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[Cites 7, Cited by 1]

Allahabad High Court

Pramod Kumar Singh vs State Of U.P. And Others on 25 January, 2010

Author: Sudhir Agarwal

Bench: Sudhir Agarwal

                                                                               Reserved

                Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.45643 of 2006

           Pramod Kumar Singh Versus State of U.P. & others

Hon'ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.

1. The   petitioner,   Pramod   Kumar   Singh,   aggrieved   by   the   order  dated 29.04.2006/09.05.2006 (Annexure No.16 to the writ petition)  passed   by   the   District   Inspector   of   Schools,   Azamgarh   (hereinafter  referred   to   as   the   'D.I.O.S.')   has   invoked   jurisdiction   of   this   Court  under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by filing the present  writ petition and has sought a writ of Certiorari for quashing of the  aforesaid impugned order and also a writ of Mandamus directing the  respondents to  pay  salary  to the petitioner  on regular  basis  till his  continuation   as   ad­hoc   Lecturer   (English)   against   the   short   term  vacancy and also to pay arrears of salary w.e.f. 01.10.1994. 

2. The   facts   in   brief   as   borne   out   from   the   writ   petition   are   as  follows:­ 

3. Panchayat Inter College, Gaura Meh Nagar, District Azamgarh  (hereinafter referred to as the Intermediate College) is recognized by  the Board of High School and Intermediate under the provisions of  U.P.   Intermediate   Education   Act,   1921   (hereinafter   referred   to   as  "1921 Act"). For the purpose of payment of salary, the staff of the  college   is   governed   by   the   provisions   of  U.P.   High   School   and  Intermediate   Colleges   (Payment   of   Salaries   of   Teachers   and   other  Employees) Act, 1971  (hereinafter referred as "1971 Act").  It is also  not   disputed   by   the   parties   that   for   recruitment   of   teachers   in   the  college,   provisions   of   U.P.   Secondary   Education   Services   Selection  Board Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as 1982 Act) are applicable. 

4. On 30.06.1991, one Bali Ram Singh, working as Principal of the  college retired on attaining the age of superannuation. Thereafter one  Narvadeshwar   Singh,   Lecturer   (English)   was   made   to   officiate   as  Principal on 01.07.1991 till regular selection/appointment on the post  of Principal is made by the Secondary Education Services Selection  Board (hereinafter referred to as the Selection Board). It is said that  in   the   resultant   short  term  vacancy   of  Lecturer   (English)  one   Ram  Ashish   Pathak   was   appointed   on   ad­hoc   basis,   who   was   granted  approval by D.I.O.S. by letter dated 17.04.1993. Sri Pathak for one or  the   other   reason   did   not   continue   with   his   job   and   the   vacancy  occurred   again,   which   was   advertised   by   the   Committee   of  Management   in   the   daily   newspaper   'Ranturya'   on   26.09.1993  inviting applications for making ad­hoc appointment on the post of  Lecturer   (English).   Copy   of   the   said   advertisement   is   annexed   as  Annexure No.3 to the writ petition. It is said that the petitioner was  issued   a   letter   of   appointment   on   06.10.1994,   appointing   him   as  Lecturer (English) and intimation of such appointment was given to  D.I.O.S. vide Manager's letter dated 07.10.1994, copy whereof is filed  as Annexure No.4 to the writ petition. The grievance of the petitioner  was that neither the appointment was approved by D.I.O.S. nor any  order   was   passed   for   making   payment   of   salary.   In   these  circumstances   after   making   certain   representations,   the   petitioner  filed   Writ   Petition   No.30741   of   1996,   which   was   dismissed   by   an  Hon'ble Single Judge on 08.10.1996. Being aggrieved, the petitioner  preferred   Special   Appeal   No.17   of   1997,   which   was   decided   on  07.08.2001 with the following directions:­  "The   Special   Appeal   is   accordingly   disposed   of  following  the   said   view   taken   by   the   Division   Bench   in  Special Appeal No.471 of 1995, it will be in the interest of  justice   to   direct  that   in   the   event   the   appellant  makes   a   representation to the District Inspector of Schools, Azamgarh  for   payment  of   salary   within   two   weeks   from   today,   the  District Inspector of Schools, Azamgarh shall inquire into the   matter and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law  within   two   months   from   date   of   receipt   of   said  representation. The District Inspector of Schools, Azamgarh   while   disposing  of   the   representation  shall   not   take   into  consideration  any  observation  made  by  the  learned  Single  Judge   in   his   order   dated   8.10.1996   in   writ   petition   No.30741/1992. The Special Appeal is allowed to the extent  indicated  above  and stands   disposed  of with  the aforesaid  observations".

5. Thereafter, the petitioner made a representation to D.I.O.S. on  08.03.2002 and it is this representation, which has been decided by  D.I.O.S.   by   the   impugned   order   rejecting   his   claim   for   payment   of  salary by holding that his appointment was illegal. 

6. It is contended by Sri Rakesh Pandey, learned counsel for the  petitioner   that   the   appointment   was   in   accordance   with   the   U.P.  Secondary  Education  Services  Commission  (Removal  of Difficulties)  (Second Order), 1981 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Second Order')  and   therefore,   the   D.I.O.S.   has   erred   in   law   in   declining   to   make  payment of salary to the petitioner by holding his appointment illegal.  It   is   further   submitted   that   as   a   matter   of   fact,   the   petitioner   is  discharging his duties as Lecturer (English) in the College since 1994  and therefore, it is illegal and arbitrary on the part of D.I.O.S., (the  respondent no.2) to deny financial approval to the appointment of the  petitioner for payment of salary from the State Exchequer under the  provisions of 1971 Act. 

7. On behalf of Respondents No.2 & 3, a counter affidavit has been  filed   sworn   by   one   Sri   Mahendra   Kumar   Mishra,   Account   Officer,  posted   in   the   office   of   D.I.O.S.   It   is   said   in   brief   that   the   entire  documents   sought   to   be   relied   by   the   petitioner   for   justifying   his  appointment are unreliable, since neither they mention any date or  dispatch number nor in fact, such papers were ever received in the  office of the respondent. It is further stated that the appointment of  the petitioner has not been made in accordance with law since there  was no vacancy of Lecturer (English) in the College and, therefore,  the petitioner has rightly been held not entitled for salary from the  State Exchequer. 

8. I   have   heard   Sri   Rakesh   Pandey,   learned   counsel   for   the  petitioner, learned Standing Counsel for the Respondents No. 1, 2 & 3  and perused the record. 

9. The   question   as   to   whether   the   documents   were   sent   by   the  Management of the College to the Respondent No.2 and whether they  were received in his office or not, apparently are disputed questions of  fact. However, before coming to this aspect of the matter and to see  whether it is at all necessary to look into the question, in my view, it  would   be   appropriate   to   consider   first   whether   the   petitioner   was  validly appointed, as claimed, on the post of Lecturer (English) on ad­ hoc  basis  against   the   alleged   short   term  vacancy,   assuming   for   the  moment that there exists a short term vacancy on the post of Lecturer  (English) in the College, though it has been seriously disputed by the  Respondents No.1, 2 & 3.

10. The   other   questions   would   obviously   depend   if   the   question  regarding the validity of the appointment is answered in favour of the  petitioner since this is the basic question to be considered in all such  matters where incumbent has approached this Court seeking a writ of  mandamus   commanding   the   respondent   for   the   payment   of   salary.  The   right  to  obtain   such   a   Mandamus   precedes  with   the  condition  that the incumbent has been validly appointed on the post and has a  right to claim salary from the respondent. 

11. It is not disputed that the Principal of the College having retired  on 01.07.1991, one Narvadeshwar Singh, who was Lecturer (English)  was promoted on officiating basis as Principal of the College in the  year 1991 itself. The Committee of Management treating as if a short  term vacancy has arisen on the post of Lecturer (English) proceeded  to make ad­hoc appointment  on the said post. Relevant documents in  this regard have not been placed on record to show as to how and in  what manner Ram Ashish Pathak was appointed  as Lecturer (English)  on   ad­hoc   basis   but   it   appears   that   his   ad­hoc   appointment   was  approved   by   D.I.O.S.   vide   letter   No.263­65/1993­94   dated  17.04.1993. Sri Ram Ashish Pathak, however, it appears, could not  join the institution for the reasons not on record but it is his complaint  dated 29.07.1993 that the management was not  permitting  him  to  join which was forwarded on 05.08.1993 by the District Magistrate,  Azamgarh to the management seeking report. The D.I.O.S. sent letter  dated   30.07.1993   (Annexure   No.2   to   the   writ   petition)   seeking  comments from the Manager of the College in this regard. It further  appears that thereafter, one Writ Petition was filed by one Dayanand  Singh challenging the appointment of Ram Ashish Pathak and therein  an interim order was passed on 16.09.1993 by this Court. 

12. I have mentioned these facts only to stress upon the facts that  the   petitioner's   claim   for   appointment   on   the   post   of   Lecturer  (English) on ad­hoc basis could not have been in consideration before  any   of  the   authorities   at   least   till   30.07.1993   and   in   any   case,   till  16.09.1993   when   this   Court   passed   an   interim   order   in   the   writ  petition filed by Dayanand Singh as has been mentioned in paragraph  no.6 of the counter affidavit filed by the respondents no.2 & 3. 

13. The petitioner's claim is that vacancy of Lecturer (English) was  advertised afresh vide advertisement, a copy whereof has been filed as  Annexure No.3 to the writ petition. The advertisement was published  in   Daily   Newspaper   'Ranturya',   Azamgarh   on   26.09.1993.   He   has  reiterated   the   same   in   written   submissions   also,   which   has   been  submitted   through   his   counsel   Sri   Rakesh   Pandey.   However,   I   find  several   reasons   for   discarding   to   rely   upon   the   advertisement  purported to be made for ad­hoc appointment on the post of Lecturer  (English).   Firstly,   language   of   the   said  advertisement   shows   that   it  was not an advertisement for the post of Lecturer (English). It does  not   mention   the   designation   at   all.   The   educational   qualification  mentioned   therein   being   only   B.A.   (English)   along   with   Sociology,  meaning thereby, it could not have been educational qualification for  Lecturer   (English)   for   which,   the   essential   qualification   included   a  Master's   Degree   besides   experience.   Further,   the   date   of   interview  mentioned in Annexure No.3 is 06.10.1994 and the applications were  invited   within   a   week.   It   is   difficult   to   comprehend   that   an  advertisement   said   to  be  published   on   26.09.1993   may   fix   date   of  interview after more than one year of its publication i.e. 06.10.1994.  Apart   from   these   technicalities   even   if,   I   treat   that   the   date   of  advertisement   mentioned   in   paragraph  no.9   of  the   writ   petition   as  26.09.1994  instead  of 26.09.1993,  even  then  there  are some  other  aspects,   which   persuade   to   this   Court   not   to   rely   on   the   above  document for the purpose the same has been relied by the petitioner.  Annexure No.4 is a letter dated 07.10.1994, which is stated to have  been sent by the Manager of the College to D.I.O.S. communicating  about   the   appointment   of   the   petitioner   as   Lecturer   (English).   A  perusal of the documents appended with the above letter shows on  page 33 of the writ petition experience about which it is mentioned  that the petitioner is imparting education to Intermediate classes in  English subject in the college itself since August, 1993. On one hand,  it   is   the   own   case   of   the   petitioner   that   Ram   Ashish   Pathak   was  appointed as Lecturer (English) on ad­hoc basis against the short term  vacancy in the year 1993 and he left the institution after some time.  Further, that the D.I.O.S. upto 30.07.1993 has found that Ram Ashish  Pathak   was   not   allowed   by   the   college   to   discharge   his   duties   as  Lecturer (English) and his appointment was stayed by this Court on  16.09.1993 as  stated by  the  respondents no.1,  2  &  3 in paragraph  no.6 of the counter affidavit, I find it difficult and failed to understand  as to how and in what circumstances the petitioner could have given  an opportunity to take Intermediate classes in the subject of English in  August 1993, when Ram Ashish Pathak was already there. Further the  advertisement   clearly   mentions   two   year's   experience   of   imparting  education  to High  School  and  Intermediate  classes.  Page  33  of the  writ petition shows that the petitioner passed B.A. in 1990 and M.A.  in   1992   and   the   only   experience   he   claimed   for   himself   was   of  imparting education to Intermediate classes in the subject of English  since   August,   1993   which   admittedly   did   not   fulfill   the   experience  qualification as prescribed in the advertisement. 

14. Therefore,   the   story   set   up   by   the   petitioner   that   after   the  vacancy   was   advertised   he   was   duly   selected   and   possess  requisite  qualification   does   not   inspire   any   confidence.   In   the   light   of   the  discussion made above, I find no hesitation in discarding the same.

15. Now,   it   would   also   be   relevant   to   consider   whether   the  procedure for ad­hoc appointment against the short term vacancy was  at all followed or not. The process for recruitment as claimed by the  petitioner   in   his   case   commenced   admittedly   after   06.08.1993.   In  Radha   Raizada   Vs.   Committee   of   Management,  1994(3)  U.P.L.B.E.C., 1551, in order to find out the procedure applicable for  ad­hoc   appointment   of   a   teacher   in   a   Secondary   Institution   under  1982 Act, this spilited the period in three stages.

1.From 31.07.1981 to 13.07.1992 2.14.07.1992 to 06.08.1993 3.07.08.1993 to onwards

16. With reference to the third stage which is admittedly applicable  in   the   present   case   also,   it   was   held   by   the   full   Bench   in  Radha  Raizada (Supra) that in view of Section 16 as substituted by U.P. Act  No.1, 1993, no ad­hoc appointment under Section 18 can be made  and,   therefore,   the   only   power   and   procedure   for   making   ad­hoc  appointment available is prescribed under the Removal of Difficulties  Order and not otherwise. The Apex Court considered the question as  to   whether   the   procedure  laid  down  in   the   Removal   of  Difficulties  Order is mandatory or not. In  Prabhat Kumar Sharma & others Vs.  State of U.P. & others, A.I.R. 1996 SC 2638 the Apex Court held that  the   procedure   for   ad­hoc   appointment   under   the   Removal   of  Difficulties   Order   is   mandatory   and   if   the   said   procedure   is   not  observed strictly, the appointment, if any, shall be void ab initio and  would not confer any right upon the incumbent either to hold the post  or to claim salary. This decision was reiterated and followed by the  Apex Court in Shesh Mani Shukla Vs. D.I.O.S., Deoria & others, J.T.  2009(10) S.C. 309.

17. Just   to   have   a   glance   over   the   procedure   prescribed   in   the  Second Order, it would be appropriate to reproduce Clause 2 thereof. 

2. Procedure for filing up short term vacancies.­(1) If  short term vacancy in the post of a teacher, caused by grant  of   leave   to   him   or   on   account   of   his   suspension   duly   approved by the District Inspector of Schools or otherwise,  shall   be   filled   by   the   management  of   the   institution,  by  promotion   of   the   permanent  senior   most   teacher   of   the   institution, in the next lower grade. The management shall  immediate inform the District Inspector of Schools of such  promotion   along   with   the   particulars   of   the   teacher   so   promoted. 

(2)Where any vacancy referred to in clause (1) cannot  be filled by promotion, due to non­availability of a teacher  in  the  next  lower  grade  in  the  institution,  possessing  the   prescribed minimum qualification, it shall be filled by direct  recruitment in the manner laid down in clause (3).

(3)(i) The management shall intimate the vacancies  to   the   District   Inspector   of   Schools   and   shall   also  immediately  notify   the   same   on   the   notice  board   of   the   institution, requiring the candidates to apply to the Manager  of   the   institution   along   with   the   particulars   given   in  Appendix "B" to this Order. The selection shall be made on   the basis of quality point marks specified in the Appendix to  the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Commission  (Removal   of   Difficulties)   Order,   1981,   issued   with  Notification No.Ma­1993/XV­7(79)­1981, dated July 1981   hereinafter   to   be   referred   to   as   the   First   Removal   of  Difficulties  Order,   1981.  The   compilation  of  quality  point  marks shall be done under the personal supervision of the  Head of institution.

(ii)   The  names  and  particulars  of  the  candidates  selected  and also of other candidates and the quality point marks  allotted to them shall be forwarded by the Manager to the  District Inspector of Schools for his prior approval.

(iii) The District Inspector of Schools shall communicate his  decision   within   seven   days   of   the   date   of   receipt   of  particulars by him failing which the Inspector will be deemed  to have given his approval.

(iv) On receipt of the approval of the District Inspector of  Schools   or,   as   the   case   may   be,   on   his   failure,   to  communicate his decision within seven days of the receipt of  papers   by   him   from  the  Manager,   the   Management  shall  appoint the selected candidates and an oder of appointment  shall be issued under the signature of the Manager.

Explanation­ For the purpose of this paragraph­

(i) the expression "senior­most teacher" means the teacher  having longest continuous service in the institution in the   Lecturer's  grade  or   the   Trained  graduate  (L.T.)   grade   or   Trained  under­   graduate  (C.T.)   grade   or   J.T.C.   or   B.T.C.  Grade as the case may be;

(ii)   in   relation   to   institution   imparting   instructions   to  women,  the  expression  'District  Inspector  of  Schools'  shall  mean the Regional Inspectress of Girls' Schools;

(ii) short­term vacancy which is not substantive and is of a   limited duration.

18. There is nothing on record to show that before appointing the  petitioner, the procedure laid down is sub paras 1, 2 & 3 of para 2 of  Second Order was observed. In any case from the record at least this  much is clear that sub paras (2, 3 & 4) have not at all been followed,  inasmuch   as   before   seeking   prior   approval   of   the   D.I.O.S.,   the  appointment   of   the   petitioner,   as   he   claimed,   was   made   by   the  management. The petitioner has said that the interview took place on  06.08.1994 and the petitioner was issued a letter of appointment on  the   same   day.   Intimation   to   D.I.O.S.   seeking   his   approval   sent   on  07.10.1994. The question, therefore, that his appointment should be  deemed to be approved by D.I.O.S., as referred to in sub para 2(3) of  Second   Order   does   not   arise   since   no   letter   seeking   approval   sent  before appointment. The effect of non compliance of the provisions  pertaining to "prior approval" in para 2(2) and 3 of Second Order has  been considered in detail by this Court by a Division Bench (in which  I was also a Member) in Surendra Kumar Srivastava Versus State of  U.P., 2007(1) ESC 118 and the Court has held as under:­  "Where     a   statute   uses   the   term   "prior   approval" 

anything  done  without   prior   approval  is   nullity.   Where   a   statute employs expression "approval", however, in such cases  subsequent ratification can make the act valid."

19. The counsel for the petitioner could not place anything which  may persuade this Court to take a different view. Even otherwise, the  judgment   of   Division   Bench   is   binding   on   this   Court.   The   above  discussion, therefore, makes it clear that the very appointment of the  petitioner   which   he   has   made   the   basis   for   seeking   direction   for  payment   of   salary   is   illegal,   void   ab   initio.   I   do   not   find   any  justification to direct the respondent to pay salary to the petitioner  who has no right to hold the post and claim salary. 

20. In   view   of   above,   the   other   questions   as   to   whether   the  documents were actually received in the office of the D.I.O.S. or not  becomes academic and need not be answered. 

21. Lastly,   Sri   Pandey,   learned   counsel   for   the   petitioner   submits  that the petitioner is working for the last 14 years and, therefore, is  entitled for salary. Once it is clear that the appointment of a person is  not in accordance with law, the liability for payment of salary under  1971 Act cannot be fasten upon the State Exchequer to attract the  provisions   of   1971   Act.   Where   the   appointment   is   not   made   in  accordance   with   law,   the   provisions   pertaining   to   the   liability   of  payment of salary from the State Exchequer cannot enforced. At the  best,   it   can   be   said   that   the   petitioner,   if   has   worked   under   the  contract   with   the   Committee   of   Management   of   the   College,   may  claim salary  from the  management  since  he  has  worked  under  the  orders of the management, by taking such recourse as is available in  law   but   for   such   kind   of   appointment   which   does   not   follow  procedure prescribed in law, the provisions pertaining to the payment  of salary governed by the statute cannot be made to apply.

22. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed.

23. There shall be no order as to costs.

Date:25.1.2010 pks