Bangalore District Court
Mohan Kumar A vs S R Vishwanath M L A on 28 October, 2025
1 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025
KABC010179892025
IN THE COURT OF LXXXI ADDL. CITY CIVIL AND
SESSIONS JUDGE, BENGALURU (CCH-82)
:PRESENT:
Sri Santhosh Gajanan Bhat, B.A.L., LL.B.,
LXXXI Addl. City Civil & Sessions Judge,
Bengaluru City (CCH-82)
(Special Court exclusively to deal with criminal cases
related to former and elected MPs/MLAs in the State of
Karnataka)
Dated this the 28th day of October, 2025
Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025
APPELLANT: Mohan Kumar.A
S/o Late.Ashwathaiah,
Aged about 52 years,
Residing at 2nd Cross,
6th Block, R.T.Nagar,
Bengaluru - 560 032.
(Sri.Dhyan Chinnappa, learned
Senior Counsel for Sri.Subair K.M.,
Advocate for Appellant)
V/s
RESPONDENT: S.R.Vishwanath
Member of Legislative Assembly
Yelahanka Constituency,
Singanayakanahalli, Yelahanka
Bengaluru - 560 064.
(Smt.Lakshmi Iyengar, learned
Senior Counsel for Sri Chittappa,
learned counsel for Respondent)
2 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025
JUDGMENT
This criminal appeal is filed under Section 372 of Cr.P.C., wherein the appellant herein was the complainant before the Trial Court in C.C.No.37125/2021, pending on the file of learned XLII ACJM, Bengaluru.
2. For the sake of convenience, the parties are addressed to their original ranking as that on the trial court.
3. The appellant herein was the complainant before the trial court, who had filed a private complaint under Sec.200 of Cr.P.C., by alleging that the accused/ respondent herein had committed an offence punishable under Sec.500 of IPC. The brief facts leading to the complaint is that, the complainant in his petition has contended that on 10.02.2021, B-TV News Channel had carried out a series of programs and new items apart from news, scrolls, making fake statements, false and unprivileged statements and 3 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 allegations against the appellant herein. It is submitted that the respondent herein who was arraigned as accused person had given an interview to the News channel, wherein he had spoken live on the camera and had stated certain statements wherein he had made false and unwarranted statements to damage the reputation of the appellant. Further it is narrated that during the course of statement, the accused had alleged that the appellant herein was behind all the scams in BDA and he was involved in big scams and that respondent/accused would call for investigation by specialized agencies and he had made malicious claim that appellant's name was directly exposed in BDA scam and in his capacity at that time as the BDA Commissioner was also looking into it and respondent had also called for Police investigation in the matter. It is also submitted that certain outlandish allegations were made that the appellant was agent and a broker in a number of scams and has played a role in the 4 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 allotment of land to Bhavani Society. The statements made by the respondent/accused were all imaginary, unsubstantiated and created with an intention to damage the reputation of the appellant's image in public eye. Pursuant to the same, the Complainant had got issued with a notice to the respondent/ appellant and since there was no reply from him, it had driven the appellant to knock the doors of the court by filing a private complaint. Based on the materials available on record, the trial court had proceeded to take cognizance for the offence punishable under Sec.500 of IPC and necessary summons was issued to the respondent/accused. The respondent/accused had appeared before the trial court and necessary substance of accusation came to be framed, which was read-over to the accused, who had pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
4. The complainant in order to prove his case, had got himself examined as PW.1 and had marked 10 5 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 documents on his behalf as Ex. P1 to 10. He had also examined four more witnesses as PW.2 to 5 and during the course of cross-examination, two documents were marked through confrontation as Ex.D1 and 2. On completion of the complainant's evidence, the statement of accused came to be recorded as contemplated under Sec.313 of Cr.P.C., wherein he had denied all the incriminating materials available against him. The respondent/accused had not preferred to lead any defence evidence and accordingly the case was posted for arguments. After hearing both the parties on merits, the trial court was pleased to dismiss the complaint and had acquitted the accused for the offence punishable under Sec.500 of IPC.
5. Being aggrieved by the same, the present appeal has been preferred by the appellant by contending that the impugned orders passed by the trial court is not in accordance with the law and also the material evidence has not been properly examined. 6 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 It is also submitted that the trial court had failed to appreciate from the evidence and materials on record that the rigors of Sec.500 of IPC was clearly made out. The appellant has also submitted that the words which were uttered by the accused was "BDA Mohan" or "R.T.Nagar Mohan" which was pointing out to the present Complainant, since his photograph was also published during the course of his interview. Further, the Respondent in his defence has contended that he was not referring to the appellant herein, despite the phrase being specific in nature. It is also submitted that during the course of interview, the photograph of appellant was aired on television and respondent did not take any steps to correct the same stating that it is not the same person. As such, the contention of the appellant/complainant was justified. Further it is submitted that the trial court failed to note that while in cross-examination, the complainant has denied that he was known to BDA Mohan or R.T.Nagar Mohan, the 7 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 accused specifically put to the complainant questions wherein he has suggested that he only is R.T.Nagar Mohan and BDA Mohan. As such, it is submitted that it is clear and evident that the accused always had appellant in mind and none other. Further it is submitted that if the respondent had complainant in mind, there was no occasion to specifically impute that it was the complainant alone who was the person in the mind of the respondent. The appellant has also submitted that the trial court had failed to notice that once the statements made are admitted as having been made, the burden shifts to the accused to show that the imputations so made is true. However, the trial court has not considered the same in proper perspective. Further the learned trial court has erred in giving findings that the complainant does not fall within the meaning of "person aggrieved" under Sec.199(1)(b). The finding was completely incorrect given the fact that the photograph of the complainant 8 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 was flashed all over the media and if the respondent was not referring to the complainant he would certainly have made this position clear immediately. Thereafter, it is submitted that the 3 rd and 4th explanation provided in the statute to propound the offence of defamation is that an imputation in the form of an alternative or expressed ironically, which may amount to defamation. Therefore, it is submitted that the impugned judgment rendered by the trial court was bad in law for not appreciating the aspects in proper perspective. The appellant has also contended that the document which was produced as Ex. D1 by the accused was the copy of the suit filed by the appellant in OS No.1111/2021. When it was the sole defence of the respondent/accused that he had made all the statements without knowing about the same, the contention of the appellant was justified. Lastly, it is submitted that the trial court had failed to appreciate the admissions made by the accused in his 9 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 statement recorded under Sec.313 of Cr.P.C. The important element was completely missed by the trial court, wherein the accused had admitted his statement made by him. Under these circumstances, the findings rendered by the trial court was inappropriate and calls for interference of this court.
6. On presentation of the appeal memorandum, necessary notice came to be ordered to the respondent/accused who had appeared through his counsel.
7. I have heard the arguments of the learned Senior Counsel Sri.Dhyan Chinnappa, who has appeared on behalf of the learned counsel for the complainant herein. The learned Senior Counsel has extensively argued that the averments made in the complaint itself discloses a prima-facie case and also the act of the accused person in not answering to the legal notice being issued by the complainant would seriously create aspersions against his conduct. 10 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 Further it is his contention that silence by the accused without answering to the fact that the video which was published in the Television during the course of interview was not the person to whom he had referred to would make him liable for prosecution under Sec.500 of IPC. Further it is his statement that the conduct of the accused itself would be self-explanatory and in a way, it amounts to innuendo. The imputation is very much answerable from the conduct of the accused person and in order to point out to the same, he has referred to the cross-examination of the complainant who was examined as PW.1. He has argued that during the course of cross-examination, a suggestion was made by the learned Counsel for the accused to the witness that the complainant was an RTI Activist who use to visit BDA office as representing the general public and also to get their work done. In spite of that, it was suggested to him that he was deposing falsely before the Court that he was not 11 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 having any other alias name. The learned Senior Counsel by pointing out to the aforesaid aspect has vehemently argued that if at all a suggestion being made by the accused himself that the complainant used to visit the public office and he was having an alternative name i.e., telecasted in the news interview as BDA Mohan or R.T.Nagar Mohan, the same would indicate that the accused was fully aware that he was making aspersions against the complainant only. The learned Senior Counsel has also taken this Court to the entire evidence which was placed before the Court. By referring to the same, it is argued at length that the accused had not taken any steps to retract from his earlier stand i.e., BDA Mohan or R.T.Nagar Mohan and the complainant were one and the same. If a suggestion is made categorically that they are one and the same, the accused is required to justify his stand taken before the Court. The learned Senior Counsel has also argued that there was no opportunity to 12 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 elucidate the truth in the instant case since accused had not preferred to lead any defense evidence. In order to substantiate his contention, the learned Senior Counsel has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2016)7 SCC 221 (Subramanian Swamy Vs. Union of India, Ministry of Law and others), wherein it has been held as follows;
168. For the aforesaid purpose, it is imperative to analyse in detail what constitutes the offence of "defamation" as provided under Section 499 IPC. To constitute the offence, there has to be imputation and it must have been made in the manner as provided in the provision with the intention of causing harm or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm the reputation of the person about whom it is made. Causing harm to the reputation of a person is the basis on which the offence is founded and mens rea is a condition precedent to constitute the said offence. The complainant has to show that the accused had intended or known or had reason to believe that the imputation made by him would harm the reputation of the complainant. The criminal offence emphasises on the intention or harm. Section 44 IPC defines "injury". It denotes any harm 13 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 whatever illegally caused to any person, in body, mind, reputation or property. Thus, the word "injury"
encapsulates harm caused to the reputation of any person. It also takes into account the harm caused to a person's body and mind. Section 499 provides for harm caused to the reputation of a person, that is, the complainant.
198. The said provision is criticised on the ground that "some person aggrieved" is on a broader spectrum and that is why, it allows all kinds of persons to take recourse to defamation. As far as the concept of "some person aggrieved" is concerned, we have referred to a plethora of decisions in course of our deliberations to show how this Court has determined the concept of "some person aggrieved". While dealing with various Explanations, it has been clarified about definite identity of the body of persons or collection of persons. In fact, it can be stated that the "person aggrieved" is to be determined by the courts in each case according to the fact situation. It will require ascertainment on due deliberation of the facts. In John Thomas v. K. Jagadeesan [John Thomas v. K. Jagadeesan, (2001) 6 SCC 30 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 974] while dealing with "person aggrieved", the Court opined that the test is whether the complainant has reason to feel hurt on 14 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 account of publication is a matter to be determined by the court depending upon the facts of each case. In S. Khushboo [S. Khushboo v.
Kanniammal, (2010) 5 SCC 600 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 1299] , while dealing with "person aggrieved", a three-Judge Bench has opined that the respondents therein were not "person aggrieved"
within the meaning of Section 199(1) CrPC as there was no specific legal injury caused to any of the complainants since the appellant's remarks were not directed at any individual or readily identifiable group of people. The Court placed reliance on M.S. Jayaraj v. Commr. of Excise [M.S. Jayaraj v. Commr. of Excise, (2000) 7 SCC 552] and G. Narasimhan [G. Narasimhan v. T.V. Chokkappa, (1972) 2 SCC 680 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 777] and observed that if a Magistrate were to take cognizance of the offence of defamation on a complaint filed by one who is not an "aggrieved person", the trial and conviction of an accused in such a case by the Magistrate would be void and illegal. Thus, it is seen that the words "some person aggrieved" are determined by the courts depending upon the facts of the case. Therefore, the submission that it can include any and everyone as a "person aggrieved"
is too specious a submission to be accepted.
15 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025
8. Also, another judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2023)13 Supreme Court Cases 365 (Balu Sudam Khalde and another Vs. State of Maharashtra), wherein it has been held as under;
38. Thus, from the above it is evident that the suggestion made by the defence counsel to a witness in the cross-examination if found to be incriminating in nature in any manner would definitely bind the accused and the accused cannot get away on the plea that his counsel had no implied authority to make suggestions in the nature of admissions against his client.
39. Any concession or admission of a fact by a defence counsel would definitely be binding on his client, except the concession on the point of law. As a legal proposition we cannot agree with the submission canvassed on behalf of the appellants that an answer by a witness to a suggestion made by the defence counsel in the cross-examination does not deserve any value or utility if it incriminates the accused in any manner.
40. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that the initial burden to establish the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt rests on the prosecution. It is also an 16 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 elementary principle of law that the prosecution has to prove its case on its own legs and cannot derive advantage or benefit from the weakness of the defence. We are not suggesting for a moment that if prosecution is unable to prove its case on its own legs then the Court can still convict an accused on the strength of the evidence in the form of reply to the suggestions made by the defence counsel to a witness. Take for instance, in the present case we have reached to the conclusion that the evidence of the three eyewitnesses inspires confidence and there is nothing in their evidence on the basis of which it could be said that they are unreliable witnesses. Having reached to such a conclusion, in our opinion, to fortify our view we can definitely look into the suggestions made by the defence counsel to the eyewitnesses, the reply to those establishing the presence of the accused persons as well as the eyewitnesses in the night hours. To put it in other words, suggestions by itself are not sufficient to hold the accused guilty if they are incriminating in any manner or are in the form of admission in the absence of any other reliable evidence on record. It is true that a suggestion has no evidentiary value but this proposition of law would not hold good at all times and in a given case during the course of cross-examination the defence counsel may put such a suggestion the answer to which may directly go 17 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 against the accused and this is exactly what has happened in the present case.
41. The principle of law that in a criminal case, a lawyer has no implied authority to make admissions against his client during the progress of the trial would hold good only in cases where dispensation of proof by the prosecution is not permissible in law. For example, it is obligatory on the part of the prosecution to prove the post-mortem report by examining the doctor. The accused cannot admit the contents of the post-mortem report thereby absolving the prosecution from its duty to prove the contents of the same in accordance with law by examining the doctor. This is so because if the evidence per se is inadmissible in law then a defence counsel has no authority to make it admissible with his consent.
42. Therefore, we are of the opinion that suggestions made to the witness by the defence counsel and the reply to such suggestions would definitely form part of the evidence and can be relied upon by the Court along with other evidence on record to determine the guilt of the accused.
43. The main object of cross-
examination is to find out the truth on record and to help the Court in knowing the truth of the case. It is a matter of common experience that 18 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 many a times the defence lawyers themselves get the discrepancies clarified arising during the cross- examination in one paragraph and getting themselves contradicted in the other paragraph. The line of cross- examination is always on the basis of the defence which the counsel would keep in mind to defend the accused. At this stage, we may quote with profit the observations made by a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Govind v. State of M.P. [Govind v. State of M.P., 2004 SCC OnLine MP 344 : 2005 Cri LJ 1244] The Bench observed in para 27 as under : (SCC OnLine MP) "27. The main object of cross-
examination is to find out the truth and detection of falsehood in human testimony. It is designed either to destroy or weaken the force of evidence a witness has already given in person or elicit something in favour of the party which he has not stated or to discredit him by showing from his past history and present demeanour that he is unworthy of credit. It should be remembered that cross-examination is a duty, a lawyer owes to his clients and is not a matter of great personal glory and fame. It should always be remembered that justice must not be defeated by improper cross-
examination. A lawyer owes a duty to himself that it is the most difficult art. However, he may fail in the result but 19 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 fairness is one of the great elements of advocacy. Talents and genius are not aimed at self-glorification but it should be to establish truth, to detect falsehood, to uphold right and just and to expose wrongdoings of a dishonest witness. It is the most efficacious test to discover the truth. Cross-
examination exposes bias, detects falsehood and shows mental and moral condition of the witnesses and whether a witness is actuated by proper motive or whether he is actuated by enmity towards his adversaries. Cross-
examination is commonly esteemed the severest test of an advocate's skill and perhaps it demands beyond any other of his duties exercise of his ingenuity.
There is a great difficulty in conducting cross-examination with
creditable skill. It is undoubtedly a great intellectual effort. Sometimes cross-examination assumes unnecessary length, the Court has power to control the cross-examination in such cases. (See Wrottescey on cross- examination of witnesses). The Court must also ensure that cross-
examination is not made a means of harassment or causing humiliation to the victim of crime [See State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh [State of Punjab v.
Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 316]
44. During the course of cross-
examination with a view to discredit the witness or to establish the defence 20 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 on preponderance of probabilities suggestions are hurled on the witness but if such suggestions, the answer to those incriminate the accused in any manner then the same would definitely be binding and could be taken into consideration along with other evidence on record in support of the same.
9. By referring to the above said authorities, it is vehemently argued that the findings rendered by the trial court was totally against the settled principles of law which would require the interference of this court. Hence, he has sought for interference of this court.
10. Per contra, it is submitted on behalf of the respondent that the impugned judgment passed by the trial court is apt and correct. Smt.Lakshmi Iyengar, learned Senior Counsel on instruction from the learned counsel for Respondent has submitted before the Court that the averments made in the complaint is required to be considered in proper perspective. It is her submission that the averments made in Para-3 of the complaint that the complainant was an 21 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 accomplished businessman and has achieved high reputation in the society both due to his success in business as well as due to his philanthropic activities and has achieved success while maintaining high standards of integrity and honesty and also he was a well-known public figure not only in the city of Bengaluru but throughout the State of Karnataka was also not established in fact. Further it is her submission that the accused was not personally present in TV interview and he had only given telephonic interview. It is also submitted that all that he had mentioned in his interview that the name of one Mohan @ R.T.Nagar Mohan was making rounds as the main person who had indulged in corrupt activities. The learned Senior Counsel has vehemently argued that unless it is pointed out that the accused had intended to defame the complainant by personally pointing out and causing aspersions against him, the contentions urged by the complainant cannot be 22 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 accepted. Further she has pointed out that, Ex.D1 was the document which would indicate that he was being called by name Mohan @ BDA Mohan and also, he had not approached the Court with clean hands. She has also pointed out to the documents which are marked before the Court at Ex.P10. By continuing her arguments, the learned Senior Counsel has vehemently argued that how a criminal case could be maintainable without making B-TV Channel as necessary party as they are the necessary parties who have published and telecasted the interview. It is submitted that ultimately for defamation the Court has to look into the following points;
a) Intention
b) Intention to defame
c) As per the exception, if allegations are in public interest, then it will not be a defamation.
11. By pointing out to the above aspects, the learned Senior Counsel has further argued that in the 23 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 judgment passed by the trial court, the very same aspect has been discussed. Even otherwise by looking to the evidence of PW.3 and 4, it could be ascertained that there was no corroboration with respect to the avocation of the complaint. Further it is submitted that the accused did not admit that he is not Mohan or BDA Mohan. The learned Senior Counsel has also taken this Court to the statement recorded under Sec.313 of Cr.P.C. Particularly with respect to Question No.2, it is argued that the questionnaire which was framed, though do not indict particularly to the complainant herein. By pointing out to the said aspects, the learned Senior Counsel has taken this Court to the Exception No.1 and 9 of Sec.499 of IPC. It is submitted that the Exceptions are very much applicable to the case on hand. Further in order to substantiate their contention, the learned Senior Counsel has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported as follows;
24 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025
1) Shahed Kamal and others Vs. M/s A.Surti Developers Pvt. Ltd. and another in Crl.Apl.No.2033 of 2025 (Special Leave Petition [Criminal] No.9942 of 2024)
2) 1982 SCC Online Del 270 (S.Nihal Singh and others Vs. Arjan Das, New Delhi)
3) AIR 2017 SC 5608 (Mohammed Abdulla Khan Vs. Prakash.K)
4) AIR 2002 Supreme Court 2989 (K.M.Mathew Vs. K.A.Abraham)
5) 2025 INSC 241 (Jaideep Bose Vs. M/s Bid and Hammer Auctioneers Pvt. Ltd.
12. By relying upon the aforesaid authorities, the learned Senior Counsel has vehemently argued that the impugned judgment rendered by the trial court is apt and correct and accordingly she has sought for dismissing of the instant complaint.
13. Heard and perused the records. The points that would arise for my consideration are as follows;
1) Whether the trial court has not appreciated the materials on record in proper perspective?
25 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025
2) Whether the trial court has erred in not considering the admissions being made by the accused during the course of his evidence?
3) Whether the impugned judgment passed by the trial court is not in accordance with law and calls for interference of this court?
4) Whether the complainant has made out grounds for interfering with the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial court?
5) What Order?
14. My answer to the above points is as under:
Point No.1: In the Negative; Point No.2: In the Negative; Point No.3: In the Negative; Point No.4: In the Negative; Point No.5: As per final order for the following: -
REASONS
15. Before adverting to the factual aspects of the case, I have recapitulated the entire evidence that has been laid before the trial Court. In the instant case, the 26 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 complainant had got himself examined as PW.1 Mohan Kumar and in his chief examination he has once again reiterated the contentions which were made in his complaint. During the course of his cross-examination wherein he was subjected to grilling cross- examination, he has deposed that he was into real estate business and also, he was doing social services. It is his evidence that he had taken several government schools for adoption and has done yeoman services to the said school. That apart he has deposed that on 23.02.2021 he had issued a notice to the accused under his instructions. He has also deposed of filing a suit in OS No. 1111/2021 for which he had issued necessary information to his Counsel. The said copy of the suit was confronted to him and since he had admitted the same it was marked as Ex. D1. Further he has deposed that none of his family were working in BDA nor his relatives or any close persons were working in BDA. He has also categorically admitted of 27 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 furnishing his address as residing in No. 62 and also has deposed of owning a house in No. 265 which were both situated in RT Nagar. During the course of further cross-examination, he was specifically confronted with the averments made in the suit which was mentioned above and it was brought to his notice that in the said suit he had averred that he was known by name RT Nagar Mohan alias BDA Mohan amongst his friends and since he had admitted the same, the portion was marked as Ex.D1(a). However, the witness has voluntarily deposed that he was not being called by name R T Nagar Mohan or BDA Mohan and due to misrepresentation the same was narrated in the suit. He has also deposed that in the said suit he had narrated that he used to visit BDA Office and also as a representative of general public to get their work done. However, he has denied the suggestion that he was in the habit of filing false cases against the officials for no rhymes or reason. He has admitted of issuing legal 28 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 notice on 10.02.2021 against the media as per Exhibit D1, wherein he has stated that the defendant had published a news article and the 18th defendant therein had begun to air the promotional slides and videos from 07.00 a.m. onwards on that day by stating that they were going to expose regarding a person by name R T Nagar Mohan, who they alleged was a BDA broker and was also a mastermind in several scams of BDA. Since the witnesses had admitted of deposing about the same in his civil suit, the same was marked as Exhibit D1(b). He has also specifically admitted that at the time of watching the interview there was no occasion for him to presume that RT Nagar Mohan or BDA Mohan which was addressed to in the interview pertained to him. Thereafter the witness was also subjected to further cross-examination and he has admitted specifically that he does not know who had furnished his photograph to B-TV channel at the time of telecasting of the news item and he had not made 29 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 any efforts to ascertain the same. He has deposed that he had issued legal notice to the B-TV channel also, but he does not know what had happened to his legal notice. He has deposed of registering a criminal case against the TV channel. However, it is his evidence that he does not know about its case number or the status at which the case is pending. Further, during the course of cross-examination, the complainant has deposed that on 10.02.2021, he has deposed before the court that the accused had visited the B-TV channel and had given an interview wherein he had stated that the Complainant was the kingpin of BDA scams and he had got the files cleared by paying crores of rupees. However, the witness has deposed that the accused had not visited the TV channel but it was a live interview which he had given. Further he has admitted that erroneously he had deposed during the course of his chief examination that the complainant had visited the B-TV Office for tendering his evidence. 30 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 Later on, the witness was once again summoned and during the course of his further cross examination he has admitted that he acted as a middleman for sale of several sites. He has also deposed that for the last 15 to 20 years he was into real estate business and during the aforesaid period he had not visited any of the offices or the government offices personally but he had visited only through his advocates. He has admitted of registering cases against 8 officials, and also against TV media persons and has volunteered that the said cases were all registered only after registration of the above case. The witness has also denied of facing several criminal cases against him. However, he has admitted categorically that in the year 2023, a case was registered against him by one Smt. Hema S Raju, which was a private complaint and as he had admitted the same, the document was marked as Ex.D2. Further during the course of cross- examination, he has specifically admitted that in the 31 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 entire interview or its transcription, the accused had not shown the photograph of the complainant by pointing out that he was the one, who was called as RT Nagar Mohan or BDA Mohan, who was involved in the corrupt activities at BDA. Further, he has feigned his ignorance that the accused was aware of the fact that the photograph of the complainant was being telecasted at the time of publishing his interview in the BTV news channel. Apart from that, nothing much was elucidated from him.
16. PW.2 K.S.Kumar has deposed that on 10.02.2021 in the afternoon one of his friend Suresh had telephonically called him and had stated that a news item was being telecasted with respect to their friend Mohan Kumar. He had switched on the TV and in the news channel, MLA Sri Vishwanath was conducting a press conference wherein he had stated that Mohan Kumar was involved in several scams and he was a BDA dealer and if he visits BDA office he was 32 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 being given red carpet welcome and he had received kickback of more than Rupees 20 Crores and without money Mohan Kumar would not touch any files. The witness has deposed that by watching the interview he felt bad as his friend was not visiting any BDA office nor was involved in any transactions. During the course of cross examination, he has deposed that for the last 25 years he knew Mohan Kumar and he was doing yeoman services to the society. He has specifically deposed that Mohan Kumar was not being called by any other name or by any alias name. He has admitted that he knew to operate internet, YouTube and in the same if a search was given by stating BDA Mohan, Photo and videos were being telecasted, for which he has feigned his ignorance. Apart from that, nothing much was elucidated from him.
17. Another witness, PW.3 Suresh has deposed that on 10.02.2021 at about 11.00 a.m. in the morning one of his friend by name Manjunath had telephoned 33 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 to him and stated that a interview was being published with respect to their friend Mohan Kumar and when he had switched on the TV he had noticed that Yelahanka MLA S.R.Vishwanath was conducting a press conference wherein he had stated that Mohan Kumar was a BDA dealer and if he visits the BDA Office, he was given a red carpet welcome and he used to do an illegal business of about 10 to 20 crores by acting as an agent. As such he had immediately called upon Mohan Kumar and had intimated about the same and the complainant Mohan Kumar had stated that all the said aspects were false. During the course of cross examination, it was suggested to him that at the time of tendering his sworn statement he had not narrated that he himself had intimated the aforesaid aspects to complainant for which he had feigned his ignorance. Apart from that nothing was elucidated from him.
18. PW4 Karthik is another witness who has deposed that on 10.02.2021 at about 11 a.m. in the 34 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 morning their friends by name Eswar and Prakash had telephonically called and intimated about the interview being telecasted at B-TV. As such when he had switched on the TV channel he had found that MLA S.R. Viswanath was conducting a press conference wherein he was giving the interview by showing the photograph of Mohan Kumar that he was a BDA dealer and if he visits the BDA office, a red carpet welcome was given to him and also when the same was brought to the notice of Mohan Kumar in the evening, he had denied all such aspects. During the course of cross- examination, he has deposed that complainant was known to him from 2009 onwards and he knew the complainant through his uncle Srinivasa Naidu. Further, he has feigned his ignorance that Mohan Kumar used to do some transactions at BDA and it is his evidence that the press conference was being conducted by Viswanath by standing outside the BDA office. Further he has deposed that at that time the 35 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 accused Vishwanath was holding a photograph of the complainant Mohan Kumar in his hand and by showing it he was giving the evidence.
19. PW.5 by Byre Gowda, is the other witness who has deposed that the complainant Mohan Kumar was his nephew and he had taken care of the complainant from his childhood days. It is his evidence that on 10.02.2021 at about 11.00 a.m. in the morning his friend Kempanna had called him and had stated about the interview which was being telecasted in B TV with respect to Mohan Kumar. As such he had switched on the TV and had found that in the said interview at BTV, it was being stated that Mohan Kumar was a BDA agent who had made a transaction of more than ₹ 20 crores and the interview was being given by S.R. Vishwanath. Immediately he had visited the house of Mohan Kumar and he had explained to him that it was a false allegation being levelled against him due to which he was defamed in the society. 36 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 During the course of his cross-examination he has admitted that Mohan Kumar for his livelihood was doing a real estate business and he has feigned his ignorance about the offices which Mohan Kumar visits for his business purposes. He has also admitted that he does not have knowledge that whether Mohan Kumar visits BDA Office for his business. He has also deposed that since the interview was being telecasted in television, he came to know that it was pertaining to the complainant Mohan Kumar. He has specifically further deposed that Mohan Kumar was not being called by name R T Nagar Mohan and has categorically admitted that no photographs were being telecasted in the said interview. Apart from that nothing much has been elucidated from him.
20. The complainant in order to prove his case had got marked Ex.P1 to 10 and also during the course of cross-examination Ex. D1 and Ex. D2 were 37 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 marked through confrontation by the Respondent herein.
21. The appellant who is the complainant before the trial Court is challenging the order of acquittal, wherein the accused who is alleged to have committed offences under Section 500 of IPC has been acquitted. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the trial Court had erred in answering the question that the accused was not found guilty of committing the aforesaid offences. It has been narrated in detail in the written submissions that the Magistrate had erred in acquitting the respondent on the basis of the appellant denied being known as BDA Mohan or RT Nagar Mohan. It is further contented that during the course of cross examination the respondent in his suggestion had specifically questioned that he was known as BDA Mohan or RT Nagar Mohan and he had also referred to himself as such in OS No. 1111/2021 which was also filed before the court and on 38 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 confrontation the same came to be marked as Ex.D1. The aforesaid aspect requires to be considered in consonance with the evidence which has been placed before the court. It is the specific contention of the complainant that a interview came to be telecasted on BTV and in the said interview the accused who was the person giving the interview had specifically stated that he had heard about several corrupt activities and also the corrupt activities taken place at BDA and in that it was stated that a person by name BDA Mohan or also called as R T Nagar Mohan was the kingpin who would not settle for a lesser sum of amount and used to accept huge chunk of amount as bribe for committing the illegal activities. The aforesaid aspect is required to be considered in the wake of the assertions which has been made in the complaint. Firstly, in the instant case it is noticed from records that the complainant has not at all admitted that he was having any other 39 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 name or he was being called by other names like R T Nagar Mohan or BDA Mohan.
22. Before averting to the factual aspect of the case, it would be appropriate to understand what amounts to defamation. As per the definition rendered in Halsbury's Law of England, Fifth Edition 2012, Volume 32 it has been stated as:
"A defamatory statement is a statement which tends to lower a person in the estimation of the right-thinking members of the society generally or to cause him to be shunned or avoided or to expose him to hatred. Contempt or ridicule or to disparage him from his office, profession, calling, trade or business".
23. When the aforesaid principle is applied to the case on land, firstly, the complainant has to establish that due to the aforesaid statement, his image in the society was lowered. Further, it is required to be proved that if the words in an action for slander are not actionable per se at common law or by statute, the claimant must allege and prove actual 40 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 material loss. However, in the matters pertaining to libel, if a person has been libeled without any lawful justification or excuse, the law presumes that some damage will flow in the ordinary course of events from mere invasion of right of his reputation and such damages is known as general damages. That apart it is also required to be proved by the claimant that the purpose of a claim of libel or slander is to vindicate the reputation of the person defamed and accordingly the proper and only party to bring the claim is the person actually and personally defamed. Thus, it is not enough that the words reflect on the claimant's property, there must also be an imputation against the claimant personally and for example, that he has knowingly or negligently caused some defamatory statement imputing the reputation which he is having in the society. The aforesaid aspect assumes importance for the reason that in the entire complaint averments it has been alleged by the complainant that 41 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 certain defamatory statements came to be made by accused person while giving an interview to B-TV channel. When the entire averments made in the complaint, which is the basic edifice, is carefully appreciated, it does indicate that he had submitted in his complaint pleadings that on 10.02.2021, a news programme was telecasted, wherein an interview was given by accused S.R. Vishwanath, who was also the commissioner of BDA. And in the said interview, it was narrated by the accused person that a person by name BDA Mohan or R T Nagar Mohan is the one who is considered as a kingpin of committing corruption in the BDA and he is also responsible for various illegal activities in BDA. Further it was narrated by the accused person during the course of interview that he would request to assign the investigation of such corrupt activities to SIT or any other specialized agencies of the Government and in this regard, he would correspond with the then Chief Minister of the 42 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 State. With this particular aspect the other contentions which has been raised are during the course of the evidence is also required to be appreciated. Firstly, in the instant case the complainant has contended that the accused had intentionally intended to malice or defame the complainant in the eyes of the right- thinking members of the society.
24. In order to better appreciate the aforesaid aspects, I have carefully appreciated the evidence which is placed before the trial Court. In the evidence which has been led before the Court, the interview conversation was also produced and it came to be marked as a necessary Ex. P6 which is a CD. In the said interview it is noticed that a specific question was raised to the accused person about the corrupt activities being carried out at BDA. In the said interview it has been specifically deposed by the accused that he does not know who Mohan was but 43 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 his name was forthcoming everywhere. Further he has narrated that he was doing an agent work and also acting as an intermediatory to officers and also purchasers and everyone used to take the name of R T Nagar Mohan. Further he has stated that whatever corrupt activities that had taken place in BDA everyone used to take the name of one Mohan. He has also given example that if a site or a layout was allotted to a Housing society, the said person would show his expertise and make illegal money in the allotment and development of layout. Thereafter, a question was posed by the person who was conducting the interview that if at all a complaint was lodged before the Chief Minister in this regard, to hand over the investigation to specialized agencies, the real picture of R T Nagar Mohan would come into light, for which, the accused has specifically stated that the same would come out and it was not only pertaining to Mohan, but also pertaining to other agents who were 44 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 involved in conducting the corrupt activities. Thereafter the interviewer has once again posed another question that what action he would initiate against R T Nagar Mohan. For the said question the accused has answered that the Chief Minister has specifically stated that whoever may be the person whether it is R T Nagar Mohan or any other person, the same will be entrusted to SIT and since there was a stay operating, the same could not have been investigated immediately and further he has deposed that the said R T Nagar Mohan has shown his expertise in order to obtain stay. That apart, nowhere it is pointed out that he was specifically pointing out to the aforesaid complainant.
25. The main question which arises at this juncture is whether such statement was referred to the complainant herein or it was any other general statement. In order to better understand this aforesaid 45 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 aspect, it is required to consider the manner in which the interview was given on the relevant date and also whether the statement which was given by accused person indeed intended to pointed out to the complainant herein. The first and foremost aspect is that in the complaint averments also it has been specifically narrated by the complainant that he was not called by any other names and he was addressed as Mohan and he was not addressed by any other names like R T Nagar Mohan or BDA Mohan. In order to better appreciate the same, the cross examination of PW1 is required to be looked into. During the course of his cross examination, he has specifically deposed that no person in his family was working at BDA nor any of his friends or relatives were working at BDA. He has also deposed that he had filed a suit before the Civil court and the copy of the plaint on confrontation was marked as Ex. D1 and in the said suit at para-No. 4 it has been narrated that the complainant who was the 46 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 plaintiff therein was popularly known as R T Nagar Mohan alias BDA Mohan amongst his friend circle. The witnesses have admitted of making such averments in the plaint; however, it has been deposed by him that due to some inadvertence the aforesaid aspect was mentioned and he was not at all being addressed by BDA Mohan or RT Nagar Mohan anywhere. Though it has been argued by the learned Senior counsel representing the accused that the aforesaid suggestion itself would indicate the innuendo in which the accused was addressing his interview against complainant as he had malafide intention to point out to the complainant, though looks attractive, it is required to be appreciated with the entire materials available on the record. When the same is appreciated, it would indicate that the complainant was also denying that he was being addressed by the name BDA Mohan or RT Nagar Mohan by his family members, friends, relatives or any other persons. Under the 47 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 circumstances the main aspect which is required to be established by the complainant is that when an allegation of libel is levelled and if a statement was made which was defamatory in nature, and published and the same had lowered the reputation of the complainant in the eyes of the right-thinking persons of the society.
26. In order to better appreciate the aforesaid aspects, the court has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court wherein the ingredients which are required to prove defamation in the case of libel has been laid down. In the judgment reported in SCC Online SC 1587 (Google India Pvt Ltd., Vs V Vishaka Industries and Another) wherein it is held as:
104. Under the said provision, the Law Giver has made the making or publishing of any imputation with a requisite intention or knowledge or reason to believe, as provided therein, that the imputation will harm the reputation of any person, the essential ingredients of the offence of defamation. What is the meaning to be attached to the words "making of an 48 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 imputation" and "publishing of an imputation"? This question has been set out with clarity in a recent judgment which is reported in Mohammed Abdulla Khan v. Prakash K. (2018) 1 SCC 615. It was held as follows:
"10. An analysis of the above reveals that to constitute an offence of defamation it requires a person to make some imputation concerning any other person;
(i) Such imputation must be made either (a) With intention, or (b) Knowledge, or
(c) Having a reason to believe that such an imputation will harm the reputation of the person against whom the imputation is made.
(ii) Imputation could be, by
(a) Words, either spoken or written, or
(b) By making signs, or
(c) Visible representations
(iii) Imputation could be either made or published.
107. In the light of this discussion, we may only reiterate that the criminal offence of defamation under Section 499 of the IPC is committed when a person makes a defamatory imputation which, as explained in Mohd. Abdulla Khan (supra), would consist of the imputation being conveyed to the person about whom the imputation is made. A publication, on the other hand, is made when the imputation is communicated to persons other than 49 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 the persons about whom the defamatory imputation is conveyed. A person, who makes the defamatory imputation, could also publish the imputation and thus could be the maker and the publisher of a defamatory imputation. On the other hand, a person may be liable though he may not have made the statement but he publishes it.
27. When the aforesaid judgment is appreciated it indicates that following aspects are required to be established which are as follows:
(a) With intention, or
(b) Knowledge, or
(c) Having a reason to believe that such an imputation will harm the reputation of the person against whom the imputation is made.
(ii) Imputation could be, by
(a) Words, either spoken or written, or
(b) By making signs, or
(c) Visible representations
(iii) Imputation could be either made or published
28. In order to consider whether the accused had intention and knowledge and also, he had reasons to believe that such imputation would harm the reputation of the complainant and also the fact which 50 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 is required to be established is that whether the same was published. In order to appreciate the same, it would be relevant to revisit the evidence which is led before the court. When the further cross-examination of the complainant herein is appreciated it indicates that he has denied the suggestion that he was having a habit of filing false complaint against Government servants or before Government office and other Courts. Further he has specifically deposed that he does not have any transactions with BDA nor he had visited BDA. If only for a moment the suggestion and the reply given by the complainant is to be appreciated with that of another independent witness, it would certainly create serious question mark over the evidence led before the court. For instance, the PW.2 to 5 who are the witnesses in the instant case have deposed that they had watched the TV interview at B-TV News Channel, wherein a Press Conference was being called. PW.2 K.S.Kumar in his evidence has deposed that in 51 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 the said Press Conference, the accused herein i.e., S.R.Vishwanath was making allegations against his friend Mohan Kumar and also, he has deposed that Mohan Kumar was alleged to be a BDA dealer and if only he visits the BDA Office, a red-carpet welcome has been given to him. It has also been deposed by him that he was not related to any transactions with BDA. During the course of cross-examination, he has deposed that complainant Mohan Kumar was not being called by any other name and if only YouTube was opened and a search was given as BDA Mohan, the video and audio of the present complainant would be portrayed. However, the said suggestion was feigned by the witness. Further it is his evidence that on that day in the Press Conference, the MLA Vishwanath was conducting the Press Conference, wherein several other persons were sitting adjacent to him and about 10 persons were present next to him and the Press Conference was being called in the BDA Office. This 52 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 particular aspect is once again required to be juxtaposed and appreciated with the evidence of PW.3 Suresh. PW.3 has deposed that on 10.02.2021 at about 11.00 a.m. in the morning, one of his friends Manjunath had called him telephonically and had stated about a Press Conference being given at B-TV. On turning to B-TV Channel, it was noticed that Yelahanka MLA S.R.Vishwanath was conducting a Press Conference and he was making several allegations against his friend Mohan Kumar as a BDA dealer. During the course of cross-examination, it is deposed by him that he had not furnished any materials with respect to Press Conference being telecasted in the News Channel. PW.4 Karthik, who has also deposed in consonance with the evidence of PW.1 and 2 has deposed during the course of cross- examination that he knew the complainant Mohan Kumar since from 2009 and he got acquainted with him through his maternal uncle Srinivasa Naidu and 53 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 has feigned his ignorance the reason for meeting them at the earliest point of time. Interestingly, in his cross- examination he has deposed that in the Press Conference, the accused S.R.Vishwanath was showing the photograph of Mohan Kumar and he was making allegations against the complainant Mohan Kumar. He has deposed that accused Vishwanath was conducting the Press Conference by standing outside the BDA Office and was holding a photograph in his hand. Furthermore, the evidence of PW.5 Byregowda would indicate that the complainant Mohan Kumar who was his nephew was not being addressed as R.T.Nagar Mohan or BDA Mohan. Further he has deposed that Mohan Kumar was not having any rivalry or friendship with S.R.Vishwanath.
29. By looking into the entire evidence of the parties, it would indicate that the identity of the complainant is a main aspect which is required to be 54 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 established in materials pertaining to libel. It is not the case of complainant that both of them knew each other prior to making such statement. It is also not in dispute that at the time of conducting Press Conference the accused had not shown any photographs in order to indicate that complainant Mohan Kumar was whom he was addressing to. As such, a burden is shifted upon the complainant either to prove that the libel which was made by the accused person and he had pointed out towards the complainant himself so as to lower his image in the eyes of the right-thinking members of the society. It is settled principle of law, that at times it is not required to point out the complainant in particular, but if such references are made which would only portray the complainant and if innuendos are made indicating of portraying the complainant and further if innuendos are made indicating of the involvement of the complainant, then the proof of the same is suffice to 55 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 hold that the accused with a malice or with a malafide intention had tried to defame the complainant. The underlining aspect is that the accused had intention and knowledge to cast imputation and further the same was duly published to persons in whose eye the image of the complainant was lowered. In order to better appreciate the same, it would be appropriate to rely upon the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the Complainant reported in 1984 SCC Online, Bombay 256 (Indian Express Newspapers, Bombay V Dr Jagmohan Mundhara and another) wherein it has been held as:
14. It is also not necessary that all the world should understand the libel; it is sufficient if those who knew the plaintiff can make out that he is the person meant. As observed by Alverstone C.J. in Jones v. Hulton(1909) 2 K.B. 444:--
"There is abundant authority to show that it is not necessary for everyone to know whom the article refers; this would in many cases be an 56 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 impossibility, but if in the opinion of a jury, a substantial number of persons who knew the plaintiff, reading the article, would believe that it refers to him, in my opinion an action, assuming the language to be defamatory, can be maintained; and it makes no difference whether the writer of the article inserted the name or description unintentionally or by accident, or believing that no person existed corresponding with the name or answering the description. If upon the evidence the jury are of opinion that ordinary sensible readers, knowing the plaintiff would be of the opinion that the article referred to him, the plaintiffs case is made out."
The question really is how ordinary sensible men having the special knowledge would understand the innuendo complained of.
In Morgan v. Odhams Press Ltd.(1971) 1 WLR 1239, the House of Lords, per majority held as follows:--
"Held (1) (Lord Guest and Lord Donvan dissenting) that in determining the impression that would be left on the mind of the reader-regard should be had to the character of the article and the class of reader likely to read it; that the relevant impression to be taken into consideration was that which would be conveyed to an 57 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 ordinary sensible man (having knowledge of the relevant circumstances) reading the article casually and not expecting a high degree of accuracy that in order to be defamatory of the plaintiff the article complained of had to contain something which, to the mind of a reader with the knowledge of the relevant circumstances, contained defamatory imputations and pointed to the plaintiff as the person defamed; ........"
(The Dissent by the two judges was only in respect of the conclusion that the article in question in that case complied with the conditions)
15. It is also no defence to say that people would not believe the imputations to be true. In Morgan's case (citation supra) Lord Morris of Borthy Gost expressed agreement with the following observations made by Goddard L.J. in Hough v. London Express Newspaper Ltd., (1940) 2 K.B. 507:--
"If words are used which impute discreditable conduct to my friend he had been defamed to me, although I do not believe the imputation, and may even know that it is untrue."58 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025
30. Further in another judgment Reported in (1971)1 SCC 885 (Sukra Mahto v. Basudeo Kumar Mahto) it has been held as under;
8. The ingredients of the Ninth Exception are first that the imputation must be made in good faith; secondly, the imputation must be for protection of the interest of the person making it or of any other person or for the public good. Good faith is a question of fact. So is protection of the interest of the person making it. Public good is also a question of fact. This Court in Harbhajan Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 1966 SC 97 : (1965) 3 SCR 235 : 1966 Cri LJ 82] in dealing with the Ninth Exception to Section 499 of the Penal Code, 1860 said that it would have to be found out whether a person acted with due care and attention. This Court said there "Simple belief or actual belief by itself is not enough. The appellant must show that the belief in his impugned statement had a rational basis and was not just a blind simple belief. That is where the element of due care and attention plays an important role. The person alleging good faith has to establish as a fact that he made enquiry before he made the imputation and he has to give 59 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 reasons and facts to indicate that he acted with due care and attention and was satisfied that the imputation was true. The proof of the truth of the statement is not an element of the Ninth Exception as of the First Exception to Section 499. In the Ninth Exception the person making the imputation has to substantiate that his enquiry was attended with due care and attention and he was thus satisfied that the imputation was true. The accent is on the enquiry, care and objective and not subjective satisfaction.
9. This Court in Chaman Lal v. State of Punjab [(1970) 1 SCC 590 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 253 : AIR 1970 SC 1372] dealing with good faith in the Ninth Exception said that "in order to establish good faith and bona fide it has to be seen first the circumstances under which the letter was written or words were uttered; secondly whether there was any malice; thirdly, whether the appellant made any enquiry before he made the allegations; fourthly, whether there are reasons to accept the version that he acted with care and caution and finally whether there is preponderance of probability that the appellant acted in good faith".
60 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025
31. The main ratio which has been laid down in the aforesaid case is the question how ordinary sensible man having special knowledge would understand the innuendo of the complaint. Once again at the cost of repetition the factual aspects when recapitulated could indicate that at no point of time the complainant was being addressed or called by the name Mohan Kumar. It is the specific con- tention that he was not being addressed as RT Nagar Mohan or BDA Mohan at any point of time. Under these circumstances the contention of causing innu- endo is seriously required to be appreciated to under- stand whether the accused did have any knowledge that the complainant was the one whom he had re- ferred as RT Nagar Mohan or BDA Mohan. When the complainant himself submits before the court that he was not being addressed by any other name and when his friends and other witness who were exam- ined have tendered evidence before the court that the 61 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 Complainant was not addressed by any other name, the main aspect of entertaining knowledge and malafide intention seems to be not established. Though it is contended by the complainant that in the said interview published by the B-Tv channel the photograph of the Complainant was being published, the question which requires to be answered is why the publisher or the person who had telecasted the interview is not made as necessary party. It is also rather interesting to note the evidence tendered by the witness examined as PW-2 to PW-5 is not at all corroborated and in fact, each of the witness have de- posed in different manner viz one of the witness de- poses that the accused was conducting the press conference along with 10 other persons sitting with him in the channel office and another witness de- poses that the accused was standing Infront of the BDA office holding the photograph of complainant and depicting it to be the who was involved in said il- 62 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 legal activities. Furthermore, the complainant himself has admitted that the accused was not holding any photograph and infact it was a live interview given by the accused person. Further the complainant has ad- mitted in his cross examination that he doesn't know who had given his photograph to the news channel. Under the circumstances, there is lot of inconsis- tency in the evidence of the complainant with that of his witness. That apart in order to attract the rigors of innuendo, the complainant is required to establish the identity when the same depends on extrinsic facts and that fact must be proved and pleaded in the complainant. Further it is relevant to note that in the instant case, the complainant has submitted that the alleged interview, which was given by the accused person amounted to innuendo. Further it is required to look into whole of the statement rather than the words which the complainant intends to commit the offence of innuendo. In this regard, I have relied upon 63 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (1990)3 SCC 396 (M J Zakharia Sait V T M Mohammed) wherein it is held as:
31. What exactly should be pleaded in an action for defamation has been stated also in Halsbury's Laws of England (Vol. 28, 4th edn.). In paragraphs 174, 175, 176, 177 and 178 of the said volume, we have discussion with regard to natural and ordinary meaning of the words complained of, and about the innuendo and the facts and matters supporting innuendo which should be pleaded and proved. It is stated there that in drafting a statement of claim in libel or slander, it is necessary to distinguish between cases in which the words complained of are alleged to be defamatory in their natural and ordinary meaning, whether the literal or the inferential meaning, and those in which the defamatory meaning is a secondary meaning derived from extrinsic or special facts or matters, so that a legal or true innuendo must be pleaded. If it is claimed that the words are defamatory in their natural and ordinary meaning and the words bear only one literal meaning, which is clear and explicit, it is not necessary to 64 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 plead the meaning in the statement of claim. However, if the words are reasonably capable of bearing more than one literal meaning or if the defamatory meaning relied on is inferential (a "false or popular"
innuendo), it is desirable and may even be necessary to plead the defamatory meaning or meanings. Where the plaintiff wishes to claim that the words complained of were understood to be defamatory in a secondary or extended meaning by those persons having knowledge of some special facts or matters, such a meaning constitutes a separate cause of action and the same should be pleaded expressly in a separate paragraph in the statement of claim (emphasis supplied). Particulars must be given of the facts and matters on which the plaintiff relies in support of any secondary or extended defamatory meaning which it is decided to plead. These special facts or matters may be extrinsic to the words used or there may be some special meaning of the words themselves. The plaintiff should plead that particular words bore the innuendo meaning.
32. In Gatley on Libel and Slander (8th edn.) in paragraph 95, while dealing with "True and False Innuendoes", it is observed that in distinguishing between the ordinary and natural meaning and 65 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 the innuendo meaning of words, the substantive law cannot be separated from the requirements of pleadings and the rules of evidence. When the plaintiff wishes to rely on any special facts as giving the words a defamatory or any particular defamatory meaning, he must plead and prove such facts including, where necessary, any special knowledge possessed by those to whom the words are published which gives the words that meaning, and must set out the meaning in his pleading. Where words are not defamatory in their natural and ordinary meaning but are so only by reason of extrinsic circumstances, the plaintiff must plead also those circumstances and the precise defamatory meaning conveyed by them to those persons to whom the words were published. Otherwise, the statement of claim will disclose no cause of action. Such an innuendo is required to be pleaded whenever the plaintiff relies on any extrinsic facts as giving to the words the meaning he alleges. The plaintiff must plead the words, the extrinsic facts and knowledge of those facts on the part of one or more of those persons to whom the words were published. He can also give evidence of any facts and circumstances which he has pleaded and which would lead reasonable 66 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 persons to infer that the words were understood in that meaning provided such facts or circumstances were known to those persons to whom the words were published. The evidence required is the evidence of special facts causing the words to have a meaning revealed to those who knew the special facts.
33. Street in his treatise on Torts (6th edn.) at page 294, has stated that where nothing is alleged to give an extended meaning, words must be construed by the judge in their ordinary and natural meaning. The whole of the statement must be looked at, not merely that part on which the plaintiff relies as being defamatory, although, of course, it may be relevant to take account of the greater importance of some part of a statement, e.g. the headlines of an article in a newspaper. There may be circumstances where the plaintiff alleges that the statement is defamatory because specific facts known to the reader give to the statement a meaning other than or additional to its ordinary meaning; this is known as a true or legal innuendo. In that case, the plaintiff must plead and prove such facts, for the defendant is entitled to know that meaning of the statement on which the plaintiff relies 67 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 so that he is able to argue either that the statement in that meaning is not defamatory or that it is then true of the plaintiff. There is a third possibility. The words may have a meaning beyond their literal meaning which is inherent in them and arises by inference or implication: this is sometimes known as the "false" innuendo. The plaintiff has to plead separately any such "false" innuendo. A "false" innuendo differs from a "true" innuendo in that the pleader of a "false" innuendo does not set out any extrinsic facts in support of his plea.
34. Duncan and Neil in their book on Defamation (1978 edn.) while referring to "innuendo" on page 17 onwards have stated that the law of defamation recognises that (a) some words have technical or slang meaning or meanings which depend on some special knowledge possessed not by the general public but by a limited number of persons and (b) that ordinary words may on occasions bear some special meaning other than their natural and ordinary meaning because of certain extrinsic facts and circumstances. The plaintiff who seeks to refer to an innuendo meaning has to plead and prove the facts and circumstances which give words a special meaning. He has also to prove that the words were 68 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 published to one or more persons who knew these facts or circumstances or where appropriate, the meaning of the technical terms etc.
35. While referring to the test where identification depends on extrinsic facts, the learned authors have stated that where identification is in issue, the matter can sometimes be decided by construing the words themselves in their context. More often, however, the plaintiff will be seeking to show that the words would be understood to refer to him because of some facts or circumstances which are extrinsic to the words themselves. In these cases the plaintiff is required to plead and prove the extrinsic facts on which he relies to establish identification and, if these facts are proved, the question becomes: would reasonable persons knowing these facts or some of them, reasonably believe that the words referred to the plaintiff.
36. Where identification depends on extrinsic facts these extrinsic facts must be pleaded because they form part of the cause of action.
37. The conspectus of the authorities thus shows that where the defamatory words complained of are not defamatory in the natural or ordinary meaning, or in other words, they are not defamatory per se but are 69 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 defamatory because of certain special or extrinsic facts which are in the knowledge of particular persons to whom they are addressed, such innuendo meaning has to be pleaded and proved specifically by giving the particulars of the said extrinsic facts. It is immaterial in such cases as to whether the action is for defamation or for corrupt practice in an election matter, for in both cases it is the words complained of together with the extrinsic facts which constitute the cause of action. It is true that Section 123(4) of the Act states that the statement of fact in question must be "reasonably calculated to prejudice the prospects" of the complaining candidate's election. However, unless it is established that the words complained of were capable of being construed as referring to the personal character or conduct of the candidate because of some specific extrinsic facts or circumstances which are pleaded and proved, it is not possible to hold that they were reasonably calculated to prejudice his prospects in the elections. For, in the absence of the knowledge of the special facts on the part of the electorate, the words complained of cannot be held to be reasonably calculated to prejudice such prospects. Once, however, it is proved by laying 70 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 the foundation of facts that the words in question were, by virtue of the knowledge of the special facts, likely to be construed by the electorate as referring to the personal character or conduct of the complaining candidate, it may not further be necessary to prove that in fact the electorate had understood them to be so. That is because all that Section 123(4) requires is that the person publishing the complaining words must have intended and reasonably calculated to affect the prospects of the complaining candidate in the election.
32. In the aforesaid authority the Hon'ble Apex Court has explained that where the defamatory words complained of are not defamatory in the natu- ral or ordinary meaning, or in other words, they are not defamatory per se but are defamatory because of certain special or extrinsic facts which are in the knowledge of particular persons to whom they are addressed, such innuendo meaning has to be pleaded and proved specifically by giving the particulars of the said extrinsic facts. Though it is 71 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 argued that a separate proceeding against media and press was being initiated by the complainant, the same would not be suffice to indicate that the ac- cused had entertained malafide intention, unless it is established by him. I have also considered the au- thorities which is relied upon by the Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant reported in (2016) 7 SCC 221 (Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India, Ministry of Law AIR 2016 SC 2728), which is discussed supra.
33. In the aforesaid judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that to constitute the offence there has to be an imputation and it must have been made in the manner as provided in the provision with the intention of causing harm or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm the reputation of the person to whom it is made. Further, it has been held that existence of mens rea is a condition precedent to constitute the said offence and the complainant has to show that accused had intended or known or had 72 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 reason to believe that the imputation made by him would harm the reputation of the complainant. If only the materials available on record is considered, once again an enormous burden will be casted upon the complainant to establish that the accused had entertained a mala fide intention wherein, he had made allegations intended or had reason to believe that it would harm the reputation of the com- plainant. However, the materials which are placed on record does not indicate that the accused was having knowledge that the complainant is the same person who was being called by the name R.T. Nagar Mohan or BDA Mohan. Even otherwise it has been elucidated in the cross examination of the com- plainant that he had never met the accused person or they had any acquittance earlier. Under the cir- cumstances the interview which was given by the ac- cused person when considered in ordinary sense would definitely indicate that the accused didn't had 73 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 any knowledge that the complainant was being ad- dressed by name R T Nagar Mohan or BDA Mohan and that apart when the entire interview is consid- ered the accused seems to be speaking of persons who are involved in corrupt activities in BDA and the main aspect which was being stated by him that nec- essary action would be initiated against such per- sons. As such the contention of the complainant that the statement was aimed at him to defame him in the society cannot be accepted.
34. For a moment, I have considered the sub- missions made by the Learned Senior Counsel wherein it is submitted that in the deposition and also during the course of cross-examination it was suggested in a categorical manner which would amount to admission that the complainant was being addressed as R.T.Nagar Mohan and BDA Mohan. In order to better appreciate the same at the cost of rep- etition, the Exhibits which were marked during the 74 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 course of cross-examination as Ex. D1 which is copy of the plaint in OS No. 1111/2021 is required to be looked into. The said plaint was confronted to the complainant and wherein it was narrated, "the plaintiff is popularly known as R.T.Nagar Mohan alias BDA Mohan among his friend circle".
35. The aforesaid aspect when once again ap- preciated with the cross examination of PW1, it would indicate that he had categorically admitted making such an averment in his plaint. However, he has de- posed that it was mentioned inadvertently and to the specific question for the reason of filing a case against the TV channels, he has answered that as his photo- graphs was telecasted, he had filed a suit against them. Further he has deposed that on the same day at about 07.00 a.m. in the morning, the 18 th defen- dant in the said civil suit was showing promotion slides and videographs. However, his photograph was not published. To a specific question he has answered 75 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 that since his photo was not shown it could not be possible for him to hold that the interview pertained to himself, the witness has admitted the same. Fur- ther, he has categorically admitted that he had not made enquiries to ascertain that who had handed over the photographs to the newspapers or the televi- sion media. If for a moment the cross examination is juxtaposed and appreciated with the basic ingredients of the defamation suit, it would clearly indicate that a bounden duty is casted upon the complainant to indi- cate that the publisher who had telecasted the same. In this regard reliance is placed on the judgment ren- dered in [2006] 3 All ER 336 (Bunt v Tilley & Ors) wherein it is held as:
45. At all events, it is clear to me from the evidence that these Defendants do indeed fall within the relevant definition. Of course that is challenged by the Claimant, but the facts which lead to that conclusion are themselves uncontroversial. I am thus unable to accept his submission that" ... the 76 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 Directive in questioJ1. most certainly does NOT apply to the business relationship that exists between the three corporate Defendants and the three individual Defendants". I need to turn next to Regulations 17 and 18, upon which AOL and Tiscali both place reliance.
46. Regulation 17(1), which is concerned with the concept of "mere conduits" provides as follows:
"(1) Where an information society service is provided which consists of the transmission in a communication network of information provided by a recipient of the service or the provision of access to a communication network, the service provider (if he otherwise would) shall not be liable for damages or for any other pecuniary remedy or for any criminal sanction as a result of that transmission where the service provider -
(a) did not initiate the transmission;
(b) did not select the receiver of the transmission; and
(c) did not select or modify the information contained III the transmission" .
47. It is further provided by Regulation 17(2) that acts of transmission and of provision of access, for the purposes of Regulation 17(1), would include the automatic, intermediate and transient 77 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 storage of the information transmitted where it takes place for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission in the communication network, and provided that the information is not stored for any period longer than is reasonably necessary for the transmission. That again is a point raised by Mr Bunt in the present proceedings. He submits that the material, or some of it, is cached for too long a period for it to be characterised as "reasonably necessary". It is appropriate for this to be judged in the light of the automatic system put in place and the objective it is intended to achieve. The evidence is set out in some detail below.
48. Regulation 18 is concerned with caching:
"Where an information society service is provided which consists of the transmission in a communication network of information provided by a recipient of the service, the service provider (if he otherwise would) shall not be liable for damages or for any other pecuniary remedy or for any criminal sanction as result of that transmission where -
(a) the information is the subject of automatic, intermediate and temporary storage where that storage is for the sole purpose of making more efficient 78 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 onward transmission of the information to other recipients of the service upon their request, and
(b) the service provider -
(i) does not modify the information;
(ii) complies with conditions of access to the information;
(iii) complies with any rules regarding the updating of the information, specified in a manner widely recognised and used by industry;
(iv) does not interfere with the lawful use of technology, widely recognised and used by industry, to obtain data on the use of the information; and
(v) acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information he has stored upon obtaining actual knowledge of the fact that the information at the initial source of the transmission has been removed from the network, or access to it has been disabled, or that a court or an administrative authority has ordered such removal or disablement"
49. The commentary in Gatley at para. 6.28 is helpful:
"The protection is therefore aimed at transient messages, such as email or at more permanent material which simply passes through the defendant's system for purposes of access and not at material which is stored by the defendant for significant periods. The 79 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 knowledge of the defendant is irrelevant, so he is not liable (in contrast to s.l of the Defamation Act 1996) for failing to take steps to prevent access to another site which he is aware carries defamatory material.
However, the provision does not confer immunity against the grant of an injunction" .
The learned editors mention (in footnote 21) a possible qualification with regard to web-based e-mail, which is normally stored on the provider's server until deleted by the customer. This qualification has been developed further by Dr Collins, op cit, at para. 17.08:
"The position is likely to be different for intermediaries who operate web- based e-mail services, such as MSN Hotmail. Such services store e-mail messages sent to their subscribers on their servers on a more permanent basis, so that the messages can be viewed by subscribers from any computer, located anywhere in the world. Rather than being deleted automatically from the intermediary's server upon initial transmission to a subscriber, e-mail messages on web- based e-mail services are usually deleted from the intermediary's server 80 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 only at the request of the subscriber. As messages sent to web-based email services are not stored only on an 'intermediate' or 'transient' basis, and are frequently stored for a period longer than is reasonably necessary for their transmission, regulation 17 is unlikely to apply. Intermediaries operating these services are probably 'hosts', rather than 'mere conduits', of messages received by subscribers".
50. Dr Collins also addresses (at para. 17.09) the matter of bulletin board postings and web pages, and concludes that Regulation 17 will usually apply to internet intermediaries who operate computer systems through which particular bulletin board postings and web pages happen to pass en route from one computer to another. This is subject to the proviso that the intermediary does not store the constituent IP datagrams for any period longer than is reasonably necessary for the transmission. Dr Collins suggests that, in order to attract the protection of Regulation 17, an intermediary would need to configure its computer system to delete any copies of the relevant datagrams immediately after receiving an acknowledgment that they have been received by the intended recipient. Should the datagrams be stored for a 81 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 longer period, the intermediary would be likely to be deemed to have "cached" or "hosted" them.
51. The purpose of Regulation 18 is to protect internet intermediaries in respect of material for which they are not the primary host but which they store temporarily on their computer systems for the purpose of enabling the efficient availability of internet material. Many ISPs and other intermediaries regularly cache, or temporarily store, commonly accessed web pages on their computer systems, so that those pages will be more quickly accessible to their subscribers. This is described by the learned editors of Gatley (at para. 6.29) as a "sort of half way house between mere transmission and 'hosting"'.
36. In the aforesaid judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Queens Bench of Hon'ble High court of England and Wales, the court had an occasion to dis- cuss about Defamation Act 1996, the Electronic Com- merce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002, wherein Regu- lation no.17 and 18 was being discussed and had held that the internet provider who was considered as 82 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 intermediary service provider one must be a service provider who is both customer of an upstream service provider and supplier to a downstream service provider. The facts are akin in the instant case also since the B-TV channel were the one who had only published the interview and as such the publisher had to indicate that:
(i) does not modify the information;
(ii) complies with conditions of access to the information;
(iii) complies with any rules regarding the updating of the information, specified in a manner widely recognised and used by industry;
(iv) does not interfere with the lawful
use of technology, widely
recognised and used by industry,
to obtain data on the use of the
information; and
(v) acts expeditiously to remove or to
disable access to the information he has stored upon obtaining actual knowledge of the fact that the information at the initial source of the transmission has been removed from the network, or access to it has been disabled, or that a court or an 83 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 administrative authority has ordered such removal or disablement
37. However, in the instant case, it is noticed from the cross examination itself that the accused had not pointed out to the complainant by holding any photographs since the complainant himself has admitted in his cross examination that the accused did not do so. Further the photograph was published by the intermediary news channel and also the evidence of the complainant would indicate that he had initiated proceedings against some other news channel and press and out of which one TV channel had apologized and had withdrawn the content. If for a moment the same is considered the, facts which could be spelled out is that accused was not the one who had published the photograph and indeed he never met or had any acquaintance with the complainant and he had given statement in generic sense. Hence, the liability was to be fastened upon 84 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 the publisher also and unless it is established that the accused was solely responsible for making libel and also for its publication, the complaint against him is not maintainable perse.
38. Further in the judgment referred supra in (1990)3 SCC 396 (M J Zakharia Sait V T M Mohammed) it has been specifically laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court that in the matters of making allegations of in- nuendo necessary pleadings are required to be made by pointing out the special or extrinsic facts in the knowledge of the person making such a statement. Once again at the cost of repetition the evidence is re- quired to be looked into wherein the complainant has specifically deposed that he was not called by any other name apart from Mohan Kumar. It is also rele- vant to note that evidence of PW.5 who is none other than the uncle of PW.1 complainant would indicate that he was not called by any other alias names. It is his specific contention that since in the television it 85 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 was being stated that a person who is residing in R.T.Nagar by name Mohan Kumar, he had presumed that it was his nephew as the one who was being pointed out. However, he has deposed that his nephew was not being addressed as R.T.Nagar Mohan at any point of time. This particular evidence coupled with the evidence which is placed before the court would clearly indicate that the allegations which were leveled were not pertaining to the complainant herein and as such the innuendo has not been established.
39. I have also bestowed my anxious reading to the witnesses who were examined before the court as PW.2 to PW.5. The witnesses who were examined has categorically deposed in a manner which is totally contrary to each other's statements. All these aspects do not help the case of the prosecution.
40. The other aspect which is required to be considered is whether the admission given by the ac- cused during the course of recording his statement 86 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., will be fatal to this case. It is a settled principle of law that the admissions given by the accused during the course of evidence cannot be brushed aside as a stray admission. The Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the counsel for complainant has vehemently argued that during the course of recording of the statement under Sec.313 of Cr.P.C., and in particularly the Question No.2 was answered in affirmative by the accused himself. For the sake of brevity, the Question No.2 recorded under Sec.313 of Cr.P.C., is extracted which reads as under;
ಪ್ರ.02. ಪ್ರಾ ಸಾ.01 ಮೋಹನ್ ಕುಮಾರ್, ಇವರು ತಮ್ಮ ಸಾಕ್ಷ್ಯದಲ್ಲಿ ಆರೋಪಿಯಾದ ನೀವು ದಿಃ 10.02.2021 ರಂದು ಬಿ
- ಟಿವಿ ಚಾನಲ್ ಗೆ ಹಾಜರಾಗಿ ಸದರಿ ಮೋಹನ್ ಕುಮಾರ್ ಬಿಡಿಎ ಹಗರಣಗಳ ಕಿಂಗ್ ಪಿನ್ , ಅಧಿಕಾರಿಗಳು ಮತ್ತು ಮಾರಾಟದಾರರಿಗೆ ದಲ್ಲಾ ಳಿ, ಬಿಡಿಎ ನಲ್ಲಿ ನಡೆದಿರುವ ಅಕ್ರಮಗಳಿಗೆ ಮತ್ತು ಭ್ರಷ್ಟಾ ಚಾರಗಳಿಗೆ ಆತನೇ ಕಿಂಗ್ ಪಿನ್ ಎಂದು ಹೇಳಿರುತ್ತೀರಿ ಎಂದು ನುಡಿದಿರುತ್ತಾ ರೆ. ಈ ಬಗ್ಗೆ ನೀವು ಏನು ಹೇಳಬಯಸುತ್ತೀರಾ? ಉತ್ತರಃ ಹೌದು ಹೇಳಿರುತ್ತೇನೆ.
87 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025
41. When the aforesaid question and answer is carefully appreciated, it would indicate that the accused had admitted for the said answer. However, when the further answers given to Question No. 3 to 5 is appreciated, it would indicate that the accused was specifically denying of giving any statement against accused person. Even otherwise the question which has been put forth to the accused is also required to be considered. In the said question it was questioned to him that on 10.02.2021 he had appeared before BTV and had given an interview stating that the said Mohan Kumar was the kingpin of BDA corrupt activities and he was also acting as inter-mediatory. The said statement has been admitted by the witness. However, if for a moment Question No.3 is consid- ered, it would also indicate that he had denied the said aspect. When the entire aspect is conjointly read, it would only lead to an inference that the accused was not particularly pointing out to the complainant 88 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 herein. Even otherwise if the answer to the question is accepted, the aspect which is required to be consid- ered is the admission of the accused given under Sec. 313 of Cr.P.C., cannot be a sole ground for conviction. The answers which are given is not under oath. Only the admissions which are made by the accused under oath is to be considered as a substantive piece of evi- dence. Though it is arguable that the recording of statement under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., is not an empty formality but it carries its own value. In my humble opinion, the statement alone cannot be a ground to convict the accused person and it is settled law that the admission or the answers rendered in statement recorded under sec 313 of Cr.P.C though cannot be held as stray admission, but the same can only be considered as link or chain to the case of the prosecution. Last but not the least, I have also con- sidered the contentions which have been urged by the parties. The Learned Senior Counsel Smt. Lakshmi 89 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 Iyengar appearing on behalf of the Learned Counsel for accused has relied upon the following judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court;
(a) Criminal Appeal No. 2033/2025 (Shahed Kamal and others Vs. M/s A.Surti Devel- opers Pvt. Ltd., and another
(b)1981 SCC Online Del 270 (S.Nihal Singh and others Vs. Arjan Das, New Delhi)
(c) (AIR 2017 Supreme Court 5608) Mo- hammed Abdulla Khan Vs. Prakash
(d)(AIR 2002 Supreme Court 2989) K.M.- Mathew Vs. K.A.Abraham
(e) (2025 INSC 241) Jaideep Bose Vs. M/s Bid and Hammer Auctioneers Pvt. Ltd.
42. By looking into the aforesaid aspects, the main fact which is required to be considered is the complainant had utterly failed to prove their case be- yond reasonable doubt. It is also pertinent to note that a presumption of innocence until proved guilty will be always upon the accused person. The Hon'ble Apex Court in catena of decisions has laid down the dictum 90 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 that the appellate courts should be slow in interfering with an order of an acquittal passed by the appellate courts.
43. In this regard, I have relied upon the judg- ment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415 (Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka ) wherein it has been held as:
27. In Atley v. State of U.P. [AIR 1955 SC 807 : 1955 Cri LJ 1653] this Court said : (AIR pp. 809-10, para 5) "In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate court in an appeal under Section 417, Criminal Procedure Code came to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order.
It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, of course, keeping in view the well-established rule that the presumption of innocence of the accused is not weakened but strengthened by the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court which had the advantage of observing 91 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 the demeanour of witnesses whose evidence have been recorded in its presence.
It is also well settled that the court of appeal has as wide powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order of conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption of innocence with which the accused person starts in the trial court continues even up to the appellate stage and that the appellate court should attach due weight to the opinion of the trial court which recorded the order of acquittal.
If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated."
(emphasis supplied)
29. Venkatarama Ayyar, J. (minority), in his dissenting judgment stated : (AIR pp. 227-28, para 34) "Do the words 'compelling reasons' in the above passage import a limitation on the powers of a court hearing an appeal under Section 417 not applicable to a court hearing appeals against conviction? If they do, then it is merely the old doctrine that appeals against acquittal are in a less favoured position, dressed in a new garb, and 92 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 the reasons for rejecting it as unsound are as powerful as those which found favour with the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup v. R. Emperor [(1933-34) 61 IA 398 : AIR 1934 PC 227 (2)] and Nur Mohd. v. Emperor [AIR 1945 PC 151 : 47 Cri LJ 1] .
But it is probable that these words were intended to express, as were the similar words of Lord Russell in Sheo Swarup [(1933-34) 61 IA 398 : AIR 1934 PC 227 (2)] that the court hearing an appeal under Section 417 should observe the rules which all appellate courts should, before coming to a conclusion different from that of the trial court. If so understood, the expression 'compelling reasons' would be open to no comment. Neither would it be of any special significance in its application to appeals against acquittals any more than appeals against conviction."
(emphasis supplied)
30. In Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan [AIR 1961 SC 715 : (1961) 3 SCR 120 : (1961) 1 Cri LJ 766] a three- Judge Bench considered almost all leading decisions on the point and observed that there was no difficulty in applying the principles laid down by the Privy Council and accepted by the Supreme Court. The Court, however, noted that appellate courts found 93 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 considerable difficulty in understanding the scope of the words "substantial and compelling reasons"
used in certain decisions. Subba Rao, J. (as His Lordship then was) stated : (AIR p. 719, para 8) "This Court obviously did not and could not add a condition to Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The words were intended to convey the idea that an appellate court not only shall bear in mind the principles laid down by the Privy Council but also must give its clear reasons for coming to the conclusion that the order of acquittal was wrong."
34. Putting emphasis on balance between importance of individual liberty and evil of acquitting guilty persons, Krishna Iyer, J. said : (SCC p. 799, para 6) "6. Even at this stage we may remind ourselves of a necessary social perspective in criminal cases which suffers from insufficient forensic appreciation. The dangers of exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt at the expense of social defence and to the soothing sentiment that all acquittals are always good regardless of justice to the victim and the community, demand especial emphasis in the contemporary context 94 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 of escalating crime and escape. The judicial instrument has a public accountability. The cherished principles or golden thread of proof beyond reasonable doubt which runs thro' the web of our law should not be stretched morbidly to embrace every hunch, hesitancy and degree of doubt. The excessive solicitude reflected in the attitude that a thousand guilty men may go but one innocent martyr shall not suffer is a false dilemma. Only reasonable doubts belong to the accused. Otherwise any practical system of justice will then breakdown and lose credibility with the community. The evil of acquitting a guilty person light-heartedly, as a learned author (Glanville Williams in Proof of Guilt) has sapiently observed, goes much beyond the simple fact that just one guilty person has gone unpunished. If unmerited acquittals become general, they tend to lead to a cynical disregard of the law, and this in turn leads to a public demand for harsher legal presumptions against indicted 'persons' and more severe punishment of those who are found guilty. Thus, too frequent acquittals of the guilty may lead to a ferocious penal law, eventually eroding the judicial protection of the guiltless. For all these reasons it is true to say, 95 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 with Viscount Simon, that 'a miscarriage of justice may arise from the acquittal of the guilty no less than from the conviction of the innocent....' In short, our jurisprudential enthusiasm for presumed innocence must be moderated by the pragmatic need to make criminal justice potent and realistic. A balance has to be struck between chasing chance possibilities as good enough to set the delinquent free and chopping the logic of preponderant probability to punish marginal innocents."
(emphasis supplied)
42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:
(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", 96 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025 "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.97 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025
44. In the aforesaid judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court has specifically held that when an order of ac- quittal is passed, the appellate courts cannot interfere in a mechanical manner and only when there is glaring lapses in the procedural aspects and also in appreciating the evidence, the court can interfere. I have bestowed my anxious reading to the entire judg- ment which is rendered by the trial Court. On consid- ering the same and also by independently assessing the entire file, I do not find any illegality in apprecia- tion of the evidence. Though this Court had looked into the materials independently and assigned rea- sons therein, the impugned judgment and order of ac- quittal does not suffer from any illegality and hence the points for consideration are answered in the Negative.
41. Point No.5: In view of my findings on Point No.1 to 4, I proceed to pass the following: 98 Crl.Apl. No.1060/2025
ORDER The Criminal Appeal filed by the appellant/accused under Sec.372 of Cr.P.C., is hereby dismissed.
Consequently, the judgment passed by the XLII Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bengaluru in CC No.37125/2021 dated 26.06.2025 is hereby confirmed.
It is hereby directed to send back the records forthwith with a copy of the judgment passed in this appeal.
(Dictated to the Stenographer Grade-I in the open court, the same was transcribed and typed by her, revised and corrected by me and then pronounced in the Open Court on this the 28th day of October, 2025) (Santhosh Gajanan Bhat) LXXXI Addl. City Civil & Sessions Judge, Bengaluru City (CCH-82) (Special Court exclusively to deal with criminal cases related to former and elected MPs/MLAs in the State of Karnataka) Digitally signed by SANTHOSHGAJANANABHAT SANTHOSHGAJANANABHAT Date: 2025.10.30 15:40:05 +0530