Madras High Court
A.K.Sigabathullah vs Minor Marica Durai Alias Syed ... on 21 December, 2012
Author: S.Vimala
Bench: S.Vimala
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED : 21.12.2012 CORAM THE HONOURABLE Mrs. JUSTICE. S.VIMALA Second Appeal No.2145 of 2001 A.K.Sigabathullah .. Appellant / defendant Vs. Minor Marica Durai Alias Syed Kuthbudeen, Rep. By his mother and next friend, Hameed Aysha Nachiar, W/o.Sathuillah Alias Haji Vappa .. Respondent / plaintiff Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code against the judgment and decree, dated 01.11.2001 in A.S.No.90 of 2001 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Nagapattinam, in confirming the judgment and decree, dated 12.04.2001 in O.S.No.49 of 1998 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Nagapattinam. For Appellant : Ms. R.T.Shyamala & Ms. S.Thilagavathy For Respondent : Mr. G.R.Swaminathan & Ms. M.Nagalakshmi - - - J U D G M E N T
The defendant, who suffered double defeat before the Courts below, has filed this second appeal. The respondent herein, the brother's son of the defendant, as plaintiff, filed the suit for declaration of title and for recovery of possession. The said suit was decreed. The defendant filed the first appeal in A.S.No.90 of 2001. The first appeal was dismissed, thereby the judgment and decree of the trial court got confirmed. Challenging the same, the second appeal has been filed raising the following substantial questions of law:-
"1. Without proving the alleged oral gift, whether the unregistered declaration deed will confer any title upon the plaintiff through Ex.A-1?
2. Whether the oral gift can be relied upon in pursuance of the Declaration Deed, dated 03.03.1994, when the witnesses of the alleged oral gift was not examined?
3. When late Kider Fathima Thayar, the vendor of the plaintiff deposed in the previous suit that possession was not given in pursuance of the alleged oral gift, whether the plaintiff can claim title in pursuance of the same?"
2. The brief facts:-
The suit property is a house bearing Door No.29, Yahussain Thaikkal Street, Nagore Town, in Town Survey No.1967 to an extent of northern 2000= sq.ft., The plaintiff is the owner of this property. Smt. Kider Fathima Thayar sold the property to the plaintiff for a valuable consideration of Rs.1,00,000/- on 08.11.1996. Originally, the very same property was settled by Smt.Kider Fathima Thayar in favour of the defendant on 28.08.1986. The defendant filed the suit in O.S.No.29 of 1997 before District Munsif Court, Nagapttinam, seeking the relief of permanent injunction. The suit was filed against plaintiff's guardian and three others. The said suit was dismissed and as against the same, an appeal was filed in A.S.No.298 of 1997. Plaintiff issued a notice dated 26.10.1997, asking the defendant to vacate the property. In the reply notice, the defendant raised a dispute regarding title to the suit property. Therefore, the plaintiff was compelled to file the suit for declaration of title.
3. The case of the plaintiff was resisted by the defendant on the following contentions:-
(i) Neither the plaintiff's vendor, consequently nor the plaintiff had any title to the suit property.
(ii) The sale deed is not true and valid.
(iii) In pursuance of the settlement deed, dated 28.08.1986, the defendant was in possession and enjoyment of the suit property.
(iv) Taking advantage of the old age and the inability of the defendant's mother, the sale deed has been obtained sham and nominally.
(v) The declaration deed, dated 03.03.1994, is a fabricated document brought into existence for the purpose of the suit. In any event, this document will not prove gift of suit property by the defendant to his mother.
(vi) The evidence given by Smt.Kider Fathima Thayar in O.S.No.29 of 1997 will prove that the settlement executed by her has not been cancelled and that the declaration deed, dated 03.03.1991, was not executed by the defendant.
(vii) The settlement deed executed by the defendant's mother can be cancelled only by another registered document.
4. Based on the pleadings, the trial court framed the following issues:-
(i) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to declaration?
(ii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recovery of possession?
(iii) To what other relief, the plaintiff is entitled to?
5. The trial court decreed the suit on the following findings:-
(i) Even though the defendant has contended that the declaration deed is a fabricated document, there is no specific denial as to the signature under Ex.A-2-acknowledgement deed. Even though the defendant has stated in his evidence that he did not execute Ex.A-2-acknowledgement deed and that he used to put his signature only in English and more specifically that the signature as found in Ex.A-2 is not that of him, still, because of the answer given to the suggested question by the other side, the defendant is deemed to have impliedly accepted the acknowledgement deed. The question was, whether the defendant signed after fully understanding the nature and content of Ex.A-2.
(ii) The suit for injunction filed by the defendant herein has been dismissed by three courts. The final judgment by this Court in S.A.No.728 of 1999 has been filed as Ex.A-5. The defendant did not mention anything in the previous suit about the declaration deed, dated 03.03.1994.
(iii) Relying upon Ex.A-5 and having regard to the findings by this Court that Ex.A-2 does not require registration and that it would amount to acknowledgement of the oral gift by the defendant in favour of his mother, the Court has concluded that the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff is valid.
6. Challenging these findings, the first appeal was filed. The appellate court framed the points for determination, out of which the relevant and most important one is, whether the appellant is entitled to canvass Ex.A-2, declaration deed, when the issue regarding the same has been finally decided under the previous proceedings under Ex.A-5.
7. Relying upon the judgment of this Court in the Second Appeal, i.e., Ex.A-5, the first appellate court concluded that the validity of Ex.A-2 cannot be canvassed as Ex.A-5 is the final decision on that issue. The first appellate court also has given the reason that the plaintiff wanted to examine the witnesses concerned in Ex.A-2 and as the important witness i.e., the Advocate, left India, he was not able to examine and therefore, the non-examination of Advocate-Aboothalha was not fatal. Ex.A-2 in the present case has been marked as Ex.B-6 in the previous suit. Now these findings are under challenge.
8. The plaintiff claims title to the suit property by virtue of Ex.A-1 sale deed, dated 08.11.1996. This sale deed has been executed by Smt.Kider Fathima Nachiyar. In respect of the very same property, she has executed a settlement deed, dated 28.08.1986, under Ex.B-2. When the defendant's mother has executed a settlement deed in his favour during 1986, the question is how the sale deed came to be executed in favour of the plaintiff during 1996 in respect of the same property. The answer of the plaintiff is that the defendant's mother, i.e., the plaintiff's grandmother, got the property back from the defendant, by virtue of the oral gift, which is acknowledged / declared under Ex.A-2, declaration deed. This declaration deed has been mentioned in the sale deed, dated 08.11.1996. But the execution and the validity of the declaration deed is challenged by the defendant as invalid. But the contention of the plaintiff is that the execution and validity of Ex.A-2, declaration deed, has been finally decided in O.S.No.29 of 1997 (A.S.No.298 of 1997 and S.A.No.728 of 1999) and therefore, it is not open to the defendant to challenge the validity of Ex.A-2 declaration deed. According to the plaintiff, the validity of Ex.A-2 declaration deed has been upheld right from the District Munsif Court and up to the High Court and therefore, the issue regarding that would be barred by res judicata.
8.1. Based on the above factual scenario, it is the contention of the plaintiff/respondent that the issue regarding validity of Ex.A-2-acknowledgement deed - declaration deed would be clearly barred by res judicata. Learned counsel for the defendant/appellant submitted that the plea raised by the appellant would not be barred by res judicata as, (a) the prior suit was not between the same parties and (b) the issue regarding title was not directly and substantially in issue in the prior suit.
8.2. Learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondent replied, contending that the issue regarding validity of Ex.A-2 would be clearly barred by res judicata, as the prior suit was between the parties litigating under the same title and that the issue regarding title was directly and substantially in issue in the prior suit also and in support of the said contention, the following decisions are relied upon:-
(i) 2007 (5) CTC 233 (Saroja v. Chinnusamy (Died) (SC). In this decision, it has been held as follows:-
"4. ... (i) There must be two suits - one former suit and the other subsequent suit;
(ii) The Court which decided the former suit must be competent to try the subsequent suit;
(iii) The matter directly and substantially in issue must be the same either actually or constructively in both the suits.
(iv) The matter directly and substantially in issue in the subsequent suit must have been heard and finally decided by the Court in the former suit;
(v) The parties to the suits or the parties under whom they or any of them claim must be the same in both the suits;
(vi) The parties in both the suits must have litigated under the same title.
(ii) 2005 (4) CTC 20 (Aanaimuthu Thevar v. Alagammal) (SC). In this decision, it has been held as follows:-
"29. The former suit in which decree of permanent injunction was sought was clearly founded on the claim of Muthuswami as the owner of the suit house to execute a mortgage. The issue of title or ownership of the suit house was thus directly or substantially involved in the former suit. "
(iii) (2005) 10 SCC 51 (SWAMY ATMANANDA v. SRI RAMAKRISHNA TAPOVANAM). In this decision, it has been held that the parties to two litigations, if have to be common, all that is necessary is that the issue concerned should be between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim.
(iv) (2005) 11 SCC 251 (AMARENDRA KOMALAM v. USHA SINHA). In this decision it has been held as follows:-
"25. It is well settled that once a issue of fact has been judicially determined finally between the parties by a Court of competent jurisdiction and the same issue comes directly in question in subsequent proceedings between the same parties then the persons cannot be allowed to raise the same question which already stands determined earlier by the competent Court..."
(v) AIR 2005 SC 626 (1) (Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar and another). In this decision, it has been held that res judicata debars a court from exercising its jurisdiction to determine the lis if it has attained finality between the parties whereas the doctrine issue estoppel is invoked against the party. If such an issue is decided against him, he would be estopped from raising the same in the latter proceeding.
(vi) 2010 (2) CTC 636 (R.J.Paul v. S.N.Kulasemaran). In this decision, it has been held that judgment inter-parties operates as estoppel and judgment in personam of a competent court is a conclusive proof in subsequent proceedings between same parties.
(vii) (2009) 1 MLJ 74 (K.Velayudham Pillai v. T.Velayutham Pillai). In this decision, it has been held that if the totality of the averments in the written statement constitute plea of res judicata, it would be sufficient and technicalities shall not be a bar and it has been further held that if the totality of the averments made in the written statement would constitute a plea of res judicata, it is sufficient even if the very word res judicata does not find place in the written statement.
8.2.1. It is contended that the issue regarding res judicata is a relevant factor under Section 40 of the Indian Evidence Act.
8.3. The decisions relied upon highlighting the essential ingredient to be proved in order to substantiate the plea of res judicata will have to be considered in the light of the fact situation available in this case.
8.4. In order to find out whether the issue regarding validity of relinquishment deed would be res judicata or not, it is necessary to consider the parties to the suit, issues raised and the relief claimed in both the cases.
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Head O.S.No.29 of 1997 O.S.No.49 of 1998
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Parties A.K.Sigabathullah-Plaintiff Minor Marica Durai
to the Alias Syed
Suit Kuthbudeen, Rep. By
his mother and next
1.Hameed Aysha Nachiyar friend, Hameed Aysha
2.Haji Vappa @ Sathulla Nachiar,
3.Thambi Vappa @ Habib Hussain W/o.Sathuillah Alias
4. Chelladurai @ H.Meera Haji Vappa -
Mohideen- Plaintiff
A.K.Sigabathullah-
Defendants Defendants
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Issues 1. Whether the plaintiff is (i) Whether the
raised entitled to permanent plaintiff is
injunction? entitled to
2. Whether the suit is affected declaration?
by joinder and non-joinder of (ii) Whether the
necessary parties? plaintiff is
3. To what other reliefs, the entitled to recovery
plaintiff is entitled to? of possession?
(iii) To what other
relief, the
plaintiff is
entitled to?
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Relief Relief of Permanent injunction Relief of
claimed declaration that he
was the owner of the
suit schedule
property and for
recovery of
possession and also
for mense profits.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
8.5. A perusal of Ex.A-5 (judgment in S.A.No.728 of 1999) would go to show that the suit has been filed for the relief of permanent injunction. The suit has been filed against the two brothers of the plaintiff, who are D-2 and D-3, and the first defendant is the wife of the second defendant (brother's wife of the plaintiff). A specific defence has been taken that the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. The issue considered was whether the plaintiff is entitled to injunction. There is a finding that plaintiff has not come to Court with clean hands, thereby meaning that he did not mention anything about the declaration deed in the plaint. Therefore, the equitable relief of injunction was refused.
8.6. This finding is unwarranted, as the appellant herein / the plaintiff in the previous suit cannot reasonably be expected to mention about the declaration deed, when he is denying the very execution of the same.
8.7. So far as Ex.B-6 (in the previous suit) is concerned, there is a finding that it is a record of past event and therefore, it does not require registration. It is relevant to extract paragraph 18 of the judgment - "No reason is stated in the plaint as to why he has not disclosed about Ex.B-6 and subsequent document in favour of first defendant's son. In the plaint, he has only stated that the first defendant's son (who is the plaintiff in the present suit) has got some document created by other defendants. Full disclosure of fact is necessary in this case, which the appellant has suppressed."
8.8. From the above paragraph, it is clear that the title deed standing in the name of the first defendant's son has not been brought on record and therefore, the issue regarding title could not have been finally decided.
8.9. When the argument was advanced that in a suit for injunction the court ought not to have taken the intricate issue of title and should have relegated the parties to a separate proceedings, this Court, in the earlier proceedings, has given a finding that parties have volunteered to lead evidence about title and that they cannot find fault with the Court. Therefore, when the first defendant's son, who is the plaintiff in the present suit, was neither a party nor the title deed standing in the name of him was relied upon as a document, whether the finding on title can be claimed to be res judicata is the issue. The finding with regard to title cannot be said to be valid, proper and complete under the stated circumstances. Therefore, the finding with regard to title cannot amount to res judicata.
8.10. In fact, the pleadings and the issues are the most important aspect to be considered when the issue of res judicata is raised. The pleadings and the issues of the previous proceedings are not filed. The only document filed is the judgment of this Court in the second appeal.
9. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that it is not the validity of the declaration deed that is under the challenge, but the oral gift, as is said to have been spoken to in the declaration deed that remains unproved. Further contention is that when the execution of declaration deed itself is denied by the defendant / appellant, then the plaintiff cannot take shelter under Ex.A-2 declaration deed. Contending that conditions of oral gift are neither available nor proved, the learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the following decisions:-
(i) 2001 (3) CTC 710 (Abdul Rahim, A v. Julaiga Beevi):-
"10. ..... there are three essentials of a gift as per Section 149 of the Mohammedan Law, which run as follows:-
Section 149. The three essentials of a gift:.- It is essential to the validity of a gift that there should be (1) a declaration of gift by the donor, (2) an acceptance of the gift, express or implied, by or on behalf of the donee, and (3) delivery of possession of the subject of the gift by the donor to the donee as mentioned in section 150. If these conditions are complied with, the gift is complete."
(ii) 2011 (4) CTC 675 (Hafeeza Bibi v. Shaikh Farid (Dead) by LRs.) (SC):-
".......... A Muslim gift may be valid even without a registered deed and may be invalid even with a registered deed. Registration being irrelevant to its legal force, a deed setting out Muslim gift cannot be regarded as constitutive of the gift and is not compulsorily registerable.
....
29. In our opinion, merely because the gift is reduced to writing by a Muhammadan instead of it having been made orally, such writing does not become a formal document or instrument of gift. When a gift could be made by Mohammadan orally, its nature and character is not changed because of it having been made by a written document. What is important for a valid gift under Mohammadan Law is that three essential requisites must be fulfilled. The form is immaterial. If all the three essential requisites are satisfied constituting valid gift, the transaction of gift would not be rendered invalid because it has been written on a plain piece of paper...."
10. If the theory of oral gift by Kider Fathima Thayar is to be accepted, (a) whether Kider Fathima Thayar had validly revoked the earlier settlement deed executed by her in favour of the appellant/defendant, and if so, (b) whether the conditions regarding oral gift has been proved by the plaintiff, are the branching issues to be considered.
10.1. At this juncture, it is relevant to point out that a gift may be revoked by the donor at any time before delivery of possession. The reason is that before delivery there is no completed gift at all; subject to the provisions of sub.sec (4), a gift may be revoked even after delivery of possession except in the following cases (a) when the gift is made by a husband to his wife or by wife to her husband; (b) when the donee is related to the donor within the prohibited degrees; (c) when the donee is dead; (d) when the thing given has passed out of the donee's possession by sale, Wali Bandi v. Tabeya (1919) 41 All. 534, 50 I.C. 919; Mulani v. Maula Baksh (1924) 46 All.260, 78 I.C. 222 (24) A.A.307, gift or otherwise; (e) when when the thing given is lost or destroyed; (f) when the thing given has increased in value, whatever be the cause of the increase; (g) when the thing is so changed that it cannot be identified, as when what is converted into flour by grinding, Maqbul v. Ghafur-un-nissa (1914) 36 All. 333, 24 I.C.225, Abdur Rehman v. Khaliur Rehman P.L.D. 1996 (W.P.) Pesh. 121 (right of revocation of gift dies with the death of the donor); (h) when the donor has received something in exchange (iwaz) for the gift (see secs. 168 and 169).
10.2. A gift may be revoked by the donor, but not by his heirs after his death, Mahbood Khan v. Abdul Rahim (64) A.Raj. 250.
10.3. It is the donor's law that will apply to a revocation and not that of the donee, Someshwar v. Barkat Ullah, ('63 A.M.469).
10.4. Once possession is delivered, nothing short of a decree of the Court is sufficient to revoke the gift. Neither a declaration of revocation by the donor nor even the institution of a suit for resuming the gift is sufficient to revoke the gift. Until a decree is passed, the donee is entitled to use and dispose of the subject of the gift, Mahboob Khan v. Abdul Rahim (supra).
10.5. In (Mulla) Principles of Mahomedan Law, Nineteenth Edition, at page 137, under the head 'Gifts', quoting Hedaya 485, Baillie. 533-537, it has been stated: The reason why, a gift to a person, other than a husband or wife or to a person other than one related within the prohibited degrees may be revoked is thus stated in the Hedaya P.486. The object of a gift to a stranger is a return:- For it is a custom to send presents to a person of high rank that he may protect the donor; to a person of inferior rank that the donor may obtain his services; and to person of equal rank that he may obtain an equivalent:- and such being the case it follows that the donor has power of annulment, so long as the object of the deed is not answered, since a gift is capable of annulment.
10.6. How to legally revoke a gift is the next question. Mere cancellation of the gift deed does not cancel the gift. For the cancellation of a gift and a decree of the Court is required, as per the decision reported in Abu Khan v. Moriam Bibi (1974) 40 C.L.T. 1306.
10.7. These conditions regarding revocation of gift deed is not available in this case. There is no proof at all to show that there is valid cancellation of settlement deed executed by Kider Fathima Thayar in favour of the defendant. The acknowledgement/declaration deed cannot be legally construed to be a deed of revocation of settlement deed. The findings in the earlier cases regarding the validity of Ex.A-2 would not amount to res judicata, as the pleadings and issues in the previous case are not filed. The decision reported in 2001-3-L.W.483 (Kuppusamy Gounder & Others v. Kannammal & Others) will amply justifies this conclusion. It has been held in the above case, as follows:-
".... In this suit, the only document filed to prove the earlier decree is the final decree. There are no other documents such as pleadings, judgment and other records to show the important ingredient so as to invoke the plea of res judicata.
10.8. When the pleadings, issues and judgment are the imperative records to decide the question of res judicata and when it is not made available excepting the judgment, the contention with regard to res judicata cannot be accepted. Therefore, the case of the respondent does not merit acceptance.
11. In the result, the second appeal is allowed. The concurrent judgments of both the Courts below are set-aside. No costs.
srk To
1. The Principal District Court, Nagapattinam
2. The Principal Subordinate Court, Nagapattinam