Bangalore District Court
Jb Nagara Taraffic Ps vs Kalaivendhan on 8 December, 2025
KABC0D0308642023
IN THE COURT OF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE TRAFFIC COURT-I AT
MAYOHALL, BANGALORE.
Present : Smt. Neelam Nitin Rao
Judicial Magistrate
Traffic Court-I Bengaluru
DATED 08TH DAY OF DECEMBER 2025
C.C. No. 30543/2023
Complainant : JB Nagar Traffic PS
Bangalore
(Rep by: State by Sr. APP)
V/s
Accused : Kalaivendhan
S/o. Chakravarthy
Aged about 53 years
R/at No. 882, Sithappa Colony
8th Main, New Thippasandra
Bengaluru
(Rep by: Adv. Sri. NVM)
1. Date of commission of offence : 18.06.2023
2. Offence alleged : P/U/S. 279, 304(A) IPC
115 r/w 194, 119 r/w
177 IMV Act
3. Date of recording of evidence : 05.07.2024
4. Date of Judgment : 08.12.2025
2
C.C. No. 30543/2023
JUDGMENT
This case arises from the charge filed by the PI of JB Nagar PS, in Cr No. 133/2023, against the accused no. 1 and accused no. 2, for the offence punishable under Section 279, 304(A) IPC, 119 r/w 177, 115 r/w 194 IMV Act.
2. The brief facts of the prosecution's case are as follows:
On 18.06.2023 at about 09.20 a.m., accused no.1, Shri Kalaivedhan, was the driver of Tipper Lorry No. TN 70 P 7449. At that time, there was a restriction on the entry of heavy goods vehicles into the city. Despite that the accused no.1 drove his tipper lorry in the city on Suranjandas road, near BEML junction from NGF junction towards BEML junction in a rash and negligent manner. The police personnel, who had been deputed to work at the junction, directed the accused to stop his lorry. Despite that, he continued to drive the vehicle, at the same speed and dashed to the pedestrian, who was standing beside the road. When he fell, the accused did not stop the vehicle, and at the same speed, he moved forward and again ran over the vehicle on the pedestrian who fell. The lorry's front wheel ran over the head of the pedestrian. His head broke skull open, and his brain drained out. He sustained previous injuries and succumbed to the occurrence. Thereby, the accused nos. 1 and 2 have committed an offence punishable under Section 279, 304(A) IPC, 119 r/w 177, 115 r/w 194 IMV Act.
3. After receipt of the complaint from CW1, the Investigating Officer registered Crime No. 133/2023 against the accused. A FIR was registered and forwarded to the court. The IO 3 C.C. No. 30543/2023 had been to the spot, conducted spot mahazar, drawn a sketch, obtained statement of the witnesses, conducted inquest, Post mortem, and inspection of the offending vehicle. After obtaining all the statements and the documents, he filed a charge sheet against the accused Nos. 1 and 2 for the offence punishable under Section 279, 304(A) IPC, 119 r/w 177, 115 r/w 194 IMV Act.
4. After receipt of the complaint from CW1, the Investigating Officer registered Crime No. 133/2023 against the accused. A FIR was registered and forwarded to the court. The IO had been to the spot, conducted spot mahazar, drawn a sketch, obtained statement of the witnesses, conducted inquest, Post mortem, and inspection of the offending vehicle. After obtaining all the statements and the documents, he filed a charge sheet against the accused Nos. 1 and 2 for the offence punishable under Section 279, 304A IPC, 119 r/w 177, 115 r/w 194 IMV Act.
5. After receipt of the charge sheet, this Court verified the entire prosecution papers. As there are prima facie materials available on record, the cognizance for the offence punishable under Section 279, 304(A) IPC, 119 r/w 177, 115 r/w 194 IMV Act, was taken, and a Criminal case was registered against accused nos. 1 and 2 in Register No. 3. A process was issued against them.
6. Pursuant to notice, accused no. 1 and accused no. 2 appeared through their counsel, and they were enlarged on bail. Prosecution papers as contemplated under Section 207 CrPC were supplied to accused nos. 1 and 2.
4C.C. No. 30543/2023
7. Heard Learned Senior APP and Learned counsel for the accused, and perused the documents. No grounds made out to discharge the accused, nos. 1 and 2, and there are prima facie materials available against accused nos. 1 and 2. Hence, the substance of the accusation was framed, read over and explained to the accused no. 1 and 2. The accused no. 1 pleaded not guilty and claims to be tried. Accused no. 2 pleads guilty of the offence under Section 194 r/w 177, 155. He paid the fine. As the accused no. 1 pleaded not guilty, the case was posted for prosecution evidence.
8. The prosecution, out of 14 witnesses, examined 4 witnesses as PW1 to PW4, marked Ex. 1 to 10. The statement of the accused no. 1, as required under Section 313 CrPC recorded, read over and explained to him in the language best known to him. Accused no. 1 denied all incriminating circumstances that arose against him in the prosecution's evidence. However, he did not choose to lead the defence evidence. Therefore, the case was posted for the arguments.
9. Heard arguments canvassed by the Learned Senior APP and Learned counsel. The accused meticulously perused the documents placed on record.
10. The following points arise for my consideration; Point No.1: Whether Whether the prosecution proves beyond all reasonable doubt that, on 18-06-2023 at 9:20 am, accused no 1 was the driver of the tipper lorry number TN 70 P7449, at Suranjandass road near BEML junction from NGF junction towards BEML junction in a 5 C.C. No. 30543/2023 rash and negligent manner, to endanger human safety. The police personnel directed him to stop the vehicle. He did not stop and dashed to the Pedestrian who was standing beside the road. At that time, there was a restriction on the movement of heavy goods vehicles on that road. Thereby, accused no. 1 has committed an offence punishable under Section 279 IPC?
Point No.2: Whether Whether the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt that on the aforementioned date, time, and place, the accused was the driver of Tipper Lorry No. TN70P7449 drove his lorry on Surendranath's road near BEML Junction from NJF Junction towards BEML Junction in a rash and negligent manner to endanger human safety. Despite the police personnel directing him to stop the vehicle, he did not stop and dashed to the pedestrian who was standing beside the road. The pedestrian sustained grievous injuries. At that time, there was a restriction on the movement of heavy goods vehicles on that road. He succumbed to the occurrence due to the negligence of the accused no. 1. Thereby, accused has committed an offence punishable under Section 304(A) IPC?
Point No.3:Whether the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt that on the aforementioned date, time, and place, Accused, despite there being a restriction to enter the city at the particular time, by a heavy goods vehicle. The accused no 1 entered the city by violating the rules. Thereby, he has committed an 6 C.C. No. 30543/2023 offence punishable under Section 119 r/w 117 and 115 r/w 194 IMV Act.
Point No.4: What order?
11. My findings on the above points are as follows:
Point No.1 : In the affirmative
Point No.2 : In the affirmative
Point No.3 : Affirmative in part
Point No.4 : As per the foregoing
for the following reasons
REASONS
12. Points No.1 to 3: As these points are interlinked with each other and to avoid repetition of facts and discussion, and also for brevity, they are taken together for common discussion. In the instant case, the burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt lies on the prosecution. The prosecution shall establish that the accused was the driver of the vehicle on the day of the occurrence. He drove his vehicle in a rash or negligent manner on a public road to endanger human safety. He did not stop the vehicle when the Person deputed to work on the junction directed him to do so. There was a restriction on the movement of heavy goods vehicles on the said road. The accused violated all these aspects. The burden lies on the prosecution.
13. In order to bring home the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, the prosecution has examined four 7 C.C. No. 30543/2023 witnesses as PW1 to PW4 and marked 10 documents as Ex. P1 to Ex. P10. The prosecution has examined CW2, Smt. Mahalakshmi as PW1. In her chief evidence, she deposed that she knows CW4. The police called her at NGF HAL Road near BEML Junction. There was an accident to her neighbour, Peria Swamy. She has not seen the accident. The police have conducted a mahazar on the spot and obtained his signature. The mahazar was marked as Ex. P1, and her signature as 1A. The police have conducted a mahazar from 03.45 to 04.45 p.m. She has stated to the police.
14. The defence side fully cross-examined him. She deposed that she has known Peria Swamy for the past 2 to 3 years. At the time of the merger, CW1 and CW4 were present. The police have not given notice to her. Someone called her and informed her about the accident. As Peria Swamy acquainted her, she went to the spot and signed it. She has given a statement to the police on the spot, and she signed Ex. P1 in a spot. Except for these questions, the defence side has utterly failed to rebut and prove anything contrary, as PW1 stood to her case that the police drew the mahazar in her presence and she signed Ex. P1 in a spot. She also deposed CW1, and 4 were present. Nothing contrary was established through the evidence of this witness by the defendants' side.
15. The prosecution examined CW1, Ramesh, as PW2. In his chief evidence, he deposed on 18.06.2023, that he was working on Suranjandass Road, BEML Junction. His working hours were 07.00 a.m. to 02.00 p.m. in an A-shift, i.e. first shift. At 09.20 a.m., he observed that one tipper lorry was rushing 8 C.C. No. 30543/2023 towards Beml Junction towards NJF Junction. At that time, there was a restriction on heavy goods vehicles from entering the said road. He directed the driver of the lorry to stop the vehicle. However, he did not stop, and the driver dashed to the person who was standing beside the BEML junction road. At that time, the driver ought to have stopped his vehicle by applying the brakes. He did not apply the brakes, and he moved his vehicle further, and the left side wheel of the lorry ran over the head of the pedestrian. The pedestrian succumbed to the occurrence. From his pocket, he saw an identity card. He came to know the name of the deceased was Peria Swamy, aged 58 years. The lorry number is TN 70 T 7449. The accused's name is Kalaivedhan. He called his colleague CW5 from the nearby junction. They shifted the dead body to the C.V. Raman Hospital and took the accused to the police station, and lodged a complaint at 11.00 a.m. During his chief evidence, the complaint was marked as Ex. P2 and his signature as Ex. 2(a). His signature on the mahazar was marked as Ex. 1(b). He identified that the accused was present before the court.
16. During cross-examination, he deposed that his working hours on the fateful day were 07.00 a.m. to 02.00 p.m. He was present on the spot. He was on the left side of the lorry. As it was a Sunday, there was no heavy traffic on that day. It was suggested that the deceased was an alcoholic. He said he didn't know. It was suggested that the deceased himself fell in front of the lorry. He denied the suggestion and deposed that the person was standing beside the road. He deposed that the driver, the lorry driver, first dashed to the person, who was standing beside the road. He did not stop the lorry and moved further and ran 9 C.C. No. 30543/2023 over his lorry, over the person. He saw the lorry rushing towards the junction from 5 to 10 metres. He directed the lorry driver to stop the vehicle. When the deceased fell, his skull broke open, and his brain came out. As there was no movement in the body, he came to know that he was dead. The CW5 took the dead body to the said hospital in the ambulance. He denied the suggestion that he was not present on the spot.
17. On careful perusal of the evidence of PW1, it could be seen that he stood by his case. During cross-examination, it was suggested that the person is an alcoholic and he himself fell in front of the lorry. He specifically denied the same and deposed that it is the negligent and rash and negligent act of the accused that resulted in the accident. He specifically deposed that when the person fell, there was an opportunity for the accused to stop his vehicle. He did not stop his vehicle there, and he moved further. That resulted in the fatal accident. The defence utterly failed to prove anything contrary to the evidence of this witness.
18. The prosecution has examined CW.4 Subramani as PW3. The deceased Peria swami is his neighbour. He didn't remember the date. One year ago at 09.00 a.m., he was at Jiyampalya towards the BEML junction. At that time, the Peria swami was standing near the BEML traffic signal. At that time, one lorry rushed from HAL in a rash and negligent manner and dashed to the Peria swami. The front wheel of the lorry ran over the head of the Peria swami. His skull broke open. He was admitted to the Siviraman Hospital. He didn't know the name of the accused. He identified the accused present before the court. He said he didn't know the vehicle number. However, the vehicle 10 C.C. No. 30543/2023 is of Tamil Nadu registration. He identified his signature on the mahazar. It was marked as Ex. P1(c) He signed Ex. P1 on the spot. He identified the photographs of the vehicle.
19. During cross-examination, he deposed that he is a carpenter. His work timing is 09.00 a.m. to 09.00 p.m. On that day, he had not gone to work. He was standing at HAL road at the time of the accident. He was standing towards the HAL road at the time of the accident. He noticed the Peria swami. The Peria swami was going towards his home. He didn't know whether Peria swami was an alcoholic. He denied that, as there was morning heavy traffic, the lorry could not come in at high speed. It was suggested that Periaswami, in an inebriated condition, struck the lorry wheel. He denied the suggestion. It is pertinent to note that PW3 identified the accused and also deposed to the presence of the accused on the spot, and he signed the mahazar on the spot. Nothing contrary was established from the evidence of this witness.
20. PW4. He is the Investigating Officer of this case. During his brief evidence, he deposed the procedure he followed during the investigation of this case. During cross-examination, it was suggested that the deceased was an alcoholic, and he himself was stuck in the lorry. He denied the suggestion. He also denied the suggestion that there was heavy traffic, hence vehicles cannot move in a rush or negligently a high speed. He denied all suggestions put to him.
21. On overall scrutiny of the oral testimony of the prosecution witnesses, it could be seen that PW1 to PW4 11 C.C. No. 30543/2023 identified the accused. His presence on the spot with his vehicle is also established by the prosecution. The identification of the accused, place of occurrence, rash, and negligent driving by the accused, all established by the prosecution from the evidence of PW1 to PW4. Though it was the only defence of the accused, accused no. 1 said that the deceased was an alcoholic and he himself drove into the lorry. There is no rebuttable evidence in this regard. Mere suggestions did not prove the case. Mere suggestions will not assist the accused to prove his defence. When the prosecution establishes its case beyond a reasonable doubt, in criminal cases, the oral testimony of the eyewitnesses is a hold weightage. It is not the Quantity of the witnesses that matters. It is the quality of evidence deposed by the witnesses that matters. In this regard, PW1 to PW4 stood by their statement during evidence and nothing contrary was initiated from their mouth.
22. As far as documentary evidences are concerned, the accused did not dispute the death of the deceased Peria Swamy. Thus, the inquest post-mortem report was marked with consent. The Ex. P1 is the spot mahazar. PW1 and PW3 specifically deposed, PW1 to PW3 specifically deposed, drawing the Ex. P1 in their presence. Ex. P2 is the complaint. The PW2 specifically stood to his case and deposed about Ex. P2. Ex. P3 is the inquest. The death as observed supra was not disputed by the accused. Ex. P4 is the post-mortem. It was also marked with consent. The gravity of the accident could be seen from the post-mortem report and external injuries mentioned therein. It was specifically mentioned that the face is disfigured, and the head is flattened side to side; the left eye is deformed. Further, 12 C.C. No. 30543/2023 it was mentioned that the underlying facial bone and skull bone are fractured, and brain matter is partially drained out. The death is instantaneous as a result of injuries sustained. The gravity of the accident is such that the entire face of the deceased Periyaswami was disfigured. His head was flattened side to side, and the left eye was deformed. The facial bones and Skull bones are fractured, and brain matter is drained out. This disclosure reveals the gravity of the accident.
23. Ex. P6 is the notice under Section 133 IMV Act issued to the accused, No. 2 Sree. K. Kuruppu Swamy, son of Kannan. He was arrayed as the accused no. 2 in this case. He pleaded guilty and paid the fine amount. As per Ex. P7, he replied to the notice and deposed that at the time of the accident, Sree. Kalaivedhan was the driver of the vehicle. Ex. P8 is the hand sketch map that discloses the movement of the Offending vehicle. Ex. P9 is the 65B Indian Evidence Act Certificate. Ex. P10(a) and P10(b) are the photographs of the deceased. Ex. P10(c) and Ex.P.10(d) are the photographs of the offending vehicle. Ex. P(e) and (d) are the spot photographs. On meticulous review of the entire evidence, it could be seen that the presence of the accused and the rash and negligent driving on his part that resulted in the fatal accident is established by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.
24. At this juncture, it is pertinent to refer to Section 279, 304(A) IPC. They read as follows:
Section 279 of IPC - Rash driving or riding on a public way.
Whoever drives any vehicle, or rides, on any public 13 C.C. No. 30543/2023 way in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life, or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
304 (A) Causing death by negligence.-
Whoever causes the death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
25. Section 279 IPC makes rash driving or riding on a public way to endanger human life or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person an offence. Culpable negligence lies in the failure to exercise reasonable and proper care, and the extent of its reasonableness will always depend upon the circumstances of each case. Rashness means doing an act with the consciousness of a risk that evil consequences will follow, but with the hope that it will not. Negligence is a breach of duty imposed by law. The question whether the conduct of the accused amounted to culpable rashness or negligence depends directly on the question as to what is the amount of care and circumspection which a prudent and reasonable man would consider to be sufficient, considering all the circumstances of the case. Criminal rashness means hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that it is dangerous or wanton and the further knowledge that it may cause injury, but done without any intention to cause injury or knowledge that it would probably cause injury.
26. Relevantly, from a perusal of the aforesaid provisions, it is observed that the essential ingredients to constitute an 14 C.C. No. 30543/2023 offence punishable under Section 279 IPC inter alia are that there must be, "rash and negligent driving or riding on a public way and the act must be to endanger human life or be likely to cause hurt or injury to any person."
27. In a road accident case, to convict a person for the offence punishable under Section 304A IPC, the prosecution is required to bring on record the basic requirement of the said Section, i.e. "Rash or Negligent Act" with the following conditions:
1) There must be the death of the person in question,
2) That the accused must have caused such death,
3) That such an act of the accused was rash or negligent and that it did not amount to culpable homicide.
28. Needless to mention, in criminal law, the burden of proof on the prosecution is that of beyond a reasonable doubt. The presumption of innocence of the accused has to be rebutted by the prosecution by adducing cogent evidence that points towards the guilt of the accused. The evidence in the present case is to be weighed keeping in view the above legal standards. What would constitute a rash and negligent act has been described by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Mohammed Aynuddin @ Miyan V State of Andhra Pradesh, (2007)7SCC72, observed as under:- A rash act is primarily an over-hasty act. It is opposed to a deliberate act. Still, a rash act can be a deliberate act in the sense that it was done without due care and caution. Culpable rashness lies in running the risk of doing an act with recklessness and with indifference as to the 15 C.C. No. 30543/2023 consequences. Criminal negligence is the failure to exercise duty with reasonable and proper care and precaution, guarding against injury to the public generally or to any individual in particular. It is the imperative duty of the driver of a vehicle to adopt such reasonable and proper care and precaution.
29. An accident is an unforeseen incident, but it must not be a ground to let off the offender. If a person who is the sole breadwinner of his family dies in an accident caused by the rash or negligent act of a person, such a family may become destitute forever. The Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh guarded against leniency in relation to the drivers found guilty of rash driving and observed as under:-
30. When automobiles have become death traps, any leniency shown to drivers who are found guilty of rash driving would be at the risk of further escalation of road accidents. All those who are manning the steering of automobiles, particularly professional drivers, must be kept under constant reminders of their duty to adopt utmost care and also of the consequences befalling them in cases of dereliction. One of the most effective ways of keeping such drivers under mental vigil is to maintain a deterrent element in the sentencing sphere. Any latitude shown to them in that sphere would tempt them to make driving frivolous and frolicsome.
31. In Suleman Rehiman Mulani v. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1968 S C 829. It was held:
16C.C. No. 30543/2023 This section requires that the death of any person must have been caused by the accused by doing any rash or negligent act. In other words, there must be proof that the rash or negligent act of the accused was the proximate cause of the death. There must be a direct nexus between the death of a person and the rash or negligent act of the accused."
32. Black's Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition) defines 'criminal negligence' as under:
"Criminal negligence which will render killing a person manslaughter is the omission on the part of the person to do some act which an ordinarily careful and prudent man would do under like circumstances, or the doing of some act which an ordinarily careful, prudent man under like circumstances would not do by reason of which another person is endangered in life or bodily safety; the word 'ordinary' being synonymous with 'reasonable' in this connection.
33. To impose criminal liability under this section, it is necessary that the death should have been the direct result of a rash or negligent act of the accused, and that act must be the proximate cause without the intervention of another's negligence. It must be the causa causans; it is not enough that it may have been the causa sine qua non. Culpable rashness is acting with consciousness that the mischievous and illegal consequences may follow, but with the hope that they will not, and often with the belief that the driver has taken sufficient precautions to prevent their happening. Culpable negligence is acting without the consciousness that the illegal and mischievous effect will follow, but in circumstances which show 17 C.C. No. 30543/2023 that the driver has not exercised the caution required of him, and that if he had, he would have had the consciousness. A rash or negligent act is an act done not intentionally or deliberately. A rash act is primarily an over-hasty act, and is thus opposed to a deliberate act, but it also includes an act which, though it may be said to be deliberate, is yet done without due deliberation and caution. Negligence is the breach of a duty caused by omission to do something which a reasonable man guided by considerations that ordinarily regulate human conduct would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is the genus of which rashness is a species. For rashness or negligence to be criminal, it must be of such a degree as to amount to taking a hazard, knowing that the hazard was such that injury or death was most likely to be caused thereby. The criminality lies in running the risk or doing such an act with recklessness and indifference to the consequences.
34. Further, in a criminal trial, the onus remains on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt, and the benefit of doubt, if any, must necessarily go in favour of the accused. The element of rashness and negligence is sine qua non for offence under section 279/304-A IPC, and the same cannot be presumed. In the case of B. C. Ramachandra v. State of Karnataka, 2007 Cri. L. J. 475, the Court relied upon several decisions of the Apex Court and concluded that in criminal proceedings, the burden of proving negligence as an essential ingredient of the offence lies on the prosecution. It was also observed that "such an ingredient cannot be said to have been proved or made out by resorting to the rule of principle of res ipsa loquitur."
18C.C. No. 30543/2023
35. Having observed the settled legal position of the law in respect of the rash or negligent driving, resulting in the death of the person, reverting to the case in hand, the PW 1to 4 supported the prosecution's case. The ocular testimony of these witnesses reveals that the death of Shri Periyaswami is the proximate act of the accused no 1, without taking any precautions and his negligent driving. Further, the speed hardly matters in the offence under sections 279 and 304A IPC, as the word used is "rash or negligent " driving. Thus, if the rashness or negligence is established, that is sufficient to bring home the guilt of the accused. In my considered view, the act of accused no 1, thereby hitting the vehicle of the victim and non stopping the vehicle there by applying the brakes despite he is having an opportunity to avoid further unforeseen events, was grossly rash and negligent. The very manner of driving by accused no 1 reeks of risk-taking and demonstrates his casual attitude towards the other road users, including the victim. The negligence of accused no 1 is writ large in the present case. Therefore, I answer points 1 to 2in the affirmative.
36. Point no 3: It is the case of the prosecution that the accused entered the city at a time when there was a restriction on heavy goods vehicles entering the city. The final report was filed for the offence under sections 194, 115, 119 and 177 of the IMV Act. They read as follows.
37. Section 194. Driving vehicle exceeding permissible weight [(1) Whoever drives a motor vehicle or causes or allows a motor vehicle to be driven in contravention of the provisions of section 113 or section 114 or section 115 shall be punishable 19 C.C. No. 30543/2023 with [***] fine [of twenty thousand rupees and an additional amount of two thousand rupees per tonne of excess load], together with the liability to pay charges for off-loading of the excess load] [Provided that such motor vehicle shall not be allowed to move before such excess load is removed or is caused or allowed to be removed by the person in control of such motor vehicle.]
38. Section 115 IMV Act: 115. Power to restrict the use of vehicles. - The State Government or any authority authorised in this behalf by the State Government, if satisfied that it is necessary in the interest of public safety or convenience, or because of the nature of any road or bridge, may, by notification in the Official Gazette, prohibit or restrict, subject to such exceptions and conditions as may be specified in the notification, the driving of motor vehicles or of any specified class or description of motor vehicles or the use of trailers either generally in a specified area or on a specified road and when any such prohibition or restriction is imposed, shall cause appropriate traffic signs to be placed or erected under section 116 at suitable places:
39. Provided that where any prohibition or restriction under this section is to remain in force for not more than one month, notification thereof in the Official Gazette shall not be necessary, but such local publicity as the circumstances may permit shall be given of such prohibition or restriction.20
C.C. No. 30543/2023
40. Section 119 of the IMV Act: 119. Duty to obey traffic signs.
(1) Every driver of a motor vehicle shall drive the vehicle in conformity with any indication given by a mandatory traffic sign and in conformity with the driving regulations made by the Central Government, and shall comply with all directions given to him by any police officer for the time being engaged in the regulation of traffic in any public place.
(2)In this section mandatory traffic sign means a traffic sign included in Part A of the [First Schedule], or any traffic sign of similar form (that is to say, consisting of or including a circular disc displaying a device, word or figure and having a red ground or border) placed or erected for the purpose of regulating motor vehicle traffic under sub-section (1) of section 116.
41. Section 117 of the IMV Act: 177. General provision for the punishment of offences. - Whoever contravenes any provision of this Act or of any rule, regulation, or notification made thereunder shall, if no penalty is provided for the offence, be punishable for the first offence, with a fine which may extend to [five hundred rupees], and for any second or subsequent offence with a fine which may extend to [one thousand and five hundred rupees
42. As far as the allegation that the accused entered the city at a time restricted with a weight exceeding permissible limits, there is no evidence, either oral or documentary. The evidence of the investigating officer is silent in this regard. However, the accused did not obey the traffic rules and signals given to him. It is established by the prosecution that the evidence of PW1, who was deputed for the work on the spot and who is also an eyewitness to the incident, is sufficient to prove this aspect.
21C.C. No. 30543/2023
43. Thus, though the prosecution failed to prove the contraventions by the accused under section 194, 115 of the IMV Act. The contradiction of section 119 IMV Act was proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, I answer point no 3 affirmatively in part.
44. Point No.4: For myriad reasons discussed supra, I proceed to pass the following:
ORDER The accused no.1 is found guilty of the offence punishable under section 279, 304(A) IPC and 119 r/ w 177 IMV Act.
Acting under section 255(2) Cr, P, C, accused no.1 is hereby convicted for the offence punishable under section 279, 304(A) IPC and 119 r/w 177 IMV Act.
Accused no.1 is hereby sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- for the contravention of Section 279 IPC, in default, he shall undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days.
Accused no.1 is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for 6 months for the offence punishable under Section 304(A) IPC.
The accused no.1 shall pay a fine of Rs.500/- for the contravention of section 119 r/w 177 IMV Act; in default, he shall undergo simple imprisonment for 10 days.
Acting under section 255(1) Cr. P.C., accused no.1, is hereby acquitted of the offence punishable under section 115 r/w 194 IMV Act.
The default sections shall run concurrently.22
C.C. No. 30543/2023 The bail bond of the accused no.1, and that of his surety bond shall continue till the expiry of the appeal period.
Supply a free copy of the judgment to the accused no.1 forthwith.
(Dictated to stenographer, transcribed and typed by her on the computer, corrected and then pronounced by me in the open court on this, the 08th December 2025) Digitally signed by NEELAM NEELAM NITIN RAO NITIN RAO Date: 2025.12.12 12:46:41 +0530 (Neelam Nitin Rao) JMFC, Traffic Court - 1 Bangalore 23 C.C. No. 30543/2023 ANNEXURE LIST OF WITNESSES EXAMINED ON THE PROSECUTION SIDE:
1. PW.1 : Smt. Mahalakshmi
2. PW.2 : Sri. Ramesh
3. PW.3 : Sri. Subramani
4. PW.4 : Sri. Venkatachalapathi LIST OF DOCUMENTS MARKED ON PROSECUTION SIDE:
Ex.P.1 : Spot Mahazar
Ex.P.1(a) : Signature of PW.1
Ex.P.1(b) : Signature of PW.2
Ex.P.1(c) : Signature of PW.3
Ex.P.1(d) : Signature of PW.4
Ex.P.2 : Complaint
Ex.P.2(a) : Signature of PW.2
Ex.P.2(b) : Signature of PW.4
Ex.P.3. : Inquest
Ex.P.3(a) : Signature of PW.4
Ex.P.4 : Postmortem report
Ex.P..4(a) : Signature of PW.4
Ex.P.5 : FIR
Ex.P.5(a) : Signature of PW.4
Ex.P.6 : 133 notice
Ex.P.6(a) : Signature of PW.1
Ex.P.7 : 133 reply
Ex.P.7(a) : Signature of PW.4
Ex.P.8 : Sketch
Ex.P.8(a) : Signature of PW.4
Ex.P.9 : 65(B) Certificate
Ex.P.9(a) : Signature of PW.4
Ex.P.10 : A to F (6 photos)
24
C.C. No. 30543/2023
LIST OF WITNESS EXAMINED AND DOCUMENTS MARKED ON DEFENCE SIDE:
NIL (Dictated to stenographer, transcribed and typed by her on the computer, corrected and then pronounced by me in the open court on this, the 08th December 2025) Digitally signed by NEELAM NEELAM NITIN RAO NITIN RAO 12:46:36 Date: 2025.12.12 +0530 (Neelam Nitin Rao) JMFC, Traffic Court - 1 Bangalore