code. We find them guilty for the offence punishable under section 302 r/w 34 of the Indian Penal Code and sentence each one of them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life for the same.
Respondents Basappa Umanna Birajdar and Ramkrishna Ningappa Birajdar are on bail. They shall be taken into custody forthwith to serve out their sentence.
Criminal Revision Application No. 418 of 1982 is disposed off in terms of Criminal Appeal No. 227 of 1983.
Issuance of certified copy is expedited.